HyperWar: International Military Tribunal for the Far East [Chapter 8]

HyperWar: International Military Tribunal for the Far East [Chapter 8]
Chapter VIII
Conventional War Crimes
(Atrocities)
After carefully examining and considering all
the evidence, we find that it is not practicable in a
judgment such as this to state fully the mass of oral and
documentary evidence presented; for a complete statement
of the scale and character of the atrocities, reference
must be had to the record of the trial.
The evidence relating to atrocities and other
Conventional War Crimes presented before the Tribunal
establishes that from the opening of the war in China
until the surrender of Japan in August 1945, torture,
murder, rape and other cruelties of the most inhumane
and barbarous character were freely practiced by the
Japanese Army and Navy. During a period of several
months, the Tribunal heard evidence, orally or by affidavit,
from witnesses who testified in detail to the atrocities
committed in all theaters of war on a scale so
vast, yet following so common a pattern in all theaters,
that only one conclusion is possible -- the atrocities
were either secretly ordered or wilfully permitted by
the Japanese Government or individual members thereof
and by the leaders of the armed forces.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the circumstances
and the conduct of the accused in relation
to the question of responsibility for the atrocities, it
is necessary to examine the matters charged. In doing
so, we will, in some case where it may be convenient,
refer to the association, if any, of the accused with
the happenings under discussion. In other cases, and
generally, as far as it is practicable, circumstances
--1001--
having relevance to the issue of responsibility will be
dealt with later.
At the beginning of the Pacific War in December
1941, the Japanese Government did institute a system
and an organization for dealing with prisoners of war
and civilian internees. Superficially, the system would
appear to have been appropriate; however, from beginning
to end, the customary and conventional rules of war
designed to prevent inhumanity were flagrantly disregarded.
Ruthless killing of prisoners by shooting,
decapitation, drowning, and other methods; death marches
in which prisoners, including the sick, were forced to
march long distances under conditions which not even
well-conditioned troops could stand, many of those dropping
out being shot or bayonetted by the guards; forced
labor in tropical heat without protection from the sun;
complete lack of housing and medical supplies, in many
cases resulting in thousands of deaths from disease;
beatings and torture of all kinds to extract information
or confessions or for minor offences; killing without
trial of recaptured prisoners after escape and for attempt
to escape; killing without trial of captured aviators;
and even cannibalism: these are some of the
atrocities of which proof was made before the Tribunal.
The extent of the atrocities and the result
of the lack of food and medical supplies is exemplified
by a comparison of the number of deaths of prisoners
of war in the European Theater with the number of deaths
in the Pacific Theater. Of United States and United
Kingdom forces, 235,473 were taken prisoners by the German
and Italian Armies; of these, 9,348, or 4 percent, died in
--1002--
captivity. In the Pacific Theater, 132,134 prisoners
were taken by the Japanese from the United States and
United Kingdom forces alone, of whom 35,756, or 27 per
cent, died in captivity.
Allegation That the Laws of War Did Not Apply
To the Conduct of the War in China
From the outbreak of the Mukden Incident till
the end of the war, the successive Japanese Governments
refused to acknowledge that the hostilities in China
constituted a war. They persistently called it an
"Incident." With this as an excuse, the military
authorities persistently asserted that the rules of
war did not apply in the conduct of the hostilities.
This war was envisaged by Japan's military
leaders as a punitive war, which was being fought to
punish the people of China for their refusal to acknowledge
the superiority and leadership of the Japanese
race and to cooperate with Japan. These military leaders
intended to make the war so brutal and savage in all
its consequences as to break the will of the Chinese
people to resist.
As the Southern movement advanced to cut off
aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chief-of-Staff
of the Central China Expeditionary Force, on 24 July 1939,
sent an estimate of the situation to War Minister ITAGAKI.
In that estimate of the situation, he said: "The Army Air
Force should carry out attacks upon strategic points
in the hinterland in order to terrorize the enemy forces
and civilians, and so develop among them an anti-war,
pacifist tendency. What we expect of offensive operations
against the interior is the mental terror they
will create among the enemy forces and civilians rather
than the material damage inflicted direct upon enemy
--1003--
personnel and equipment. We will wait and see them
falling into nervous prostration in an excess of terror
and madly starting anti-Chiang and pacifist movements."
Government and military spokesmen alike from
time to time stated that the purpose of the war was to
make the Chinese people "seriously reflect" upon the
error of their ways, which in effect meant acceptance of
Japanese domination.
HIROTA, in February 1938, speaking in the House
of Peers, said "Japan has been endeavoring to make the
Chinese Nationalist Government make reflections, if
possible, while chastising their mistaken ideas by armed
force . . ." In the same speech, he said "Since they were
facing Japan with very strong anti-Japanese feeling, we
decided on a policy whereby we had to necessarily
chastise them."
HIRANUMA began his "stimulation of the national
morale" by a speech to the Diet on 221 January 1939, in
which he said: "In regard to the China Incident upon
which both the Cabinet and the people are concentrating
their endeavors, there exists an immutable policy for
which Imperial Sanction was obtained by the previous
Cabinet. The present Cabinet is of course committed
to the same policy. I hope the intention of Japan will
be understood by the Chinese so that they may cooperate
with us. As for those who fail to understand, we hav
no other alternative than to exterminate them."
Formulation of Military Policy
Before discussing the nature and extent of
atrocities committed by the Japanese armed forces, it is
desirable to state, very shortly, the system under which
such conduct should have been controlled.
--1004--
Those having authority in the formulation of
military policy were the Army and Navy Ministers, the
Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, the Inspector-General
of Military Education, the Supreme War Council of
Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and the War Council.
The Army and Navy Ministers administered; the Inspector=General
of Military education supervised training; and
the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs directed
--1005--
operations of the armed forces. The two war councils
were advisory groups. The Army enjoyed special prerogatives.
One of these was the exclusive right to nominate
the successor of the War Minister. By the exercise
of this power, the Army was able to enforce continued adherence
to the policies advocated by it.
In the War Ministry, the policy initiating agency
was the Military Affairs Bureau, which after consultation
with the army General Staff, other Bureaux of the
War Ministry, and other departments of the government
concerned, announced the policy of the Japanese Military,
usually in the form of regulations issued over the signature
of the War Minister. This was the Bureau which
formed the policy and issued regulations governing the
conduct of war in general, and the treatment of civilian
internees and prisoners of war in particular. Such
administration of prisoners of ar as there was during
the war in China was conducted by this Bureau. Until
the opening of hostilities in the Pacific War, the administration
of civilian internees and prisoners of war
was retained by this Bureau when a special Division was
created in the Bureau to perform that function. Three
of the accused served as Chiefs of this powerful Military
Affairs Bureau; they were KOISO, MUTO, and SATO.
KOISO served at the beginning of the war in China, between
the dates of 8 January 1930 and 29 February 1932. MUTO
served before and after the commencement of the Pacific
War; he became Chief of the Bureau on 30 September 1939,
and served until 20 April 1942. SATO was employed in the
Bureau before the beginning of the Pacific War, having been
appointed on 15 July 1938, when MUTO was transferred
--1006--
to command troops in Sumatra, SATO became Chief of the
Bureau and served in that capacity from 20 April 1942
to 14 December 1944.
The corresponding Bureau in the Navy Ministry
was the Naval Affairs Bureau. The Naval Affairs Bureau
formed and promulgated regulations for the Navy and
prescribed the policy of the Navy in conducting war at
sea, occupied islands and other territory under its
jurisdiction, and administered such prisoners of war and
civilian internees as came under its power. The accused
OKA served as Chief of this Bureau before and during the
Pacific War, from 15 October 1940 to 31 July 1944.
In the War Ministry, the Vice-Minister of War
was the operating chief of the War Ministry Office and
was responsible for coordination of the various Bureaux
and other agencies under the Ministry. He received reports
and suggestions from commanders in the field, advised
the War Minister on the affairs under the Ministry
and often issued orders an directives. Three of
the accused served as Vice-Minister of War during the
period prior to the Pacific War. KOISO served from
29 February 1932 to 8 August 1932. UMEZU occupied the
position from 23 March 1936 to 30 May 1938. TOJO became
Vice-Minister of War on 30 May 1938, and served until 10
December 1939. KIMURA was Vice-Minister of War before
and after the commencement of the Pacific War; he was
appointed on 10 April 1941 and served until 11 March 1943.
Lastly, of course, the commanders in the field
were responsible for the maintenance of the discipline
and the observance of the laws and customs of war by the
troops under their command.
--1007--
Captives Taken in the China War Were Treated as Bandits
The Japanese Delegate at Geneva, in accepting the
resolution of the League of Nations of 10 December 1931,
setting up the Lytton Commission and imposing a virtual
truce, stated that his acceptance was based on the understanding
that the resolution would not preclude the
Japanese Army from taking action against "bandits" in
Manchuria. It was under this exception to the resolution
that the Japanese Military continued hostilities against
the Chinese troops in Manchuria. They maintained that
no state of war existed between Japan and China; that the
conflict was a mere "incident" to which the laws of war
did not apply; and that those Chinese troops who resisted
the Japanese Army were not lawful combatants, but were
merely "bandits." A ruthless campaign for the extermination
of these "bandits" in Manchuria was inaugurated.
Although the main Chinese Army withdrew within
the Great Wall at the end of 1931, resistance to the
Japanese Army was constantly maintained by widely dispersed
units of Chinese volunteers. The Kwantung Army
Intelligence Service listed a large number of so-called
Chinese route-armies, which in 1932 formed the subdivisions
of the volunteer armies. These volunteer armies
were active in the areas around Mukden, Haisheng and
Yingkow. in August 1932, fighting broke out in the
immediate vicinity of Mukden. At the height of the
fighting at Mukden on 8 August 1932, Vice-Minister of
War KOISO was appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung
Army and also Chief of its Intelligence Service. He
served in that capacity until 5 March 1934. On 16 September
1932, the Japanese forces in pursuit of defeated
--1008--
Chinese volunteer units arrived at the towns of Pingtingshan,
Chienchinpao and Litsekou in the vicinity of
Fushun. The inhabitants of these towns were accused of
harboring the volunteers or "bandits" as they were
called by the Japanese. In each town, the Japanese troops
assembled people along ditches and forced them to kneel;
they then killed these civilians, men, women and children,
with machine guns; those who survived the machine-gunning
being promptly bayonetted to death. Over 2,700 civilians
perished in this massacre, which the Japanese Kwantung
Army claimed to be justified under its program of exterminating
"bandits." Shortly thereafter, KOISO sent to
the Vice-Minister of War ann "Outline for Guiding Manchukuo"
in which he said: "Racial struggle between
Japanese and Chinese is to be expected. therefore, we
must never hesitate to wield military power in case of
necessity." In this spirit, the practice of massacring,
or "punishing" as the Japanese termed it, the inhabitants
of cities and towns in retaliation for actual or supposed
aid rendered to Chinese troops was applied. This
practice continued throughout the China War; the worst
example of its being the massacre of the inhabitants of
Nanking in December 1937.
Since the Government of Japan officially classified
the China War as an "Incident" and considered
Chinese soldiers in Manchuria as "bandits", the Army refused
to accord to captives taken in the fighting the
status and the rights of Prisoners of War. MUTO says
that it was officially decided in 1938 to continue to
call the war in China and "Incident" and to continue for
that reason to refuse to apply the rules of war to the
conflict. TOJO told us the same.
--1009--
Many of the captured Chinese were tortured,
massacred, placed in labor units to work for the Japanese
Army, or organized into army units to serve the puppet
governments established by Japan in the conquered
territory in China. Some of these captives who refused
to serve in these armies were transported to Japan to
relieve the labor shortage in the munitions industries.
At the camp at Akita, on the northwest shore of Honshu
Island, 418 Chinese out of a group of 981 so transported
to Japan died from starvation, torture or neglect.
The Policy Remained Unchanged After
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident
Both the League of Nations and the meeting at
Brussels of the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty
railed to stop Japan's pursuing this "punitive" war on
China after the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco
Polo Bridge in 1937. This policy of Japan to treat the
China war as an "incident" remained unchanged. Even
after the establishment of the Imperial General Headquarters,
which was considered appropriate only in the case of an
"incident" of such an extent as to require a declaration
of war, as suggested by the War Minister at the cabinet
meeting held on 19th November 1937, no additional effort
was made to enforce the laws of war in the conduct of the
hostilities in China. Although the Government and the
fighting services were organized on a full wartime basis,
the China war was still treated as an "incident" with the
consequent disregard of the rules of war.
--1010--
The Rape of Nanking
As the Central China Expeditionary Force under
command of MATSUI approached the city of Nanking in
early December 1937,, over one-half of its one million
inhabitants and all but a few neutrals who remained
behind to organize an International Safety Zone, fled
from the city. the Chinese Army retreated, leaving approximately
50,000 troops behind to defend the city. As
the Japanese forces stormed the South Gate on the night
of 12 December 1937, most of the remaining 50,000 troops
escaped through the North and West Gates of the city.
Nearly all the Chinese soldiers had evacuated the city
or had abandoned their arms and uniforms and sought
refuge in the International Safety Zone, and all resistance
had ceased as the Japanese Army entered the city on
the morning of 13 December 1937. The Japanese soldiers
swarmed over the city and committed various atrocities.
According to one of the eyewitnesses, they were let loose
like a barbarian horde to desecrate the city. It was said
by eyewitnesses that the city appeared to have fallen
into the hands of the Japanese as captured prey, that
it had not merely been taken in organized warfare, and
that the members of the victorious Japanese Army had set
--1011--
upon the prize to committee unlimited violence. Individual
soldiers and small groups of two of three roamed
over the city murdering, raping, looting, and burning.
there was no discipline whatever. Many soldiers were
drunk. Solders went through the streets indiscriminately
killing Chinese men, women and children without
apparent provocation or excuse until in places the
streets and alleys were littered with the bodies of their
victims. According to another witness, Chinese were
hunted like rabbits, everyone seen to move was shot.
At least 12,000 non-combatant Chinese men, women and
children met their deaths in these indiscriminate killings
during the first tow or three days of the Japanese
occupation of the city.
There were many cases of rape. Death was a
frequently penalty for the slightest resistance on the
part of a civtion [
sic
] or the members of her family who sought
to protect her. Even girls of tender years and old
women were raped in large numbers throughout the city,
and many cases of abnormal and sadistic behaviour in
connection with these rapings occurred. Many women were
killed after the act and their bodies mutilated.
Approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred within the
city during the first month of the occupation.
Japanese soldiers took from the people everything
they desired. Soldiers were observed to stop unarmed
civilians on the road, search them, and finding
nothing of value then to shoot them. Very many residential
and commercial properties were entered and looted.
Looted stocks were carried away in trucks. After looting
shops and warehouses, the Japanese soldiers frequently
set fire to them. Taiping Road, the most important
--1012--
shopping street, and block after block of the commercial
section of the city were destroyed by fire. Soldiers
burned the homes of civilians for no apparent reason.
Such burning appeared to follow a prescribed pattern after
a few days and continued for six weeks. Approximately
one-third of the city was thus destroyed.
Organized and wholesale murder of male civilians
was conducted with the apparent sanction of the
commanders on the pretense that Chinese soldiers had
removed their uniforms and were mingling with the population.
Groups of Chinese civilians were formed, bound
with their hands behind their backs, and marched outside
the walls of the city where they were killed in
groups by machine gun fire and with bayonets. More than
20,000 Chinese men of military age are known to have died
in this fashion.
The German Government was informed by its
representative about "atrocities and criminal acts not
of an individual but of an entire Army, namely, the
Japanese," which Army, later in the Report, was qualified
as a "bestial machinery."
Those outside the city fared little better than
those within. Practically the same situation existed in
all the communities within 200 li (about 66 miles) of
Nanking. The population had fled into the country-side
in an attempt to escape from the Japanese soldiers. In
places they had grouped themselves into fugitive camps.
The Japanese captured many of these camps and visited
upon the fugitives treatment similar to that accorded th
inhabitants of Nanking. Of the civilians who had fled
Nanking, over 57,000 were overtaken and interned. These
were starved and tortured in captivity until a large
--1013--
number died. Many of the survivors were killed by machine
gun fire and by bayoneting.
Large parties of Chinese soldiers laid down
their arms and surrendered outside Nanking; within 72
hours after their surrender, they were killed in groups
by machine gun fire along the bank of the Yangtze River.
--1014--
Over 30,000 such prisoners of war were so killed. There
was not even a pretence of trial of these prisoners so massacred.
Estimates made at a later date indicate that
the total number of civilians and prisoners of war murdered
in Nanking and its vicinity during the first six
weeks of the Japanese occupation was over 200,000. That
these estimates are not exaggerated is borne out by the
fact that burial societies and other organizations
counted more than 155,000 bodies which they buried. They
also reported that most of those were bound with their
hands tied behind their backs. These figures do not
take into account those persons whose bodies were destroyed
by burning, or by throwing them into the Yangtze
River, or otherwise disposed of by Japanese.
