Papers by Christophe Bouton
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2026
In this article, I explore the young Foucault’s engagement with phenomenology in his 1949 master’... more In this article, I explore the young Foucault’s engagement with phenomenology in his 1949 master’s thesis, “The Constitution of a Historical Transcendental in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit” (Foucault, 2024). I begin by outlining the context of this early work (Section 1), followed by a brief summary of the thesis and its overall argumentative structure (Section 2). In Section 3, I analyze Foucault’s critique of Kant, which concerns not only Kant’s ahistorical conception of the transcendental (3.1), but also the lack of critical reflection on the conditions of access to transcendental philosophy (3.2). Finally, I trace the emergence of the theme of the “empirico–transcendental doublet” in the 1949 thesis, and consider to what extent this notion applies to both Kant and Hegel (3.3)
Síntesis, 2025
Résumé: Dans le prolongement de mon dernier ouvrage L’accélération de l’histoire (2022), je me pr... more Résumé: Dans le prolongement de mon dernier ouvrage L’accélération de l’histoire (2022), je me propose de développer l’hypothèse – esquissée par Hartog (Chronos, 2020) et Chakrabarty (The climate of history in a planetary age, 2021) – selon laquelle on peut concevoir la notion controversée d’Anthropocène comme désignant l’émergence d’un nouveau régime d’historicité, le « régime d’historicité planétaire ou anthropocénique » (selon l’expression de Chakrabarty). Je commencerai par présenter les quatre éléments principaux qui, selon moi, constituent un régime d’historicité : un horizon d’attente et un espace d’expérience spécifiques, auxquels s’ajoutent un régime de temporalité et un régime de spatialité (I). J’examinerai ensuite les tentatives de penser le nouveau régime anthropocénique d’historicité avec des catégories tirées de régimes d’historicité plus anciens qui ne tiennent pas compte du caractère sans précédent de l’Anthropocène (II). Le temps de l’Anthropocène est une expérience inédite de l’histoire, caractérisée par la prise de conscience d’une menace planétaire et d’une urgence climatique (III). Il génère un nouveau rapport à l’espace (que j’appelle « eutopie »), dans un sens politique qu’il convient de clarifier (IV).
Abstract: As a follow-up to my last book L’accélération de l’histoire (2022), I propose to test the hypothesis – sketched out by Hartog (Chronos, 2020) and Chakrabarty (The climate of history in a planetary age, 2021) – that we can conceive of the controversial notion of the Anthropocene as designating the emergence of a new regime of historicity, the “planetary or Anthropocenic regime of historicity” (as Chakrabarty puts it). I will begin by outlining the four main elements that I believe make up a regime of historicity: a specific horizon of expectation and space of experience, to which are added a regime of temporality and a regime of spatiality (I). I will then look at attempts to think the new anthropocenic regime of historicity with categories drawn from older regimes of historicity that miss the unprecedented character of the Anthropocene (II). The time of the Anthropocene is a new experience of history, characterized by awareness of a planetary threat and climate emergency (III). It also generates a new relationship with space (which I call “eutopia”), in a political sense that needs to be clarified (IV).
Abstract: As a follow-up to my last book L’accélération de l’histoire (2022), I propose to test the hypothesis – sketched out by Hartog (Chronos, 2020) and Chakrabarty (The climate of history in a planetary age, 2021) – that we can conceive of the controversial notion of the Anthropocene as designating the emergence of a new regime of historicity, the “planetary or Anthropocenic regime of historicity” (as Chakrabarty puts it). I will begin by outlining the four main elements that I believe make up a regime of historicity: a specific horizon of expectation and space of experience, to which are added a regime of temporality and a regime of spatiality (I). I will then look at attempts to think the new anthropocenic regime of historicity with categories drawn from older regimes of historicity that miss the unprecedented character of the Anthropocene (II). The time of the Anthropocene is a new experience of history, characterized by awareness of a planetary threat and climate emergency (III). It also generates a new relationship with space (which I call “eutopia”), in a political sense that needs to be clarified (IV).
The animal that remembers. Nietzsche's historical anthropology.
