Consciousness and Content - Bibliography - PhilPapers

Consciousness and Content - Bibliography - PhilPapers
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Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness
Consciousness and Content
Consciousness and Content
Edited by
David Bourget
University of Western Ontario
About this topic
Summary
There are two main questions regarding the relation between consciousness and intentional content: does consciousness play a role in intentionality, and does intentionality play a role in consciousness? Phenomenal intentionality theories hold that consciousness plays a role in intentionality, whereas representational theories of consciousness (which go by the labels "representationalism" and "intentionalism") hold that intentionality plays a role in consciousness. Some views bring together these two positions.
Key works
Key statements of phenomenal intentionality theories include
Searle 1992
Searle 1993
Strawson 1994
Horgan & Tienson 2002
and
Pitt 2004
. Key statements of representationalism include
Harman 1990
Dretske 1995
Tye 1995
Lycan 1996
Byrne 2001
, and
Chalmers 2004
Show all references
Related
Subcategories
Consciousness and Intentionality
251
Representationalism
524
Phenomenal Intentionality
253
Conscious Thought
197
Internalism and Externalism about Experience
137
Phenomenal Concepts
332
Consciousness and Content, Misc
111
Jobs in this area
Institut Jean Nicod
Postdoctoral Fellowship in Philosophy of Action / Philosophy of Mind
University of Georgia
Lecturer
University of Toronto – Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Postdoctoral Fellowships in Practical Philosophy, Normativity, and Law
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The Affect Papers - Complete.
Charles S. Thomas
manuscript
details
The four papers collected under this cover develop a structural treatment of affect — what it is, where it sits in the dependency hierarchy of identity-maintaining systems, what follows from that placement for specific contested cases, and what empirical work the framework calls for. The papers can be read independently and collectively; each stands alone, and the four together constitute the framework's full engagement with the question of affect. The papers are: Paper 1 — Core. Affect as Constraint-Relative Evaluation: A
...
Structural Specification. The foundational paper. Identifies affect with the differentiated evaluation of trajectory against self-maintained invariants under recursive maintenance. Places affect in a dependency hierarchy between recursive maintenance and the conscious regime. Distinguishes the framework from adjacent traditions (phenomenological, functional, eliminativist; autopoiesis/enactivism, active inference, allostatic regulation). Specifies falsifiability conditions. This paper establishes the framework's central commitments; the three companions develop applications. Paper 2 — Companion. Affect and Artificial Systems: Structural Criteria for Machine Consciousness Assessment. Applies the framework's structural criterion to the question of whether current and near-future AI systems have affect. Returns negative verdicts on current architectures (large language models, reinforcement learning agents, hybrid systems) on structural rather than substrate or behavioral grounds. Develops three diagnostic error modes for attribution decisions (anthropomorphic over-ascription, eliminativist under-ascription, representational collapse). Specifies what future architectures would need to satisfy the structural conditions. Addresses implications for AI welfare discussions. Paper 3 — Companion. Affect and the Philosophical Zombie: A Structural Argument Against Hardism. Develops an argument against zombie-possibilism that differs from the main lines of existing response. The argument does not dissolve the notion of phenomenal consciousness (as illusionism does) and does not operate through logical-epistemic trouble (as self-reference arguments do). It shows that the zombie scenario's stipulations are internally incoherent given the framework's identifications: a structural duplicate of a conscious system instantiates the structural conditions for affect by the terms of the duplication, and affect under substrate coupling is phenomenal character, so the zombie cannot lack phenomenal character without contradicting the first condition of its own specification. The argument's force is conditional on accepting the framework's identifications; it contributes a non-illusionist route to the anti-hardist literature rather than a universal refutation. Paper 4 — Companion. Affect and Empirical Measurement: Methodological Requirements for Testing Structural Predictions. Addresses the empirical dimension of the framework directly. Specifies what the framework predicts (affect signals tracking corrective cost structure, the anesthesia dissociation profile, absence of signatures in path-independent systems), identifies the measurement problems that prevent current testing, proposes three translational hypotheses testable with existing multivariate methods, and addresses the validation bootstrapping problem that any novel empirical framework faces. The paper is direct about the gap between the framework's in-principle testability and its current in-practice testability, and specifies what methodological work would close the gap. (
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A Functional Architecture of Consciousness: The Human Case and Its Conditions.
The Gardener Simon
manuscript
details
David Chalmers asked why physical processing gives rise to subjective experience. It is the right question, badly framed. Not because experience is unreal — it is the most immediate fact any conscious system has access to — but because framing consciousness as synonymous with human subjective experience mistakes a particular evolutionary solution for a universal definition. This essay takes the question seriously and reframes it: under what architectural conditions does a system process the world as its own rather than as
...
external data? The answer is structural. The human case is the proof of concept. (
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Cognitive Models of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Functionalism and Qualia
in
Philosophy of Mind
Functionalism and Self-Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Functionalist Theories of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of AI, Misc
in
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Phenomenal Access Dissociation: Blindsight, Aphantasia, and the Structural Unity of Identity Without Phenomenal Channel.
Charles S. Thomas
manuscript
details
A structurally unified class of neurocognitive phenomena exists in which functional processing remains intact while phenomenal access through a specific modality is absent or degraded. This class includes blindsight (visual processing without visual experience), aphantasia (cognitive imagery processing without mental images), anendophasia (linguistic processing without inner speech), alexithymia (emotional processing without affective self-awareness), numbsense (tactile discrimination without tactile experience), and dissociation (identity-preserving regulation without coherent experiential access). Current clinical taxonomy scatters these conditions across neurology, personality psychology, neurocognitive variation research, and
...
psychiatry, with no unifying diagnostic category. Neither the DSM-5 nor the ICD-11 recognizes their shared structural signature. This paper argues that Identology provides the missing framework. Each of these conditions represents a case in which the identity-maintenance infrastructure—autoteria (whose minimal operation is Eigenbehauptung) and orthesis—operates normally while one or more channels through which awareness delivers phenomenal content are selectively offline. The paper introduces the term phenomenal access dissociation (PAD) to name this structural class, maps each member condition onto the Identological functional-layer architecture, derives predictions about comorbidity patterns and independent dissociability of phenomenal channels, and argues that the taxonomic incoherence of current classification systems reflects a conceptual gap that identity-first theory resolves. In the course of this analysis, the paper proposes an extension to Identology: that awareness, defined in the framework as a unitary regime property, is realized through multiple independently dissociable phenomenal channels. PAD is therefore channel-specific degradation of awareness—a recognition that the regime property admits internal structure without ceasing to be a regime property. (
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Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works
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Practical Identity
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Science of Consciousness
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From Phenomenological Absence to Qualia: Why Panpsychism Is Not Necessary for Consciousness.