Japanese Embassy officials entered the city
of Nanking with the advance elements of the Army; and
on 14 December, an official of the Embassy informed the
International Committee for the Nanking Safety ¸one
that the "Army was determined to make it bad for Nanking,
but that Embassy officials were going to try
to moderate the action." The Embassy officials also
informed the members of the Committee that at the time
of the occupation of the city, no more than 17 military
policemen were provided by the Army commanders to maintain
order within the city. When it transpired that
complaints to the Army officials did not have any result,
those Japanese embassy officials suggested to the foreign
missionaries that the latter should try and get publicity
in Japan, so that the Japanese Government would be
forced by public opinion to curb the Army.
--1015--
Dr. Bates
testified that the terror was intense
for two and one-half to three weeks, and was
serious six to seven weeks following the fall of the city.
Smythe
, the Secretary of the Int. Committee
for the Safety Zone, filed two protests a day for the
first six weeks.
MATSUI, who had remained in a rear area until
17 December, made a triumphal entry into the city on
that day, and on 18 December held a religious service for
the dead, after which he issued a statement in the course
of which he said: "I extend much sympathy to millions
of innocent people in the Kiangpei and Chekiang
districts, who suffered the evils
--1016--
of war. Now the flag of the rising sun is floating
high over Nanking, and the Imperial Way is shining
in the southern parts of the Yangtze-Kiang. The dawn
of the renaissance of the East is on the verge of offering
itself. On this occasion, I hope for reconsideration
of the situation by the 400 million people
of China." MATSUI remained in the city for nearly a week.
MUTO, then a colonel, had joined MATSUI's staff
on 10 November 1937, and was with MATSUI during the drive
on Nanking and participated in the triumphal entry and
occupation of the city. Both he and MATSUI admit that
they heard of the atrocities being committed in the city
during their stay at rear headquarters after the fall
of the city. MATSUI admits that he heard that foreign
governments were protesting against the commission of
these atrocities. No effective action was taken to
remedy the situation. Evidence was given before the
Tribunal by an eye witness, that while MATSUI was in
Nanking on the 19th of December, the business section of
the city was in flames. On that day, the witness counted
fourteen fires in the principal business street zone.
After the entry of MATSUI and MUTO into the city, the
situation did not improve for weeks.
Members of the Diplomatic Corps and Press and
the Japanese Embassy in Nanking sent out reports detailing
the atrocities being committed in and around Nanking.
The Japanese Minister-at-Large to China, Ito,
Nobofumi, was in Shanghai from September 1937 to February
1938. He received reports from the Japanese Embassy
in Nanking and from members of the Diplomatic Corps and
Press regarding the conduct of the Japanese troops and
--1017--
sent a resumé of the reports to the Japanese Foreign
Minister, HIROTA. These reports, as well as many others
giving information of the atrocities committed at Nanking,
which were forwarded by members of the Japanese diplomatic
officials in China, were forwarded by HIROTA to the
War Ministry of which UMEZU was Vice-Minister. They were
discussed at Liaison Conferences, which were normally
attended by the Prime Minister, War and Navy Ministers,
Foreign Minister HIROTA, Finance Minister KAYA, and the
Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs.
News reports of the atrocities were widespread.
MInAMI, who was serving as Governor-General of Korea
at the time, admits that he read these reports in the
Press. Following these unfavorable reports and the
pressure of public opinion aroused in nations all over
the world, the Japanese GOvernment recalled MATSUI and
approximately 80 of his officers, but took no action to
punish any of them. MATSUI, after his return to Japan
on 5 March 1938, was appointed a Cabinet Councillor and
0n 29 April 19490, was decorated by the Japanese Government
for "meritorious services" in the China War. MATSUI,
in explaining his recall, says that he was not replaced
by HATA because of the atrocities committed by his
troops at Nanking, but because he considered his work
ended at Nanking and wished to retire from the Army.
He was never punished.
The barbarous behaviour of the Japanese Army
cannot be excused as the acts of a soldiery which had
temporarily gotten out of hand when at last a stubbornly
defended position had capitulated -- rape, arson and murder
continued to be committed on a large scale for at least
six weeks after the city had been taken and for at least
--1018--
four weeks after MATSUI and MUTO had entered the city.
The new Japanese garrison Commander at Nanking,
General Amaya, on 5 February 1938, at the Japanese
Embassy in Nanking, made a statement to the Foreign
diplomatic corps criticizing the attitude of the foreigners
who had been sending abroad reports of Japanese
atrocities at Nanking and upbraiding them for encouraging
anti-Japanese feeling. This statement by Amaya reflected
the attitude of the Japanese Military toward
foreigners in China, who were hostile to the Japanese
policy of waging an unrestrained punitive war against
the people of China.
The War Was Extended to Canton and Hankow
When Shanghai capitulated on 12 November 1937,
and MATSUI began his advance on Nanking, the National
Government of China under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek
abandoned its capital city, moved to Chungking with interim
headquarters at Hankow, and continued the resistance.
After the capture of Nanking of 13 December 1937,
the Japanese Government established a puppet government
at Peiping.
The program designed to "pacify" the inhabitants
of this occupied area and "make them rely on the
Japanese Army" and force "self examination" on the part
of the National Government of China, which was adopted at
Shanghai and Nanking and proclaimed by MATSUI at Nanking,
indicated settled policy. In december 1937, at Hsing Tai
District on the Peping-Hankow railway, Gendarmes under
the command of a Japanese Warrant Officer seized seven
civilians, who were suspected of being Chinese Irregulars,
tortured and starved them for three days, then bound
them to a tree and bayonetted them to death. Soldiers
from this Army had
--1019--
appeared at the village of Tung Wang Chia, in Hopeh
Province, earlier in October 1937, and committed murder,
rape and arson, killing 24 of the inhabitants and burning
about two-thirds of the homes. Another village in
the same province known as Wang-Chia-To was visited by
a Japanese unit in January 1938 and more than 40 of
the civilian inhabitants were murdered.
Many of the inhabitants of the area around
Shanghai fared no better than those in Nanking and other
parts of North China. After the fighting had ceased at
Shanghai, observers found around the ashes of farm
houses in the suburban areas of Shanghai the bodies of
farmers and their families with their hands tied behind
them and bayonet wounds in their backs. As MATSUI's
troops occupied village after village on their march
to Nanking, they plundered and murdered and terrorized
the population. Soochow was occupied in November 1937,
and a number of residents who had not fled from the
advancing troops were murdered.
HATA's troops entered Hankow and occupied the
city on 25 October 1938. The next morning, a massacre of
prisoners occurred. At the customs wharf, the Japanese
soldiers collected several hundred prisoners. They
then selected small groups of three or four at a time,
marched them to the end of the gangplanks reaching out
to deep water, pushed them into the river and shot them.
When the Japanese saw that they were being observed
from the American gunboats anchored in the river off
Hankow, they stopped and adopted a different method.
They continued to select small groups, put them into
motor launches and took them out in the stream where
they threw them in the water and shot them.
--1020--
It was during the Third Konoye Cabinet that
the massacre at the town of Powen, on the Chinese Island
of Hainan, occurred. In August 1941, during a punitive
operation, a Japanese Naval Unit passed through the
town of Powen without opposition. the next day, as a
Detachment from that Unit returned to Powen, they
found the dead body of a sailor of the Japanese Navy
who had apparently been dead for several days. Under
the assumption that the sailor had been killed by the
residents of Powen, the Detachment burned the native
houses and the church of the town. They killed the
French missionary and 24 natives and burned their bodies.
This incident is important because the wide circulation
given the report of the massacre must have informed the
members of the Cabinet and its subordinate officials
of the method of warfare continuing to be employed by
the Japanese military forces. The Chief-of-Staff of
the Japanese occupation forces on Hainan Island made
a complete report of this matter to Vice-Minister of
War KIMURA on 14 October 1941. KIMURA at once circulated
the report from the information of all concerned
to the various bureaux of the War Ministry and then
sent it to the Foreign Ministry. It received wide
circulation both in and out of the Army.
An indication that the ruthless methods of the
Japanese Army in waging war continued is revealed by
the conduct of a Detachment of soldiers from UMEZU's
Army in Manchukuo in the campaign designed to stifle
all resistance to the puppet regime under Emperor Pu
Yi. This Detachment visited the village of Si-Tu-Ti
in Jehol Province one night in August 1941. It captured
the village, killed the members of more than 300
families and burned the village to the ground.
--1021--
Even long after the occupation of Canton and
Hankow, the Japanese, while carrying on campaigns into
the farther interior, committed large-scale atrocities
there. Toward the end of 1941, Japanese troops entered
the city of Wei-Yang, in Kwantung Province. They indulged
in a massacre of Chinese civilians, bayoneting
male and female, old and young without discrimination.
One eye-witness, who survived a bayonet wound in the
abdomen, told of the slaughter of more than 600 Chinese
civilians by Japanese troops. In July 1944, Japanese
troops arrived at the Tai Shan District in the Kwantung
Province. They committed arson, robbery, slaughter and
numerous other atrocities. As a result thereof, 559
ships were burnt, and more than 700 Chinese civilians killed.
From Hankow, the Japanese troops carried on
their campaign southward to Changsha. In September 1941,
the Japanese troops of the Sixth Division forced more
than 200 Chinese prisoners of war to plunder large quantities
of rice, wheat and other commodities. Upon their
return, the Japanese soldiers, to conceal these crimes,
massacred them by artillery fire. After the Japanese
forces had occupied Changsha, they also freely indulged
in murder, rape, incendiarism and many other atrocities
throughout the district. Then they drove further down
southward to Keilin and Liuchow in Kwangsi Province.
During the period of Japanese occupation of Kwelin,
they committed all kinds of atrocities such as rape and
plunder. They recruited women labour on the pretext of
establishing factories. They forced the women thus
recruited into prostitution with Japanese troops. Prior
to their withdrawal from Kweilin in July 1945, the
Japanese troops organized an arson corps and set fire to
buildings in the entire business district of Kweilin.
--1022--
Returning Soldiers Told of Atrocities Committed by Them
After the occupation of Hankow, Japanese soldiers
returning from China told stories of the army's
misdeeds in China and displayed loot which they had
taken. This conduct on the part of the soldiers returning
to Japan apparently became so general that the
War Ministry under ITAGAKI, in an effort to avoid unfavourable
criticism at home and abroad, issued special
orders to the commanders in the field to instruct returning
officers and men upon the proper conduct to be
followed by them upon reaching Japan. These special
orders were prepared in the military Service Section of
the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry, classified
as "Top Secret" and issued by ITAGAKI's Vice-Minister
of War in February 1939. They were transmitted
by the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff to the
Japanese Army Commanders in China. These secret orders
detailed the objectionable conduct of returning soldiers
which was to be corrected. It was complained that the
soldiers told stories of atrocities committed by them
on Chinese soldiers and civilians; some of the stories
commonly heard were cited as follows: "One company
commander unofficially gave instructions for raping
as follows; 'In order that we will not have problems,
either pay them money or kill them in some obscure
place after you have finished'."; "If the army men
who participated in the war were investigated individually,
they would probably all be guilty of murder,
robbery or rape."; "The thing I like best during the
battle is plundering. In the front lines the superiors
turn a blind eye to plundering and there were some who
plundered to their heart's content."; At . . . we captured
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a family of four. We played with the daughter as we
would with a harlot. But as the parents insisted that
the daughter be returned to them we killed them. We
played with the daughter as before until the unit's
departure and then killed her."; "In the half year of
battle, about the only things I learned are raped and
burglary."; "The plundering by our army in the battle
area is beyond imagination."; and, "The Prisoners taken
from the Chinese Army were sometimes lined up in one
line and killed to test the efficiency of the machine-gun."
Concerning loot brought back to Japan by returning
soldiers, it was noted that some commanders distributed
among the men license cards authorized by the stamp of
the Unit Commander permitting the soldiers to transport
their loot to Japan. These orders stated: "Not only
does the improper talk of the returned officers and men
become the cause of rumors, but also impairs the trust
of the people in the Army, disrupts the unity of the
people supporting the Army, etc. I repeat the order again
to make the control of instruction even more strict and
consequently glorify the meritorious deeds, raise the
Japanese Army's military reputation and insure that
nothing will impair the accomplishment of the object
of the Holy War."
Murder of Captured Aviators
Japanese leaders feared that aerial warfare
might be waged against the cities and towns of Japan. One
of the reasons given by the Japanese Military for opposing
ratification of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention
of 1929 was that such ratification would double the
range of enemy planes making raids on Japan in that the
crews could land on Japanese territory after completing
--1024--
their mission and be secure in the knowledge that they
would be treated as prisoners of war.
The fear that Japan would be bombed was realized
on 18 April 1942 when American planes under the command
of Colonel Doolittle bombed Tokyo and other cities in
Japan. This was the first time Japan had been subjected
to a bombing raid; and in the words of TOJO, it was an
awful "shock" to the Japanese. Sugiyama, the Chief of
the Japanese General Staff, demanded the death penalty for
all aviators who bombed Japan. Although there had been
no law or regulation of the Japanese Government prior
to this raid under which the death penalty could be administered,
Prime Minister TOJO ordered regulations issued
to be retroactive to the time of the raid which would
permit the death penalty to be imposed upon the Doolittle
fliers. TOJO later admitted that he took this action as
a deterrent to prevent future raids.
These regulations, which were dated 13 August
1942, were made applicable to "enemy fliers who have raided"
Japan, Manchukuo or Japanese operational areas "and have
come within the jurisdiction of the Japanese Expeditionary
Forces in China." Thus they were directly and retrospectively
aimed at the United States airmen already in
the hands of the Japanese in China.
The offences were air attacks
upon ordinary people,
upon private property of a non-military nature
against other than military objectives, and
"Violations of war time international law."
The punishment prescribed was death or imprisonment for
ten years or more.
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Conduct defined as offences 1, 2, and 3 were
such as the Japanese themselves had regularly practiced
in China. It will be remembered that in July 1939 the
Chief-of-Staff of the Central China Expeditionary Force
reported to War Minister ITAGAKI that a policy of indiscriminate
bombing in order to terrorize the Chinese had
been adopted. The fourth, violations of the laws of war,
required no such regulations. Their breach was punishable
in any event, but, of course, only upon proper trial
and within the limits of punishment permitted by international law.
The crews of two of the Doolittle planes which
had been forced to land in China were taken prisoner by
the Japanese occupation forces under the command of
HATA. These eight fliers composing the crews were treated
as common criminals, being handcuffed and bound. The
members of one crew were taken to Shanghai and the members
of the other crew were taken to Nanking; at each place
they were interrogated under torture. On 25 April 1942,
the fliers were taken to Tokyo and were kept blindfolded
and handcuffed until they were inside the Military Police
Headquarters in Tokyo. They were then placed in solitary
confinement, from which they were taken out and questioned
again under torture for eighteen days. At the end of this
period, the fliers to avoid further torture signed statements
written in Japanese, the contents of which were
unknown to them.
The fliers were returned to Shanghai on 17 June
1942, where they were incarcerated, starved, and otherwise
ill-treated. On 28 July 1942, Vice-Minister of War KIMURA
transmitted TOJO's orders to HATA, who was the Supreme
Commander of all Japanese Force in China at that time.
--1026--
TOJO's orders were to the effect that the fliers were to
be punished under the new regulations. On orders from the
Chief of the General Staff, HATA instructed that the fliers
be put on trial. At this "trial" some of the airmen were
too ill to take part in the proceedings, there was no
translation of the matters charged, and they were given
no opportunity to defend themselves. The trial was a
mere mockery. This trial was held on 20 August 1942, when
all of the fliers were sentenced to death. Upon review
in Tokyo, and on the recommendation of TOJO, five of the
sentences were reduced to life imprisonment and the remaining
three death sentences were approved. On 10 October
1942, HATA ordered the sentences to be executed, and
reported his action to the Army Chief of Staff. The
death sentences were carried out as ordered.
In this manner was begun the policy of killing
Allied fliers who fell into the hands of the Japanese.
This was done not only in Japan, but in occupied
territories during the remainder of the Pacific War. The
usual practice was to starve and torture captured aviators
before their murder. Even the formality of a trial
was often omitted. Where a court-martial was held
prior to their being killed, it appears that the court-martial
was a mere formality.
As an illustration, we cite the case of two
American B-29 fliers at Osaka on 18 July 1945, who were
charged with violation of the regulations. Prior to the
trial, their case was investigated by an officer appointed
to perform that duty, who recommended the death penalty.
The recommendation was approved by the Commander
of the central Military District and by General HATA, who
was at that time the Commander of the Second Army Corps
--1027--
at Hiroshima. The recommendation of the Investigating
Officer, with the approval of the Military Commanders,
was sent to the War Ministry for final approval; and that
approval was obtained. At the trial, the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Officer and the approval
of General HATA and others were read to the court-martial
by the prosecutor, who demanded the death penalty
based upon those documents. The accused were asked
a few routine questions and the death penalty was imposed.