Continental Philosophy Review , 2025
full-text view-only version: https://rdcu.be/eT94S
Abstract: In this paper, I explore Nietzsche’s... more full-text view-only version: https://rdcu.be/eT94S
Abstract: In this paper, I explore Nietzsche’s specific contribution to historical anthropology, an expression by which I designate an anthropology focused on the relationship of the human being to history. Why human beings have a history, in the sense of events and narrative? Why are human beings, unlike other animals it seems, historical animals? After clarifying the meaning of the anthropological question in Nietzsche’s thought (I), I begin by questioning the clear-cut opposition, which the philosopher puts forward in § 1 of the Second untimely meditation, between the historicity of human beings, who are the animals that remember, and the unhistoricity of other animals, who are supposed to live in oblivion (II). What are the sources of this thesis? To what extent is it defensible? I argue that, at the stage of the Second untimely meditation, human historicity remains partly an enigma. In the second part of this study, I look for further answers in the later corpus: in Beyond good and evil, with the idea that humans are the still undetermined animals (III), and in On the genealogy of morality, according to which they are animals that can promise (IV). How do these two theses complement Nietzschean historical anthropology?
Abstract: In this paper, I explore Nietzsche’s specific contribution to historical anthropology, an expression by which I designate an anthropology focused on the relationship of the human being to history. Why human beings have a history, in the sense of events and narrative? Why are human beings, unlike other animals it seems, historical animals? After clarifying the meaning of the anthropological question in Nietzsche’s thought (I), I begin by questioning the clear-cut opposition, which the philosopher puts forward in § 1 of the Second untimely meditation, between the historicity of human beings, who are the animals that remember, and the unhistoricity of other animals, who are supposed to live in oblivion (II). What are the sources of this thesis? To what extent is it defensible? I argue that, at the stage of the Second untimely meditation, human historicity remains partly an enigma. In the second part of this study, I look for further answers in the later corpus: in Beyond good and evil, with the idea that humans are the still undetermined animals (III), and in On the genealogy of morality, according to which they are animals that can promise (IV). How do these two theses complement Nietzschean historical anthropology?
Heidegger gave a course at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in the winter semester of 1938/... more Heidegger gave a course at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in the winter semester of 1938/39, published belatedly in 2003, and little studied until now, entitled: “Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemässer Betrachtung” (GA 46). He confronts, in much more detail than in “Being and Time” (§76), all aspects of Nietzsche's “Second Untimely Meditation”. This leads him to take a stand on the question of the anthropological difference between man and animal, as a continuation of the first part of the 1929/30 course on the animal (“Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit” (Winter Semester 1929/30), GA 29/30), and to develop a phenomenology of memory, that was absent from “Being and Time”. In this study, I examine this Heideggerian interpretation of the “Second untimely Meditation” in order to address two questions left unanswered in “Being and Time”: What, for Heidegger the reader of Nietzsche, makes human beings have a history, unlike animals, it seems? How does he interpret Nietzsche's thesis of the anhistoricity of the animal and the correlative thesis of the historicity of the human being? Insofar as the answer revolves around the problem of memory, the 1938/39 course invites us to also question how Nietzsche forces Heidegger to think about the phenomena of remembering and forgetting. What about the virtue of forgetting? How does memory help to shed light on the historicity of the human being?
Gennaro Imbriano (ed.), Crisi, Sovranità, Europa. Atti del Convegno internazionale in onore del centenario della nascita di Reinhart Koselleck (Bologna, 20-22 novembre 2023), Villa Vigoni Editore, Verlag, Loveno di Menaggio 2024, p. 55-67., 2024
Although not part of the great dictionary of "Geschichtlische Grundbegriffe", the concept of even... more Although not part of the great dictionary of "Geschichtlische Grundbegriffe", the concept of event seems to be a fundamental and controversial category in the theory of history. I will examine Koselleck's analysis of the concept of event in the twentieth century, and show how it can lead to a theory of the plurality of historical times and a diagnosis of the present. I will begin with Braudel's opposition between event and long duration. Drawing on Koselleck's work (notably the 1973 article “Darstellung, Ereignis und Struktur”), I will then ask what are the main meanings of the historical category of event. How does it relate to the category of structure? How does Koselleck conceive the relationship between event and language? In what sense does the event allow us to grasp certain aspects of modernity?
