Data Integrity EdDSA Cryptosuites v1.0

Achieving Data Integrity using EdDSA with Edwards curves

W3C Recommendation 15 May 2025

Abstract

This specification describes Data Integrity cryptographic suites for use when creating or verifying a digital signature using the the Ed25519 instantiation of the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA).

Status of This Document

This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. A list of current W3C publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the W3C standards and drafts index at https://www.w3.org/TR/.

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This document was published by the Verifiable Credentials Working Group as a Recommendation using the Recommendation track.

W3C recommends the wide deployment of this specification as a standard for the Web.

A W3C Recommendation is a specification that, after extensive consensus-building, is endorsed by W3C and its Members, and has commitments from Working Group members to royalty-free licensing for implementations.

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This document is governed by the 03 November 2023 W3C Process Document.

This specification defines a cryptographic suite for the purpose of creating, verifying proofs for Ed25519 EdDSA signatures in conformance with the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification. The approach is accepted by the U.S. National Institute of Standards in the latest [FIPS-186-5] publication and meets U.S. Federal Information Processing requirements when using cryptography to secure digital information.

The suites described in this specification use the RDF Dataset Canonicalization Algorithm [RDF-CANON] or the JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] to transform an input document into its canonical form. The canonical representation is then hashed and signed with a detached signature algorithm.

Terminology used throughout this document is defined in the Terminology section of the Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0 specification.

As well as sections marked as non-normative, all authoring guidelines, diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.

The key words MAY, MUST, MUST NOT, and SHOULD in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

A conforming proof is any concrete expression of the data model that complies with the normative statements in this specification. Specifically, all relevant normative statements in Sections 2. Data Model and 3. Algorithms of this document MUST be enforced.

A conforming processor is any algorithm realized as software and/or hardware that generates or consumes a conforming proof. Conforming processors MUST produce errors when non-conforming documents are consumed.

This document contains examples of JSON and JSON-LD data. Some of these examples are invalid JSON, as they include features such as inline comments (//) explaining certain portions and ellipses (...) indicating the omission of information that is irrelevant to the example. These parts would have to be removed in order to treat the examples as valid JSON or JSON-LD.

The following sections outline the data model that is used by this specification to express verification methods, such as cryptographic public keys, and data integrity proofs, such as digital signatures.

This cryptographic suite is used to verify Data Integrity Proofs [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] produced using Edwards Curve cryptographic key material. The encoding formats for those key types are provided in this section. Lossless cryptographic key transformation processes that result in equivalent cryptographic key material MAY be used for the processing of digital signatures.

The Multikey format, defined in Controlled Identifiers v1.0, is used to express public keys for the cryptographic suites defined in this specification.

The publicKeyMultibase value of the verification method MUST start with the base-58-btc prefix (z), as defined in the Multibase section of Controlled Identifiers v1.0. A Multibase-encoded Ed25519 256-bit public key value follows, as defined in the Multikey section of Controlled Identifiers v1.0. Any other encoding MUST NOT be allowed.

Developers are advised to not accidentally publish a representation of a private key. Implementations of this specification will raise errors if they encounter a Multikey prefix value other than 0xed01 in a publicKeyMultibase value.

Example 1: An Ed25519 public key encoded as a Multikey

{
  "id": "https://example.com/issuer/123#key-0",
  "type": "Multikey",
  "controller": "https://example.com/issuer/123",
  "publicKeyMultibase": "z6Mkf5rGMoatrSj1f4CyvuHBeXJELe9RPdzo2PKGNCKVtZxP"
}

Example 2: An Ed25519 public key encoded as a Multikey in a controller document

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
    "https://w3id.org/security/multikey/v1"
  ],
  "id": "did:example:123",
  "verificationMethod": [{
    "id": "did:example:123#key-0",
    "type": "Multikey",
    "controller": "did:example:123",
    "publicKeyMultibase": "z6Mkf5rGMoatrSj1f4CyvuHBeXJELe9RPdzo2PKGNCKVtZxP"
  }],
  "authentication": [
    "did:example:123#key-0"
  ],
  "assertionMethod": [
    "did:example:123#key-0"
  ],
  "capabilityDelegation": [
    "did:example:123#key-0"
  ],
  "capabilityInvocation": [
    "did:example:123#key-0"
  ]
}

The secretKeyMultibase value of the verification method MUST start with the base-58-btc prefix (z), as defined in the Multibase section of Controlled Identifiers v1.0. A Multibase-encoded Ed25519 256-bit secret key value follows, as defined in the Multikey section of Controlled Identifiers v1.0. Any other encoding MUST NOT be allowed.

Developers are advised to prevent accidental publication of a representation of a secret key, and to not export the secretKeyMultibase property by default, when serializing key pairs to Multikey.

This section details the proof representation formats that are defined by this specification.

A proof contains the attributes specified in the Proofs section of [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] with the following restrictions.

The type property MUST be DataIntegrityProof.

The cryptosuite property of the proof MUST be eddsa-rdfc-2022 or eddsa-jcs-2022.

The proofValue property of the proof MUST be a detached EdDSA signature produced according to [RFC8032], encoded using the base-58-btc header and alphabet as described in the Multibase section of Controlled Identifiers v1.0.

Example 3: An Ed25519 digital signature expressed as a DataIntegrityProof

{
  "@context": [
    {"myWebsite": "https://vocabulary.example/myWebsite"},
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"
  ],
  "myWebsite": "https://hello.world.example/",
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
    "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
    "verificationMethod": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1
      cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z5C5b1uzYJN6pDR3aWgAqUMoSB1JY29epA74qyjaie9qh4okm9DZP6y77eTNq
      5NfYyMwNu9bpQQWUHKH5zAmEtszK"
  }
}

The following section describes multiple Data Integrity cryptographic suites that use the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm.

This algorithm is used to configure a cryptographic suite to be used by the Add Proof and Verify Proof functions in Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0. The algorithm takes an options object (map options) as input and returns a cryptosuite instance (struct cryptosuite).

Initialize cryptosuite to an empty struct.
If options.type does not equal DataIntegrityProof, return cryptosuite.
If options.cryptosuite is eddsa-rdfc-2022:
1. Set cryptosuite.createProof to the algorithm in Section 3.2.1 Create Proof (eddsa-rdfc-2022).
2. Set cryptosuite.verifyProof to the algorithm in Section 3.2.2 Verify Proof (eddsa-rdfc-2022).
If options.cryptosuite is eddsa-jcs-2022:
1. Set cryptosuite.createProof to the algorithm in Section 3.3.1 Create Proof (eddsa-jcs-2022).
2. Set cryptosuite.verifyProof to the algorithm in Section 3.3.2 Verify Proof (eddsa-jcs-2022).
Return cryptosuite.

The eddsa-rdfc-2022 cryptographic suite takes an input document, canonicalizes the document using the RDF Dataset Canonicalization algorithm [RDF-CANON], and then cryptographically hashes and signs the output resulting in the production of a data integrity proof. The algorithms in this section also include the verification of such a data integrity proof.

When the RDF Dataset Canonicalization Algorithm [RDF-CANON] is used, implementations will detect dataset poisoning by default, and abort processing upon such detection.

The following algorithm specifies how to create a data integrity proof given an unsecured data document. Required inputs are an unsecured data document (map unsecuredDocument), and a set of proof options (map options). A data integrity proof (map), or an error, is produced as output.

Let proof be a clone of the proof options, options.
Let proofConfig be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.2.5 Proof Configuration (eddsa-rdfc-2022) with options passed as a parameter.
Let transformedData be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.2.3 Transformation (eddsa-rdfc-2022) with unsecuredDocument, proofConfig, and options passed as parameters.
Let hashData be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.2.4 Hashing (eddsa-rdfc-2022) with transformedData and proofConfig passed as a parameters.
Let proofBytes be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.2.6 Proof Serialization (eddsa-rdfc-2022) with hashData and options passed as parameters.
Let proof.proofValue be a base58-btc-encoded Multibase value of the proofBytes.
Return proof as the data integrity proof.

The following algorithm specifies how to verify a data integrity proof given an secured data document. Required inputs are an secured data document (map securedDocument). This algorithm returns a verification result, which is a struct whose items are:

verified: true or false
verifiedDocument: if verified is false, Null; otherwise, an unsecured data document

Let unsecuredDocument be a copy of securedDocument with the proof value removed.
Let proofOptions be the result of a copy of securedDocument.proof with proofValue removed.
Let proofBytes be the Multibase decoded base58-btc value in securedDocument.proof.proofValue.
Let transformedData be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.2.3 Transformation (eddsa-rdfc-2022) with unsecuredDocument and proofOptions passed as parameters.
Let proofConfig be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.2.5 Proof Configuration (eddsa-rdfc-2022) with unsecuredDocument and proofOptions passed as parameters.
Let hashData be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.2.4 Hashing (eddsa-rdfc-2022) with transformedData and proofConfig passed as a parameters.
Let verified be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.2.7 Proof Verification (eddsa-rdfc-2022) algorithm on hashData, proofBytes, and proofConfig.
Return a verification result with items:

verified

verified

verifiedDocument

if verified is true, unsecuredDocument; otherwise, Null

The following algorithm specifies how to transform an unsecured input document into a transformed document that is ready to be provided as input to the hashing algorithm in Section 3.2.4 Hashing (eddsa-rdfc-2022).