They were executed the same day.
In the Tokai Military District, prior to May
1945, eleven Allied airmen were subjected to trials in
which their interests were not safeguarded, sentenced to
death and executed. However, the Commandant of Military
Police for Japan considered this procedure imposed an
unnecessary delay in the killing of captured Allied fliers;
consequently in June 1945, he sent a letter to each of
the Military Police Headquarters Commandants of the several
military districts in Japan, complaining of the delay
in the disposition of captured Allied airmen, stating
that it was impossible to dispose of them immediately by
courts-martial, and recommending that the Military Police
in the military districts dispense with courts-martial
after securing the approval of the Commander of the
Military District. In the Tokai Military District, 27
Allied fliers were killed without trial after this letter
was received. In the Central Military District over
which HATA exercised administrative command, 43 Allied
airmen were killed without having been tried by courts-martial
or otherwise. At Fukuoka, eight Allied airmen
were killed without trial on 20 June 1945, eight more
in the same manner on 12 August 1945, and three days
--1028--
later, on 15 August 1945, the third group of eight, making
a total of 24 Allied airmen killed at Fukuoka without
being given a trial, after the above-mentioned letter
recommending this procedure was sent out from Tokyo by
the Commandant of Military Police.
The killing of Allied airmen in the Tokai,
Central and Western Districts of Japan was done by firing
squads; in the Eastern District, which embraced Tokyo,
more inhumane methods were used. Allied airmen captured
in that district were detained in the Military Police
Headquarters Guard House, pending a so-called investigation
to determine whether they had violated the Regulations.
This investigation consisted of interrogation
under torture in an effort to coerce the victim into
confessing to facts which would subject him to the death
penalty under the regulations. No less than 17 airmen
died in this guard house as a result of torture, starvation
and lack of medical care. Those who survived this
torture were victims of a more dreadful death. The Tokyo
Army Prison was located on the edge of the Yoyogi Military
Parade Ground. This prison was a disciplinary barracks
in which were confined Japanese solders serving sentences.
the prison grounds were small and surrounded by a brick
wall approximately 12 feet high. The prison buildings
were of wood and were constructed so close together as to
occupy all of the ground available within the brick wall
except for necessary alley-ways and courts. One of the
cell blocks was set apart by a wooden wall seven feet
high. On 25 April 1945, five Allied fliers were placed
in that cell block; on 9 May, 20 more were added; and on 10
May, 28 others were confined there. On the night of 25
May 1945, Tokyo was heavily bombed. On that night, there
--1029--
were 62 Allied fliers confined in this cell block. There
were 464 Japanese Army prisoners confined in other buildings
within the prison. The wooden buildings of the
prison, as well as the highly inflammable dwellings surrounding
it, were hit and set on fire by incendiary bombs.
The prison was completely demolished; and after the fire,
it was found that all of the 62 Allied fliers had perished.
It is significant that none of the 464 Japanese, or any
of their jailors, suffered a similar fate. The evidence
shows that eh fate of the Allied airmen was deliberately planned.
In the occupied territories, one of the methods
of killing captured airmen was by d e capitation with a
sword, and at the hands of a Japanese officer. Captured
airmen were killed this way at:
Singapore, Malaya (June-July 1945);
Samarinda, Borneo (January 1945);
Palembang Sumatra (March 1942);
Batavia, Java (April 1942);
Menada, Celebes (June 1945);
Tomohon, Celebes (September 1944);
Toli Toli, Celebes (October 1944);
Kendari, Celebes (November 1944, January 1945, February 1945);
Beo, Talaud Islands (March 1945);
Rainis, Talaud Islands (January 1945);
Singkang, Celebes (July 1945);
Carara, Ambon Island (August 1944);
New Guinea (October 1944);
Totabil, New Britain (November 1944);
Porton Island (December 1943);
Kwajalein Island (October 1942); and
Cebu City, Philippines (March 1945).
Another method of murdering Allied fliers was
used at Hankow, China, in December 1944. Three
American fliers, who had been forced down and captured
--1030--
sometime before, were paraded through the streets and
subjected to ridicule, beating and torture by the
populace. When they had been weakened by the beatings
and torture, they were saturated with gasoline and burned
alive. Permission for this atrocity was granted by the
Commander of the 34th Japanese Army.
The cruelty of the Japanese is further illustrated
by the treatment of an Allied airman, who was
captured at Rabaul on the island of New Britain. He was
bound with a rope on which fish-hooks had been attached
so that when he moved the hooks dug into his flesh. He
ultimately died of malnutrition and dysentery.
Massacres
Massacres of prisoners of war, civilian
internees, sick and wounded, patients and medical staffs
of hospitals, and civilian populations were common throughout
the Pacific War. Prisoners of war and civilian
internees were massacred in some instances shortly after capture.
A massacre at Balikpapan in Borneo occurred
in the following circumstances; On January 20, 1942,
two Dutch POW officers were ordered by the Japanese to
Balikpapan to transmit an ultimatum to the Dutch commandant
in which it was demanded to surrender Balikpapan
intact. In case of noncompliance, all European were to
be killed. The ultimatum was read in the presence of a
Japanese Major General and five other Japanese officers
to the Dutch officers, who had to deliver it to the commander
at Balikpapan. Reply was sent by the Commander
of Balikpapan to the Japanese to the effect that the
Commander at Balikpapan had had from the Dutch authorities
the necessary instructions with regard to demolition,
which, therefore, had to be carried out.
--1031--
When the Japanese approached Balikpapan, the
oil fields were set on fire. In an affidavit of an
eyewitness, the Tribunal was given a description of the
massacre of the white population of Balikpapan, numbering
between 80 and 100, who were executed in a cruel manner
on 24 February 1942, by being driven into the sea and
subsequently shot after some had been killed by having
arms and legs lopped off with swords, as is described later.
In this relation, it is interesting to note
that there was produced, in this trial, a Foreign
Affairs document, marked "very secret", containing a
"tentative draft of Japan's policies toward the
Southern Regions", dated October 4, 1940, In this draft
it states with regard to the Dutch East Indies:
If any of the important natural resources
should be destroyed, all the persons connected
with the raw material, ten government
officials concerned, shall be severely
punished as being the responsible persons.
It was of vital importance for Japan to take
the NEI oil fields intact. The oil question was a
decisive element in the move to the South, and the
Japanese Government was very much afraid lest, in case
of war, the oil fields would be set on fire. Matsuoka
gave expression to this fear to von Ribbentrop on March
29, 1941, when he stated:
If at all avoidable, he would not touch the
Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid
that in the event of a Japanese attack on
this area the oil fields would be set on
fire. They could be brought into operation
again only after one or two years.
In view of this, and remembering the fact
that the Japanese Government officially ordered the
destruction of all harmful documents, this Foreign
--1032--
Office draft obtains a special significance. Yamamoto,
a former high official in the Foreign Office, when asked
for the reason why most of the things planned in the
"tentative draft" actually did occur, in spite of the
fact that this draft was, according to him, made only
by a junior secretary, cynically replied that "these
secretaries were very good students."
Taking all these facts together, the result
justifies the inference that the plan proposed in the
draft of October 4, 1940, was accepted as government
policy, the more so because a massacre of male personnel
also occurred at Blora, apparently in relation to the
demolition of the oil fields at Tjepu, Java. Women in
this place were not killed, but were all raped several
times in the presence of the commanding officer.
Instances of such massacres occurred at:
Hong Kong, China (December 1941);
Opoh, Malaya (December 1941);
between Port Sulong and Maur, Malaya (January 1942);
Perit Sulong, Malaya (January 1942);
Katonga, Malaya (January 1942);
Alexander Hospital, Malaya (January 1942);
Singapore, Malaya (February-March 1942);
Pangang, Malaya (February 1942);
Maur, Malaya (February 1942);
Jampong Job, Thailand (December 1941);
Longnawa, Borneo (August 1942);
Tarakan, borneo (January 1942);
Banka Island, Netherlands East Indies (February 1942);
Kota Radja, Sumatra (March 1942);
Remban, Java (March 1942);
Lembang, Java (March 1942);
Soeban, Java (March 1942);
Tjiatar Pass, Java (March 1942);
Bandoeng, Java (March 1942);
Laha, Ambon Island, Moluccas (February 1942);
Okabeti, Dutch Timor (February 1942);
Oesapa Besar, Dutch Timor (April 1942);
Tatuu Mewta, Portuguese Timor (February 1942);
Milne Bay, British New Guinea (August 1942);
Buna, British New Guinea (August 1942);
Tol, New Britain (February 1942);
Tarawa Island (October 1942);
--1033--
Camp O'Donnell, Philippines (April 1942);
and Santa Cruz, Manila, Philippines (April 1942).
Massacres occurred in this manner in
French Indo-China in the hostilities against the Free
French organizations there. Prisoners of war and detained
civilians were massacred at such places as:
Longson (March 1945);
Dinh Lap (March 1945);
Thaikhek (March 1945);
Tong (March 1945);
Tan Qui (March 1945);
Loas (March 1945);
Dong Dang (March 1945);
Hagiang (March 1945); and
Tonkin (March 1945).
Citizens of the U.S.S.R. at Hailar in Manchuria
were massacred on 9 August 1945. This was done
at the instance of the Commander of the Kwantung Army.
Those murdered were not charged with any offense, but
the reason given for the murders was that they might
carry on espionage or sabotage against the Japanese Army.
After the Japanese forces had occupied territory
and fighting had ceased, massacres were freely
committed as a means of terrorizing the civilian
population and subjecting them to the domination of the
Japanese. Massacres of this type were committed against
the civilian population at the following places:
Shanywa, Burma (1945);
Tharrawaddy, Burma (May 1945);
Ongun, Burma (May 1945);
Ebaing, Burma (June 1945);
Kalagon, Burma (July 1945);
Mantanani Island (February 1944);
Sulug Island (October 1943);
Udar Island (Early 1944);
Dinawan Island (July 1944);
Pontianak, Borneo (October 1943-June 1944);
Singkawang, Borneo (August 1944);
Buitenzorg, Java (1943);
Kava (The "Koo" Incident) (July 1943-March 1944);
--1034--
Lautem, Portuguese Timor (January 1943);
Moa Island (September 1944);
Semata Island (September 1944);
Aileu, Portuguese Timor (September 1942);
Nauru Island (March 1943);
Hopevale, Philippines (December 1943);
Alaminos, Philippines (March 1944);
San Carlos, Philippines (February 1943);
Barrio Angad, Philippines (November 1944);
Palo Beach, Philippines (July 1943);
Tigbuan, Philippines (August 1943);
Calbayog, Philippines (July 1943);
Ranao-Pilayan, Philippines (June 1944);
Bogo, Philippines (October 1944);
Barrio Umagos, Philippines (October 1944);
Lipa Airport, Philippines (1944);
Santa Catalina, Philippines (August 1944); and
Sitio Canugkay, Pilor, Philippines (December 1944).
There were massacres of prisoners of war and civilian
internees or conscripted laborers during the
occupation which were committed because they had become
starved, diseased or otherwise disabled and were no
longer of use, or for other reasons had become a burden
to the Japanese occupation force. Such massacres were
committed at the following places:
Chaymoga Labor Camp, Siam (February 1944);
Hsipaw, Burma (January 1945);
Port Blair, Andaman Islands (August 1945);
Kot Tjane, Sumatra (May 1943);
Sibolga, Sumatra (April 1942);
Djombang, Java (April 1942);
Amboina, Ambon Island (July 1943);
Wewak, British New Guinea (May 1944);
Aitape, New Guinea (October 1943);
But, New Guinea (June 1944);
Rabaul, New Britain (January 1943);
Bougainville (August 1944);
Wake Island (October 1943);
and in the labor camps along the Burma-Siam Railroad Project (1943-1944).
There were some massacres which
--1035--
were intended to discourage general violation of
regulations, such as that at the labor camp on Hainan
Island (May 1943) in an effort to prevent smuggling;
that at Saigon, French Indo-China (December 1943)
intended to prevent illegal use of the radio; and that
of civilians and prisoners of war at Amboina, Ambon
Island (July 1943) where the civilians were killed for
giving, and the prisoners for receiving, food. In
addition those referred to, were other massacres
and murders, such as that aboard the
Nitta Maru
(December
1941), where American prisoners of war were
beheaded; and that on New Guinea which involved the
killing of two American prisoners of war (October
1944). In the latter case, the Japanese officer
responsible said, "I asked if I could get an American
prisoner of war and kill him." The Commander of the
36th Japanese Division promptly granted the request
and delivered two prisoners to be killed. They were
blindfolded, tied, and stabbed in the back with bayonets,
and then decapitated with shovels.
There were massacres perpetrated in anticipation
of a Japanese withdrawal or of an Allied attack. These
were not limited to prisoners of war, although many
prisoners were massacred under these circumstances,
apparently to prevent them from being liberated by the
Allied forces. Civilian internees and members of the
civilian population were also massacred under such
circumstances. Massacres of this type occurred in the
following places:
Hailar, China (August 1945);
Malacca, Nicobar Islands (July 1945);
Sandakan, British Borneo (June-July 1945);
Ranau, British Borneo (August 1945);
--1036--
Kuala Belat, British Borneo (July 1945);
Miri, British Borneo (June 1945);
Labuan, British Borneo (June 1945);
Leeluta, Portuguese Timor (September 1945);
Ballah Island (January 1943);
Ocean Island (September 1943);
Puerto Princesa, Philippines (December 1944);
Irisan Area, Philippines (April 1945);
Calambya, Philippines (February 1945);
Panghulo, Philippines (February 1945);
Tapel, Philippines (July 1945); and
Barrio Dinwiddie, Philippines (August 1945).
Massacres of this kind were
very numerous in Batangas Province of the Philippines.
They were committed, among others, at the following places:
Barrio San Indres (January 1945);
Bauan (February 1945);
Santo Tomas (February 1945);
Lippa (February and March 1945);
Taal (February 1945);
Tanauan (February 1945); and
Rosario (March 1945).
When it became apparent that Manila would be liberated,
massacres of this type were committed all over the
city, as well as rape and arson.
We have not mentioned massacres of prisoners of
war at sea, to be discussed later, nor those that
occurred in "death marches." These also we shall
mention later. Apart from the massacres already
mentioned, there were many individual murders. Many
of them were committed in horrible fashion; many were
committed in connection with other crimes such as
rape, robbery and arson, while others were committed
apparently for no other purpose than to gratify the
cruel instincts of the perpetrators.
Some of the massacres call for further description,
especially those of patients and medical personnel
in military hospitals which were clearly marked with the
--1037--
Geneva insignia and entitled to protection under that
convention as well as the general laws of war. During
the massacres at Hong Kong, Japanese troops entered
the Military Hospital at St. Stephens College and
bayonetted the sick and wounded in their beds, and
raped and murdered nurses who were on duty there.
During the battle of Northwestern Jehore in Malay
(January 1942), an ambulance convoy containing sick
and wounded was captured by Japanese soldiers. The
personnel and wounded were removed from the ambulances
and killed by shooting, bayoneting and burning alive
after being saturated with oil. At Katonga in Malay
(January 1942), an ambulance convoy was fired upon
by Japanese machine gunners. The personnel and wounded
were taken from the convoy, tied together and shot in
the back. The Alexandra Hospital at Singapore, Malaya,
was captured by the Japanese forces on 13 February
1942. The Japanese troops went through the first floor
of the hospital and bayonetted everyone on that floor.
They entered the operating room where a soldier was
under chloroform undergoing an operation, and bayonetted
the patient, the surgeon and the anesthetist. They
then went to the second floor and other parts of the
building and removed the patients and medical personnel
and massacred them. When the Japanese troops entered
Soebang, Java, in March 1942, they removed a nurse and
her patients from the Military Hospital and massacred
them with women and children of the civilian population.
These massacres, in disregard of the laws of war
respecting the treatment to be accorded to military
hospitals and their personnel and patients, illustrate
--1038--
the attitude of Japanese soldiers and their officers
towards the laws of war.
There is a similarity of method to be found in
most of the massacres. The victims were first bound
and then shot, bayonetted or decapitated with swords.
In most instances, the victims were shot and then
bayonetted by Japanese soldiers who went among the wounded
killing those who still lived. In a number of cases,
they were gathered on a beach with the water to their
backs, or on the edge of a cliff, and there killed.
In some places, even more dreadful methods were
employed. At the Manila German Club and at Fort Santiago,
the victims were gathered together in a building, which
was set on fire; and those who attempted to escape were
shot or bayonetted as they emerged from the flames.