Alexandra Roux (dir.), Quelle philosophie de l’esprit ? Mélanges offerts à Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, Paris, Hermann, 2024, p. 509-521., 2024
Je dois attendre que le sucre fonde ». Durée de la conscience et durée de l'univers chez Bergson ... more Je dois attendre que le sucre fonde ». Durée de la conscience et durée de l'univers chez Bergson par Christophe Bouton Selon Paul Ricoeur, l'aporie la plus obscure du temps concerne l'opposition entre ce qu'il appelle « le temps de l'âme » et « le temps du monde 1 ». D'un côté, le temps semble être un élément de l'univers indépendant de notre existence. De l'autre, il se manifeste comme un processus inséparable de la conscience. Ricoeur illustre cette aporie à partir de la théorie de saint Augustin, qu'il oppose à celle d'Aristote. Selon lui, ces deux approches du problème du temps sont inconciliables. L'approche d'Aristote par la nature ne peut mener qu'au temps cosmologique et risque de ne jamais saisir le temps psychologique. Mais l'approche du problème du temps par la conscience est de son côté incapable de rendre compte du fait que le temps ne peut se réduire à une structure de la subjectivité humaine. Si tel était le cas, l'histoire de l'univers et de la Terre avant l'apparition de l'homme, qui a duré plusieurs milliards d'années, serait tout simplement inconcevable. Pour Ricoeur, il est tout aussi impossible d'engendrer le temps du monde à partir du temps de la conscience que de procéder en sens inverse en déduisant le temps de la conscience du temps de la nature. L'objet de mon propos est d'interroger la philosophie de Bergson à la lumière de cette aporie. Un penseur qui a accordé tant d'importance
« Accélération », Dictionnaire Arcadie. Lexique philosophique par temps d’Anthropocène, 7 juin 2024,
Arcadico, 2024
URL : https://arcadico.hypotheses.org/1282
Administration & éducation, 2023
L’idée d’accélération de l’histoire, évidente en apparence, soulève en réalité de nombreuses ques... more L’idée d’accélération de l’histoire, évidente en apparence, soulève en réalité de nombreuses questions qui intéressent la théorie critique de l’histoire. Je me propose d’en aborder ici certaines d’entre elles. La première porte sur la généalogie de cette idée. À partir de quelle période a-t-on parlé d’une accélération de l’histoire ? La deuxième interrogation est d’ordre sémantique et concerne les sens équivoques d’une telle formule. Que signifie l’idée d’accélération quand on l’érige en catégorie historique de la modernité ? La dernière question vise les jugements de valeur qui accompagnent les diagnostics sur l’accélération de l’histoire. Selon quels critères le phénomène de l’accélération est-il glorifié ou critiqué ? En conclusion, je ferai quelques remarques sur les apports de la question de l’accélération sur la problématique du temps dans l’éducation.
In his book Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time (2003; Engl. trans. 2015),... more In his book Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time (2003; Engl. trans. 2015), Hartog develops a new notion, that of the 'regime of historicity', with a view to describing the different relations societies entertain with their own historicity, their different 'experiences of time'. He applies this concept to our present epoch, which, according to him, makes available a new experience of time, founded in the primacy of the present: presentism. This diagnosis is advanced as a hypothesis which itself exhibits two sides, depending on whether presentism is thought as a provisional phase or whether, on the contrary, it is taken to be a durable state, our new 'regime of historicity'. In this article, I want to come to terms with the epistemological and semantic status of the concept of a 'regime of historicity', situated at the intersection of anthropology (1) and of the theory of history developed in the German tradition (Reinhart Koselleck) (2). Then, I would like to examine the way in which Hartog makes use of this concept as a methodological instrument, making it possible for him to distinguish several regimes of historicity and to lay them out periodically (3). Finally, I would like to discuss the thesis of a contemporary 'presentism' in both of its two versions, 'stopgap' or 'new state' (4). Hence my question: how far can our contemporary experience of time be reduced to the category of 'presentism'?