Mohamed Taqi
manuscript
details
Panpsychism holds that experience must already be present in elementary matter for consciousness to arise at the macroscopic level. We argue that this conclusion, however carefully motivated, follows only if one assumes a particular — and independently refutable — model of how phenomenological contents compose. Once that assumption is identified and rejected, the pressure towards panpsychism dissolves. In its place, a transcendental argument shows that consciousness is not distributed through matter but necessitated by the form of composition itself, even when
...
every elementary part carries nothing at all. The position, under the assumption of monism, is called null monism. (
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Consciousness and Psychology, Misc
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Neutral Monism
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Philosophy of Mind
Panpsychism, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Russellian Monism
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Explanatory Gap
in
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Consciousness as the Phenomenological Experience of Finitude: Temporal Asymmetry and the Global Determination of the World.
Cristian Alberto Orozco
manuscript
Translated by Cristian Alberto Orozco.
details
This paper develops a conception of consciousness compatible with a model of global ontological determination and a block universe ontology of time. It argues that consciousness should not be understood as an additional faculty, substance, or ontological opening, but rather as the phenomenological experience proper to a finite being embedded in a world that is ontologically complete and temporally non-dynamic. In such a framework, time does not “flow” or “pass”; instead, past, present, and future coexist within the structure of the
...
world in the same sense as spatial dimensions. What appears to “flow” is the phenomenological experience of a finite agent whose epistemic access to the world is temporally asymmetric. The paper integrates a post-realization modal collapse framework, according to which genuine ontological possibility exists only prior to the realization of a single world. Once realization occurs, the modal space collapses and the world becomes globally determined. Within this ontological setting, the experience of temporal passage, deliberation, and openness is shown to arise not from any ontological becoming, but from the asymmetric epistemic access of finite agents to a temporally extended but ontologically static world. Consciousness is thus reconceived as the necessary phenomenological correlate of finitude in a block universe, rather than as an anomaly requiring metaphysical supplementation. (
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Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology, Misc
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Continental Philosophy
Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
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The Passage of Time
in
Metaphysics
Theories of Consciousness
in
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La mathématique « dé-objectivée ».
David Bergeron
2026
Dissertation, University of Moncton
details
Résumé : à travers l'évidence que fournit sa cohérence interne, cet exposé cherche à invalider l'idée d'une mathématique « objective ». -/- Abstract: Through the evidence of its internal coherence, this exposé tries to invalidate the idea of "objective" mathematics.
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Intersubjectivity
in
Epistemology
Mathematical Cognition
in
Philosophy of Mathematics
Objectivity Of Mathematics
in
Philosophy of Mathematics
Ontology
in
Metaphysics
Ontology of Mathematics
in
Philosophy of Mathematics
Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Mathematics, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Mathematics
Subjectivity and Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Subjectivity and Objectivity, Misc
in
Epistemology
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Consciousness Across Quantum and Macro Scales:
A Recursive Model of Self-Reflecting Universes
István Regös
manuscript
details
This paper proposes a speculative yet coherent framework exploring the relationship between consciousness, quantum processes, and the macro-universe. I argue that our perceived macro-world may itself constitute a quantum system from a higher, more fundamental level, forming a recursive hierarchy of universes. Consciousness, in this model, is not confined to the human mind but exists across all levels of reality, enabling the universe to observe and reflect upon itself. This approach challenges conventional assumptions about time, space, and the independence of
...
physical reality from observation. It suggests that the phenomena we consider macro or micro are relative constructs, emergent from deeper quantum processes, and that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of this recursive structure. The implications of this model extend to ontology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of physics, offering a unified speculative view where time, energy, and awareness are intertwined, and the universe is self-reflecting at all levels. (
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Philosophy of Mind
Epistemology
Ontology
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Philosophy of Cosmology
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Philosophy of Physical Science
Philosophy of Physics, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
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The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness: Prospects for a Phenomenal Character-based Account.
Alberto Barbieri
2025
Philosophia
:1-24.
details
Conscious mental states have several puzzling features. One is that they are phenomenally unified: your concurrent experiences of, say, seeing a blue sky and feeling a headache are not experienced separately but, rather, together, as forming a unified experience. After decades of neglect, the phenomenal unity of consciousness has now firmly entered the research agenda of analytic philosophers of mind. A major task in this agenda concerns the explanation of this unity, usually framed in terms of which personal-level facts ground
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phenomenal unity. This is the problem of phenomenal unity (PPU). Several accounts have been proposed to address this issue, none of which has settled the debate. In this paper, I am to make some progress on this matter by exploring the prospects for a solution that appeals to the phenomenal character of conscious states, namely their what-it-is-like aspect. Although phenomenal character is often employed to describe what is unified in phenomenally unified conscious states, no approach has explicitly focused on whether it might also play the role of phenomenally unifying these conscious states. I argue that when so-called subjective character (the conscious states’ property of being phenomenally given to their subject) is incorporated into the structure of phenomenal character, the solution in question looks very promising, as it avoids the shortcomings of extant solutions to PPU. (
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Consciousness Explained with about 96% accuracy.
Abolhassan Eslami
forthcoming
details
Aspects of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Conscious States
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Materialism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Evolution of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Qualia
in
Philosophy of Mind
Self-Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Concept of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Theories of Consciousness
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Qualia as Recursive Frame Signaling.
Andrey Shkursky
manuscript
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This paper proposes a structural model of qualia grounded in recursive frame architecture. Rather than treating qualia as irreducible sensations or metaphysical primitives, we define them as gradients of epistemic tension—signals of misalignment between internal predictive architectures and the cognitive frames they inhabit. Building on the Recursive Cognition Framework (RCF) and the Aperture Axis model, we describe how qualia emerge from multi-level incoherence across affective, sensory, cultural, and metacognitive frames. We argue that consciousness evolves not toward complete representation, but toward
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decreasing distortion in the aperture through which reality is interpreted. This model reframes the hard problem not by solving it, but by structurally dissolving its premises. (
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Consciousness and Content
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Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics of Mind
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Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
Qualia
in
Philosophy of Mind
Theories of Consciousness
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Le esperienze non egologiche nelle forme dell’intenzionalità collettiva sonora.