In evidence upon the atrocity committed at
the German Club in Manila in February 1945, it was disclosed
that fugitives took shelter under the Club from
bombardment and shell-fire then proceeding. Japanese
soldiers surrounded the Club by a barricade of inflammable
material, then poured gasoline over this barricade
and ignited it. Thus, the fugitives were forced to attempt
to escape through the flaming barricade. Most of
them were bayonetted and shot by the waiting Japanese
soldiers. Some of the women were raped and their infants
bayonetted in their arms. After raping the women, the
Japanese poured gasoline on their hair and ignited it.
The breasts of some of the women were cut off by
Japanese soldiers.
A massacre took place at St. Paul's College
in Manila in the following manner: Approximately 250
people were placed in the building, and the doors and
--1039--
windows solidly shut and barred. While so confined, it
was noticed that the three hanging chandeliers were wrapped
in blackout paper and that strings of light wires ran
from inside these wrappings to the outside of the building.
Later, the Japanese brought in biscuits, candy and
liquor of some sort, placed them in the center of the
room and told the captives that they were safe where they
were, and that they might have the food and drink which
had been brought to them. Accordingly, they went to the
food as deposited and within a matter of moments there
were three explosions. The covered chandeliers had contained
explosives. Many were thrown to the floor and a
panic ensued. Japanese outside the building began firing
machine guns into it and threw grenades. The explosions
had blown out the windows and a portion of the wall,
through which those who were able endeavoured to escape.
Many of these were killed as they tried to do so.
At a prisoner of war camp above Puerto Princesa
Bay on the Philippine island of Palawan, there occurred
a particularly cruel and premeditated massacre of
American prisoners. There were some 150 prisoners in
this camp. They had been told previously by their
captors that if Japan won the war they would be
returned to America, but that they would be killed if
Japan were defeated. Before the massacre, there had
been some raiding of the island by American aircraft.
In the camp, a number of shallow and lightly covered
air raid shelters had been dug. At about 2 p.m. on
14 December 1944, the prisoners were ordered to go to
these shelters. Japanese soldiers armed with rifles
and machine guns were posted around the camp. When
the prisoners were all in the shelters, gasoline was
--1040--
thrown into them from buckets and then this was followed
by lighted torches. Explosions followed, and
those prisoners who were not too badly burnt struggled
to escape. These were killed by fire from the rifles
and machine guns placed in position for the purpose.
In some cases, they were killed by bayonet thrusts.
Five only of the 150 survived this dreadful experience.
They did so by swimming out into the bay whence, after
nightfall, they escaped into the jungle and eventually
joined up with Philippine guerillas.
Mass drowning was used at Port Blair, Andaman
islands (August 1945), where the civilian internees
were placed aboard ship, then to see, and forced into
the water. A combination of drowning and shooting,
similar to that employed at Hankow, was used at Kota
Radja (March 1942), where Dutch prisoners of war were
placed in sloops, towed to sea, shot and thrown into
the sea. At Tarakan, Borneo (January 1942), Dutch
prisoners of war were taken aboard a Japanese light
cruiser, taken to the spot where a Japanese destroyer
had been fired upon by them, decapitated and thrown
into the sea.
Massacres Were Ordered
The evidence shows that most of these massacres
were ordered by commissioned officers, that some of
them were ordered by high-ranking generals and admirals,
that in many cases commissioned officers were actually
present during their commission, observing, directing
or actually doing the killing. Japanese orders were
captured which gave directions for killing Filipinos.
The file of orders issued by the Manila Navy Defence
Force between December 1944 and February 1945 was
--1041--
captured. It contained this order: "Be careful to
make no mistake in the time of exploding and burning
when the enemy invades. When killing Filipinos,
assemble them together in one place as far as possible
thereby saving ammunition and labor." Diaries of
Japanese soldiers were captured indicating that their
owners had been ordered to massacre, and had done so
pursuant to such orders.Battle reports of military
units and police reports of military police, which were
captured, contained reports to superior authorities
relating to massacres which had been committed, together
with the number of rounds of ammunition expended and
the number of victims killed. Prisoners of war from
many camps in Japan and the occupied areas have
testified that they were informed by their Japanese,
Formosan, and Korean guards that they would be killed
in case the Allies invaded the locality, or if Japan
should lose the war. We have referred to cases where
these threats were carried out. In one camp, at
least, written evidence of an order from higher
authority to kill the prisoners of war was found. The
captured journal from a camp in Formosa contained an
entry showing that a reply had been sent to an inquiry
from the Chief-of-Staff of the 11th Military Police
Unit of the Kiirun Fortified Area Headquarters regarding
"extreme measures" for prisoners of war. The method
to be employed in carrying out these "extreme measures"
was detailed as follows: "Whether they are destroyed
individually or in groups, or however it is done, with
mass bombing, poisonous smoke, poisons, drowning,
decapitation, or what, dispose of them as the
--1042--
situation dictates. In any case, it is the aim not
to allow the escape of a single one, to annihilate
them all, and not to leave any traces." This annihilation
was,
inter alia,
prescribed in all cases "where
escapees from the camp may turn into a hostile fighting force."
A general order was issued by Vice-Minister
of War Shibayama on 11 March 1945. The order stated:
"The handling of prisoners of war in these times when the
state of things is becoming more and more pressing and
the evils of war extend to the Imperial Domain, Manchuria
and other places, is in the enclosed summary. We hope
you follow it, making no mistakes." The enclosed summary
to which reference was made began: "The Policy: With the
greatest efforts prevent the prisoners of war falling
into the hands of the enemy. Further for this purpose
carry out a transfer of the place of confinement for
those prisoners of war for whom it is necessary."
The Ranau Death Marches, which began at about this time
between Sandakan and Ranau in Borneo, to which we will
refer presently, conformed ot the policy indicated
by the order just quoted.
Death Marches
The Japanese Army did not observe the laws of
war in the movement of prisoners of war from one place to
another. Prisoners were forced to march long distances
without sufficient food and water and without rest.
Sick and wounded were forced to march in the same manner
as the able. Prisoners who fell behind on such marches
--1043--
were beaten, tortured and murdered. We have been
furnished evidence of many such marches.
The Bataan March is a conspicuous example.
When General King surrendered his forces on Bataan on
9 April 1942, he was assured by Japanese General Homma's
Chief-of-Staff that his soldiers would be treated
humanely. General King had saved sufficient trucks
from demolition to move his men from Bataan to the
prisoner of war camp. The American and Filipino
soldiers on Bataan had been on short rations and the
sick and wounded were numerous. However, when General
King suggested the use of the trucks, he was forbidden
to do so. The prisoners were marched in intense heat
along the highway to San Fernando, Pampanga, which is
a distance of 120 kilometers, or 75 miles. The sick
and wounded were forced to march. Those who fell by
the roadside and were unable to continue were shot or
bayonetted. Others were taken from the ranks, beaten,
tortured and killed. The march continued for nine
days, with the Japanese guards being relieved at five
kilometer intervals by fresh guards who had been
transported in the American trucks. During the first
five days, the prisoners received little or no food or
water. Thereafter, the only water available was that
from an occasional artesian well or caribou wallow.
When the prisoners grouped around a well in an attempt
to get water, the Japanese fired upon them. Shooting
and bayonetting of prisoners were commonplace. Dead
bodies littered the side of the road. Murata, who had
been sent to the Philippines in February 1942 by War
Minister TOJO as a civilian advisor to General Homma,
--1044--
drove along this highway and saw the dead bodies along
the highway in such great numbers that he was prompted
to ask General Homma about the situation. Murata
testified that, "I merely saw it; I did not complain
about it; I just asked questions." At San Fernando,
the prisoners were crowded into railway freight cars to
be transported to Camp O'Donnell. They were forced to
stand through lack of space and many died in the cars
from exhaustion and lack of ventilation. It is not clear
how many died in this movement from Bataan to Camp
O'Donnell. The evidence indicates that there were
approximately 8,000 deaths of American and Filipino
prisoners. At Camp O'Donnell, the evidence shows that
from April to December 1942, no less that 27,500 Americans
and Filipinos died.
TOJO admitted that he heard of this march in
1942 from many different sources. He said that his information
was to the effect that the prisoners had been
forced to march long distances in the heat and that
many deaths had occurred. TOJO also admitted that the
United States Government's protest against the unlawful
treatment of these prisoners had been received and
discussed at the bi-weekly meetings of the Bureaux
Chiefs in the War Ministry soon after the death march
occurred, but that he left the matter to the discretion
of the Bureau Chiefs. TOJO said that the Japanese
forces in the Philippines were not called upon for a
report on the incident and that he did not even discuss
the matter with General Homma when that General visited
Japan in early 1943. TOJO said that he first inquired
into this subject when he visited the Philippines in
--1045--
May 1943l; and at that time he discussed it with General
Homma's Chief-of-Staff, who informed him of the details.
TOJO explained his failure to take action to prevent
a repetition of similar atrocities as follows: "It is
--1046--
Japanese custom for a commander of an expeditionary army
in the field to be given a mission in the performance
of which he is not subject to specific orders from
Tokyo, but has considerable autonomy." This can mean
only that under the Japanese method of warfare, such
atrocities were expected to occur, or were at least
permitted, and that the Government was not concerned
to prevent them.
Such atrocities were repeated during the Pacific
War, which it is reasonable to assume resulted from the
condonation of General Homma's conduct at Bataan.
Other Forced Marches
On the march from the port to Koepang prisoner
of war camp on Dutch Timor in February 1942, the prisoners
suffering from wounds, hunger, malaria and dysentery
were marched for five days with their hands tied
behind their backs, and were driven and beaten along
by their Japanese and Korean guards like a herd of
cattle. Similar marches were imposed upon Indian
prisoners between Wewak, But and Aitape in British
New Guinea during 1943 and 1944. On those marches, the
prisoners who became ill and were unable to keep up
with the main body were shot. There was evidence of
other similar happenings. Those mentioned show the accepted
and common practice followed by the Japanese Army
and Prisoner of War Administration when moving prisoners
of war from one place to another under harsh conditions
enforced by the beating and murdering of stragglers.
The Ranau marches are in a different category.
They began early in 1945, when the Japanese feared that
--1047--
the Allies were preparing a landing at Kuching; the
purpose of these marches was to remove the prisoners
to prevent their liberation. The village of Ranau is in
a jungle over 100 miles west of Sandakan in Borneo, on
the eastern slope of Mt. Kinabalu. The trail from
Sandakan to Renau lies through dense jungle and is too
narrow for vehicles. The first 30 miles are marshy and
heavy with mud and slush. The next 40 miles are in
higher country over short, steep hills. The next 20
miles are over a mountain. The last 26 miles are all
uphill and mountainous. Australian prisoners of war
were moved along this jungle trail in a series of
marches. The prisoners were suffering from malaria,
dysentery, beri-beri and malnutrition before they were
taken from the camp at Sandakan. The test to determine
whether a prisoner was fit to make the march was to beat
and torture him to make him stand; if he did stand, he
was considered fit for the march. The prisoners were
forced to carry food and ammunition for their guards
as well as their own scanty rations. One party of 40
prisoners was forced to subsist for three days on this
march upon six cucumbers divided among them. Those who
fell out of the marching column were shot or bayonetted
to death. The marches continued until the first part
of April 1945. The trail was littered with the corpses
of those who perished along the way. Less than one-third
of the prisoners of war who began these marches
at Sandakan ever reached Ranau. Those who did reach
Ranau were starved and tortured to death, or died of
disease, or were murdered. Only six out of more than
two thousand who were prisoners at Sandakan are known
--1048--
to have survived. These dod so by escaping from the
camp at Ranau. Those who were too sick to begin the
marches at Sandakan died of disease or were murdered
by their guards.
Burma-Siam Railway
A flagrant example of atrocities over an
extended period in one area is found in the treatment
of prisoners of war and native workmen employed in the
construction of the Burma-Siam Railway. Prior to and
during the work, prisoners were constantly subjected to
ill-treatment, torture and privation of all kinds, commencing
with a forced march of 200 miles to the area
under almost indescribable hardships. As a result, in
eighteen months, 16,000 prisoners out of 46,000 died.
To further their strategic plans in Burma and
India, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters early in
1942 considered the question of communications. The
shortest convenient line of communications at that time
was through THailand. It was decided to link the
railroad running from Bangkok in Siam with that from
Moulmein in Burma, the distance of the gap being about
250 miles (400 kil.). Thus, communication with the
Japanese armies in Burma would be facilitated.
For that purpose, on the advice of TOJO, it was
decided to use prisoners of war, and orders were issued
to the Southern Army, then stationed in Malaya, to
proceed with the work with all possible speed, November
1943 being fixed as the completion date. Pursuant to
these orders, two groups of prisoners were sent from the
--1049--
Singapore area commencing in August 1942; one group,
known as "A" Force, being sent by sea, and the second
group, composed of "F" and "H" forces, by rail to
Bangpong. From Bangpong they were made to march to the
various camps along the line of the projected construction.
Before "F" and "H" forces left Singapore, the
Japanese general in charge of the prisoner of war
administration informed the prisoners that they were
being sent to rest camps in the mountains, where the
food situation was better, because so many of them were
sick and suffering from malnutrition, caused by lack
of food and unsanitary conditions in the Singapore camps.
He therefore insisted that the sick be(included in those
to be sent to the labor camps. The prisoners were
crowded into railway freight cars without sufficient space to
lie down. They had been told that it would not be
necessary to carry along their cooking utensils as they
would be replaced. However, they were not replaced.
Furthermore, the only food furnished the prisoners was
thin vegetable stew, and for the last twenty-four hours
of the trip by rail, no food or water was available.
After four days and four nights, the prisoners
were detrained and required to surrender their baggage
and what cooking gear they had brought, as well as all
drugs and medical equipment. They were then required
to march 200 miles on foot in two and one-half weeks.
The march would have taxed fit soldiers, as the route
lay over rough jungle tracks in mountainous country.
The march was accomplished in fifteen night stages in
--1050--
the rain and mud of the monsoon. The weakened condition
of the prisoners, together with the necessity of carrying
some 2,000 non-walking sick, made this march almost
beyond human endurance. Some of those who became
sick or too weak to march were beaten and driven by
their guards.
In the camps established along the projected
railway, which lay in virgin jungle, no cover was
provided; sanitary facilities were almost non-existent,
medical care and drugs were not provided, clothing was
not furnished, rations were completely inadequate,
while the constant driving and daily beating of the
prisoners added to the ever-mounting toll of dead and
disabled. Those who tried to escape were killed. Other
groups of prisoners of war from Singapore followed "F"
and "H" forces and were accorded similar treatment.
TOJO told the Tribunal that he had received
reports of the poor condition of the prisoners employed
on this project, and that he sent the Chief of the
Prisoner of War Information Bureau to investigate in
May 1943. He admits that the only action which he took
as a result of that investigation was to court-martial
a certain company commander who had dealt unfairly with
the prisoners of war, and to relieve from duty the
Commanding General of Railway Construction. However, we
find from other evidence that the Commanding General
was not removed because of the ill-treatment of prisoners
of war. The first Commanding General of Railway
Construction, who was in charge of this project, was
killed by an Allied air raid. The second Commanding
General in charge of the project was transferred because
--1051--
he was too sick to attend to his duties, and because
the work was not progressing fast enough for the Imperial
General Headquarters. The inspector, who recommended
the removal of the second Commanding General, was not,
as stated by TOJO, the Chief of the Prisoner of War
Information bureau, but Wakamatsu, the Director of the
Third Division of the Army General Staff in charge of
transportation and communication. He reported to the
Chief of the Army general Staff that the work was not
making sufficient progress and recommended that the
General in command of the railroad units in Malaya be
placed in charge of the construction, and that he be
allowed a two-month extension of the date set for the
completion of the road.
The court-marital of one company commander was
so insignificant and inadequate as a corrective measure
in view of the general disregard of the laws of war by
those in charge of prisoners of war on this project and
the inhumane treatment to which they were subjecting
the prisoners as to amount to condonation of their
conduct. One of the principal concerns of the Government
and the Japanese Imperial General Staff in 1943 was that
the railway should be completed in time to use it in
resisting the advance of the Allied forces which was
making progress in Burma. No concern appears to have
been shown for the cost in sick, wounded and dead Allied
prisoners of war caused by the constant driving, beating,
torturing and murdering at the hands of their Japanese
and Korean guards and the unsanitary conditions in which
the prisoners were required to live and work, and the
failure of the Japanese government to furnish the barest
--1052--
necessities of life and medical care.
The lack of proper accommodation, the treatment
of the sick, and the inhumane treatment of prisoners
engaged in connection with construction of the railway,
which is typical of Japanese treatment of prisoners of
war, is described by the witness, Colonel Wild, who
was kept on this project until November 1943. Colonel
Wild, who, by reason of his knowledge of Japanese, acted
as liaison officer between the prisoners of war and the
Japanese officers, visited many of the camps in which
the prisoners were kept, and had a first-hand knowledge
of the treatment accorded them. The following extract
from his evidence graphically describes conditions:
Q. Substantially, was there any difference
between the living conditions and treatment of prisoners
of war in these various camps?