La notion de temps libre est riche des sens multiples qui lui ont été associés, en particulier au... more La notion de temps libre est riche des sens multiples qui lui ont été associés, en particulier au cours des transformations qu’ont connues nos sociétés à l’âge de la modernité. Le temps libéré du travail – en des conquêtes fragiles et souvent remises en cause – n’est pas un temps homogène, le même partout et pour tous et toutes. De l’oisiveté des Anciens qui était un temps pour la politique à l’oisiveté bourgeoise pensée comme un temps pour soi et pour la culture, échappatoire au grignotage de la vie par le travail, le temps libre a pu prendre la forme plus vitale d’un
temps de récupération pour les ouvriers soumis aux cadences
infernales d’une industrie en révolution. Il a pu aussi nourrir des formes d’engagement pour résister au capitalisme qui a fait du temps, à côté des ressources naturelles, une ressource à exploiter.
Cette résistance a pu prendre la forme d’une utopie du temps libre parfois contradictoire, du fait de son espoir placé en la machine, avec les équilibres écologiques de nos sociétés. Soumis constamment à sa possible transformation en loisir marchand, intégré alors paradoxalement au système qui en a fait ressentir la nécessité vitale, le temps libre appelle aujourd’hui une nouvelle réflexion politique capable d’allier émancipation du travail et préservation des ressources, capable de combiner une utopie du loisir revisitée à l’exigence de sobriété énergétique.
temps de récupération pour les ouvriers soumis aux cadences
infernales d’une industrie en révolution. Il a pu aussi nourrir des formes d’engagement pour résister au capitalisme qui a fait du temps, à côté des ressources naturelles, une ressource à exploiter.
Cette résistance a pu prendre la forme d’une utopie du temps libre parfois contradictoire, du fait de son espoir placé en la machine, avec les équilibres écologiques de nos sociétés. Soumis constamment à sa possible transformation en loisir marchand, intégré alors paradoxalement au système qui en a fait ressentir la nécessité vitale, le temps libre appelle aujourd’hui une nouvelle réflexion politique capable d’allier émancipation du travail et préservation des ressources, capable de combiner une utopie du loisir revisitée à l’exigence de sobriété énergétique.
Metodo 10(2) , 2023
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the principal meanings attached to the conception of worl... more The purpose of this paper is to analyse the principal meanings attached to the conception of world history (Weltgeschichte) as a court of judgement (Weltgericht) before, in and after Hegel. Who are the judges and who are the accused? Which authors have used this notion of tribunal as a historical category? With what aim in view, and in what contexts? And why was this conception so severely criticised? After reminding of the three principal senses of the idea of history as a tribunal—“the Tribunal of Posterity”, “the Tribunal of Freedom”, “The Tribunal of Power”—, I focus on different political usages of this idea in the context of the totalitarianisms of the first half of the XX century. In the last part of the paper, I discuss the thesis, defended by Joan W. Scott, that the “Judgement of History” schould be understood as a critical enquiry into the past.
Por una antropología del Antropoceno ¿Anunciará la era de la sobriedad energética un cambio del Homo consumens al Homo continens?
https://legrandcontinent.eu/es/2022/11/17/por-una-antropologia-del-antropoceno/
« Pour une anthropologie de l’Anthropocène », Le Grand Continent, 17 novembre 2022
revue en ligne "Le Grand Continent", 2022
https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2022/11/17/pour-une-anthropologie-de-lanthropocene/
in Die Vergangenheit im Begriff. Von der Erfahrung der Geschichte zur Geschichtstheorie bei Reinhart Koselleck, édité par Jeffrey Andrew Barash, Christophe Bouton, Servanne Jollivet, Freiburg/München, Verlag Karl Alber, p. 76-99., 2021
Die von Hartmut Rosa (Beschleunigung, Suhrkamp, 2015) popularisierte Idee, dass die Moderne von ... more Die von Hartmut Rosa (Beschleunigung, Suhrkamp, 2015) popularisierte Idee, dass die Moderne von einer Erfahrung der Beschleunigung geprägt ist, wurde zunächst von Reinhart Koselleck in zwei Studien vorgelegt: »Gibt es eine Beschleunigung der Geschichte?« (1976), und »Zeitverkürzung und Beschleunigung. Eine Studie zur Säkularisierung« (1985) (wieder abgedruckt in Zeitschichten, Studien zur Historik, Suhrkamp, 2000). Der Zweck dieses Beitrags ist es, den Begriff der Beschleunigung der Geschichte als historische Kategorie der Moderne gemäß ihren drei aufeinanderfolgenden Bedeutungen zu analysieren, die Koselleck identifiziert hat: eschatologisch, politisch und technisch. Das Interesse dieser Kategorie liegt darin, dass sie sich am Schnittpunkt von drei seiner Hauptanliegen befindet: historische Semantik, Theorie der geschichtlichen Zeiten, und Theorie der Moderne. Sie bietet daher eine hervorragende Fallstudie, um Kosellecks Denken zu verstehen. Die Position Kosellecks – die Verbindung zwischen Moderne und Beschleunigung – wird dann mit den nachfolgenden Diskussionen zu diesem Thema verglichen, insbesondere im Bereich der Sozialphilosophie, bei Rosa, und in den Debatten über das »Anthropocene«, wo die Kategorie der Beschleunigung in Form der »Great Acceleration«, über die wir abschließend einige Worte sagen werden, auf neue Weise mobilisiert wird. Die Frage ist, inwieweit die Kategorie der Beschleunigung, die auf die Geschichte angewendet wird, ein relevantes heuristisches Werkzeug zum Verständnis dessen ist, was als die Moderne bezeichnet wird.