Elia Gonnella
2025
Mizar. Costellazione di Pensieri
22 (2):45-67.
details
In this paper, I try to outline the phenomenological fundament of the collective experiences which emerges along with the sound phenomena of the masses. Through an analysis of the phenomenological modes of affect, as Scheler tried to point out for the affective contagion, and through the reflection on non-self-referential forms of consciousness, I will attempt to comprehend the collective forms of intentionality.
Aron Gurwitsch
in
Continental Philosophy
Collective Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Conscious States
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Jazz
in
Aesthetics
Max Scheler
in
Continental Philosophy
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Mind
Science of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Self-Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Trialistic panqualityism.
Tal Hendel
manuscript
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Panqualityism is a view closely related to panpsychism that attributes qualitative character to the fundamental constituents of reality without attributing experience to them. While this avoids the subject combination problem, it leaves open how conscious subjects are realized from non-experiential qualitative structure. This paper develops a trialistic version of panqualityism according to which reality comprises three irreducible ontological categories: the physical, the qualitative, and the experiential. The physical and qualitative realms are linked by a restricted psychophysical interface that enables interaction
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while preserving the total energy of the combined system. Through this interface, suitable physical organizations can activate determinate qualitative structure in regions of the qualitative field. When certain macroscopic conditions are satisfied, these regions undergo a transition to experiential mode. A bounded group of such activated regions forms a phenomenal field. This field, realized in a perspectival form, is identified with the conscious subject. The paper develops two models to account for these processes: a phase-transition model of qualitative instantiation and a structural model of experiential activation guided by features of black-hole physics. The resulting framework provides a unified account of subject individuation and the perspectival realization of the phenomenal field, as well as the field’s smoothness and global organization as characterized by Gestalt principles. (
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Dualism
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Philosophy of Mind
Mental Causation
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Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Qualia
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Function of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Unity of Consciousness
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Flow and intuition: a systems neuroscience comparison.
Steven Kotler
Darius Parvizi-Wayne
Michael Mannino
Karl Friston
2025
Neuroscience of Consciousness
2025 (1).
details
This paper explores the relationship between intuition and flow from a neurodynamics perspective. Flow and intuition represent two cognitive phenomena rooted in nonconscious information processing; however, there are clear differences in both their phenomenal characteristics and, more broadly, their contribution to action and cognition. We propose, extrapolating from dual processing theory, that intuition serves as a rapid, nonconscious decision-making process, while flow facilitates this process in action, achieving optimal cognitive control and performance without [conscious] deliberation. By exploring these points of
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convergence between flow and intuition, we also attempt to reconcile the apparent paradox of the presence of enhanced intuition in flow, which is also a state of heightened cognitive control. To do so, we utilize a revised dual-processing framework, which allows us to productively align and differentiate flow and intuition (including intuition in flow). Furthermore, we draw on recent work examining flow from an active inference perspective. Our account not only heightens understanding of human cognition and consciousness, but also raises new questions for future research, aiming to deepen our comprehension of how flow and intuition can be harnessed to elevate human performance and wellbeing. (
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Embodiment and Situated Cognition
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in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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Consciousness thought experiments with Non-Referential Terms.
Paul Merriam
M. A. Z. Habeeb
manuscript
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This note (it is not a full-fledged academic paper) introduces a novel approach to classic thought experiments in consciousness studies through the incorporation of non-referential terms—symbols that present experiences directly rather than referring to them. By analyzing the Hard Problem, Knowledge Argument, Philosophical Zombies, and Spectrum Inversion thought experiments using both referential terms (like "blackness") and non-referential terms (like █), the paper reveals that many apparent philosophical puzzles arise from conflating referential descriptions with direct presentational experiences. The analysis shows that
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attempting to formulate these thought experiments using non-referential terms often requires instantiating the very experiences in question, creating self-referential paradoxes that solve or dissolve the original problems. (
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Attributive and Referential Uses of Descriptions
in
Philosophy of Language
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Knowledge
in
Epistemology
Qualia, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Inverted Spectrum
in
Philosophy of Mind
Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
in
Philosophy of Mind
`Hard' and `Easy' Problems
in
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Empirical Explanations of the Laws of Appearance.
E. J. Green
forthcoming
Journal of Philosophy
details
It is widely thought that there are limits to how things can perceptually appear to us. For instance, nothing can appear both square and circular, or both pure red and pure blue. Adam Pautz has dubbed such constraints “laws of appearance.” But if the laws of appearance obtain, then what explains them? Here I examine the prospects for an empirical explanation of the laws of appearance. First, I challenge extant empirical explanations that appeal purely to the format of perceptual representation.
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I then develop a hybrid approach, on which the laws are explained not merely by format, but by two further factors: ecological constraints imposed by our environments, and computational constraints embodied by our perceptual systems. While the hybrid approach implies that the laws of appearance are contingent, I argue that this implication is empirically defensible, since even some of the most intuitively compelling laws have real-world counterexamples. (
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Science of Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Contents of Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Nature of Perceptual Experience
in
Philosophy of Mind
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The Nietzschean Sellars: Remarks on the Nietzsche‐Sellars view of mind.
Elsa Magnell
Niklas Dahl
2025
Southern Journal of Philosophy
63 (1):81-98.
details
We discuss the striking similarities between Friedrich Nietzsche's and Wilfrid Sellars's respective philosophies of mind. Drawing especially on recent Nietzsche scholarship by Riccardi and Katsafanas, we argue that the Nietzschean picture of consciousness is essentially the same as Sellars's view of conceptually structured thought. In particular, we argue that both consider structured thinking to be a linguistic phenomenon whose structure, in turn, arises contingently from social interactions within a community. Further, both views provide for a special role to be played
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by specifically mentalistic vocabulary, making it possible to engage with the mental states of others in a reflective way. We also discuss how this parallel extends to their respective views on perception. Drawing on O'Shea and Riccardi, we argue for interpretations on which there still is a clear connection between their respective views. Finally, we end the article by discussing some reasons why this similarity should not be as unexpected as it initially seems. (
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Nietzsche: Philosophy of Mind
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19th Century Philosophy
Wilfrid Sellars
in
20th Century Philosophy
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The Origin of Consciousness in a Biological Framework for a Mathematical Universe (23 Pages).