A. None.
Q. Will you describe one of them as an example?
A. When I entered Songkrei camp on the third
of August 1943, I went first to a very large hut accommodating
about 700 men. The hut was of the usual
pattern. On each side of an earthen gangway there was
a 12-foot wide sleeping platform made of split bamboo.
The roof was inadequately made with an insufficient
quantity of palm leaves. which let the rain through
almost everywhere. There were no walls, and a stream
of water was running down the earthen gangway. The
framework of the hut was bamboo tied with creeper.
In this hut were 700 sick men. They were
lying two deep along each side of the hut on the split
bamboo platform. Their bodies were touching one another
--1053--
down the whole length of the hut. They were all very
thin and practically naked. In the middle of the hut
were about 150 men suffering from tropical ulcers. These
commonly stripped the whole of the flesh from a man's
leg from the knee to the ankle. There was an almost
overwhelming smell of putrefaction. The only dressings
available were banana leaves tied around with puttees,
and the only medicine was hot water. There was another
hut further up the hill of similar design in which so-called
fit men were kept, and one well-roofed and better
constructed hut occupied by the Japanese guards.
Q. Was any bedding supplied?
A. None whatever.
Q. What did they have to cover them from the rain?
A. When we first entered these working camps,
none of them were roofed at all for the first few weeks.
The monsoon had already broken, and during those weeks
the men had nothing whatever to cover themselves from
the rain except banana leaves. If they were strong
enough, each man cut a couple of banana leaves and put
them over his own body.
Q. Was any roofing material ever received?
A. In my own camp, if which I was in command,
Lower Niki, we got a lorry load of atap palm, which was
enough to roof half the hut in which the worst of the
sick were lying. In Niki Camp no atap palm was ever
received, but we got some rotten, leaking canvas. In
the other four camps, after a few weeks, about enough
atap palm was supplied to roof all the huts with about
half the amount that was necessary. Again, this does
not apply to the Japanese and Korean guards, who always
--1054--
had a proper roof over them.
Q. By the middle of July 1943, that is, ten
weeks after you had left Singapore, what was the state
of "F" Force as a whole?
A. We had 1700 deaths by that time, and 700
men out of the 7,000 were going out to work. Of these
700, we British officers considered that 350 should have
been lying down sick.
The account of the construction of this railway
would be incomplete without reference to the treatment
of the conscripted native labour employed.
To supplement the prisoners of war employed on
the work, native labourers, Burmese, Tamils, Javanese,
Malayans and Chinese were recruited, sometimes on
promises of varying kinds, and at others, by force, for
labour in occupied areas. In all, about 150,000 of these
labourers were employed on the railway work. The treatment
given them and the conditions under which they
existed were, if anything, worse than those already
described. At least 60,000 of the 150,000 died during
the period of construction.
We shall deal later in some detail with protests
made by the Allies against ill-treatment of prisoners,
and shall refer to knowledge of atrocities on the part of the
General Staff and the Government. It is, however,
pertinent at this stage to refer to the evidence establishing
that, before the railway project was begun, the
Army was advised of the terrible conditions under which
the work would be done; that the Government had knowledge
of the casualties and failed to remedy these conditions.
In 1942, before the work began, the Southern Army
--1055--
Headquarters was advised of the dange of prisoners
contracting the various tropical diseases, and from
time to time the death rate was reported. Confirmation
of the knowledge of the danger to the health of the
prisoners and the insufficiency of food, shelter and
medical supplies is found in a report dated 6 October
1944 from the Chief-of-Staff of the Southern Army
to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau,
reading in part: "For strategic reasons the completion
of the railway was most urgent. Since the proposed
site of this railway line was a virgin jungle, shelter,
food, provisions and medical supplies were far from
adequate and much different from normal conditions
for prisoners of war."
In July 1943, when thousands of prisoners had
died or were incapacitated by disease, Foreign Minister
SHIGEMITSU, in reply to a protest, said that the prisoners
were equitably treated and that all sick received medical
attention. Yet, even according to Japanese figures,
within a month of the sending of SHIGEMITSU's message,
the total of prisoners who had died in Thailand alone
was 2,909. According to the same source, the death rate
had increased enormously month by month, from 54 in
November 1942 to 800 in August 1943.
In the summer of 1943, Wakamatsu, on his return
to Tokyo from his inspection of the area, previously
referred to, reported personally to Sugiyama, Chief
of the General Staff, that he had seen many cases of
beri-beri and dysentery and that the quality of the food
was not of the required standard.
--1056--
It is claimed that many of the deaths occurred
because the Allied Forces interfered with the regular
supply of food and drugs. However, for the very reason
of this interference with shipping, the order was given in
February 1943 to shorten the terms by which the work
had to be finished, by four months. Since that order,
the commanders became reckless. POWs were told: Men
are of no importance, the railroad has to be built
irrespective of any suffering or death, or "the construction
of the railway had to go on without delay
as it was required for operational purposes, and had
to be finished within a certain time at all costs,
irrespective of the loss of lives of British and
Australian prisoners."
Finally, we refer to one of the monthly reports,
dated 3 September 1943, received by the Prisoner of War
Information Bureau from the Prisoner of War Commandant
in Thailand, which stated that of a total of 40,314
Prisoners, 15,064 were sick. In view of the practice
of forcing beri-beri and dysentery cases to continue to
work, the number of sick, if these had been included,
would have been much greater.
Torture and Other Inhumane Treatment
The practice of torturing prisoners of war and
civilian internees prevailed at practically all places
occupied by Japanese troops, both in the occupied
territories and in Japan. The Japanese indulged in
this practice during the entire period of the Pacific
War. Methods of torture were employed in all areas so
uniformly as to indicate policy both in training and
execution. Among these tortures were the water treatment,
burning, electric shocks, the knee spread,
--1057--
suspension, kneeling on sharp instruments and flogging.
The Japanese Military Police, the
Kempetai,
was
most active in inflicting these tortures. Other Army
and Navy units, however, used the same methods as the
Kempetai.
Camp guards also employed similar methods.
Local police forces organized by the Kempetai in the
occupied territories also applied the same methods of torture.
We will show how the Chiefs of Camps were
instructed in Tokyo before assuming their duties. We
will also show that these Chiefs of Camps were under
the administrative control and supervision of the
--1058--
Prisoner of War Administration Section of the Military
Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry to which they
rendered monthly reports. The Kempetai were administered
by the War Ministry. A Kempetai training
school was maintained and operated by the War Ministry
in Japan. It is a reasonable inference that the conduct
of the Kempetai and the camp guards reflected the
policy of the War Ministry.
To indicate the prevalence of torture and the
uniformity of the methods employed we give a brief
summary of these methods.
The so-called "water treatment" was commonly
applied. The victim was bound or otherwise secured in
a prone position; and water was forced through his
mouth and nostrils into his lungs and stomach until
he lost consciousness. Pressure was then applied,
sometimes by jumping upon his abdomen to force the
water out. The usual practice was to revive the victim
and successively repeat the process. There was evidence
that this torture was used in the following places:
China, at Shanghai, Peiping and Nanking; French Indo-China,
at Hanoi and Saigon; Malaya, at Singapore;
Burma, at Kyaikto; Thailand, at Chumporn; Andaman Islands,
at Port Blair; Borneo, at Jesselton; Sumatra, at Medan,
Tadjong Karang and Palembank; Java, at Batavia, Bandung,
Soerabaja and Buitennzong; Celebes, at Makassar;
Portuguese Timor, at Ossu and Dilli; Philippines, at
Manila, Nichols Field, Palo Beach and Dumaguete;
Formosa, at Camp Haito; and in Japan, at Tokyo.
Torture by burning was practiced extensively.
--1059--
This torture was generally 9inflicted by burning the body
of the victim with lighted cigarettes, but in some
instances burning candles, hot irons, burning oil and
scalding water were used. In many of these cases, the
heat was applied to sensitive parts of the body, such
as the nostrils, ears, abdomen, sexual organs, and in
the case of women, to the breasts. We have evidence of
specific instances in which this form of torture was
employed in the following places: China, at Hankow,
Peiping, Shanghai and Nomonhan; French Indo-China, at
Haiphong, Hanoi, Vinh, and Saigon; Malaya, at Singapore,
Victoria Point, Ipoh and Muala Lumpur; Burma, at
Kyaikto; Thailand, at Chumporn; Andaman Islands, at
Port Blair; Nicobar Islands, at Kakana; borneo, at
Jesselton; Sumatra, at Palambang and Pakan Baru; Java,
at Batavia, Bandung and Semarang; Moluccas Islands,
at Amboina; Portuguese Timor, at Ossu; Solomon Islands,
at Buin; Philippine Islands, at Manila, Iloilo City,
Palo, Bataan and Dumaguete; and in Japan, at Kawasaki.
The electric shock method was also common.
Electric current was applied to a part of the victim's
body so as to produce a shock. The point of application
was generally a sensitive part of the body such as the
nose, ears, sexual organs or breasts. The evidence
shows specific instances of the use of this method of
torture at the following places: China, at Peiping and
Shanghai; French Indo-China, at Hanoi and Mytho;
Malaya, at Singapore; thailand, at Chumporn; Java, at
Bandung, Buitenzorg and Semarang; and in the
Philippines Islands, at Davao.
The so-called knee spread was a frequent method
--1060--
of torture. The victim, with his hands tied behind his
back, was forced to kneel with a pole, sometimes as
much as three inches in diameter, inserted behind both
knee joints so as to spread those joints as pressure
was applied to his thighs, at times by jumping on his
thighs. the result of this torture was to separate the
knee joints and so cause intense pain. THe evidence
shows specific instances of this torture being used at
the following places: China, at Shanghai and Nanking;
Burma, at Tavoy; Andaman Islands, at Port Blair; Borneo,
at Sandakan; Sumatra, at Pakan Baru; Moluccas Islands,
at Halmahera Island; Portuguese Timor, at Dilli;
Philippine Islands, at Manila, Nichols field and Pasay
Camp; and in Japan, at Tokyo.
Suspension was another common form of torture.
The body of the victim was suspended by the wrists,
arms, legs or neck, and at time in such manner as to
strangle the victim or pull joints from their sockets.
This method was at times combined with flogging during
suspension. Specific instances of the employment of
this method of torture occurred in the following places:
China, at Shanghai and Nanking; French Indo-China, at
Hanoi; Malaya, at Singapore, Victoria Point, Ipoh and
Kuala Lumpur; Thailand, at Chumporn; burma, at Kyaikto;
Borneo, at Sandakan; Sumatra, at Brastagi; Java, at
Bandung, Soerabaja and Buitenzorg; Moluccas Islands,
at Amboina; Portuguese Timor, at Dilli; Philippine
Islands, at Manila, Nichols field, Palo, Iloilo City
and Dumaguete; and in Japan, at Tokyo and Yokkaichi.
Kneeling on sharp instruments was another form of
torture. the edges of square blocks were mostly used
--1061--
as the sharp instruments, the victim was forced to
kneel on these sharp edges for hours without relief;
if he moved he was flogged. Specific instances of the
use of this method have been shown to us to have occurred
at the following places: French Indo-China, at
Hanoi; Malaya, at Singapore; Andaman Islands, at Port
Blair; Moluccas Islands, on Halmahera Island; Philippine
Islands, at Davao; and in Japan, at Fukuoka and Omuta.
Removal of the nails of the fingers and toes
also occurred. Instances of this method of torture are
found at the following places: China, at Shanghai;
Celebes, at Menado; Philippines, at Manila, Iloilo City;
and in Japan, at Yamani.
Underground dungeons were used as torture
chambers at the following places: French Indo-China, at
Hanoi; Malaya, at Singapore; and in Java, at Bandung.
Flogging was the most common of the cruelties of
the Japanese. It was commonly used at all prisoner of
war and internee camps, prisons, Kempetai headquarters
and at all work camps and on all work projects, as well
as aboard prison ships. It was indulged in freely by
the guards with the approval and often at the direction
of the Camp Commandant or some other officer. Special
instruments were issued for use in flogging at camps;
some of these were billets of wood the size of a baseball
bat. On occasions, prisoners were forced to beat their
fellow prisoners under the supervision of the guards.
Prisoners suffered internal injuries, broken bones, and
lacerations from these beatings. In many instances,
they were beaten into unconsciousness only to be revived
in order to suffer a further beating. the evidence shows
--1062--
that on occasions prisoners were beaten to death.
Mental torture was commonly employed. An
illustration of this form of torture is to be found
in the treatment to which the Doolittle filers were
subjected. After having been subjected to the various
other forms of torture, they were taken one at a time
and marched blindfolded a considerable distance. The
victim could hear voices and marching feet, then the
noise of a squad halting and lowering their rifles as
if being formed to act as a firing squad. A Japanese
officer then came up to 6the victim and said: "We are
Knights of the Bushido of the Order of the Rising Sun;
we do not execute at sundown; we execute at sunrise."
The victim was then taken back to his cell and informed
that unless he talked before sunrise, he would be executed.
On 5 December 1944, the Swiss Legation in Tokyo
delivered to Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU a Note of
Protest from the British Government. In that note,
SHIGEMITSU was informed that a copy of a book entitled,
"Notes for the Interrogation of Prisoners of War", and
issued by the Japanese Hayashi Division in Burma on
6 August 1943, had been captured. The note gave
SHIGEMITSU direct quotations from that book as follows:
"Care must be exercised when making use of rebukes,
invectives or torture as it will result in his telling
falsehood and making a fool of you. The following
are the methods normally to be adopted; (a) TOrture
which includes kicking, beating and anything connected
with physical suffering. This method to be used only
when everything else fails as it is the most clumsy
--1063--
one." (This passage was specially marked in the copy
captured.) "Change the interrogating officer when
using violent torture, and good results can be had if
the new officer questions in a sympathetic manner.
(b) Threats. (1) Hints of future physical discomforts,
for instance: torture, murder, starving,
solitary confinement, deprivation of sleep. (2) Hints
of future mental discomforts, for instance; he will
not be allowed to send letters, he will not be given
the same treatment as the other prisoners of war, he
will be kept till the last in the event of an exchange
of prisoners, etc." The note then continued: "The
Government of the United Kingdom has requested that
the attention of the Japanese Government be drawn to
the foregoing. It recalls that the Japanese Government
has recently strongly denied that Imperial Japanese
authorities make use of torture. See the letter from
SHIGEMITSU to the Swiss Minister of 1 July 1944." We
have no evidence that any cation was taken to stop this
practice of torturing Allied prisoners of war; on the
other hand, the practice continued to the time of the
surrender of Japan, and when the surrender came, orders
were issued to assist the criminals in avoiding just
punishment for their crimes. In addition to ordering all
incriminating evidence in the form of documents to be
destroyed, the following order as issued by the Chief
of Prisoner of War Camps at the Prisoner of War Administration
Section of the Military Affairs Bureau on
20 August 1945: "Personnel who mistreated prisoners
of war and internees or are held in extremely bad
sentiment by them are permitted to take care of it by
immediately transferring or by fleeing without trace."
This order was sent to various prisoner of war camps,
--1064--
including those in Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, North
China, Hong Kong, Borneo, Thailand, Malaya and Java.
Vivisection and Cannibalism
Vivisection was practiced by Japanese Medical
Officers upon prisoners in their hands. There were
also cases of dismemberment of prisoners by Japanese
who were not Medical Officers. In addition to the
incidents stated below, other dismembered bodies of
dead captives were found in circumstances indicating
that the mutilation had occurred before death.
There was evidence that at Khandok a prisoner
of war described as "healthy, unwounded" was treated as
follows: "The man was tied to a tree outside the
Hikari Kiken Office. A Japanese doctor and four
Japanese medical students stood around him. They first
removed the finger nails, then cutting open his chest
removed his heart, on which the doctor gave a practical
demonstration."
The captured diary of a Japanese, apparently an
officer, recorded an incident on Guadalcanal. "26
September - Discovered and captured the two prisoners
who escaped last night in the jungle, and let the
Guard Company guard them. To prevent their escaping
a second time, pistols were fired at their feet, but
it was difficult to hit them. The two prisoners were
dissected while still alive by Medical Officer Yamaji
and their livers were taken out, and for the first time
I saw the internal organs of a human being. It was
very informative."
A case of mutilation of a living captive, this
--1065--
time not by a medical, but by a combatant Japanese officer,
was deposed to from Canagay, in the Philippines.
The evidence was: ." . . A young woman . . . about
24 years old, was caught hiding in the grass. The
officer in charge of the entire patrol tore off her
clothes, while two soldiers held her. He then had her
taken to a small nipa hut, without walls . . . and
there the officer in charge of the patrol used his
sabre to cut her breasts and womb. Soldiers held her
while the officer did this. At first, the girl was
screaming. She finally lay still and silent. The
Japanese then set fire to the nipa hut. . . ."