The idea that modernity is characterized by an experience of acceleration, popularized by Hartmut Rosa (Beschleunigung, Suhrkamp, 2015), was initially outlined by Reinhart Koselleck in two studies, "Gibt es eine Beschleunigung der Geschichte? " (1976), and "Zeitverkürzung und Beschleunigung. Eine Studie zur Säkularisation" (1985) (published in Zeitschichten, Studien zur Historik, Suhrkamp, 2000). The aim of this contribution is to analyze the concept of acceleration of history understood as a historical category of modernity according to its three successive meanings identified by Koselleck: eschatological, political and technical. The interest of this category is that it lies at the intersection of his three main concerns: historical semantics, the theory of historical times, and the theory of modernity. It thus offers a privileged case study to understand his approach. Koselleck’s position - the link between modernity and acceleration - will then be confronted with subsequent discussions on this theme, particularly in the field of social philosophy, in Rosa, and in the debates around the Anthropocene where the category of acceleration is mobilized in a new way in the form of the "Great Acceleration", of which a few words will be said in conclusion. The question is to know to what extent the category of acceleration, applied to history, is a relevant heuristic tool for understanding what we call modernity
The idea that modernity is characterized by an experience of acceleration, popularized by Hartmut Rosa (Beschleunigung, Suhrkamp, 2015), was initially outlined by Reinhart Koselleck in two studies, "Gibt es eine Beschleunigung der Geschichte? " (1976), and "Zeitverkürzung und Beschleunigung. Eine Studie zur Säkularisation" (1985) (published in Zeitschichten, Studien zur Historik, Suhrkamp, 2000). The aim of this contribution is to analyze the concept of acceleration of history understood as a historical category of modernity according to its three successive meanings identified by Koselleck: eschatological, political and technical. The interest of this category is that it lies at the intersection of his three main concerns: historical semantics, the theory of historical times, and the theory of modernity. It thus offers a privileged case study to understand his approach. Koselleck’s position - the link between modernity and acceleration - will then be confronted with subsequent discussions on this theme, particularly in the field of social philosophy, in Rosa, and in the debates around the Anthropocene where the category of acceleration is mobilized in a new way in the form of the "Great Acceleration", of which a few words will be said in conclusion. The question is to know to what extent the category of acceleration, applied to history, is a relevant heuristic tool for understanding what we call modernity
"Outlines of a critical theory of history"
Theory of History at Work ; Bielefeld University, 2022
https://gtw.hypotheses.org/3171
« Esquisse d’une théorie critique de l’histoire »
Geschichtstheorie am Werk, blog de l’université de Bielefeld., 2022
https://gtw.hypotheses.org/2838
The Routledge Companion to Historical Theory, Edited By Chiel van den Akker, Oxon/New York, Routledge, 2022, 2022
What specific sense does the concept of experience have for historians? What is constructed and w... more What specific sense does the concept of experience have for historians? What is constructed and what is given in historical experience? Is the very idea of an experience of the historical past meaningless? Whether it bears on the present or the past, all experience seems to be an experience of something (its ‘object’) by someone (its ‘subject). Who is the subject of an historical experience? Is it something strictly individual, or can it also be collective? And correlatively, what could the object of such a historical experience possibly be? Events? Processes? Epochs? Inversely, what is beyond all experience? Structures? Periods? These questions will be dealt within the frame of the theory of history. After having outlined the polysemy of the concept of experience, we will proceed from the most singular forms of experience to examine the different generalizations to which it gave rise: the experience of events by agents and witnesses (from lived history to remembered history), the experience of society by a group formulated in narratives (related history), the experience of historical time, of an epoch, the experience as learning from history (the practical past) and as a special knowledge of the past.