Required inputs to this algorithm are an unsecured data document (unsecuredDocument) and transformation options (options). The transformation options MUST contain a type identifier for the cryptographic suite (type) and a cryptosuite identifier (cryptosuite). A transformed data document is produced as output. Whenever this algorithm encodes strings, it MUST use UTF-8 encoding.

If options.type is not set to the string DataIntegrityProof and options.cryptosuite is not set to the string eddsa-rdfc-2022, an error MUST be raised that SHOULD convey an error type of PROOF_TRANSFORMATION_ERROR.
Let canonicalDocument be the result of converting unsecuredDocument to RDF statements, applying the RDF Dataset Canonicalization Algorithm [RDF-CANON] to the result, and then serializing the result to a serialized canonical form [RDF-CANON].
Return canonicalDocument as the transformed data document.

The following algorithm specifies how to cryptographically hash a transformed data document and proof configuration into cryptographic hash data that is ready to be provided as input to the algorithms in Section 3.2.6 Proof Serialization (eddsa-rdfc-2022) or Section 3.2.7 Proof Verification (eddsa-rdfc-2022).

The required inputs to this algorithm are a transformed data document (transformedDocument) and canonical proof configuration (canonicalProofConfig). A single hash data value represented as series of bytes is produced as output.

Let proofConfigHash be the result of applying the SHA-256 (SHA-2 with 256-bit output) cryptographic hashing algorithm [RFC6234] to the canonicalProofConfig. proofConfigHash will be exactly 32 bytes in size.
Let transformedDocumentHash be the result of applying the SHA-256 (SHA-2 with 256-bit output) cryptographic hashing algorithm [RFC6234] to the transformedDocument. transformedDocumentHash will be exactly 32 bytes in size.
Let hashData be the result of concatenating proofConfigHash (the first hash produced above) followed by transformedDocumentHash (the second hash produced above).
Return hashData as the hash data.

The following algorithm specifies how to generate a proof configuration from a set of proof options that is used as input to the proof hashing algorithm.

The required inputs to this algorithm are the document (unsecuredDocument) and the proof options (options). The proof options MUST contain a type identifier for the cryptographic suite (type) and MUST contain a cryptosuite identifier (cryptosuite). A proof configuration object is produced as output.

Let proofConfig be a clone of the options object.
If proofConfig.type is not set to DataIntegrityProof and/or proofConfig.cryptosuite is not set to eddsa-rdfc-2022, an error MUST be raised and SHOULD convey an error type of PROOF_GENERATION_ERROR.
If proofConfig.created is present and set to a value that is not a valid [XMLSCHEMA11-2] datetime, an error MUST be raised and SHOULD convey an error type of PROOF_GENERATION_ERROR.
Set proofConfig.@context to unsecuredDocument.@context.
Let canonicalProofConfig be the result of applying the RDF Dataset Canonicalization Algorithm [RDF-CANON] to the proofConfig.
Return canonicalProofConfig.

The following algorithm specifies how to serialize a digital signature from a set of cryptographic hash data. This algorithm is designed to be used in conjunction with the algorithms defined in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification, Section 4: Algorithms. Required inputs are cryptographic hash data (hashData) and proof options (options). The proof options MUST contain a type identifier for the cryptographic suite (type) and MAY contain a cryptosuite identifier (cryptosuite). A single digital proof value represented as series of bytes is produced as output.

Let privateKeyBytes be the result of retrieving the private key bytes (or a signing interface enabling the use of the private key bytes) associated with the verification method identified by the options.verificationMethod value.
Let proofBytes be the result of applying the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032], using the Ed25519 variant (Pure EdDSA), with hashData as the data to be signed using the private key specified by privateKeyBytes. proofBytes will be exactly 64 bytes in size.
Return proofBytes as the digital proof.

The following algorithm specifies how to verify a digital signature from a set of cryptographic hash data. This algorithm is designed to be used in conjunction with the algorithms defined in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification, Section 4: Algorithms. Required inputs are cryptographic hash data (hashData), a digital signature (proofBytes) and proof options (options). A verification result represented as a boolean value is produced as output.

Let publicKeyBytes be the result of retrieving the public key bytes associated with the options.verificationMethod value as described in the Retrieve Verification Method section of the Controlled Identifiers v1.0 specification.
Let verificationResult be the result of applying the verification algorithm for the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032], using the Ed25519 variant (Pure EdDSA), with hashData as the data to be verified against the proofBytes using the public key specified by publicKeyBytes.
Return verificationResult as the verification result.

The eddsa-jcs-2022 cryptographic suite takes an input document, canonicalizes the document using the JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785], and then cryptographically hashes and signs the output resulting in the production of a data integrity proof.

Let proof be a clone of the proof options, options.
If unsecuredDocument.@context is present, set proof.@context to unsecuredDocument.@context.
Let proofConfig be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.3.5 Proof Configuration (eddsa-jcs-2022) with proof passed as the proof options parameter.
Let transformedData be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.3.3 Transformation (eddsa-jcs-2022) with unsecuredDocument and options passed as parameters.
Let hashData be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.3.4 Hashing (eddsa-jcs-2022) with transformedData and proofConfig passed as a parameters.
Let proofBytes be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.3.6 Proof Serialization (eddsa-jcs-2022) with hashData and options passed as parameters.
Let proof.proofValue be a base58-btc-encoded Multibase value of the proofBytes.
Return proof as the data integrity proof.

Note: Not implementing step 2 can lead to interoperability failures

Implementers are warned that while step 2 is not strictly necessary when generating proofs that will not be included in a proof set or a proof chain, that it is not always possible to be certain of where generated proofs will be used, or how they might be combined with other proofs at the application layer. It is strongly advised to always implement step 2, though some implementers have signaled that their software might not always implement step 2.

verified: true or false
verifiedDocument: if verified is true, an unsecured data document; otherwise Null

Let unsecuredDocument be a copy of securedDocument with the proof value removed.
Let proofOptions be the result of a copy of securedDocument.proof with proofValue removed.
Let proofBytes be the Multibase decoded base58-btc value in securedDocument.proof.proofValue.
If proofOptions.@context exists:
1. Check that the securedDocument.@context starts with all values contained in the proofOptions.@context in the same order. Otherwise, set verified to false and skip to the last step.
2. Set unsecuredDocument.@context equal to proofOptions.@context.
Let transformedData be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.3.3 Transformation (eddsa-jcs-2022) with unsecuredDocument and proofOptions passed as parameters.
Let proofConfig be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.3.5 Proof Configuration (eddsa-jcs-2022) with proofOptions passed as the parameter.
Let hashData be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.3.4 Hashing (eddsa-jcs-2022) with transformedData and proofConfig passed as a parameters.
Let verified be the result of running the algorithm in Section 3.3.7 Proof Verification (eddsa-jcs-2022) on hashData, proofBytes, and proofConfig.
Return a verification result with items:

verified

verified

verifiedDocument

if verified is true, unsecuredDocument; otherwise, Null

If options.type is not set to the string DataIntegrityProof and options.cryptosuite is not set to the string eddsa-jcs-2022, an error MUST be raised that SHOULD convey an error type of PROOF_VERIFICATION_ERROR.
Let canonicalDocument be the result of applying the JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] to a JSON serialization of the unsecuredDocument.
Return canonicalDocument as the transformed data document.

The following algorithm specifies how to cryptographically hash a transformed data document and proof configuration into cryptographic hash data that is ready to be provided as input to the algorithms in Section 3.3.6 Proof Serialization (eddsa-jcs-2022) or Section 3.3.7 Proof Verification (eddsa-jcs-2022).

Let transformedDocumentHash be the result of applying the SHA-256 (SHA-2 with 256-bit output) cryptographic hashing algorithm [RFC6234] to the transformedDocument. transformedDocumentHash will be exactly 32 bytes in size.
Let proofConfigHash be the result of applying the SHA-256 (SHA-2 with 256-bit output) cryptographic hashing algorithm [RFC6234] to the canonicalProofConfig. proofConfigHash will be exactly 32 bytes in size.
Let hashData be the result of joining proofConfigHash (the first hash) with transformedDocumentHash (the second hash).
Return hashData as the hash data.

The following algorithm specifies how to generate a proof configuration from a set of proof options that is used as input to the proof hashing algorithm.

The required inputs to this algorithm are proof options (options). The proof options MUST contain a type identifier for the cryptographic suite (type) and MUST contain a cryptosuite identifier (cryptosuite). A proof configuration object is produced as output.

Let proofConfig be a clone of the options object.
If proofConfig.type is not set to DataIntegrityProof or proofConfig.cryptosuite is not set to eddsa-jcs-2022, an error MUST be raised that SHOULD convey an error type of PROOF_GENERATION_ERROR.
If proofConfig.created is set to a value that is not a valid [XMLSCHEMA11-2] datetime, an error MUST be raised and SHOULD convey an error type of PROOF_GENERATION_ERROR.
Let canonicalProofConfig be the result of applying the JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] to the proofConfig.
Return canonicalProofConfig.