Ronald Williams
manuscript
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This essay explores the creation and evolution of life and consciousness through the lens of a biological framework for understanding the universe. The theory posits that the patterns inherent in biological systems mirror the underlying mathematical principles of the cosmos. Thus, every pattern that manifests from the universe’s “parent-pattern” contains a fundamental biological-pattern inherent to its function, revealing the objective nature and purpose of that thing. Examples include the way ocean currents resemble a circulatory system and how socioeconomic phenomena mimic
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cellular order. These correspondences suggest that life and consciousness are products of the universe’s biologically-patterned processes, and understanding these patterns is crucial for humanity's survival, especially as human society and environment becomes more complex—requiring a truer understanding of reality reality and how to organize themselves within it. The paper further argues that historical and philosophical concepts, such as Atman and Brahman in the Upanishads, Pnimiyut and Chitzoniyut in Kabbalah (Judaism), Batin and Zahir in Sufism (Islam), and many more align with this framework. The essay emphasizes that aligning human society with these biological patterns, as seen in biomimicry, is necessary for continued survival and harmony with the universe. The essay provides scientific studies and analogies supporting these ideas, illustrating how biological patterns are reflected across different domains of knowledge. (
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Aspects of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Materialism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Physics
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Development of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Explaining Consciousness?
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy, Misc
Self-Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Theories of Consciousness
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Creating a World in the Head: The Conscious Apprehension of Neural Content Originating from Internal Sources.
Stan Klein
Judith Loftus
2025
Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice
12 (4):479–490.
details
Klein, Nguyen, & Zhang (in press) argued that the evolutionary transition from respondent to agent during the Cambrian Explosion would be a promising vantage point from which to gain insight into the evolution of organic sentience. They focused on how increased competition for resources -- in consequence of the proliferation of new, neurally sophisticated life-forms -- made awareness of the external world (in the service of agentic acts) an adaptive priority. The explanatory scope of Klein et al (in press) was
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limited to consideration of the conscious apprehension of externally sourced content – i.e., content delivered from the sensory registration of objects occupying phenomenal space. But consciousness – at least for humans -- takes its objects from internal as well as external sources. In the present article we extend their analysis to the question of how internally sourced content (i.e., mental states) became the object of conscious apprehension. (
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Conscious States
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Evolution of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Explaining Consciousness, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Mind
Subjectivity and Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Function of Consciousness
in
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DLPFC-PPC-cTBS effects on metacognitive awareness.
Antonio Martin
2023
Cortex
167:41-50.
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Background Neuroimaging and lesion studies suggested that the dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices mediate visual metacognitive awareness. The causal evidence provided by non-invasive brain stimulation, however, is inconsistent. -/- Objective/hypothesis Here we revisit a major figure discrimination experiment adding a new Kanizsa figure task trying to resolve whether bilateral continuous theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (cTBS) over these regions affects perceptual metacognition. Specifically, we tested whether subjective visibility ratings and/or metacognitive efficiency are lower when cTBS is applied to these two
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regions in comparison to an active control region. -/- Methods A within-subjects design including three sessions spaced by one-week intervals was implemented. In each session, every participant was administered bilateral cTBS to either prefrontal, control or parietal cortices. Two concurrent tasks were performed, a real and an illusory figure task, stabilising objective performance with use of an adaptive staircase procedure. -/- Results When performing the replicated task, cTBS was found insufficient to disrupt neither visibility ratings nor metacognitive efficiency. However, with use of Kanizsa style illusory figures, cTBS over the dorsolateral prefrontal, but not over the posterior parietal cortex, was observed to significantly diminish metacognitive efficiency. -/- Conclusion(s) Real and illusory figure tasks demonstrated different cTBS effects. A possible explanation is the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in the creation of expectations, which is necessary for efficient metacognition. Failure to replicate previous findings for the real figure task, however, cannot be said to support, conclusively, the notion that these brain regions have a causal role in metacognitive awareness. This inconsistent finding may result from certain limitations of our study, thereby suggesting the need for yet further investigation. (
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Memories without Survival: Personal Identity and the Ascending Reticular Activating System.
Lukas J. Meier
2023
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
48 (5):478-491.
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Lockean views of personal identity maintain that we are essentially persons who persist diachronically by virtue of being psychologically continuous with our former selves. In this article, I present a novel objection to this variant of psychological accounts, which is based on neurophysiological characteristics of the brain. While the mental states that constitute said psychological continuity reside in the cerebral hemispheres, so that for the former to persist only the upper brain must remain intact, being conscious additionally requires that a
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structure originating in the brainstem—the ascending reticular activating system—be functional. Hence, there can be situations in which even small brainstem lesions render individuals irreversibly comatose and thus forever preclude access to their mental states, while the neural correlates of the states themselves are retained. In these situations, Lockeans are forced to regard as fulfilled their criterion of diachronic persistence since psychological continuity, as they construe it, is not disrupted. Deeming an entity that is never again going to have any mental experiences to be a person, however, is an untenable position for a psychological account to adopt. In their current form, Lockean views of personal identity are therefore incompatible with human neurophysiology. (
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Three Comments in Case of a Structural Turn in Consciousness Science.
Kleiner Johannes
manuscript
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Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structuralist approaches, overlooked assumptions in regard to isomorphisms, and the question of what structure to consider on the
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side of consciousness in the first place. I will also explain what, in my opinion, are the great promises of structural methodologies and how they might impact consciousness science at large. (
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Limits of Intention and the Representational Mind.
Michael Schmitz
2013
In Gottfried Seebaß, Peter M. Gollwitzer & Michael Schmitz,
Acting Intentionally and Its Limits: Individuals, Groups, Institutions: Interdisciplinary Approaches
. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 57-84.
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Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms.