in Stefan Berger (ed.), Bloomsbury History: Theory & Method (online), 2021
https://www.bloomsburyhistorytheorymethod.com/home
Les usages de la temporalité dans les sciences sociales/Vom Umgang mit Temporalität in den Geistes-und Sozialwissenschaften, édité par Pierre Monnet, Thomas Maissen et Barbara Mittler, en coopérarion avec Jean-Louis Georget, Bochum, Dr. Dieter Winkler Verlag, p. 25-39, 2019
https://winklerverlag.com/v2641x/v2641x_lep.htm
The question I raise in this contribution is whet... more https://winklerverlag.com/v2641x/v2641x_lep.htm
The question I raise in this contribution is whether philosophers who have reflected on the concepts of time and history have relied on other (Social/Human) sciences, have borrowed models from them, or whether, for methodological reasons, they have constructed autonomous concepts of time and history that break with scientific conceptions. I propose to provide some leads from French and German phenomenology, starting from the triad Heidegger, Koselleck, Ricoeur, and focusing on the concept of historical time and on the relationship between philosophy and history. First of all, I would like to remind you that the phenomenological approach to concepts of time, history and historicity developed by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit was a deliberate break with historiography (section 1). Heidegger adopts what might be called an overhanging attitude according to which the philosopher knows better than the historian what history is in the sense of its « historicity » (Geschichtlichkeit), so he must think of the concept of historical time and even the idea of historiography without reference to the work of historians. In contrast to this attitude, authors like Koselleck, on the historical side, and Ricoeur, on the philosophical side, have built a space for critical discussion where philosophers and historians, even if their approaches differ, meet on an equal footing. As an example of the outcome of such a discussion, I study the notion of « historical anthropology » developed by Koselleck and based on a critical reading of Heidegger’s existential analytics (section 2). Finally, I examine how Ricoeur defines his « hermeneutics of the historical condition » in its critical and ontological aspects in reference to Koselleck and Heidegger (section 3). Historical anthropology becomes with him a philosophical anthropology of the « capable man », centred on memory. But because of his phenomenological prism, Ricoeur leaves aside several useful contributions of Koselleck’s historical anthropology, which I mention in conclusion
The question I raise in this contribution is whether philosophers who have reflected on the concepts of time and history have relied on other (Social/Human) sciences, have borrowed models from them, or whether, for methodological reasons, they have constructed autonomous concepts of time and history that break with scientific conceptions. I propose to provide some leads from French and German phenomenology, starting from the triad Heidegger, Koselleck, Ricoeur, and focusing on the concept of historical time and on the relationship between philosophy and history. First of all, I would like to remind you that the phenomenological approach to concepts of time, history and historicity developed by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit was a deliberate break with historiography (section 1). Heidegger adopts what might be called an overhanging attitude according to which the philosopher knows better than the historian what history is in the sense of its « historicity » (Geschichtlichkeit), so he must think of the concept of historical time and even the idea of historiography without reference to the work of historians. In contrast to this attitude, authors like Koselleck, on the historical side, and Ricoeur, on the philosophical side, have built a space for critical discussion where philosophers and historians, even if their approaches differ, meet on an equal footing. As an example of the outcome of such a discussion, I study the notion of « historical anthropology » developed by Koselleck and based on a critical reading of Heidegger’s existential analytics (section 2). Finally, I examine how Ricoeur defines his « hermeneutics of the historical condition » in its critical and ontological aspects in reference to Koselleck and Heidegger (section 3). Historical anthropology becomes with him a philosophical anthropology of the « capable man », centred on memory. But because of his phenomenological prism, Ricoeur leaves aside several useful contributions of Koselleck’s historical anthropology, which I mention in conclusion