Let privateKeyBytes be the result of retrieving the private key bytes (or a signing interface enabling the use of the private key bytes) associated with the verification method identified by the options.verificationMethod value.
Let proofBytes be the result of applying the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032], using the Ed25519 variant (Pure EdDSA), with hashData as the data to be signed using the private key specified by privateKeyBytes. proofBytes will be exactly 64 bytes in size.
Return proofBytes as the digital proof.

Let publicKeyBytes be the result of retrieving the public key bytes associated with the options.verificationMethod value as described in the Retrieve Verification Method section of the Controlled Identifiers v1.0 specification.
Let verificationResult be the result of applying the verification algorithm for the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032], using the Ed25519 variant (Pure EdDSA), with hashData as the data to be verified against the proofBytes using the public key specified by publicKeyBytes.
Return verificationResult as the verification result.

Before reading this section, readers are urged to familiarize themselves with general security advice provided in the Security Considerations section of the Data Integrity specification.

The following section describes security considerations that developers implementing this specification should be aware of in order to create secure software.

This section is non-normative.

Ed25519 signatures (EdDSA algorithm with edwards25519 curve) have been widely adopted, due both to the compact size of the keys and signatures and to the speed at which signatures can be produced and verified. Many libraries exist that can create and verify Ed25519 signatures. Since the publication of [RFC8032], security properties of Ed25519 signatures have been rigorously proven (see [Provable_Ed25519] and [Taming_EdDSAs]). However, it has been observed that a significant number of libraries do not achieve these security levels, due to missing input validity checks during the signature verification process. In this section, we summarize the security levels achievable with Ed25519 signatures, and indicate how one can determine whether a library will support those levels.

Digital signatures might exhibit a number of desirable cryptographic properties [Taming_EdDSAs] among these are:

EUF-CMA (existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks) is usually the minimal security property required of a signature scheme. It guarantees that any efficient adversary who has the public key $\begin{matrix} p k \end{matrix}$ of the signer and received an arbitrary number of signatures on messages of its choice (in an adaptive manner): $\begin{matrix} {m_{i}, σ_{i}}_{i = 1}^{N} \end{matrix}$ , cannot output a valid signature $\begin{matrix} σ^{*} \end{matrix}$ for a new message $\begin{matrix} m^{*} \notin {m_{i}}_{i = 1}^{N} \end{matrix}$ (except with negligible probability). If the attacker outputs a valid signature on a new message: $\begin{matrix} (m^{*}, σ^{*}) \end{matrix}$ , it is called an existential forgery.

SUF-CMA (strong unforgeability under chosen message attacks) is a stronger notion than EUF-CMA. It guarantees that for any efficient adversary who has the public key $\begin{matrix} p k \end{matrix}$ of the signer and received an arbitrary number of signatures on messages of its choice: $\begin{matrix} {m_{i}, σ_{i}}_{i = 1}^{N} \end{matrix}$ , it cannot output a new valid signature pair $\begin{matrix} (m^{*}, σ^{*}) \end{matrix}$ , such that $\begin{matrix} (m^{*}, σ^{*}) \notin {m^{i}, σ^{i}}_{i = 1}^{N} \end{matrix}$ (except with negligible probability). Strong unforgeability implies that an adversary not only cannot sign new messages, but also cannot find a new signature on an old message. See [Provable_Ed25519] for a real world attack that would have been circumvented with SUF-CMA security over EUF-CMA security.

Binding signature (BS) We say that a signature scheme is binding if no efficient signer can output a tuple $\begin{matrix} [p k, m, m^{'}, σ] \end{matrix}$ , where both $\begin{matrix} (m, σ) \end{matrix}$ and $\begin{matrix} (m^{'}, σ) \end{matrix}$ are valid message signature pairs under the public key $\begin{matrix} p k \end{matrix}$ and $\begin{matrix} m \neq m^{'} \end{matrix}$ (except with negligible probability). A binding signature makes it impossible for the signer to claim later that it has signed a different message; the signature binds the signer to the message.

Strongly Binding signature (SBS) Certain applications may require a signature to not only be binding to the message but also be binding to the public key. We say that a signature scheme is strongly-binding if any efficient signer cannot output a tuple $\begin{matrix} [p k, m, p k^{'}, m^{'}, σ] \end{matrix}$ , where $\begin{matrix} (m, σ) \end{matrix}$ is a valid signature for the public key $\begin{matrix} p k \end{matrix}$ and $\begin{matrix} (m^{'}, σ) \end{matrix}$ is a valid signature for the public key $\begin{matrix} p k^{'} \end{matrix}$ and either $\begin{matrix} m^{'} \neq m \end{matrix}$ or $\begin{matrix} p k \neq p k^{'} \end{matrix}$ , or both (except with negligible probability). See [Provable_Ed25519] for real world attacks that would have been circumvented with the SBS property.

Note that the BS and SBS properties are forms of non-repudiation.

As pointed out in [Taming_EdDSAs], flaws in Ed25519 libraries primarily occur on the signature verification side, where edge cases are sometimes not properly checked. An Ed25519 signature library that is in conformance with [RFC8032] or [FIPS-186-5], i.e., one that performs all specified validation checks, will have the SUF-CMA property in addition to EUF-CMA.

Reference [Taming_EdDSAs] achieves the BS and SBS properties along with SUF-CMA in their "signature verification algorithm 2" where an additional check is performed against the public key A to make sure that it is not one of eight "small order points". These additional checks incur minimal processing overhead.

Reference [Taming_EdDSAs] included a set of twelve test vectors to test various Ed25519 libraries available at the time of publication. They found that a significant portion missed edge cases and hence did not achieve SUF-CMA (just EUF-CMA), and only two libraries out of sixteen achieved all the security properties. Since the time of publication, more Ed25519 libraries have been created, and some of the libraries have been updated to include all verification checks. Implementers are recommended to test the Ed25519 library they are using against the test vectors of [Taming_EdDSAs].

Before reading this section, readers are urged to familiarize themselves with general privacy advice provided in the Privacy Considerations section of the Data Integrity specification.

The following section describes privacy considerations that developers implementing this specification should be aware of in order to avoid violating privacy assumptions.

The cryptographic suites described in this specification do not support selective disclosure or unlinkable disclosure. If selective disclosure is a desired feature, readers might find the Data Integrity ECDSA Cryptosuites v1.0 specification useful. If unlinkable disclosure is of interest, the Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuites v1.0 specification provides an unlinkable digital signature mechanism.

Ed25519Signature2020 is an earlier version of a cryptographic suite for use of the EdDSA algorithm and Curve25519. While it has been used in production systems, new implementations should instead use eddsa-rdfc-2022. Ed25519Signature2020 has been kept in this specification to provide a stable reference.

The key format described in this section is provided to document a legacy mechanism that has been deployed to production. The key format described in section 2.1.1 Multikey supercedes the one described in this section. New applications are strongly urged to use the newer key format.

The type of the verification method MUST be Ed25519VerificationKey2020.

The controller of the verification method MUST be a URL.

The publicKeyMultibase value of the verification method MUST start with the base-58-btc prefix (z), as defined in the Multibase section of [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]. A Multibase-encoded Multikey value follows, which MUST consist of a binary value that starts with the two-byte prefix 0xed01, which is the Multikey header for an Ed25519 public key, followed by the 32-byte public key data, all of which is then encoded using base-58-btc. Any other encoding MUST NOT be allowed.

Developers are advised to not accidentally publish a representation of a private key. Implementations of this specification will raise errors in the event of a Multikey header value other than 0xed01 being used in a publicKeyMultibase value.

Example 4: An Ed25519 public key encoded as an Ed25519VerificationKey2020

{
  "id": "https://example.com/issuer/123#key-0",
  "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2020",
  "controller": "https://example.com/issuer/123",
  "publicKeyMultibase": "z6Mkf5rGMoatrSj1f4CyvuHBeXJELe9RPdzo2PKGNCKVtZxP"
}

Example 5: An Ed25519 public key encoded as an Ed25519VerificationKey2020 in a controller document.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
    "https://w3id.org/security/suites/ed25519-2020/v1"
  ],
  "id": "did:example:123",
  "verificationMethod": [{
    "id": "did:example:123#key-0",
    "type": "Ed25519VerificationKey2020",
    "controller": "did:example:123",
    "publicKeyMultibase": "z6Mkf5rGMoatrSj1f4CyvuHBeXJELe9RPdzo2PKGNCKVtZxP"
  }],
  "authentication": [
    "did:example:123#key-0"
  ],
  "assertionMethod": [
    "did:example:123#key-0"
  ],
  "capabilityDelegation": [
    "did:example:123#key-0"
  ],
  "capabilityInvocation": [
    "did:example:123#key-0"
  ]
}

The proof format described in this section is provided to document a legacy mechanism that has been deployed to production. The DataIntegrityProof formats described in section 2.2.1 DataIntegrityProof supercede the one described in this section. New applications are strongly urged to use the newer proof format.

The verificationMethod property of the proof MUST be a URL. Dereferencing the verificationMethod MUST result in an object containing a type property with the value set to Ed25519VerificationKey2020.

The type property of the proof MUST be Ed25519Signature2020.

The created property of the proof MUST be an [XMLSCHEMA11-2] formatted date string.

