1 Joseph Maxwell’s paper: “Causal Explanation, Qualitative Research and Scientific Inquiry in Education” grapples with two models of causality that has in essence created a Chisolm between quantitative and qualitative researchers. At a fundamental level Maxwell argues for the existence of two distinct models of causality. The reader is forced to conceive of two very different models, one used by most if not all quantitative researchers (regularity model of causality proposed by Hume) and the alternative model of causality adopted by critical realist and those in the qualitative research arena. In this paper Maxwell notes that the standard or “gold” model of causality stems from a report issued by the National Research Council (NRC): Scientific Research in Education. It appears that todays preferred model of causality based on Hume’s model of regularity is inescapably couched in “Scientifically Based Research” (SBR). He cites the traditional model of causality as being too restrictive and by its very nature intrinsically problematic. This unsatisfactory model of causality is implicitly used when conducting SBR by most quantitative researchers. Maxwell notes how scientific realism offers a different conceptual model of causality, one that offers a different account of what a causal explanation might look like. Accordingly, this alternative way of looking at it challenges SBR’s preferred model of causal regularity. A conceptual discomfort occurs when Maxwell attempts to re-conceptualize the traditional model of causality. He states that “The central manifestation of the regularity view in the NRC (2002) report is its presentation of causality as primarily pertaining to whether x caused y, rather than how it did so (p. 110). This view apparently ties in with many in the realists community who lay claim to the “actual causal mechanism or “how” factor of causality. 2 Maxwell cites Salmon (1989), as arguing the case for both constructs of causality (unobservable and observable). Salmon insists that one can agree that they are different but yet that they are compatible aspects of scientific explanation. Another critical realists Sayer (1992), argues that too often the traditional view of regular causality assumes a regularity in the conjunction between two events. As a result we are left with an ‘inferior’ narrative ‘ad hoc.’ According to Sayer this is an erroneous view of causality and asserts that realism replaces regularity with two other accounts: Objects and social relations. He goes on to state that these observable mechanisms have causal powers which can be explained independently of regularities. After consideration of the evidential examples offered by Maxwell I have come to a quite different conclusion. This different model of causality lead me to believe that the problem isn’t so much about “the preferred model of causality” but rather about the misapplication of the concept of causality. If SBR advocates were to be hypothetically removed by 1 degree (step) from actually observing the actual causal mechanism then Maxwell and the critical realists are in a different category all together. As most quantitative researchers who back SBR know, the regularities inherent for any two events are part of the underlying assumptions that lead to the statistical patterns, covariance and correlations that they have come to expect. For realists like Maxwell, the whole idea behind their concept of causality rests on the premise that they are in essence inventing a new system of notation. Realists who subscribe to this notation are not removed by degrees (steps) from identifying the actual causal mechanism, they are really revolutionizing the concept of what causality is instead. 3 A possible solution to this dilemma might stem from a philosopher’s work on the employment of a grammatical investigation of the term – causality. This philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein looked at the way language worked and insisted on clarification of its use. The idea of a grammatical investigation would imply an analysis concerning the use and definition of the term – causality. If Maxwell and the realists are going to insists that the “actual” mechanism of causality can be observed and explained then this assumption must be validated by an agreed upon criteria. In essence the realists must be prepared to acknowledge that the word causality is now being re- defined and used in a new way. If this were to be the case, they must be ready to demonstrate or show how this new way of using causality is continuous or consistent with its use in other domains. To be fair, Maxwell is not in error here. Speaking about causality in this manner is fine so long as he concedes that he is employing the concept of “causality” in a new way. It must be able to be used in this new manner without overlapping its uses in other domains. This concept of “causality” must be used in such a new way that it does not necessarily imply a continuum of use in other domains in which it has traditionally been employed. If however, Maxwell were to disagree and insist that the realists version of causality is consistent or continuous within other domains then by implication a justification would be needed here. Qualitative researchers and critical realists who insists on its continuity of use in other domains would need to give a more compelling case if we are to take their “version” of causality seriously and not reject it out right as others in the research community have done so. 4 Variance theory presumes that the regularity of causality forms the basis of all quantitative statistical results and expresses itself in the interaction of variables and ensuing correlations. Other variables held constant the presumed causal regularity will produce statistically variable results. Process theory on the other hand insists that the actual causal mechanism is not unexplainable or simply a regularity of two events but instead identifiable. It is not based on a variable outcome but instead on an account of context, makeup, behavior and interrelationships. This is the model of causality that Maxwell and other critical realists insists upon and believe. These accounts must be seen as indicative of what causality is, the actual mechanism of causality. According to Pawson and Tilley (1997), these accounts are actually “responsible” for this version of causality and some philosophers and researchers even make the claim that the very act of causality can even be observed. Maxwell cites evidence that the mechanism of causality can be identified by qualitative analysis and even cites additional evidence for mental phenomena, meanings and beliefs as being construed as a form of actual causality. In closing it appears that Maxwell isn’t appealing to just one but several possible re-definitions of what actual causality could be. The problem is that there have been traditionally two distinct categories or domains in which causality resides, one being the epistemological concept of causality (via Hume) and the scientific concept of causality in which case most if not all quantitative research is based on. There really isn’t a third category or domain in which causality resides that would entitle Maxwell to “hang his hat on.” It is true that a causal explanation provides information on how something can come to be in terms of an underlying mechanism. But causal processes (cause and effect) can only be “discovered” by conducting a repeated number of experiments that ultimately provide the researcher with inferences from which to 5 draw upon. The very act of causal experimentation involves the testing of a hypothesis which is generally accepted if it agrees with observation and results. Process theory as propounded by critical realists cannot provide an adequate account of causality for the sole reason that it starts off as a categorical mistake and as a result leads the researcher into darkness. Variance theory allows for causality to be treated as a hypothetical construct while process theory by its very nature cannot. While this form of causality can typically be attributable to human behavior it ultimately cannot account for an agreed upon criteria-based objective measurement device. Wittgenstein once said “Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement.” This is the conundrum that Maxwell and other realists find themselves in. They want to desperately claim that this form of causality and the other domains in which causality is posited are analogous in form. This is where the problem lies, the analogy cannot hold, we are dealing with two distinct categories…..