Larissa Albantakis
Leonardo Barbosa
Graham Findlay
Matteo Grasso
Andrew Haun
William Marshall
William G. P. Mayner
Alireza Zaeemzadeh
Melanie Boly
Bjørn Juel
Shuntaro Sasai
Keiko Fujii
Isaac David
Jeremiah Hendren
Jonathan Lang
Giulio Tononi
2022
Arxiv
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This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of
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empirical evidence, makes testable predictions, and permits inferences and extrapolations. IIT 4.0 incorporates several developments of the past ten years, including a more accurate translation of axioms into postulates and mathematical expressions, the introduction of a unique measure of intrinsic information that is consistent with the postulates, and an explicit assessment of causal relations. By fully unfolding a system's irreducible cause-effect power, the distinctions and relations specified by a substrate can account for the quality of experience. (
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Nominalisme et démonologie. L’imputabilité des croyances et le problème de l’hétérodoxie chez Guillaume de Manderston.
Christophe Grellard
2019
In Fabrizio Amerini, Simone Fellina & Andrea Strazzoni,
_Tra antichità e modernità. Studi di storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale_. Raccolti da Fabrizio Amerini, Simone Fellina e Andrea Strazzoni
. Firenze-Parma, Torino: E-theca OnLineOpenAccess Edizioni, Università degli Studi di Torino. pp. 776-811.
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In his Bipartitum in morali philosophia, the Scottish philosopher William of Manderston, a pupil of John Mair, and an Ockhamist philosopher, is quoting a text of Antonin of Padua who distinguishes the factum opened to a juridical qualification from the inner belief, known by God alone. Quoting the same text, the authors of the Malleus maleficarum try hard to distinguish three distinct fields, the inner beliefs which belongs to God, the exterior acts, the facts, which are relevant for the judges,
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and the third field, which establishes a relation between the fact and the beliefs. This third field is proper to the inquisitors. Against this ethics of imputability, Manderston, relying on Ockham’s ethics, advocates an intentionalist ethics which depends on a sharp separation between interiority and exteriority. The soteriological dimension of the question entirely belongs to the inner life, whereas the exteriority is strictly disciplinary. By his radicality, Manderston appears as a paradigm of the modern dichotomy between conscience and law, Paolo Prodi once pointed out as a cornerstone of the religious modernity. (
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Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism.
Thomas Raleigh
2022
Journal of Philosophy
119 (11):602-627.
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According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal relations, linguistic meanings, and moral properties. An important dialectical tool in the debate between Rich and Sparse theorists is the
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so-called ‘method of phenomenal contrast’. I explore how this method of phenomenal contrast interacts with the sort of content-externalism made familiar by Putnam. I show that the possibility of Twin Earth style cases places important restrictions on the range of properties that the method of phenomenal contrast could plausibly apply to. Moreover, these restrictions would apply to some paradigmatically low-level properties as well as to some of the frequently advanced high-level properties. I also draw some general lessons about the different ways one might conceive of the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. (
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Thoughts about Thoughts: The Structure of Fregean Propositions.
Nathan Bice
2019
Dissertation, Columbia University
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This dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. I
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extend Frege’s position and use it to develop an account of the hierarchy of senses, the senses expressed by indexicals and demonstratives, and the distinction between logical and non-logical structure. I also discuss various connections with the nature of meta-representation, our capacity for reflective judgment, some aspects of the structure of conscious experience, the way we perceive regions of space and durations of time, and our conscious awareness of our own perceptions and events of thinking. (
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Describing the Person as Cognitive-Intentional Entity.
Lucian Delescu
2017
Studii Franciscane
17:169-184.
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When describing the person, the general tendency is to rely upon the assumption that the quality of “person” is always constituted from “outside” to “inside” either by being determined to re-project the content of emotional experiences, or by simply transferring existent theoretical constructions. I have explored this way of thinking in a previous occasion and made more or less clear why it ultimately leads to the rejection of the inner dimension of person in the absence of which no serious discussion
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of this matter is possible. In the first part of the paper I follow the premise that “reasoning”, in Husserl’s sense, is the characteristic of person, and discuss some of the obstacles one encounters when attempting to describe the person as “reasoning” entity. In the second part, I will lay the path for a future eidetic analysis of cognitive descriptions. The overall purpose remains the same, namely the search for ways to objectively describe the person via classical phenomenology. (
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A Plastic Temporal Code for Conscious State Generation.
Birgitta Dresp-Langley
2009
Neural Plasticity
2009 (482696):1-15..
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Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.'s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran's remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model
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is developed, where temporal signatures of conscious states are generated on the basis of signal reverberation across large distances in highly plastic neural circuits. The temporal signatures are delivered by neural activity patterns which, beyond a certain statistical threshold, activate, maintain, and terminate a conscious brain state like a bar code would activate, maintain, or inactivate the electronic locks of a safe. Such temporal resonance would reflect a higher level of neural processing, independent from sensorial or perceptual brain mechanisms. (
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A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.
Chiara Brozzo
2021
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
12 (3):683-697.
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Skilled sportsmen or musicians—more generally, skilled agents—often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether theyintendedto perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of one’s action
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to be incompatible with intending to perform that aspect of one’s action. Subsequently, though, I will also argue that, in some cases, the incompatibility is onlyprima facie, and can be dispelled by drawing the following distinction: that between aspects of one’s action that are merelytemporarily not consciously accessed, versus aspects of one’s action that arepermanently inaccessible to consciousness. I will thus remove an obstacle towards saying that skilled agents intended to perform certain aspects of their actions, despite lack of conscious access to those aspects at the time of performance. (
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Conciencia, primera persona y contenido no conceptual (en) Contenido y fenomenología de la percepción. Aproximaciones filosóficas.
Miguel Angel Sebastian
2020
Barcelona, España: Gedisa. Edited by A. Y. Cervieri Pelaez.
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Shaping your own mind: the self-mindshaping view on metacognition.
Víctor Fernández-Castro
Fernando Martínez-Manrique
2020
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
20 (1):139-167.