The proofPurpose property of the proof MUST be a string, and MUST match the verification relationship expressed by the verification method controller.

The proofValue property of the proof MUST be a detached EdDSA produced according to [RFC8032], encoded using the base-58-btc header and alphabet as described in the Multibase section of [CID].

Example 6: An Ed25519 digital signature expressed as a Ed25519Signature2020

{
  "@context": [
    {"myWebsite": "https://vocabulary.example/myWebsite"},
    "https://w3id.org/security/suites/ed25519-2020/v1"
  ],
  "myWebsite": "https://hello.world.example/",
  "proof": {
    "type": "Ed25519Signature2020",
    "created": "2020-11-05T19:23:24Z",
    "verificationMethod": "https://di.example/issuer#z6MkjLrk3gKS2nnkeWcmcxiZPGskmesDpuwRBorgHxUXfxnG",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z4oey5q2M3XKaxup3tmzN4DRFTLVqpLMweBrSxMY2xHX5XTYVQeVbY8nQAVHMrXFkXJpmEcqdoDwLWxaqA3Q1geV6"
  }
}

The Ed25519Signature2020 cryptographic suite takes an input document, canonicalizes the document using the RDF Dataset Canonicalization algorithm [RDF-CANON], and then cryptographically hashes and signs the output resulting in the production of a data integrity proof. The algorithms in this section also include the verification of such a data integrity proof.

To generate a proof, the algorithm in Section 4.1: Add Proof in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification MUST be executed. For that algorithm, the cryptographic suite specific transformation algorithm is defined in Section A.2.1.3 Transformation (Ed25519Signature2020), the hashing algorithm is defined in Section A.2.1.4 Hashing (Ed25519Signature2020), and the proof serialization algorithm is defined in Section A.2.1.6 Proof Serialization (Ed25519Signature2020).

To verify a proof, the algorithm in Section 4.2: Verify Proof in the Data Integrity [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] specification MUST be executed. For that algorithm, the cryptographic suite specific transformation algorithm is defined in Section A.2.1.3 Transformation (Ed25519Signature2020), the hashing algorithm is defined in Section A.2.1.4 Hashing (Ed25519Signature2020), and the proof verification algorithm is defined in Section A.2.1.7 Proof Verification (Ed25519Signature2020).

If options.type is not set to the string Ed25519Signature2020, an error MUST be raised that SHOULD convey an error type of PROOF_TRANSFORMATION_ERROR.
Let canonicalDocument be the result of converting unsecuredDocument to JSON-LD expanded form and then to RDF statements, applying the Universal RDF Dataset Canonicalization Algorithm, and then serializing the result to a serialized canonical form.
Return canonicalDocument as the transformed data document.

The following algorithm specifies how to cryptographically hash a transformed data document and proof configuration into cryptographic hash data that is ready to be provided as input to the algorithms in Section A.2.1.6 Proof Serialization (Ed25519Signature2020) or Section A.2.1.7 Proof Verification (Ed25519Signature2020).

The required inputs to this algorithm are a transformed data document (transformedDocument) and proof configuration (proofConfig). The proof configuration MUST contain a type identifier for the cryptographic suite (type) and MAY contain a cryptosuite identifier (cryptosuite). A single hash data value represented as series of bytes is produced as output.

Let transformedDocumentHash be the result of applying the SHA-256 (SHA-2 with 256-bit output) cryptographic hashing algorithm [RFC6234] to the transformedDocument. transformedDocumentHash will be exactly 32 bytes in size.
Let proofConfigHash be the result of applying the SHA-256 (SHA-2 with 256-bit output) cryptographic hashing algorithm [RFC6234] to the canonicalProofConfig. proofConfigHash will be exactly 32 bytes in size.
Let hashData be the result of joining proofConfigHash (the first hash) with transformedDocumentHash (the second hash).
Return hashData as the hash data.

The following algorithm specifies how to generate a proof configuration from a set of proof options that is used as input to the proof hashing algorithm.

The required inputs to this algorithm are proof options (options). The proof options MUST contain a type identifier for the cryptographic suite (type) and MAY contain a cryptosuite identifier (cryptosuite). A proof configuration object is produced as output.

Let proofConfig be a clone of the options object.
If proofConfig.type is not set to Ed25519Signature2020, an error MUST be raised and SHOULD convey an error type of PROOF_GENERATION_ERROR.
If proofConfig.created is present and set to a value that is not a valid [XMLSCHEMA11-2] datetime, an error MUST be raised and SHOULD convey an error type of PROOF_GENERATION_ERROR.
Set proofConfig.@context to unsecuredDocument.@context
Let canonicalProofConfig be the result of applying the RDF Dataset Canonicalization algorithm [RDF-CANON] to the proofConfig.
Return canonicalProofConfig.

Let privateKeyBytes be the result of retrieving the private key bytes (or a signing interface enabling the use of the private key bytes) associated with the verification method identified by the options.verificationMethod value.
Let proofBytes be the result of applying the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032], using the Ed25519 variant (Pure EdDSA), with hashData as the data to be signed using the private key specified by privateKeyBytes. proofBytes will be exactly 64 bytes in size.
Return proofBytes as the digital proof.

Let publicKeyBytes be the result of retrieving the public key bytes associated with the options.verificationMethod value as described in the Retrieve Verification Method section of the Controlled Identifiers v1.0 specification.
Let verificationResult be the result of applying the verification algorithm for the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032], using the Ed25519 variant (Pure EdDSA), with hashData as the data to be verified against the proofBytes using the public key specified by publicKeyBytes.
Return verificationResult as the verification result.

This section is non-normative.

The signer needs to generate a private/public key pair with the private key used for signing and the public key made available for verification. The representation of the public key and the representation of the private key are shown below.

Example 7: Private and Public keys for Signature

{
    publicKeyMultibase: "z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
    secretKeyMultibase: "z3u2en7t5LR2WtQH5PfFqMqwVHBeXouLzo6haApm8XHqvjxq"
}

Signing begins with a credential without an attached proof, which is converted to canonical form, and then hashed, as shown in the following three examples.

Example 8: Credential without Proof

{
    "@context": [
        "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
        "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
    ],
    "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
    "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "AlumniCredential"],
    "name": "Alumni Credential",
    "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
    "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
    "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
    "credentialSubject": {
        "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
        "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
    }
}

Example 9: Canonical Credential without Proof

<did:example:abcdefgh> <https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples#alumniOf> "The School of Examples" .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#VerifiableCredential> .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples#AlumniCredential> .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://schema.org/description> "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential." .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://schema.org/name> "Alumni Credential" .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#credentialSubject> <did:example:abcdefgh> .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#issuer> <https://vc.example/issuers/5678> .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#validFrom> "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime> .

Example 10: Hash of Canonical Credential without Proof (hex)

517744132ae165a5349155bef0bb0cf2258fff99dfe1dbd914b938d775a36017

The next step is to take the proof options document, convert it to canonical form, and obtain its hash, as shown in the next three examples.

Example 11: Proof Options Document

{
  "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
  "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
  "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ]
}

Example 12: Canonical Proof Options Document

_:c14n0 <http://purl.org/dc/terms/created> "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime> .
_:c14n0 <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://w3id.org/security#DataIntegrityProof> .
_:c14n0 <https://w3id.org/security#cryptosuite> "eddsa-rdfc-2022"^^<https://w3id.org/security#cryptosuiteString> .
_:c14n0 <https://w3id.org/security#proofPurpose> <https://w3id.org/security#assertionMethod> .
_:c14n0 <https://w3id.org/security#verificationMethod> <did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2> .

Example 13: Hash of Canonical Proof Options Document (hex)

bea7b7acfbad0126b135104024a5f1733e705108f42d59668b05c0c50004c6b0

Finally, we concatenate the hash of the proof options followed by the hash of the credential without proof, use the private key with the combined hash to compute the Ed25519 signature, and then base58-btc encode the signature.

Example 14: Combine hashes of Proof Options and Credential (hex)

bea7b7acfbad0126b135104024a5f1733e705108f42d59668b05c0c50004c6b0517744132ae165a5349155bef0bb0cf2258fff99dfe1dbd914b938d775a36017

Example 15: Signature of Combined Hashes (hex)

4d8e53c2d5b3f2a7891753eb16ca993325bdb0d3cfc5be1093d0a18426f5ef8578cadc0fd4b5f4dd0d1ce0aefd15ab120b7a894d0eb094ffda4e6553cd1ed50d

Example 16: Signature of Combined Hashes base58-btc

z2YwC8z3ap7yx1nZYCg4L3j3ApHsF8kgPdSb5xoS1VR7vPG3F561B52hYnQF9iseabecm3ijx4K1FBTQsCZahKZme

Assemble the signed credential with the following two steps:

Add the proofValue field with the previously computed base58-btc value to the proof options document.
Set the proof field of the credential to the augmented proof option document.

Example 17: Signed Credential

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
    "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z2YwC8z3ap7yx1nZYCg4L3j3ApHsF8kgPdSb5xoS1VR7vPG3F561B52hYnQF9iseabecm3ijx4K1FBTQsCZahKZme"
  }
}

Here we again go through the steps of creating a credential signed with eddsa-rdfc-2022, but with a more complicated input document. The representation of the public key and the representation of the private key are shown below.