At Manila, an eye witness described how his
house boy was tied to a pillar. The Japanese then cut off
his genitals and thrust his severed penis in his mouth.
Other instances of the mutilation of prisoners
in the hands of Japanese soldiers occurred at Balikpapan
in Borneo. The incident was related by an eye witness
as follows: "I saw a district-officer in uniform and
a Police Inspector in uniform. A Japanese officer
started a conversation with that district-officer . . .
I saw that during that conversation that
officer was ill-treating the district-officer by blows
in his face with the hand, and further with the scabbard
over his body.  . . . The Japanese officer who had
started the talk with the (Dutch) district-officer,
drew his sword and hewed off both the district-officer's
arms, a little above his elbows, and then his two legs
at the height of the knees. The district-officer was
also taken to a cocoanut tree, bound to it and stabbed
to death with the bayonet.  . . . After this, the same
officer went over to the Policeman in uniform;  . . .
he was kicked and beaten with the hand and with the
sword in the scabbard. After this, that (Japanese)
officer hewed off his arms under the elbow and his
--1066--
legs near the knees; I heard him shout once more
'Gove save the Queen'. With bayonet thrusts and kicks
the Policeman was made to stand up, and standing on
his leg stumps, he was stabbed to death with a bayonet."
Towards the end of the Pacific War the Japanese
Army and Navy descended to cannibalism, eating parts
of the bodies of Allied prisoners whom they had unlawfully
killed. This practice was not unnoticed nor even
disapproved by the Japanese Army. A Japanese prisoner
upon interrogation said: "On 10 December 1944 an order
was issued from 18 Army Headquarters that troops were
permitted to eat the flesh of Allied dead but must
not eat their own dead." This statement was confirmed
by a captured memorandum upon discipline found in the
possession of a Major General. In this memorandum
occurs the passage: "Although it is not prescribed in
the criminal code, those who eat human flesh (except
that of the enemy) knowing it to be so, shall be
sentenced to death as the worst kind of criminal
against mankind."
At times this consumption of the flesh of their]
enemies was made into something of a festive occasion
at officers' quarters. Even officers of the rank of
General and Rear-Admiral took part. Flesh of murdered
prisoners or soup made from such flesh was served at
meals of Japanese below the rank of officers. The
evidence indicates that this cannibalism occurred when
there was other food available. That is to say, on
such occasions, this horrible practice was indulged in
from choice and not of necessity.
--1067--
Prison Ships Were Subjected to Attack
The Japanese practices in the movement of prisoners
of war by sea was in line with equally unlawful and inhumane
methods of movement by land. The prisoners were crowded
into holds and coal bunkers of ships with inadequate
sanitary facilities and insufficient ventilation, and
were given no medical service. They were forced to
remain below decks during long voyages and to subsist on
meager rations of food and water. These prison ships
were unmarked and subjected to Allied attack in which
thousands of prisoners perished.
The method employed to conserve space was generally
as follows; Wooden stages or temporary decks were built
in empty coal bunkers and holds with a vertical distance
of three feet between them. The space allotted to
prisoners on these temporary decks was an area six feet
by six feet for 15 prisoners. They were compelled to
sit cross-legged during the entire voyage. Space was
conserved also by the elimination of proper sanitary
facilities. The sanitary facilities provided consisted
of buckets or boxes which were lowered into the hold or
bunker with ropes and were removed in the same manner for
emptying over the side. Drippings from these containers
added to the general unsanitary conditions. Many
prisoners were suffering from dysentery when taken on
board; and their excreta fell freely through the cracks
of the wooden stages upon the prisoners below. To save
space for the preparation of food, the prisoners were
served uncooked food or food that had been prepared before
sailing. For the same reason, an inadequate supply of
water was carried. To add to the horrible conditions
--1068--
which prevailed, prisoners were not allowed on deck. This
method of transportation by sea of prisoners of war prevailed
generally during the entire period of the Pacific
War. It has been defended as necessary because of a
shortage of tonnage possessed by Japan. This is not a
good defence; for the Japanese Government was not
entitled to move prisoners if it was unable to do so
under the conditions prescribed by the laws of war.
This method of transportation was used in August
1942 in moving the first group of British prisoners from
Singapore to Moulmein to labor on the Burma-Siam
Railroad. It occurred again when the
Nitta Maru
called at Wake Island in January 1942 to remove 1,235
American prisoners of war and civilian internees to
Yokohama and Shanghai. In this case, as in other, the
prisoners and internees were forced to run the gauntlet
of Japanese soldiers in which they were beaten and
kicked as they went aboard. It was on connection with
this voyage that our attention was first called to the
"Regulations for Prisoners" which were in force aboard
prison ships. Those regulations, among other things,
provided as follows: "The prisoners disobeying the
following orders will be punished with immediate death:
(a) those disobeying orders and instructions; (b) those
showing a motion of antagonism and raising a sign of
opposition; . . . (d) those talking without permission
and raising loud voices; (e) those walking and moving
without order; . . . (i) those climbing ladder without
order; . . . the Navy of the Great Japanese Empire will not
try to punish you all with death. Those obeying all the
rules of the Japanese Navy, cooperating with Japan in
--1069--
constructing the 'New Order of Great Asia' will be well
treated." On some voyages, the prisoners were crowded
into bunkers not fitted with temporary decks and forced
to range themselves around the coal so long as standing
room remained. On other voyages, highly inflammable
cargo was packed into the hold with the prisoners. In
addition to the many obvious discomforts and dangers to
health to which this method of packing prison ships
subjected the prisoners, it made their escape from the
ship in case of sinking almost impossible.
The prison ships were often attacked in the same
manner as other Japanese ships by the Allied forces who
could not distinguish them from other ships. A large
number of sinkings resulted and thousands of Allied
prisoners of war were lost. It was the practice in
some cases, when these attacks occurred, to fasten
down the hatches to prevent the escape of the prisoners
and to station Japanese soldiers armed with rifles
and machine guns with orders to kill those prisoners
who might overcome these obstacles and escape from
the sinking ship. This happened on the
Lisbon Maru
which was sunk in October 1942 on a voyage out of
Hong Kong with British prisoners aboard. In other cases,
the prisoners were shot or otherwise murdered after the
sinking and while in the water. This was done in the
case of the
Oryoku Maru,
which was sunk on a voyage
from Manila in December 1944 with American prisoners of
war aboard. the same thing occurred in the case of the
sinking of the
Van Waerwyck
in the Malacca Straits in
June 1944. This occurred again in the sinking of the
Junior Maru
in September 1944 off the east coast of
Sumatra with large numbers of Ambonese prisoners of war
--1070--
and conscripted Indonesian laborers aboard.
Many prisoners of war died on these voyages from
suffocation, disease and starvation; those who survived
were so weakened from the ordeal of the voyage that they
were unable to labor upon arriving at their destination.
This impairment of the ability of the prisoners of war
to perform labor caused the War Ministry to issue "Despatch,
Army Asia Secret Order No. 1504" dated 10 December 1942.
In that order it was stated that, "Recently during the
transportation of the prisoners of war to Japan many of
them have taken ill or have died and quite a few of them
have been incapacitated for further work due to the
treatment on the way, which at times was inadequate."
Instructions were then given to insure the arrival of the
prisoners at their destination in condition to perform
labor. The condition of the prisoners transported by sea
was not materially improved by the issuance of this
order, however; and on 3 March 1944, TOJO's Vice-Minister
of War, Tominaga, issued another order to "the Units
concerned" in which, among other things, he said: "In
the Prisoner of War Administration, the use of prisoners
for labor has been stressed heretofore. Although this
has directly helped to increase our fighting strength,
the average prisoner of war's health condition is hardly
satisfactory. Their high death rate must be brought to
our attention. In the light of the recent intensified
enemy propaganda warfare, if the present condition continues
to exist, it will be impossible for us eto expect
the world opinion to be what we wish it to be. Such will
cause an obstacle to our prosecution of moral warfare.
Not only that, it is absolutely necessary to improve the
health condition of prisoners of war from the standpoint
--1071--
of using them satisfactorily to increase our fighting
strength. It should be added that, although efforts must
be exerted to utilize spaces on ships in transporting
war prisoners, it is necessary that the purport of the
Despatch, Army Asia Secret No. 1504 of 1942 be thoroughly
understood in handling war prisoners at this juncture."
Members of the Government and many government officials
were aware of the effect of these methods upon the
prisoners. Such corrective measures as were taken by
them, which were totally inadequate, were designed to
preserve the ability of the prisoners to perform labor
for use in the prosecution of the war, not to insure
the enforcement of the laws of war relating to the
movement of prisoners of war.
Submarine Warfare
Inhumane, illegal warfare at sea was waged by the
Japanese Navy in 1943 and 1944. Survivors of passengers
and crews of torpedoed ships were murdered.
Ambassador OSHIMA was empowered by the TOJO
Cabinet to discuss the prosecution of the war with the
Reich Foreign Minister; and although technical questions
were to be discussed directly by members of the Mixed
Commission, it was OSHIMA's expressed opinion that it was
of the greatest importance that questions of policy should
be discussed exclusively by OSHIMA and Ribbentrop, the
German Foreign Minister. OSHIMA had a conference with
Hitler on 3 January 1942. Hitler explained his policy
of submarine warfare, which he was conducting against
Allied shipping, and said that although the United States
might build ships very quickly, her chief problem would
be the personnel shortage, since the training of seafaring
--1072--
personnel took a long time. Hitler explained that he had
given orders for his submarines to surface after torpedoing
merchant ships and to shoot up the life-boars, so
that the word would get about that most seamen were lost
in torpedoing, and the United States would have difficulty
in recruiting new crews. OSHIMA, in replying to Hitler,
approved this statement of policy and stated that the
Japanese, too, would follow this method of waging submarine warfare.
An order issued by the Commander of
the First Submarine Force at Truk on 20 March 1943,
contained this command: "All submarines shall act
together in order to concentrate their attacks against
enemy convoys and shall totally destroy them. Do not
stop with the sinking of enemy ships and cargoes; at the
same time, you will carry out the complete destruction
of the crews of the enemy's ships;' if possible, seize
part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about
the enemy."
This order for inhumane warfare at sea was followed
by the Japanese submarine commanders. Between
13 December 1943 and 29 October 1944, Japanese submarines,
after sinking eight British, American and Dutch merchant
vessels in the Indian Ocean and one American vessel in the
--1073--
Pacific Ocean, surfaced after firing their torpedoes,
attempted to or did take on board the master of the ship,
and then proceeded to destroy the life-boats and murder
the survivors.
Repeated protests were made by the Allied Governments
in which they stated the exact date and position
of the sinkings and the details of the atrocities
committed upon the passengers and crews of the torpedoed
vessels. no satisfactory answer was made to these protests
and the sinkings continued without modification of
the treatment of survivors.
The action taken by the Japanese Navy in the sinking
of the British Merchant Ship
Behar
by gunfire on 9 March
1944 is illustrative. One hundred and fifteen survivors
were picked up by the cruiser
Tone.
Later in the day,
the
Tone
reported the sinking and capture to the
Flagship
Aoba.
Orders were immediately signalled to
the
Tone
from the
Aoba
to kill the survivors. It was
later decided to place fifteen of the survivors, including
two women and one Chinese in a civilian internee camp
and to kill the remaining one hundred. On orders of the
captain of the
Tone
these hundred survivors were killed
aboard the
Tone.
The massacre of survivors of the American ship
Jean Nicolet
is another example of methods employed by
the Japanese Navy. This ship was travelling from Australia
to Ceylon in July 1944, when she was torpedoed at night by
a Japanese submarine while some 600 miles from land. Her
ship's company was about 100, of whom about 90 were taken
aboard the submarine. The ship was sunk and her boats were
also smashed by gun fire, although all did not sink. The
--1074--
hands of the survivors were tied behind their backs. A
few of the officers were taken below and their fate is
not known to the Tribunal. The remainder were made to
sit on the forward deck of the submarine as she cruised
searched for survivors. DUring this time, some were
washed overboard and others were beaten with wooden and
metal bludgeons and robbed of personal property such as
watches and rings. Then they were required to proceed
singly towards the stern between lines of Japanese who
beat them as they passed between their ranks. Thus, they
were forced into the water to drown. Before all the
prisoners had been forced to run the gauntlet, the vessel
submerged, leaving the remaining prisoners on her deck to
their fate. Some, however, did survive by swimming.
These and their comrades whom they kept afloat were discovered
the next day by aircraft, which directed a rescuing
ship to them. Thus, twenty-two survived this terrible
experience, from some of whom this Tribunal received
testimony of this inhumane conduct of the Japanese Navy.
Illegal Employment, Starvation and Neglect
of Prisoners and Internees
General Uemura, Director of the Prisoner of War
Administration Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of
the War Ministry, only a few weeks after the agreement
with the Allies to apply the provisions of the Geneva
Prisoner of War Convention to prisoners of war and civilian
internees, advised the Chief-of-Staff of the Japanese
Army in Formosa on 2 April 1942 that "Plans are now being
pushed for the use of prisoners of war in production",
and requested an immediate report upon the number that
might be utilized for that purpose in Formosa.
--1075--
On 6 May 1942, the Vice-Minister of War informed
the Chief-of-Staff of the Army in Formosa of the
policy governing employment of prisoners of war. He said
that it had been decided that: "Prisoners of war can be
used for the enlargement of our production and as
military labor, white prisoners of war will be confined
successively in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria.
Superior technicians and high ranking officers -- Colonels
and above -- will be included among the prisoners of
war confined in Formosa. Those who are not suitable
for use in enlargement of our production will be confined
in prisoner of war camps which will be built
immediately on the spot." General Uemura on 5 June
1942 directed the Chief-of-Staff of the Army in Formosa
as follows: "Although the working of prisoner of war
officers and warrant officers is forbidden by the
Regulations of 1903, the policy of the control authorities
is that under the situation of our country
where not one person now eats without working they
want them to set to work. It is desired that you give
proper orders on this." These instructions were also
sent to all other Army units concerned. This directive
originated within the Cabinet, for on 30 May 1942, Prime
Minister TOJO issued instructions to the Commander of
a Division, which had a prisoner of war camp under its
jurisdiction, in which he said: "The present situation
of affairs in this country does not permit anyone
to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely. With
that in view, in dealing with prisoners of war, I
hope you will see that they may be usefully employed."
Pn 25 June 1942, TOJO issued his instructions to newly
appointed Chiefs of Prisoner of War camps. He said:
"In Japan, we have our own ideology concerning prisoners
--1076--
of war, which sould naturally make their treatment
more or less different from that in Europe and
America. In dealing with them, you should, of course,
observe the various Regulations concerned, aim at an
adequate application of them . . . At the same time, you
must not allow them to lie idle doing nothing but
eating freely for even a single day. Their labor and
technical skill should be fully utilized for the replenishment
of production, and contribution rendered toward
the prosecution of the Greater East Asiatic War for
which no effort ought to be spared." The application
of these instructions account, at least in part, for the
constant driving, beating and prodding of the sick and
wounded prisoners and those suffering from malnutrition
to force them to labor upon military works until they
died from disease, malnutrition and exhaustion. These
instructions were repeated on 26 June 1942 by TOJO to
another group of newly appointed prisoner of war camp
chiefs and again to another such group on 7 July 1942.
That the Cabinet supported TOJO in his program to
employ prisoners of war to aid in the prosecution of the
war is shown by the "Foreign Affairs Monthly Report" of
the Foreign Section of the Police Bureau of the Home
Ministry issued for the month of September 1942. The
report showed that, due to the labor shortage in Japan,
the Cabinet Planning Board, with the concurrence of the
Prisoner of War Administration Section of the Military
Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, held a conference on
15 August 1942 at which it was decided to transfer
prisoners of war to Japan and employ them to mitigate
the labor shortage in the industries in the National
Mobilization Plan. According to the report, it had been
--1077--
decided to employ the prisoners of war in mining,
stevedoring, and on engineering and construction works
for national defense. A complete plan had been agreed
upon whereby the prefectural governors, cooperating
with the Welfare Ministry and the Army, would take charge
of the supervision of the prisoners of war and their
employment. With members of the Government, HOSHINO
and SUZUKI participated in this decision. HOSHINO had
been selected as Chief Secretary of the Cabinet by TOJO
because of his long experience in economic planning and
had been charged by TOJO to devote his main efforts to
such activities in cooperation with SUZUKI, who he had
selected to head the Cabinet Planning Bureau. HOSHINO
became Chief Secretary of the Cabinet on 18 October 1941,
and served until the fall of the TOJO Cabinet on 19
July 1944. SUZUKI became a Councillor of the Planning
Bureau on 30 May 1939, and when HOSHINO was relieved as
President of the Cabinet Planning Bureau and as Minister
without Portfolio on 4 April 1941, SUZUKI succeeded him
and continued to serve as Minister without Portfolio and
President of the Cabinet Planning Bureau in the Third
Konoye Cabinet and the TOJO Cabinet until the TOJO
Cabinet resigned on 19 July 1944.