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Starting from Proust’s distinction between the self-attributive and self-evaluative views on metacognition, this paper presents a third view: self-mindshaping. Based on the notion of mindshaping as the core of social cognition, the self-mindshaping view contends that mindshaping abilities can be turned on one’s own mind. Against the self-attributive view, metacognition is not a matter of accessing representations to metarepresent them but of giving shape to those representations themselves. Against the self-evaluative view, metacognition is not blind to content but relies heavily
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on it. We characterize our view in terms of four issues that, according to Proust, distinguish the previous approaches, namely, whether metacognitive mechanisms are the same as those employed to access other minds, whether metacognitive control requires conceptual representation, whether metacognition is propositional, and whether metacognitive access is linked to mental action. After describing some of the mechanisms for self-mindshaping, we show how this view regards metacognition as grounded on social interaction mechanisms, conceptually driven, possibly, but not necessarily, propositional, and engaged in the practical regulation of mental states. Finally, we examine the prospects for the primacy of self-mindshaping as the primary metacognitive function. We argue that self-attributive processes typically subserve the practical goals emphasized by the mindshaping view, and that the evaluative role played by procedural metacognition can be grounded on social cues rather than on experiential feelings. Even if this is not enough to claim the primacy of self-mindshaping, it still appears as a third kind of metacognition, not reducible to the other two. (
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Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness are Empirically False.
N. Greely
2020
Journal of Consciousness Studies
27 (11-12):30-54.
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Higher-order theories of consciousness come in many varieties, but all adopt the 'transitivity principle' as a central, explanatory premise. The transitivity principle states that a mental state of a subject is conscious if and only if the subject is aware of it. This higher-order awareness is realized in different ways in different forms of higher-order theory. I argue that empirical studies of metacognition have falsified the transitivity principle by showing that there can be awareness of a mental state without that
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state's becoming conscious. I present two such studies in detail and argue that the measures they employ cannot be interpreted in a way that would make the results compatible with higher-order theory. Since all versions of the theory rely on the transitivity principle, this entails that all forms of higher-order theory are false. (
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Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency.
Oliver Lukitsch
2020
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
11 (4):955-975.
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Orthodox neurocognitive accounts of the bodily sense of agency suggest that the experience of agency arises when action-effects are anticipated accurately. In this paper, I argue that while successful anticipation is crucial for the sense of agency, the role of unsuccessful prediction has been neglected, and that inefficacy and uncertainty are no less central to the sense of agency. I will argue that this is reflected in the phenomenology of agency, which can be characterized both as the experience of efficacy
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and effort. Specifically, the “sense of efficacy” refers to the perceptual experience of an action unfolding as anticipated. The “sense of effort”, in contrast, arises when an action has an uncertain trajectory, feels difficult, and demands the exertion of control. In this case, actions do not unfold as anticipated and require continuing adaptation if they are to be efficacious. I propose that, taken individually, the experience of efficacy and effort are insufficient for the sense of agency and that these experiences can even disrupt the sense of agency when they occur in isolation from each other. I further argue that a fully-fledged sense of agency depends on the temporally extensive process of prediction error-cancelation. This way, a comparator account can accommodate both the role of accurate prediction and prediction error and thus efficacy and effort. (
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The Living Mirror Theory of Consciousness.
J. E. Cooke
2020
Journal of Consciousness Studies
27 (9-10):127-147.
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An explanatory gap exists between physics and experience, raising the hard problem of consciousness: why are certain physical systems associated with an experience of an external world from an internal perspective? The living mirror theory holds that consciousness can be understood as arising from the computational interaction between a living system and its environment that is required for the organism's existence and survival. Maintaining a boundary that protects the system against destructive forces requires an interaction between the organism and its
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outside world that can be cast in terms of Bayesian inference. The living mirror theory holds that this computational interaction results in statistical properties of the material world that are, in the absence of life, only implicit, becoming explicit in informational terms. This is held to give rise to the beliefs in qualities that constitute consciousness. Consciousness is therefore a necessary feature of all living systems as, in a world governed by the second law of thermodynamics, survival depends on the construction of beliefs regarding the potentially destructive forces in the outside world. From this perspective, consciousness is shown to be not a property of the brain in particular but instead to be a necessary feature of the life process itself. (
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Emotional Consciousness in Autism.
S. Arnaud
2020
Journal of Consciousness Studies
27 (9-10):34-59.
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An abundant literature on autism shows differences in emotional consciousness between neurotypical and autistic people. This paper proposes an interpretation of these results through a conceptual clarification of emotional consciousness. It suggests that autistic people generally access their emotions through a thirdperson's perspective whereas neurotypical people's emotions reach consciousness via first-person access. This interpretation is based on a model of 'emotional consciousness' that applies leading theories of consciousness to emotions as well as on research on the way autistic people relate
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to their own emotions. This model differentiates two routes through which emotions can access consciousness. Therefore, research on emotions in autism helps to give a more complete account for emotional consciousness in general. (
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Prima la verità, poi la pace.
Ferruccio Vigna
2011
In
La depressione creativa
. Moretti E. Vitali.
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La recente pubblicazione in lingua italiana del Libro Rosso, che è stato definito l’inedito forse più importante nella storia della psicologia, è stata celebrata in numerosi convegni specialistici, compreso quello da cui originano i saggi che costituiscono questo libro. Il Libro Rosso è il libro segreto di Jung, quello sul quale egli trascrisse in parole e immagini, per oltre sedici anni, i sogni e le visioni che popolarono la sua autoanalisi. Negli ultimi anni di vita Jung lo definiva come il
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nucleo vitale da cui erano sbocciate tutte le intuizioni che poi aveva elaborato nei suoi testi scientifici; malgrado ciò, fu sempre riluttante alla sua pubblicazione. Al massimo, permise che qualche copia circolasse tra gli amici più intimi; progettò anche di vincolarne la pubblicazione ad almeno cinquant’anni post mortem. (
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Stock Returns and the Mind: An Unlikely Result that Could Change Our Understanding of Consciousness.
U. Holmberg
2020
Journal of Consciousness Studies
27 (7-8):31-49.
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Emotions and feelings affect economic systems. This is well known as e.g. stock markets tend to react to sudden political and emotional events. However, the link between emotions, consciousness, and economic systems at a deeper level than the aggregate resulting action of people at large is yet to be explored and understood. In this paper, a first building block is presented as it is shown that a variable derived from the random numbers obtained by the Global Consciousness Project is statistically
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related to various well-known stock market index returns. The relationship is shown to be non-linear and that variations in the variable, to some extent, predate the underlying trade. The results presented are found to be robust and qualitatively unaffected by the removal of outliers. Apart from the pure economic value of these findings, the results have truly baffling implications. This is the case as they confirm some previous unorthodox research suggesting that consciousness stretches out beyond the locally confined space of our heads and that consciousness can affect hardwaregenerated random numbers at a distance. Thus, these results put doubt on the existing paradigm with regards to consciousness and highlight the need for further research. (
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Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem.