Example 18: Private and Public keys for Signature

{
    publicKeyMultibase: "z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
    secretKeyMultibase: "z3u2en7t5LR2WtQH5PfFqMqwVHBeXouLzo6haApm8XHqvjxq"
}

Signing begins with a credential without an attached proof, which is converted to canonical form, and then hashed, as shown in the following three examples.

Example 19: Employment Authorization Credential without Proof

{
    "@context": [
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
      "https://w3id.org/citizenship/v4rc1"
    ],
    "type": [
      "VerifiableCredential",
      "EmploymentAuthorizationDocumentCredential"
    ],
    "issuer": {
      "id": "did:key:zDnaegE6RR3atJtHKwTRTWHsJ3kNHqFwv7n9YjTgmU7TyfU76",
      "image": ""
    },
    "credentialSubject": {
      "type": [
        "Person",
        "EmployablePerson"
      ],
      "givenName": "JOHN",
      "additionalName": "JACOB",
      "familyName": "SMITH",
      "image": "",
      "gender": "Male",
      "residentSince": "2015-01-01",
      "birthCountry": "Bahamas",
      "birthDate": "1999-07-17",
      "employmentAuthorizationDocument": {
        "type": "EmploymentAuthorizationDocument",
        "identifier": "83627465",
        "lprCategory": "C09",
        "lprNumber": "999-999-999"
      }
    },
    "name": "Employment Authorization Document",
    "description": "Example Employment Authorization Document.",
    "validFrom": "2019-12-03T00:00:00Z",
    "validUntil": "2029-12-03T00:00:00Z"
  }

Example 20: Canonical Employment Authorization Credential without Proof

<did:key:zDnaegE6RR3atJtHKwTRTWHsJ3kNHqFwv7n9YjTgmU7TyfU76> <https://schema.org/image> <> .
_:c14n0 <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://w3id.org/citizenship#EmploymentAuthorizationDocumentCredential> .
_:c14n0 <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#VerifiableCredential> .
_:c14n0 <https://schema.org/description> "Example Employment Authorization Document." .
_:c14n0 <https://schema.org/name> "Employment Authorization Document" .
_:c14n0 <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#credentialSubject> _:c14n1 .
_:c14n0 <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#issuer> <did:key:zDnaegE6RR3atJtHKwTRTWHsJ3kNHqFwv7n9YjTgmU7TyfU76> .
_:c14n0 <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#validFrom> "2019-12-03T00:00:00Z"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime> .
_:c14n0 <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#validUntil> "2029-12-03T00:00:00Z"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime> .
_:c14n1 <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://schema.org/Person> .
_:c14n1 <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://w3id.org/citizenship#EmployablePerson> .
_:c14n1 <https://schema.org/additionalName> "JACOB" .
_:c14n1 <https://schema.org/birthDate> "1999-07-17"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime> .
_:c14n1 <https://schema.org/familyName> "SMITH" .
_:c14n1 <https://schema.org/gender> "Male" .
_:c14n1 <https://schema.org/givenName> "JOHN" .
_:c14n1 <https://schema.org/image> <> .
_:c14n1 <https://w3id.org/citizenship#birthCountry> "Bahamas" .
_:c14n1 <https://w3id.org/citizenship#employmentAuthorizationDocument> _:c14n2 .
_:c14n1 <https://w3id.org/citizenship#residentSince> "2015-01-01"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime> .
_:c14n2 <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://w3id.org/citizenship#EmploymentAuthorizationDocument> .
_:c14n2 <https://schema.org/identifier> "83627465" .
_:c14n2 <https://w3id.org/citizenship#lprCategory> "C09" .
_:c14n2 <https://w3id.org/citizenship#lprNumber> "999-999-999" .

Example 21: Hash of Canonical Employment Authorization Credential without Proof (hex)

03f59e5b04ab575b1172cb684f22eede72f0e9033e0b5c67d0e2506768d6ce11

The next step is to take the proof options document, convert it to canonical form, and obtain its hash, as shown in the next three examples.

Example 22: Proof Options Document

{
  "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
  "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
  "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://w3id.org/citizenship/v4rc1"
  ]
}

Example 23: Canonical Proof Options Document

_:c14n0 <http://purl.org/dc/terms/created> "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime> .
_:c14n0 <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://w3id.org/security#DataIntegrityProof> .
_:c14n0 <https://w3id.org/security#cryptosuite> "eddsa-rdfc-2022"^^<https://w3id.org/security#cryptosuiteString> .
_:c14n0 <https://w3id.org/security#proofPurpose> <https://w3id.org/security#assertionMethod> .
_:c14n0 <https://w3id.org/security#verificationMethod> <did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2> .

Example 24: Hash of Canonical Proof Options Document (hex)

bea7b7acfbad0126b135104024a5f1733e705108f42d59668b05c0c50004c6b0

Example 25: Combine hashes of Proof Options and Credential (hex)

bea7b7acfbad0126b135104024a5f1733e705108f42d59668b05c0c50004c6b003f59e5b04ab575b1172cb684f22eede72f0e9033e0b5c67d0e2506768d6ce11

Example 26: Signature of Combined Hashes (hex)

20b1a944960b75ca69ba070af4820de6e6acae1afe827d8c566c0f7b932d1bd3abde3222b3095088051439a8b4e7a5356c7ba6d246774f875ebb6ddee1577003

Example 27: Signature of Combined Hashes base58-btc

zeuuS9pi2ZR8Q41bFFJKS9weSWkwa7pRcxHTHzxjDEHtVSZp3D9Rm3JdzT82EQpmXMb9wvfFJLuDPeSXZaRX1q1c

Assemble the signed credential with the following two steps:

Add the proofValue field with the previously computed base58-btc value to the proof options document.
Set the proof field of the credential to the augmented proof option document.

Example 28: Signed Employment Authorization Credential

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://w3id.org/citizenship/v4rc1"
  ],
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "EmploymentAuthorizationDocumentCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "did:key:zDnaegE6RR3atJtHKwTRTWHsJ3kNHqFwv7n9YjTgmU7TyfU76",
    "image": ""
  },
  "credentialSubject": {
    "type": [
      "Person",
      "EmployablePerson"
    ],
    "givenName": "JOHN",
    "additionalName": "JACOB",
    "familyName": "SMITH",
    "image": "",
    "gender": "Male",
    "residentSince": "2015-01-01",
    "birthCountry": "Bahamas",
    "birthDate": "1999-07-17",
    "employmentAuthorizationDocument": {
      "type": "EmploymentAuthorizationDocument",
      "identifier": "83627465",
      "lprCategory": "C09",
      "lprNumber": "999-999-999"
    }
  },
  "name": "Employment Authorization Document",
  "description": "Example Employment Authorization Document.",
  "validFrom": "2019-12-03T00:00:00Z",
  "validUntil": "2029-12-03T00:00:00Z",
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
    "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "zeuuS9pi2ZR8Q41bFFJKS9weSWkwa7pRcxHTHzxjDEHtVSZp3D9Rm3JdzT82EQpmXMb9wvfFJLuDPeSXZaRX1q1c"
  }
}

The signer needs to generate a private/public key pair with the private key used for signing and the public key made available for verification. The representation of the public key, and the representation of the private key are shown below.

Example 29: Private and Public keys for Signature

{
  publicKeyMultibase: "z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
  secretKeyMultibase: "z3u2en7t5LR2WtQH5PfFqMqwVHBeXouLzo6haApm8XHqvjxq"
}

Signing begins with a credential without an attached proof, which is converted to canonical form, and then hashed, as shown in the following three examples.

Example 30: Credential without Proof

{
    "@context": [
        "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
        "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
    ],
    "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
    "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "AlumniCredential"],
    "name": "Alumni Credential",
    "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
    "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
    "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
    "credentialSubject": {
        "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
        "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
    }
}

Example 31: Canonical Credential without Proof

{"@context":["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2","https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"],"credentialSubject":{"alumniOf":"The School of Examples","id":"did:example:abcdefgh"},"description":"A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.","id":"urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33","issuer":"https://vc.example/issuers/5678","name":"Alumni Credential","type":["VerifiableCredential","AlumniCredential"],"validFrom":"2023-01-01T00:00:00Z"}

Example 32: Hash of Canonical Credential without Proof (hex)

59b7cb6251b8991add1ce0bc83107e3db9dbbab5bd2c28f687db1a03abc92f19

The next step is to take the proof options document, convert it to canonical form, and obtain its hash, as shown in the next three examples.