Consideration for Racial Needs
Food and Clothing
The Japanese Government promised early in 1942 to
take into consideration the national customs and racial
habits of the prisoners of war and civilian internees in
supplying them with food and clothing. This was never
done. Regulations in force at the time this promise was
made required that camp commandants in supplying prisoners
--1078--
of war and internees with food and clothing should be
guided by the Table of Basic Allowances governing the
supply of the Army. the commandants were authorized to
determine the amount of the allowance to be made to
the inmates of the camps, but were directed to make
such determination within the limits prescribed in the
Table of Allowances. These Regulations, insofar as
they affected diet, were interpreted as forbidding the
prisoners and internees sufficient food, even when other
food existed in the vicinity of the camps. This rule
was followed even when the inmates of the camps were
dying in large numbers from malnutrition. The amount
and kind of food prescribed by the Table of Allowances
was not materially changed during the war, except to
reduce the amount prescribed, although it soon became
apparent to those in command that, due to different
national dietary customs and habits, the prisoners and
internees could not subsist on the food supplied. On
29 October 1942, orders were issued to all camp commandants
that "in view of the consumption of rice and
barley by workers in heavy industries in Japan," the
ration for prisoners of war and civilian internees who
were officers or civil officials should be cut so as
not to exceed 420 grams per day. In January 1944, this
ration of rice was further cut to a maximum of 390
grams per day. As the inmates of the camps began to
suffer from malnutrition, they fell easy prey to
disease and were quickly exhausted by the heavy labor
forced upon them. Regardless of this, the commandants
of the camps enforced TOJO's instructions that those who
did not labor should not eat, and still further reduced
the ration, and in some cases withdrew it entirely from
--1079--
those who were unable to labor because of illness or injury.
The Regulations provided that the prisoners of
war and civilian internees should war the clothing
formerly worn by them, that is to say, the clothing they
were wearing when captured or interned. This
Regulation was enforced by the camp commandants with
the result that in many of the camps the inmates were
in rags before the war ended. It is true that the
Regulation allowed the camp commandants to lend certain
items of clothing in cases where the clothing formerly
worn by the prisoners or internees was unfit, but
this appears to have been used only in rare cases.
Medical Supplies
The Japanese Army and Navy were required by their
regulations to keep on hand and in storage a supply of
medicine and medical equipment sufficient for one year's
use. This was done in many instances by confiscating Red
Cross drugs and medical supplies, but the supplies were
kept in storage or used mostly for the benefit of
Japanese troops and camp guards. The prisoners of war
and civilian internees were rarely furnished medicines
and equipment from these warehouses. At the time of
surrender, large quantities of these supplies were
found stored in and around prisoner of war and civilian
internee camps in which prisoners and internees had been
dying at an alarming rate for lack of such supplies.
Suzuki, Kunki, who served as a staff officer of
the Eastern Military district on Honshu Island under
DOHIHARA and other Commanders, testified before this
Tribunal. Suzuki admitted that he authorized chiefs
--1080--
of camps and guards at the detention camps in his
district to confiscate Red Cross parcels intended for
prisoners of war. The evidence shows that this was
common practice at the camps located in Japan as well
as in Japan's overseas possessions and in the occupied
territories. Incidentally, Suzuki also admitted that
he knew that his guards were beating and otherwise ill-treating
the prisoners.
Failure to afford adequate or any medical supplies
to the prisoners of war and civilian internees was common
in all theatres of war and contributed to the deaths
of thousands of prisoners and internees.
Housing
The regulations provided that Army buildings,
temples and other existing buildings should be used as
prisoner of war and internee camps. The regulations
also provided that employers using prisoner of war
and civilian internees in war production should furnish
necessary shelter for them. Nevertheless, the housing
provided was in many instances inadequate as cover or
insanitary or both. The Japanese adjutant at the
Kanburi camp in Siam opened a hospital for the sick
prisoners of war in a group of approximately 20 empty
huts, which had been evacuated shortly before by a
Japanese cavalry regiment which had been using the huts
as stables. Atap huts with dirt floors furnished the
only shelter available in most of the camps located on
islands in the Pacific and along the Burma-Siam Railway.
It was common practice to build these camps with the
labor of the prisoners of war who were to occupy them,
--1081--
and to force the prisoners to live in the open,
exposed to the weather until the huts were completed.
However, in some instances, the prisoners were spared
the labor of construction by moving them into atap
huts camps, which had been depopulated by epidemics;
this was the case at the 60 kilometer camp on the Burma-Siam
Railway project, where approximately 800 Australian
prisoners of war were quartered in the huts recently
occupied by Burmese laborers who had died of cholera.
A former Javanese labor camp at Lahat, Molucca Islands,
was converted into a prisoner of war camp in August
1944. When the Dutch and British prisoners of war
arrived at the camp, they found it filled with dead
bodies of Javanese. KIMURA, as Vice-Minister of War,
when informed that ITAGAKI was planning to quarter 1,000
British and 1,000 American prisoners of war in three
theological schools in Korea, inquired if the buildings
scheduled for accommodation of the prisoners of war were
not too good for them.
Work
The policy of the Japanese Government was to use
prisoners of war and civilian internees to do work
directly related to war operations. In the theater of
operations they were used to construct military air
fields, roads, railroads, docks, and other military
works, and as stevedores to load and unload military
supplies. In the overseas possessions and in Japan,
they were forced, in addition to the foregoing work, to
labor in mines, in munitions and aircraft factories,
and in other projects bearing a direct relation to war
operations. As a general rule, the camps in which the
--1082--
prisoners of war and civilian internees were detained
were located near the place of employment without regard
to their safety, in consequence they were subjected to
unnecessary danger from air raids, both on and off
their work. There is evidence that in some instances
the camps were so located deliberately with the intention
of deterring the Allies from raiding the
military works or factories concerned.
Native Labor
Having decided upon a policy of employing prisoner
of war and civilian internees on work directly contributing
to the prosecution of the war, and having
established a system to carry that policy into execution,
the Japanese went further and supplemented this source
of manpower by recruiting laborers from the native
population of the occupied territories. This recruiting
of laborers was accomplished by false promises, and by
force. After being recruited, the laborers were transported
to and confined in camps. Little or no distinction
appears to have been made between these
conscripted laborers on the one hand, and prisoners of
war and civilian internees on the other hand. They were
all regarded as slave laborers to be used to the limit
of their endurance. For this reason, we have included
these conscripted laborers in the term "civilian
internees" whenever that term is used in this chapter.
The lot of these conscripted laborers was made worse
by the fact that generally they were ignorant of the
principles of hygiene applicable to their unusual and
crowded conditions, and succumbed more readily to the
diseases resulting from the insanitary conditions of
--1083--
confinement and work forced upon them by their Japanese captors.
Prisoners and Internees Forced to Sign Parole
To reduce the number of guards necessary for
prisoners of war and civilian internees, regulations in
defiance of the Rules of War were issued by the War
Ministry early in 1943 providing, "As soon as prisoners
of war have been imprisoned, they shall be administered
an oath forbidding them from making an escape.
Prisoners of war who refuse to take the oath mentioned
in this paragraph shall be deemed to have intentions
of escaping and shall be placed under strict surveillance."
This "strict surveillance" in practice meant
solitary confinement on reduced rations or subjection
to torture until they took the oath required. At
Singapore in August 1942, 16,000 prisoners, who had
refused to give the parole demanded, were herded into
a barrack square and kept there without food or latrine
facilities for four days to force them to sign the
parole. The resulting conditions are too disgusting to
describe. Some of the prisoners of war at Hong Kong,
who refused to sign the parole, were confined in a
prison without food and forced to kneel all day. If
they moved they were beaten. The senior prisoner of
war at the camp at Sandakan, who, with his men, refused
to sign was immediately seized and beaten. A firing
squad paraded. He was saved from death only when his
men agreed to sign. Prisoners of war in camps in
Batavia and Java were beaten and deprived of food until
they signed the parole. At Zentsuji Camp on Shikoku
Island, 41 prisoners were kept in confinement from
--1084--
14 June 1942 until 23 September 1942 for refusing to
take the oath, and were finally threatened with death
if they persisted in their refusal. As already stated,
the Prisoner of War Regulations also applied to civilian
internees by virtue of another regulation which we
have quoted. To enforce this parole, which was obtained
by coercion, the regulations further provided, "Persons
on parole, woh break the parole, shall be subject to
either the death penalty, or hard labor, or imprisonment
for life or for a minimum of seven years. WHen
the persons mentioned offer armed resistance, they
shall be subject to the death penalty." The regulations
also provided: "The persons, who violate any
other oath, shall be subject to a maximum ot ten years
imprisonment." This latter provision is explained by
still another article in the regulations as follows,
"Before a commandant of a prisoner of war camp dispatches
prisoners of war (
i.e.,
sends prisoners of war
to work details or to work camps from the prisoner
of war camp), he shall endeavor to prevent escapes and
unexpected disturbances, investigating thoroughly the
characters, mental attitudes, past histories, ans well
as the abilities of the prisoners of ar, and in
addition he shall administer a solemn oath on other
matters of importance." ITAGAKI, as Commander of the
Korean Army, informed War Minister TOJO by a message
dated 4 September 1942, that he intended to force all
prisoners of war, including officers and warrant officers,
under his jurisdiction to work; as he put it, "Not one
prisoner of war must be left time in idleness."
He stated that one of the regulations he had issued was
that "It is important to guard against destruction by
--1085--
the prisoners of war; if necessary, make them give an
oath and establish severe penalties." On 1 September
1942, TOJO received a message from the Commander of the
Formosa Army that "399 prisoners of war, including
Lt. General Percival, 6 Major-Generals, or Rear Admirals,
27 Brigadier Generals, or Commodores, 25 Colonels, or
Navy Captains, 130 officers of the rank of Lt. Colonel,
or Commander or below, and 210 non-commissioned officers
together with 6 civil officials, who had been transferred
from the Tomi group, were interned on 31 August 1942 in
the Formosa Prisoner of War Camp. At first, Lt. General
percival and others refused to make an oath, but finally
all but three (1 Brigadier-General, 1 Navy Captain
and Engineering Lieutenant) signed their names."
This system of regulations issued and enforced by
the Japanese Government to compel prisoners of war and
civilian internees by duress to give an oath not to
escape and not to violate other regulations and orders
of the Japanese Government violated the general laws
of war. The system was devised, instituted and maintained
as part of the policy of the Japanese Government
in disregard and violation of the laws of war.
Excessive and Unlawful Punishment Was Imposed
TOJO, in his instructions to chiefs of prisoner
of war and civilian internee camps, told those officials
to tighten their control over their subordinates and
to supervise the prisoners rigidly; he said, "It is
necessary to put them under strict discipline." He
repeated this charge in his instructions to the Commander
of the Zentsuji Division on 30 May 1942, when he
said: "Prisoners of war must be placed under strict
--1086--
discipline as far as it does not contravene the law
of humanity. It is necessary to take care not to be
obsessed with the mistaken idea of humanitarianism or
swayed by personal feelings toward those prisoners of
war which may grow in the long time of their imprisonment."
The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929
provided with respect to punishment of prisoners of war
for offenses committed while they were prisoners:
"Any corporal punishment, any imprisonment in quarters
without daylight, and, in general any form whatever of
cruelty is forbidden", and "Collective punishment for
individual acts is also forbidden." Other important
limitations upon punishments that might be inflicted
upon prisoners of war were included. All of them were
designed to insure humane treatment of the prisoners.
One of these limitations was contained in a provision of
the Convention which dealt with escapes and attempts to
escape; that provision reads: "Escaped prisoners of
war who are retaken before being able to rejoin their
own army or to leave the territory occupied by the
army which captured them shall be liable only to
disciplinary punishment. After an attempted or
accomplished escape, the comrades of the person escaping
who assisted in the escape may incur only
disciplinary punishment on this account. Arrest is the
most severe summary punishment which may be imposed
on a prisoner of war. The duration of a single
punishment may not exceed 30 days." In this connection,
disciplinary punishment and summary punishment were
used as synonymous terms. It was also provided that,
--1087--
"Attempted escape, even if it is not a first offense,
shall not be considered as an aggravating circumstance
in case the prisoner of war should be given over to
the courts on account of crimes or offenses against
persons or property committed in the course of that attempt."
That the Japanese truly understood the Convention
is shown by their objection in 1934 to its ratification.
they said that under the Convention, "Prisoners of war
could not be so severely punished as Japanese soldiers
and this would involve a revision of Japanese Military
and Naval Disciplinary Codes to put them on an equal
footing, a revision which was undesirable in the
interests of discipline." The real objection to the
ratification of the Convention was that the Military
desired to avoid any express commitments which would
hinder their policy of ill-treatment of prisoners of war.
Early in the Pacific War, and after the Japanese
Government had given its promise to apply the provisions
of the Convention to Allied prisoners of war and
civilian internees, ordinances and regulations were made
contrary to that promise. In 1943, this regulation was
published; "In case a prisoner of war is guilty of an
act of insubordination, he shall be subject to imprisonment
or arrest; and any other measures deemed necessary
for the purpose of discipline may be added." Under
this regulation,k corporal punishment as well as torture
and mass punishment was administered. It was common
practice in all areas in which prisoner of war and
civilian internee camps were located to inflict corporal
punishment for the slightest offence or for no offence.
This punishment in its mildest forms was beating and
--1088--
kicking the victim. The victim, if he became unconscious,
was often revived with cold water or by other means,
only to have the process repeated. Thousands died as
a result of this punishment. In some cases, death was
hastened by weakness due to starvation and disease.
Other forms of cruel punishments frequently employed
were: exposing the victim to the hot tropical sun for
long hours without headdress or other protection; suspension
of the victim by his arms in such a manner as
at times to force the arms from their sockets; binding
the victim where he would be attacked by insects; confining
the victim in a cramped cage for days without
food; confining the victim in an underground cell without
food, light or fresh air for weeks; and forcing the
victim to kneel on sharp objects in a cramped position
for long periods of time.
In direct defiance of the rules of war, mass punishments
were commonly employed as punishment for individual
acts, especially when the Japanese were unable to
discover the offender. The usual form of mass punishment
ws to force all members of the group involved to
assume a strained position such as sitting with the
legs folded under the body and the hands on the knees
with the palm turned upward, or kneeling, and to remain
in that position during daylight hours for days. Other
forms of mass punishment were also employed such as that
used at Havelock Road Camp in Malaya, where the prisoners
were forced to run in a circle without shoes over
broken glass while being spurred on by Japanese soldiers
who beat them with rifle butts. On 9 March 1943, an
ordinance was issued providing the death penalty, or
life imprisonment, or confinement for ten years or more
--1089--
for a number of offences; the novel feature of this
ordinance was that, in the case of each offence, it
provided for the death penalty or other severe penalty
to be imposed upon the so-called "leader" of any group
action resulting in the commission of the offence
named, and the same punishment, or a slightly less
severe penalty, for all others who might be involved.
Under this ordinance, mass punishment was often inflicted
upon groups of prisoners of war or civilian
internees for what, at the most, amounted to no more than
an individual act. This ordinance also provided the
death penalty for "prisoners of war who defy or disobey
the orders of persons supervising, guarding, or escorting
them"; it also provided imprisonment for five years
for "prisoners of war who privately or publicly insult
persons supervising, guarding or escorting them." This
is an example, of which there are a number, where the
Japanese Government departed from its undertaking in
respect of the Geneva Convention by altering its laws
concerning prisoners of war.
During the Pacific War, contrary to its undertaking
already referred to, the Japanese Prisoner of War
regulations were amended to permit an escaping prisoner
to be punished in the same way as a deserter from the
Japanese Army. The ordinance of 9 March 1943 contained
the following provision: "The leader of a group of
persons, who have acted together in effecting
--1090--
an escape, shall be subject to either death or to hard
labor or to imprisonment for life or for a minimum
of ten years. The other persons involved shall be
subject to either the death penalty, or to hard labor
or to imprisonment for life or for a minimum of one
year." This provision, taken together with the
regulations governing paroles not to escape, which
prisoners of war were forced to give, constituted the
regulations governing escapes which were enforced in all
camps. These regulations were in direct violation of
international law and, as we have just pointed out,
were contrary to the Convention which Japan had promised
to apply. Under these regulations, the death
penalty was imposed almost without exception upon all
prisoners who attempted to escape or escaped and were
recaptured. Also, under these regulations, those
comrades who assisted a prisoner to escape were also
punished, frequently by the death penalty. In some
camps, the prisoners were divided into groups, and the
practice was to kill all members of the group if one
member attempted to escape or was successful in escaping.