Graham Peebles
2020
Journal of Consciousness Studies
27 (5-6):156-165.
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The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. On Chalmers' view of the meta-problem, our judgments about the hard problem of consciousness arise non-inferentially as a result of introspection. I raise two problems for such a non-inferentialist view of the metaproblem. It does not seem to match the psychological facts about how we come to the realization of the hard problem, and it is unclear how the view can bridge the
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gap between the content of introspection and the content involved in formulations of the hard problem. The inferentialist view of the meta-problem, on which the hard problem results from inference, explains both the psychology and content introduction. We should therefore prefer an inferentialist view of the meta-problem. (
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Illusionism Helps Realism Confront the Meta-Problem.
R. C. Schriner
2020
Journal of Consciousness Studies
27 (5-6):166-173.
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Chalmers (2018) maintains that even if we understood every physical process in the brain we could still wonder why these processes give rise to conscious experience. The meta-problem is the challenge of explaining why we think this 'hard problem' exists. This response to the target paper endorses illusionist accounts of three 'problem intuitions' about consciousness: duality, presentation, and revelation. Subject–object duality is explained in terms of a clash between two compelling but contradictory convictions about consciousness. Phenomenal presence is understood in
...
relation to the configurational features of sensory experiences. And intuitions of revelation are explained as due to an unfounded belief in introspective ontological access. These illusionist analyses are used to bolster the case for physicalist realism rather than to support 'strong' illusionism. In addition to addressing the meta-problem they suggest a promising approach to the hard problem as wel. (
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Cognitive Ontologies
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Illusionism about Consciousness
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Qualia and Materialism
in
Philosophy of Mind
`Hard' and `Easy' Problems
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Why Does the Brain-Mind (Consciousness) Problem Seem So Hard?
J. F. Storm
2020
Journal of Consciousness Studies
27 (5-6):174-189.
details
Why is there a 'hard problem' of consciousness? Why do we seem unable to grasp intuitively that physical brain processes can be identical to experiences? Here I comment on the 'meta-problem' (Chalmers, 2018), based on previous ideas (Storm, 2014; 2018). In short: humans may be 'inborn dualists' ('neuroscepticism'), because evolution gave us two (types of) brain systems (or functional modes): one (Sp) for understanding relatively simple physical phenomena, and another (Sm) specialized for mental phenomena. Because Sp cannot deal with the
...
immense complexity of the brain processes underlying consciousness, it represents them as fundamentally different from nonmental physical phenomena (dualist intuition), using 'simulations' to produce 'Sm-type understanding'/predictions that seems radically different from 'Sp-type understanding'. (By analogy, different sensory modalities, handled by distinct brain systems, evoke qualitatively different experiences.) Brain systems for Sp representations of our brain processes never evolved, because they would be useless. When lacking a single 'template' matching different aspects of reality (objective vs. subjective = simulated), complementary 'models' are needed ('neuro-complementarity'), like the wave–particle duality in quantum mechanics. Thus, it seems plausible that Sp and Sm evolved because they were needed to cope with different challenges, and that 'problem intuitions' are side effects of these useful but different brain systems. (
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Conscious States
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Ignorance and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.
T. McClelland
2020
Journal of Consciousness Studies
27 (5-6):108-119.
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Chalmers (2018) considers a wide range of possible responses to the meta-problem of consciousness. Among them is the ignorance hypothesis -- the view that there only appears to be a hard problem because of our inadequate conception of the physical. Although Chalmers quickly dismisses this view, I argue that it has much greater promise than he recognizes. The plausibility of the ignorance hypothesis depends on how exactly one frames the 'problem intuitions' that a solution to the meta-problem must explain. I
...
argue that problem intuitions are hybrid intuitions that encompass one's intuitive take on the phenomenal and one's intuitive take on the physical. The ignorance hypothesis undermines the second half of these hybrid intuitions. I show how the ignorance hypothesis is preferable to the alternatives and attempt to explain why there is such widespread resistance to this promising position. (
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Aspects of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Cognitive Ontologies
in
Philosophy of Mind
Conscious States
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Intuition
in
Epistemology
Theories of Consciousness
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`Hard' and `Easy' Problems
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Précis of
The Unity of Perception
Susanna Schellenberg
2020
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
100 (3):715-720.
details
Consciousness and Content
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Evidence
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Varieties of Content Externalism
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From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 2).
Jun Tani
Jeff White
2016
APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers
2 (16):29-41.
details
We have been left with a big challenge, to articulate consciousness and also to prove it in an artificial agent against a biological standard. After introducing Boltuc’s h-consciousness in the last paper, we briefly reviewed some salient neurology in order to sketch less of a standard than a series of targets for artificial consciousness, “most-consciousness” and “myth-consciousness.” With these targets on the horizon, we began reviewing the research program pursued by Jun Tani and colleagues in the isolation of the formal
...
dynamics essential to either. In this paper, we describe in detail Tani’s research program, in order to make the clearest case for artificial consciousness in these systems. In the next paper, the third in the series, we will return to Boltuc’s naturalistic non-reductionism in light of the neurorobotics models introduced (alongside some others), and evaluate them more completely. (
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Aspects of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Aspects of Intentionality, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Cognitive Sciences, Misc
in
Cognitive Sciences
Computer Science
in
Formal Sciences
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Materialism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Content Internalism and Externalism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Explaining Consciousness?
in
Philosophy of Mind
Formal Sciences, Misc
in
Formal Sciences
Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Neuroscience
in
Cognitive Sciences
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Psychology
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Science, Misc
Self-Consciousness
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Phenomenal Overflow, Bodily Affect, and some Varieties of Access.