Example 33: Proof Options Document

{
  "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
  "cryptosuite": "eddsa-jcs-2022",
  "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ]
}

Example 34: Canonical Proof Options Document

{"@context":["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2","https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"],"created":"2023-02-24T23:36:38Z","cryptosuite":"eddsa-jcs-2022","proofPurpose":"assertionMethod","type":"DataIntegrityProof","verificationMethod":"did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2"}

Example 35: Hash of Canonical Proof Options Document (hex)

66ab154f5c2890a140cb8388a22a160454f80575f6eae09e5a097cabe539a1db

Example 36: Combine hashes of Proof Options and Credential (hex)

66ab154f5c2890a140cb8388a22a160454f80575f6eae09e5a097cabe539a1db59b7cb6251b8991add1ce0bc83107e3db9dbbab5bd2c28f687db1a03abc92f19

Example 37: Signature of Combined Hashes (hex)

407cd12654b33d718ecbb99179a1506daaa849450bf3fc523cce3e1c96f8b80351da3f253d725c6f00b07c9e5448d50b3ef78012b9ab54255116d069c6dd2808

Example 38: Signature of Combined Hashes base58-btc

z2HnFSSPPBzR36zdDgK8PbEHeXbR56YF24jwMpt3R1eHXQzJDMWS93FCzpvJpwTWd3GAVFuUfjoJdcnTMuVor51aX

Assemble the signed credential with the following two steps:

Add the proofValue field with the previously computed base58-btc value to the proof options document.
Set the proof field of the credential to the augmented proof option document.

Example 39: Signed Credential

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "cryptosuite": "eddsa-jcs-2022",
    "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "@context": [
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
    ],
    "proofValue": "z2HnFSSPPBzR36zdDgK8PbEHeXbR56YF24jwMpt3R1eHXQzJDMWS93FCzpvJpwTWd3GAVFuUfjoJdcnTMuVor51aX"
  }
}

The signer needs to generate a private/public key pair with the private key used for signing and the public key made available for verification. The representation of the public key, and the representation of the private key, are shown below.

Example 40: Private and Public keys for Signature

{
    publicKeyMultibase: "z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
    secretKeyMultibase: "z3u2en7t5LR2WtQH5PfFqMqwVHBeXouLzo6haApm8XHqvjxq"
}

Signing begins with a credential without an attached proof, which is converted to canonical form, and then hashed, as shown in the following three examples.

Example 41: Credential without Proof

{
    "@context": [
        "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
        "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
    ],
    "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
    "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "AlumniCredential"],
    "name": "Alumni Credential",
    "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
    "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
    "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
    "credentialSubject": {
        "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
        "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
    }
}

Example 42: Canonical Credential without Proof

<did:example:abcdefgh> <https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples#alumniOf> "The School of Examples" .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#VerifiableCredential> .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples#AlumniCredential> .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://schema.org/description> "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential." .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://schema.org/name> "Alumni Credential" .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#credentialSubject> <did:example:abcdefgh> .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#issuer> <https://vc.example/issuers/5678> .
<urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33> <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#validFrom> "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime> .

Example 43: Hash of Canonical Credential without Proof (hex)

517744132ae165a5349155bef0bb0cf2258fff99dfe1dbd914b938d775a36017

The next step is to take the proof options document, convert it to canonical form, and obtain its hash, as shown in the next three examples.

Example 44: Proof Options Document

{
  "type": "Ed25519Signature2020",
  "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2",
    "https://w3id.org/security/suites/ed25519-2020/v1"
  ]
}

Example 45: Canonical Proof Options Document

_:c14n0 <http://purl.org/dc/terms/created> "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime> .
_:c14n0 <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <https://w3id.org/security#Ed25519Signature2020> .
_:c14n0 <https://w3id.org/security#proofPurpose> <https://w3id.org/security#assertionMethod> .
_:c14n0 <https://w3id.org/security#verificationMethod> <did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2> .

Example 46: Hash of Canonical Proof Options Document (hex)

04e14bcf5727cba0c0aa04a04d22a56fef915d5f8f7756bb92ae67cb1d0c4847

Example 47: Combine hashes of Proof Options and Credential (hex)

04e14bcf5727cba0c0aa04a04d22a56fef915d5f8f7756bb92ae67cb1d0c4847517744132ae165a5349155bef0bb0cf2258fff99dfe1dbd914b938d775a36017

Example 48: Signature of Combined Hashes (hex)

cd8d023e8a9b462d563bbbd24c4499d8172738eb3f5235d74f65971e9be36dd7f23a1e201791e9a6747e45b8fa877a984f51f591567365c4d8222ecad39be60c

Example 49: Signature of Combined Hashes base58-btc

z57Mm1vboMtZiCyJ4aReZsv8co4Re64Y8GEjL1ZARzMbXZgkARFLqFs1P345NpPGG2hgCrS4nNdvJhpwnrNyG3kEF

Assemble the signed credential with the following two steps:

Add the proofValue field with the previously computed base58-btc value to the proof options document.
Set the proof field of the credential to the augmented proof option document.

Example 50: Signed Credential

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2",
    "https://w3id.org/security/suites/ed25519-2020/v1"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "Ed25519Signature2020",
    "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2#z6MkrJVnaZkeFzdQyMZu1cgjg7k1pZZ6pvBQ7XJPt4swbTQ2",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z57Mm1vboMtZiCyJ4aReZsv8co4Re64Y8GEjL1ZARzMbXZgkARFLqFs1P345NpPGG2hgCrS4nNdvJhpwnrNyG3kEF"
  }
}

Proof sets and chains are defined in the [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]. We provide test vectors showing the creation of proof sets and chains with the eddsa-rdfc-2022 cryptosuite. Multiple signers can be involved in the generation of proof sets and chains so multiple public/private key pairs are needed. These are shown below.

Example 51: Public and Private Key Pairs

{
  "keyPair1": {
    "publicKeyMultibase": "z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7",
    "privateKeyMultibase": "z3u2W4YnTstS1nSSBAgZcYSJF43JuZ9uLV6bF38B1Bf8NugW"
  },
  "keyPair2": {
    "publicKeyMultibase": "z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E",
    "privateKeyMultibase": "z3u2cfp4Q17kMGhNCh348a3yw3cUBiWK6RXRzyJE54sixMFn"
  },
  "keyPair3": {
    "publicKeyMultibase": "z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1",
    "privateKeyMultibase": "z3u2Zr3tcDLBDQKGxVa9SRDFNLqNqPWsa8p9rWPvCEH6bADB"
  },
  "keyPair4": {
    "publicKeyMultibase": "z6Mkm1S51iPHJvDEkJ9MRtxJmT8Pqo6wHipAFwBAjN83vntT",
    "privateKeyMultibase": "z3u2ZTWiFwM17veUR7sXniY66Gf14SqMdpMLy7SW9x4EDdmw"
  }
}

The original unsigned credential is shown below:

Example 52: Unsigned Credential

{
    "@context": [
        "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
        "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
    ],
    "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
    "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "AlumniCredential"],
    "name": "Alumni Credential",
    "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
    "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
    "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
    "credentialSubject": {
        "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
        "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
    }
}

To demonstrate creating a proof set, we start with a document containing a single proof and add another proof to it. The starting document is shown below and contains a proof signed with keyPair1.

Example 53: Starting Document for Proof Set

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "id": "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
    "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
    "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7#z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z66vWyqwAghu52WbpRkCwFRTu6Msn92ArtjpJ3gGMSVoU5RADwBfszoDt1QWY8owqLPz4nTj7hAwV7xFti1p93zdr"
  }
}

The options input to Section 4.4: Add Proof Set/Chain in [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] is shown below. Note that it does not include a previousProof attribute since we are constructing a proof set and not a chain. In addition, we will be using keyPair2 for signing.

Example 54: Proof Options for Set

{
  "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
  "id": "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54",
  "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
  "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E#z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod"
}

Per the algorithm of Section 4.4: Add Proof Set/Chain in [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY], we create an array variable, allProofs, and add the proof from the starting document to it. Since there is no previousProof attribute, no modification of unsignedDocument is needed prior to computing the signed proof in step 6 of Section 4.4: Add Proof Set/Chain in [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]. The signed proof configuration is shown below.

Example 55: Signed Proof Options

{
  "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
  "id": "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54",
  "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
  "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E#z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
  "proofValue": "z2scr94SNNrGpP2bE7ajvKWeUHm7HJ2edDkxpARvFAQ8V3USzwEzibqrXKaLHBrWostswsfvg82twQR88BgtnsrXY"
}

The signed proof options above gets appended to the allProofs variable, which then gets set as the proof attribute of the unsigned document to produce the final signed document as shown below.

Example 56: Signed Proof Set

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": [
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7#z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z66vWyqwAghu52WbpRkCwFRTu6Msn92ArtjpJ3gGMSVoU5RADwBfszoDt1QWY8owqLPz4nTj7hAwV7xFti1p93zdr"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E#z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z2scr94SNNrGpP2bE7ajvKWeUHm7HJ2edDkxpARvFAQ8V3USzwEzibqrXKaLHBrWostswsfvg82twQR88BgtnsrXY"
    }
  ]
}

This collection of test vectors demonstrates the construction a proof chain. We start with a document containing a proof set, i.e., our previous example, and then add a new proof to the credential that has a dependency on the existing proofs. This example also demonstrates the case where the previousProofs attribute is an array. This example uses keyPair3 and the starting document is given below.

Example 57: Starting Document for Proof Chain

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": [
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7#z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z66vWyqwAghu52WbpRkCwFRTu6Msn92ArtjpJ3gGMSVoU5RADwBfszoDt1QWY8owqLPz4nTj7hAwV7xFti1p93zdr"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E#z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z2scr94SNNrGpP2bE7ajvKWeUHm7HJ2edDkxpARvFAQ8V3USzwEzibqrXKaLHBrWostswsfvg82twQR88BgtnsrXY"
    }
  ]
}

The options input to Section 4.4: Add Proof Set/Chain in [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] is shown below. Note that it includes a previousProof attribute since we are constructing a proof chain.

Example 58: Options for Proof Chain

{
  "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
  "id": "urn:uuid:d94f792a-c546-4d06-b38a-da070ab56c23",
  "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
  "created": "2023-02-26T22:06:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1#z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
  "previousProof": [
    "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
    "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54"
  ]
}

Per the algorithm of Section 4.4: Add Proof Set/Chain in [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY], we create an array variable, allProofs, and add the proofs from the starting document to it. Since the options contains the previousProof attribute, we compute the matchingProofs variable per step 4 of Section 4.4: Add Proof Set/Chain, and we set the unsecuredDocument.proof equal to the matchingProofs. This produces the document shown below.

Example 59: Temporary Unsecured Document for Binding Previous Proofs

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": [
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7#z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z66vWyqwAghu52WbpRkCwFRTu6Msn92ArtjpJ3gGMSVoU5RADwBfszoDt1QWY8owqLPz4nTj7hAwV7xFti1p93zdr"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E#z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z2scr94SNNrGpP2bE7ajvKWeUHm7HJ2edDkxpARvFAQ8V3USzwEzibqrXKaLHBrWostswsfvg82twQR88BgtnsrXY"
    }
  ]
}

In step 6, we use the previous document (unsecured document with previous proofs added to it) to compute the proofValue attribute. This gives the signed configuration options (proof) shown below:

Example 60: Signed Configuration Options (proof)

{
  "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
  "id": "urn:uuid:d94f792a-c546-4d06-b38a-da070ab56c23",
  "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
  "created": "2023-02-26T22:06:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1#z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
  "previousProof": [
    "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
    "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54"
  ],
  "proofValue": "zWaPeEvBAkhQpNQj8pknuvg5STcKnt3cvM9t4kAYeJETFjvVMSXEEjadC4uxC9fKCn6JHbjt6fj2fhoaVNynBm6J"
}

The signed proof options above gets appended to the allProofs variable, which then gets set as the proof attribute of the unsigned document to produce the final signed document as shown below.

Example 61: Signed Proof Chain

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": [
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7#z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z66vWyqwAghu52WbpRkCwFRTu6Msn92ArtjpJ3gGMSVoU5RADwBfszoDt1QWY8owqLPz4nTj7hAwV7xFti1p93zdr"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E#z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z2scr94SNNrGpP2bE7ajvKWeUHm7HJ2edDkxpARvFAQ8V3USzwEzibqrXKaLHBrWostswsfvg82twQR88BgtnsrXY"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:d94f792a-c546-4d06-b38a-da070ab56c23",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-26T22:06:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1#z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "previousProof": [
        "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
        "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54"
      ],
      "proofValue": "zWaPeEvBAkhQpNQj8pknuvg5STcKnt3cvM9t4kAYeJETFjvVMSXEEjadC4uxC9fKCn6JHbjt6fj2fhoaVNynBm6J"
    }
  ]
}

This collection of test vectors demonstrates construction of an extended proof chain. We start with the output of the previous section and add an additional proof that is dependent on one of the existing proofs. This example uses keyPair4, and the starting document is given below.

Example 62: Starting Document for Extended Proof Chain

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": [
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7#z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z66vWyqwAghu52WbpRkCwFRTu6Msn92ArtjpJ3gGMSVoU5RADwBfszoDt1QWY8owqLPz4nTj7hAwV7xFti1p93zdr"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E#z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z2scr94SNNrGpP2bE7ajvKWeUHm7HJ2edDkxpARvFAQ8V3USzwEzibqrXKaLHBrWostswsfvg82twQR88BgtnsrXY"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:d94f792a-c546-4d06-b38a-da070ab56c23",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-26T22:06:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1#z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "previousProof": [
        "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
        "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54"
      ],
      "proofValue": "zWaPeEvBAkhQpNQj8pknuvg5STcKnt3cvM9t4kAYeJETFjvVMSXEEjadC4uxC9fKCn6JHbjt6fj2fhoaVNynBm6J"
    }
  ]
}

The options input to Section 4.4: Add Proof Set/Chain in [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] is shown below. Note that it includes a previousProof attribute since we are constructing a proof chain, however this time it is a single value.

Example 63: Options for Extended Proof Chain

{
  "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
  "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
  "created": "2023-02-26T22:16:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6Mkm1S51iPHJvDEkJ9MRtxJmT8Pqo6wHipAFwBAjN83vntT#z6Mkm1S51iPHJvDEkJ9MRtxJmT8Pqo6wHipAFwBAjN83vntT",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
  "previousProof": "urn:uuid:d94f792a-c546-4d06-b38a-da070ab56c23"
}

Per the algorithm of Section 4.4: Add Proof Set/Chain in [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY], we create an array variable, allProofs, and add the proofs from the starting document to it. Since the options contains the previousProof attribute, we compute the matchingProofs variable per step 4 of Section 4.4: Add Proof Set/Chain, and we set the unsecuredDocument.proof equal to the matchingProofs. This produces the document shown below.

Example 64: Temporary Unsecured Document for Binding Previous Proofs (Extended Chain)

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": [
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:d94f792a-c546-4d06-b38a-da070ab56c23",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-26T22:06:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1#z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "previousProof": [
        "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
        "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54"
      ],
      "proofValue": "zWaPeEvBAkhQpNQj8pknuvg5STcKnt3cvM9t4kAYeJETFjvVMSXEEjadC4uxC9fKCn6JHbjt6fj2fhoaVNynBm6J"
    }
  ]
}

In step 6, we use the previous document (unsecured document with previous proofs added to it) to compute the proofValue attribute. This gives the signed configuration options (proof) shown below:

Example 65: Signed Configuration Options (Extended)

{
  "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
  "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
  "created": "2023-02-26T22:16:38Z",
  "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6Mkm1S51iPHJvDEkJ9MRtxJmT8Pqo6wHipAFwBAjN83vntT#z6Mkm1S51iPHJvDEkJ9MRtxJmT8Pqo6wHipAFwBAjN83vntT",
  "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
  "previousProof": "urn:uuid:d94f792a-c546-4d06-b38a-da070ab56c23",
  "proofValue": "z4b5uUtxNiV4E541LiR8qLvA21xM1Vt4Hfn6nLmmDePdFvLB3jFj3HyEEJyRMbpJzv4Gfdr8ABeuRTxAvZv6KWRRh"
}

The signed proof options above gets appended to the allProofs variable, which then gets set as the proof attribute of the unsigned document to produce the final signed document as shown below.

Example 66: Signed Proof Chain (Extended)

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:58172aac-d8ba-11ed-83dd-0b3aef56cc33",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "AlumniCredential"
  ],
  "name": "Alumni Credential",
  "description": "A minimum viable example of an Alumni Credential.",
  "issuer": "https://vc.example/issuers/5678",
  "validFrom": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdefgh",
    "alumniOf": "The School of Examples"
  },
  "proof": [
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7#z6MktgKTsu1QhX6QPbyqG6geXdw6FQCZBPq7uQpieWbiQiG7",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z66vWyqwAghu52WbpRkCwFRTu6Msn92ArtjpJ3gGMSVoU5RADwBfszoDt1QWY8owqLPz4nTj7hAwV7xFti1p93zdr"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-24T23:36:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E#z6MkhWqdDBPojHA7cprTGTt5yHv5yUi1B8cnXn8ReLumkw6E",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "proofValue": "z2scr94SNNrGpP2bE7ajvKWeUHm7HJ2edDkxpARvFAQ8V3USzwEzibqrXKaLHBrWostswsfvg82twQR88BgtnsrXY"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "id": "urn:uuid:d94f792a-c546-4d06-b38a-da070ab56c23",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-26T22:06:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1#z6MkmEq87wkHCYnWnNZkigeDMGTN7oUw1upkhzd77KuXERS1",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "previousProof": [
        "urn:uuid:26329423-bec9-4b2e-88cb-a7c7d9dc4544",
        "urn:uuid:8cc9022b-6b14-4cf3-8571-74972c5feb54"
      ],
      "proofValue": "zWaPeEvBAkhQpNQj8pknuvg5STcKnt3cvM9t4kAYeJETFjvVMSXEEjadC4uxC9fKCn6JHbjt6fj2fhoaVNynBm6J"
    },
    {
      "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
      "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
      "created": "2023-02-26T22:16:38Z",
      "verificationMethod": "did:key:z6Mkm1S51iPHJvDEkJ9MRtxJmT8Pqo6wHipAFwBAjN83vntT#z6Mkm1S51iPHJvDEkJ9MRtxJmT8Pqo6wHipAFwBAjN83vntT",
      "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
      "previousProof": "urn:uuid:d94f792a-c546-4d06-b38a-da070ab56c23",
      "proofValue": "z4b5uUtxNiV4E541LiR8qLvA21xM1Vt4Hfn6nLmmDePdFvLB3jFj3HyEEJyRMbpJzv4Gfdr8ABeuRTxAvZv6KWRRh"
    }
  ]
}

This section is non-normative.