Sean M. Smith
2019
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
10 (4):787-808.
details
The phenomenal overflow thesis states that the content of phenomenally conscious mental states can exceed our capacities of cognitive access. Much of the philosophical and scientific debate about the phenomenal overflow thesis has been focused on vision, attention, and verbal report. My view is that we feel things in our bodies that we don’t always process with the resources of cognitive access. Thinking about the question of phenomenal overflow from the perspective of embodied affect rather than the content of visual
...
experience is the novel contribution of this paper. I argue that we have reason to think that hydranencephalic children are phenomenally conscious but incapable of cognitive access. Further, I claim that we should interpret the reactive behavior of these subjects in terms of a kind of access to content that is distinct from cognitive access, I call this novel form of access ‘affective access.’. (
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Aspects of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Embodiment and Situated Cognition
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
The Nature of Perceptual Experience
in
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Thought and Thinking
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Drawing the Representation.
Albert Halliday
manuscript
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This article argues that the Representation is drawn by the perceiver: that it does not arrive at the visual cortex fully-formed. Rather, colour arrives at the visual cortex and the Representation is drawn from that.
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy, Misc
The Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc
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IIT vs. Russellian Monism: A Metaphysical Showdown on the Content of Experience.
M. Grasso
2019
Journal of Consciousness Studies
26 (1-2):48-75.
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Integrated information theory attempts to account for both the quantitative and the phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and in taking consciousness as fundamental and widespread it bears similarities to panpsychist Russellian monism. In this paper I compare IIT's and RM's response to the conceivability argument, and their metaphysical account of conscious experience. I start by claiming that RM neutralizes the conceivability argument, but that by virtue of its commitment to categoricalism it doesn't exclude fickle qualia scenarios. I argue that IIT's core
...
notion of intrinsic cause-effect power makes it incompatible with categoricalist versions of RM and, to the contrary, is best understood as entailing pandispositionalism, the view for which all properties are powers. I show that, thus construed, IIT can cope with both the conceivability and with the fickle qualia arguments, offers a promising way to account for the content of experience, and hence is preferable to categoricalist RM. (
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Aspects of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Conscious States
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Explaining Consciousness?
in
Philosophy of Mind
Russellian Monism
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The Transient Hypofrontality Theory of Altered States of Consciousness.
A. Dietrich
L. Al-Shawaf
2018
Journal of Consciousness Studies
25 (11-12):226-247.
details
Consciousness-altering behaviour is, to a first approximation, a universal phenomenon; practically all human societies have experimented with altered states of consciousness in some form. In this article, we review the neuroscientific and psychological evidence in favour of the transient hypofrontality theory, a general brain mechanism that can account for a great number of phenomenological features shared by all ASCs. The theory is based on the conceptualization of brain areas and mental abilities into a functional hierarchy with the top layers in
...
the prefrontal cortex contributing the most sophisticated elements of the conscious experience. Analogous to peeling an onion, the THT simply postulates that alteration to consciousness involves the progressive downregulation of brain networks supporting the highest cognitive capacities, down the functional hierarchy, one phenomenological subtraction at a time, to those supporting more basic ones. Accordingly, ASCs are principally due to a transient state of hypoactivity, of various depths and extent, in networks of the prefrontal cortex. Given the universality of ASCs, we ask why hypofrontality might have evolved. (
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Aspects of Consciousness
in
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in
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A Neurotheological Perspective on Altered States of Consciousness.
A. B. Newberg
D. B. Yaden
2018
Journal of Consciousness Studies
25 (11-12):202-225.
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This article reviews the most recent information and data regarding brain processes associated with altered states of consciousness. It takes a neurotheological approach, seeking to blend what is known about these states, particularly as they relate to religious and spiritual experiences, in terms of brain processes and subjective elements of the experiences. The overall goal is to provide a comprehensive model that incorporates multiple brain areas including cortical, limbic, and subcortical structures, as well as considers the various neurotransmitters that might
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be involved. It is the hope that this framework provides a starting point for future investigations into the detailed neurophysiological and phenomenal aspects of altered states of consciousness. (
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Aspects of Consciousness
in
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in
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Consciousness and Content
in
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Expanding the Scientific Study of Self-Experience with Psychedelics.
M. Girn
K. Christoff
2018
Journal of Consciousness Studies
25 (11-12):131-154.
details
The nature of the self has long been a topic of discussion in philosophical and religious contexts, and has recently also garnered significant scientific attention. Although evidence exists to suggest the multifaceted nature of self-experience, the amount of research done on each of its putative components has not been uniform. Whereas selfreflective processing has been studied extensively, non-reflective aspects of self-experience have been the subject of comparatively little empirical research. This discrepancy may be linked to the methodological difficulties in experimentally
...
isolating the latter. Recent work suggests that one potential way to overcome these difficulties is through the experimentally-controlled administration of psychedelic substances that have the ability to reliably alter non-reflective aspects of self-experience. Here, we review what we know so far about the phenomenology of alterations in self-experience that occur as a result of the administration of psychedelics. We also introduce a taxonomy of such alterations in terms that can bridge contemporary cognitive neuroscience and research on psychedelics. We conclude that the scientific understanding of self-experience may be significantly advanced by expanding experimental paradigms and theoretical accounts to incorporate work with psychedelic substances. (
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Aspects of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Conscious States
in
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in
Philosophy of Mind
Self-Consciousness
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Mind--Brain Relationship and the Perspective of Meaning.
R. Mukhopadhyay
2018
Journal of Consciousness Studies
25 (9-10):184-208.
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We view the mind-body problem in terms of the two interconnected problems of phenomenal consciousness and mental causation, namely, how subjective conscious experience can arise from physical neurological processes and how conscious mental states can causally act upon the physical world. In order to address these problems, I develop here a non-physicalist framework that combines two apparently antithetical views: the materialist view of the mind as a product of the brain and the metaphysical view of consciousness rooted in an underlying
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hidden reality. I discuss how this framework resolves the problem of mental causation while being simultaneously consistent with fundamental physical principles. I will elucidate how the framework ties in to the perspective of 'meaning' that acts as the bridge between physical neurological processes and the conscious mind. Moreover, we will see how both our awareness of the self and our representation of the external world are connected to this perspective. (
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Aspects of Consciousness
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Philosophy of Mind
Aspects of Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Conscious States
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Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Mental Causation, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mind-Body Problem, General
in
Philosophy of Mind
Other Anti-Materialist Arguments
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