This section contains the substantive changes that have been made to this specification over time.

Changes since the Second Candidate Recommendation:

Various editorial changes in algorithms and descriptions to improve readability.
Update test vectors to use more relevant examples.

Changes since the First Candidate Recommendation:

Various editorial changes in algorithms and descriptions to improve readability.
Moved Multikey definitions to Controller Document.
Update examples to align with updates in Data Integrity.
Unify error handling between all Data Integrity cryptosuites.
Ensure that the created proof option is not required and additional proof options are included in the generated proof.
Move language related to context injection to Data Integrity.
Align proof serialization format and algorithm arguments with interfaces defined in Data Integrity.

Changes since the First Public Working Draft:

Added support for JSON Canonicalization Scheme in addition to RDF Dataset Canonicalization.
Added test vectors for rdfc and jcs cryptosuites.
Deprecated and moved Ed25519Signature2020 to appendix.
Add Security Considerations for proper implementation of EdDSA.
Move normative definition of Multikey to the Data Integrity specification.
Add RDF-CANON mitigation for Dataset poisoning.
Revise cryptographic suite names and align with other cryptosuites.
Add secretKeyMultibase definition.

This section is non-normative.

Work on this specification has been supported by the Rebooting the Web of Trust community facilitated by Christopher Allen, Shannon Appelcline, Kiara Robles, Brian Weller, Betty Dhamers, Kaliya Young, Manu Sporny, Drummond Reed, Joe Andrieu, Heather Vescent, Kim Hamilton Duffy, Samantha Chase, Andrew Hughes, Erica Connell, Shigeya Suzuki, Zaïda Rivai, Will Abramson, and Eric Schuh. The participants in the Internet Identity Workshop, facilitated by Phil Windley, Kaliya Young, Doc Searls, and Heidi Nobantu Saul, also supported the refinement of this work through numerous working sessions designed to educate about, debate on, and improve this specification.

The Working Group also thanks our Working Group Chair Brent Zundel, and ex-chair Kristina Yasuda, as well as our W3C Staff Contact, Ivan Herman, for their expert management and steady guidance of the group through the W3C standardization cycle. We also thank the Chairs of the W3C Credentials Community Group, Christopher Allen, Joe Andrieu, Kim Hamilton Duffy, Heather Vescent, Wayne Chang, Mike Prorock, Harrison Tang, Kimberly Wilson Linson, and Will Abramson, who oversaw the incubation of this work.

Portions of the work on this specification have been funded by the United States Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate under contracts 70RSAT20T00000029, 70RSAT21T00000016, 70RSAT23T00000005, 70RSAT20T00000010/P00001, 70RSAT20T00000029, 70RSAT21T00000016/P00001, 70RSAT23T00000005, 70RSAT23C00000030, 70RSAT23R00000006, 70RSAT24T00000011, and the National Science Foundation through NSF 22-572. The content of this specification does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the U.S. Government and no official endorsement should be inferred.

The Working Group would like to thank the following individuals for reviewing and providing feedback on and implementations of the specification (in alphabetical order by last name):

Greg Bernstein, Simon Bihel, Sebastian Crane, Stas Dmytryshyn, Tashi D. Gyeltshen, Ivan Herman, Andrew Jones, Filip Kolarik, Helge Krueger, Dominik Kuziński, Charles E. Lehner, Dave Longley, Tyler Minard, Bryan Newbold, Marty Reed, Brian Richter, Eugeniu Rusu, Markus Sabadello, Pritam Singh, Patrick St. Louis, Manu Sporny, Orie Steele, Ted Thibodeau Jr., Benjamin Young, and Dmitri Zagidulin.

[CID]: Controlled Identifiers v1.0. Michael Jones; Manu Sporny. W3C. 15 May 2025. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/cid-1.0/
[FIPS-186-5]: FIPS PUB 186-5: Digital Signature Standard (DSS). U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology. 3 February 2023. National Standard. URL: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf
[INFRA]: Infra Standard. Anne van Kesteren; Domenic Denicola. WHATWG. Living Standard. URL: https://infra.spec.whatwg.org/
[JSON-LD11-API]: JSON-LD 1.1 Processing Algorithms and API. Gregg Kellogg; Dave Longley; Pierre-Antoine Champin. W3C. 16 July 2020. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/json-ld11-api/
[RDF-CANON]: RDF Dataset Canonicalization. Gregg Kellogg; Dave Longley; Dan Yamamoto. W3C. 21 May 2024. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-canon/
[RFC2119]: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. S. Bradner. IETF. March 1997. Best Current Practice. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119
[RFC6234]: US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF). D. Eastlake 3rd; T. Hansen. IETF. May 2011. Informational. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234
[RFC8032]: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). S. Josefsson; I. Liusvaara. IETF. January 2017. Informational. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032
[RFC8174]: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words. B. Leiba. IETF. May 2017. Best Current Practice. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174
[RFC8785]: JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). A. Rundgren; B. Jordan; S. Erdtman. IETF. June 2020. Informational. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785
[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]: Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0. Ivan Herman; Manu Sporny; Ted Thibodeau Jr; Dave Longley; Greg Bernstein. W3C. 15 May 2025. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-integrity/
[vc-data-model-2.0]: Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0. Ivan Herman; Michael Jones; Manu Sporny; Ted Thibodeau Jr; Gabe Cohen. W3C. 15 May 2025. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/
[XMLSCHEMA11-2]: W3C XML Schema Definition Language (XSD) 1.1 Part 2: Datatypes. David Peterson; Sandy Gao; Ashok Malhotra; Michael Sperberg-McQueen; Henry Thompson; Paul V. Biron et al. W3C. 5 April 2012. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema11-2/

[Provable_Ed25519]: The Provable Security of Ed25519: Theory and Practice. Jacqueline Brendel; Cas Cremers; Dennis Jackson; Mang Zhao. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/823. 2020. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/823
[Taming_EdDSAs]: Taming the many EdDSAs. Konstantinos Chalkias; François Garillot; Valeria Nikolaenko. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/1244. 2020. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1244
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[VC-DI-ECDSA]: Data Integrity ECDSA Cryptosuites v1.0. Manu Sporny; Dave Longley; Greg Bernstein. W3C. 15 May 2025. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-di-ecdsa/

Data Integrity EdDSA Cryptosuites v1.0

Data Integrity EdDSA Cryptosuites v1.0

Achieving Data Integrity using EdDSA with Edwards curves

Abstract

Status of This Document

1. Introduction

1.1 Terminology

1.2 Conformance

2. Data Model

2.1 Verification Methods

2.1.1 Multikey

2.2 Proof Representations

2.2.1 DataIntegrityProof

3. Algorithms

3.1 Instantiate Cryptosuite

3.2 eddsa-rdfc-2022

3.2.1 Create Proof (eddsa-rdfc-2022)

3.2.2 Verify Proof (eddsa-rdfc-2022)

3.2.3 Transformation (eddsa-rdfc-2022)

3.2.4 Hashing (eddsa-rdfc-2022)

3.2.5 Proof Configuration (eddsa-rdfc-2022)

3.2.6 Proof Serialization (eddsa-rdfc-2022)

3.2.7 Proof Verification (eddsa-rdfc-2022)

3.3 eddsa-jcs-2022

3.3.1 Create Proof (eddsa-jcs-2022)

3.3.2 Verify Proof (eddsa-jcs-2022)

3.3.3 Transformation (eddsa-jcs-2022)

3.3.4 Hashing (eddsa-jcs-2022)

3.3.5 Proof Configuration (eddsa-jcs-2022)

3.3.6 Proof Serialization (eddsa-jcs-2022)

3.3.7 Proof Verification (eddsa-jcs-2022)

4. Security Considerations

4.1 Security Properties of Ed25519 Implementations

4.1.1 Signature Security Properties

4.1.2 Achieving Ed25519 Security Properties

5. Privacy Considerations

5.1 Selective and Unlinkable Disclosure

A. The Ed25519Signature2020 Suite

A.1 Data Model

A.1.1 Verification Methods

A.1.1.1 Ed25519VerificationKey2020

A.1.2 Proof representations

A.1.2.1 Ed25519Signature2020

A.2 Algorithms

A.2.1 Ed25519Signature2020

A.2.1.1 Add Proof (Ed25519Signature2020)

A.2.1.2 Verify Proof (Ed25519Signature2020)

A.2.1.3 Transformation (Ed25519Signature2020)

A.2.1.4 Hashing (Ed25519Signature2020)

A.2.1.5 Proof Configuration (Ed25519Signature2020)

A.2.1.6 Proof Serialization (Ed25519Signature2020)

A.2.1.7 Proof Verification (Ed25519Signature2020)

B. Test Vectors

B.1 Representation: eddsa-rdfc-2022

B.2 Enhanced Example for Representation: eddsa-rdfc-2022

B.3 Representation: eddsa-jcs-2022

B.4 Representation: Ed25519Signature2020

B.5 Proof Sets and Chains

B.5.1 Proof Set

B.5.2 Proof Chain with Multiple Dependencies

B.5.3 Extended Proof Chain

C. Revision History

D. Acknowledgements

E. References

E.1 Normative references

E.2 Informative references