Even the formality of a trial was dispensed with
in many instances. The death penalty is proved to have
been imposed for attempt to escape at the following
camps: Mukden in Liaoning Province of China (July
1943); Hong Kong, China (July 1943); Singapore, Malaya
(March 1942); Mergui, Burma (1942); Tarakan, Borneo
(1942 and 19450; Pontianak, Borneo (June 1942);
Bandjermasin, Borneo (July 1942); Samarinda, Borneo
(January 1945); Palembang, Sumatra (March 1942);
Djati Nanggor, Java (March 1942); Bandung, Java (April 1942);
Batavia, Java (April 1942); Soekaboemi, Java (May 1942);
Jogjakarta, Java (May 1942); Thimahi, Java (May 1942);
--1091--
Makassar, Celebes (September 1942); Amboina, Moluccas
Islands (November 1942, April 1945); Oesapa Besar, Dutch
Timor (February 1942); Cabanatuan, Philippines (June
1942); Motoyama, Japan (November 1942); Fukuoka, Japan
(May 1944); Wake Island (October 1943); and Ranau,
Borneo (August 1945).
Prisoners of War Humiliated
The Japanese maintained a policy of submitting
Allied prisoners of war to violence, insults and public
humiliation to impress other peoples of Asia with the
superiority of the Japanese race.
On 4 March 1942, Vice-Minister of War KIMURA received
a telegram from the Chief-of-Staff of the Korean
Army, of which ITAGAKI was Commander, stating that:
"As it would be very effective in stamping out the
respect and admiration of the korean people for
Britain and America, and also in establishing in them a
strong faith in victory, and as the Governor-General
and the Army are both strongly desirous of it, we
wish you would intern 1,000 British and 1,000 American
prisoners of war in Korea. We wish you would give us
special consideration regarding this matter." The
Governor-general of Korea at that time was MINAMI. On
5 March 1942, KIMURA replied at about 1,000 white
prisoners of war were to be sent to Fusan, Korea. On
23 March 1942, ITAGAKI sent a message to War Minister
TOJO informing him of the plans to use the prisoners of
war in Korea to make the Koreans realize positively the
true might of our Empire as well as to contribute to
psychological propaganda work for stamping out any
--1092--
ideas of worship of Europe and America which the greater
part of Korea still retains at bottom." ITAGAKI went
on to say that the first camp would be located at Seoul,
Korea, in the abandoned Iwamura Silk Reeling Warehouse;
his former plan to confine the prisoners in the theological
school in Fusan having been abandoned with KIMURA
objected that those buildings were too good for prisoners
of war. Among the main points of his plan, ITAGAKI
stated that the prisoners of war would be used on various
works in the principal cities of Korea, especially where
psychological conditions were not good, in order to
achieve his purpose stated at the beginning of his
message; and that the equipment of the camps would be
cut to a minimum and that the internment, supervision and
guarding of the prisoners would be carried out so as to
leave nothing to be desired in the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the prisoners of war were being transported
to Korea.
On 2 April 1942, the Chief-of-Staff of the Army
in Formosa informed the Prisoner of War Information
Bureau that he planned to use prisoners of war not only
for labor to increase production for war, but also "as
material for education and guidance."
Thus was applied the plan to use prisoners in
violation of the laws of war as pro-Japanese propaganda.
On 6 May 1942, the Vice-Minister of War informed the Chief-of-Staff
of the Formosa Army that "white prisoners of war
will be confined successively in Korea, Formosa, and
Manchuria." He added, "for the purpose of control and
security it is planned to assign special units organized
of Koreans and Formosans." The psychological effect
was to be attained by allowing Koreans and Formosans to
--1093--
take part in the plan to submit Allied prisoners of war
to insult and public curiosity!
On 16 May 1942, Vice Minister of War KIMURA
notified the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Area Army,
whose headquarters were at Singapore, that between May
and August the white prisoners of war at Singapore
should be handed over to the Formosan and Korean Armies.
The white prisoners of war were handed over and
sent to Korea. About 1,000 prisoners captured in the
fighting in Malaya arrived in Korea and were marched
through the streets of Seoul, Fusan, and Jinsen, where
they were paraded before 120,000 Koreans and 57,000
Japanese. These prisoners had previously been subjected
to malnutrition, ill-treatment and neglect so that their
physical condition would elicit contempt from those who
saw them. ITAGAKI's Chief-of-Staff in reporting to
KIMURA on what he considered the great success of this
demonstration of Japanese superiority quoted a Korean
bystander who had remarked; "When we look at their frail
and unsteady appearance, it is no wonder that they lost
to the Japanese forces"; he also quoted another Korean
bystander who remarked: "When I saw young Korean soldiers,
members of the Imperial Army, guarding the prisoners,
I shed tears of joy!" ITAGAKI's Chief-of-Staff
concluded his message with the observation that, "As a
whole, it seems that the idea was very successful in
driving all admiration for the British out of the Koreans'
minds and in driving into them an understanding of the situation."
As far away as in Moulmein, in Burma, this
practice of parading prisoners of war was followed. In
February 1944, 25 Allied prisoners of war were paraded
through the streets of that city. They were in an
emaciated condition and
--1094--
were forced to carry notices in Burmese, falsely stating
that they had been recently captured on the Arakan front.
they were ridiculed and held up to contempt by a
Japanese officer who accompanied the parade.
--1095--
The System
Certain changes made regarding the enforcement
of the laws of war and the administration of prisoners
of war and civilian internees by Japan after the outbreak
of the Pacific War were nominal only; they did not
secure the enforcement of the laws of war. The attitude
of the Japanese Government toward the enforcement of the
laws of war, as demonstrated in its prosecution of the
China War, did not really change with the commencement
of the Pacific War. Certain changes in governmental
organizations and methods of procedure were made, but
no real effort was made to secure the enforcement of
the laws of war. In fact, as has been shown in the
Regulations affecting attempts to escape, changes were
made which enjoined the commission of grave breaches of
the laws of war. During the China War no special agency
had been created by the Japanese Government for the administration
of prisoners of war and civilian internees,
and no Prisoner of War Information Bureau was maintained
as required by the Hague and Geneva Conventions. MUTO
said that "the question of whether Chinese captives would
be treated as prisoners of war or not was quite a problem,
and it ws finally decided in 1938 that because
the Chinese conflict was officially known as an 'incident'
although it was really a war, that Chinese captives
would not be regarded as prisoners of war."
TOJO said that this was true; and that after the commencement
of hostilities in the Pacific War, he considered
that Japan was bound to abide by the Hague and Geneva
Conventions; and for that reason, he caused a Prisoner
of War Information Bureau to be created. This statement
by TOJO that he considered that Japan was bound to abide
--1096--
by the Hague and Geneva Conventions in the prosecution
of the Pacific War must be interpreted in the light of
his statement made during a meeting of the Investigation
Committee of the Privy Council on 18 August 1943. He
then said: "International Law should be interpreted
from the view point of executing the war according to
our own opinions." This idea was the basis upon which
the policy of the Japanese Government for its treatment
of prisoners of war and civilian internees was developed.
Japan Agreed to Apply the Geneva Convention, 1929
The Secretary of State of the United States
directed the American Legation in Switzerland, on 18
December 1941, to request the Government of Switzerland
to inform the Japanese Government that the Government of
the United States intended to abide by the Geneva Prisoner
of War Convention and the Geneva Red Cross Convention,
both of which had been signed on 27 July 1929, that it
further intended to extend and apply the provisions of
the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention ot any civilian
enemy aliens that it might intern, that it hoped that the
Japanese Government would apply the provisions of these
conventions reciprocally as indicated, and that the
Government of the United States would appreciate an expression
of intention by the Japanese Government in that
respect. The inquiry was delivered to the Japanese Foreign
Minister TOGO on 27 December 1941 by the Minister
for Switzerland.
The Governments of Great Britain and the Dominions
of Canada, Australia and New Zealand also inquired
through the Argentine Ambassador in Tokyo on 3 January 1942.
In that inquiry, those Governments said that they would
--1097--
observe the terms of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention
of 1929 towards Japan and asked if the Japanese
Government was prepared to make a similar declaration.
On 5 January 1942, the Argentine Ambassador
delivered another note on behalf of Great Britain,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, proposing that in the
application of Articles 11 and 12 of the Convention relating
to the provision of food and clothing to prisoners,
both parties take into consideration the national and
racial customs of the prisoners.
Upon receipt of these inquiries, TOGO called
upon the War Ministry, Navy Ministry, Ministry for Home
Affairs, and Ministry of Overseas Affairs for their
opinion. At that time, TOJO was concurrently Prime Minister
and War Minister; MUTO was Chief of the Military
Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry; SATO was MUTO's
assistant in the MIlitary affairs Bureau, KIMURA was
Vice-Minister of War; SHIMADA was Navy Minister; OKA
was Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau in the Naval
Ministry; and HOSHINO was Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.
TOGO was concerned for the safety of the Japanese
living in Allied countries, and for that reason desired
to give a favorable answer to the inquiries and so
instructed the Bureau of Treaties, pointing out that the
fate of Japanese residents amounting to several hundred
thousands, in the enemy countries would be affected by
the treatment by Japan of the prisoners of war and civilian
internees who might be in her power. The War Ministry
agreed with TOGO. On 23 January 1942, KIMURA told
TOGO: "In view of the fact that the Geneva Convention
relating to prisoners of war was not ratified by His
Majesty, we can hardly announce our observance of the
--1098--
same. But it would be safe to notify the world that we
have no objection to acting in accordance with the Convention
in the treatment of prisoners of war. As regards
providing prisoners of war with food and clothing, we
have no objection to giving due consideration to the
national or racial habits and customs of the prisoners."
TOGO answered the American and British inquiries
on 29 January 1942. His note to the Government of
the United States read as follows: "Japan strictly observes
the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relative
to the Red Cross, as a signatory of that Convention.
The Imperial Government has not yet ratified the Convention
relating to treatment of prisoners of war of
27 July 1929. It is therefore not bound by the said
Convention. nevertheless it will apply 'mutatis
mutandis' the provisions of that Convention to American
prisoners of war in its power." The note addressed to
the Governments of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand on the same date was as follows: "The Imperial
Government has not ratified the agreement concerning
the treatment of prisoners of war dated 27 July
1929, and therefore, it would not be bound to any extent
by the said agreement, but would apply 'mutatis
mutandis' the provisions of the said agreement toward
the British, Canadian, Australian and New Xealand
prisoners of war under Japanese control. The Imperial
Government would consider the national and racial manners
and customs under reciprocal conditions when
supplying clothing and provisions to prisoners of war."
The same assurances were given to the other Allied Powers.
As the War Ministry had not agreed to extend
these provisions to civilian internees, TOGO, through his
Vice-Minister, inquired of the War Ministry on 27 January
--1099--
1942, regarding the application of the Prisoner of War
Convention to non-combatant internees. After conferences,
the War Ministry acquiesced further in TOGO's
plan to protect Japanese nationals in Allied countries,
and on 6 February 1942 KIMURA told TOGO: "The 1929
Convention relating to prisoners of war has no binding
power whatsoever on Japan. But this Ministry has no
objection to applying the principles of the Convention
to non-combatant internees within such limits as it is
applicable, provided, however, that no person be subjected
to labor against his will."
TOGO informed the Government of the United
States on 13 February 1942 that, "The Imperial Government
will apply for the duration of the war under conditions
of reciprocity the provisions of the Convention relating
to treatment of prisoners of war of 27 July 1929
to enemy civilian internees, in so far as they are
applicable and provided that they are not made to work
without their consent."
Taking note of the assurance TOGO had addressed
the British countries on 29 January 1942 that Japan would
take into consideration the national and racial customs
of the prisoners of war in supplying them with clothing
and provisions, the United Stats addressed another inquiry
on that subject. That inquiry was dated 20 February 1942,
and stated that the Government of the United
States would be bound by the same provisions for prisoners
of war as for civilian internees in conformity with
Articles 11 and 12 of the Geneva Convention and expected
in consequence that the Japanese Government would equally
conform to those provisions in the treatment of prisoners
of war and civilian internees. TOGO answered this
--1100--
inquiry on 2 March 1942, in the following manner: "The
Imperial Government intends to take into consideration,
with regard to provisions and clothing to be distributed,
the racial and national customs of American prisoners of
war and civilian internees placed under Japanese power."
This exchange of assurances constituted a solemn
agreement binding the Government of Japan as well as
the Governments of the other combatants to apply the provisions
of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 27
July 1929 to prisoners of war and civilian internees
alike, to take into consideration the national and racial
customs of those prisoners and internees when supplying
them with food and clothing as required by that Convention,
and not to force internees to work. The agreement
provided that the Convention was to be applied in a
spirit of reciprocity, that is to say equally by both
sides, each performing in kind and in return for that
done by the other. The only exception to this rule established
by the agreement were such as might be justified
under the reservation
"mutatis mutandis"
. That the agreement
did not allow an exception to be made by reason of
conflict with the municipal law of Japan is plain upon
construction and is shown by TOGO's testimony as follows:
"The inquiries from the United States and Britain were
therefore referred in the normal course by the Foreign
Ministry Treaty Bureau, which managed such matters, to
the War Ministry, as the ministry empowered to decide
the question. The answer which came back was that we
should undertake to apply the terms of the Geneva Convention
mutatis mutandis',
and it was therefore so
replied to the Governments inquiring.
"Although the prosecution seems to consider
--1101--
that by the giving of this answer Japan became bound by
the Convention to the same extent as if she had ratified
it, I assumed (and still assume) that we were binding
ourselves only to apply to Convention so far as
circumstances
permitted
. '
Mutatis mutandis
',
then, I supposed
to imply that in the absence of serious hindrances
the Convention would be applied; I assumed also (although
this was only assumption on my part) that where the requirements
of the Convention came into conflict with the
provisions of domestic law, the former would prevail."
The Director of the Bureau of Treaties, who conducted
the conferences with the other Ministries regarding the
answer to be given the Allied inquiries, further confirmed this.
Although when it was made, the members of the
TOJO Cabinet intended that the Allied Powers should understand
the agreement as we have interpreted it, they did
not abide by the agreement. Instead is was used as a
means to secure good treatment for Japanese who might
become prisoners of war or be interned by the Allied
Powers. When Vice-Minister KIMURA answered TOGO's request
for his opinion regarding the answer to be made to
the Allied inquiries, he said that "it would be safe to
notify the world" that Japan would observe the Convention,
but he prefaced that statement with the remark that the
Government could hardly afford to announce an intention
to observe the Convention in view of the fact that the
Emperor had not ratified it. The successive Japanese
governments did not enforce the Convention, for although
the Ministers of State considered these assurances to the
Allies to be a promise to perform new and additional
duties for the benefit of prisoners of war
and internees, they never issued any new orders
--1102--
or instructions to their officers in charge of prisoners
of war and internees to carry this new promise into execution
and never set up any system which secured performance
of the promise. Instead of making an effort to perform
this agreement, they made efforts to conceal from the
Allies their guilty non-performance by denying access
to the prisoner of war and internee camps; by limiting
the length, contents and number of letters which a prisoner
or internee might mail; by suppressing all news regarding
such prisoners and internees; an by neglecting
to answer or by making false answers to protests and inquiries
addressed to them regarding the treatment of
prisoners and internees.
Reference has been made in an earlier part of
this judgment to the effect of the various conventions
in relation to the treatment of prisoners of war and
civilian internees and to the obligations of belligerents
in that respect. Whatever view may be taken of the
assurance or undertaking of the Japanese Government to
comply with the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention
"mutatis mutandis,
the fact remains that under the customary
rules of war, acknowledged by all civilized
nations, all prisoners of war and civilian internees
must be given humane treatment. It is the grossly inhumane
treatment by the Japanese military forces as referred
to in this part of the judgment that is particularly
reprehensible and criminal. A person guilty of
such inhumanities cannot escape punishment on the plea
that he or his government is not bound by any particular
convention. The general principles of the law exist independently
of the said conventions. The conventions
merely reaffirm the pre-existing law and prescribe
--1103--
detailed provisions for its application.
As to the effect of the undertaking by the
Japanese Government to observe the convention
"mutatis
mutandis",
counsel for the Defence submitted,
inter alia,
that the insufficiency of food and medical supplies in
many of the instances established was due to disorganization
and lack of transport facilities resulting from the
Allied offensives. Whatever merit that argument has in
its narrow application, it loses effect in face of the
proof that the Allied Powers proposed to the Japanese
Government that they should send, for distribution among
prisoners of war and internees, the necessary supplies;
which offer was refused by the Japanese Government.
It is not necessary to enter into a precise
definition of the condition
"mutatis mutandis",
for at no
stage in the defence was anything said or even suggested
to the effect that these words justified the atrocities
and other grossly inhumane acts of Japanese forces, nor
was it argued that these words could justify the looting,
pillaging and arson which as been clearly established.
On those points, the accused who gave evidence, for the
most part, did no more than plead complete ignorance of
the happenings deposed to.
Any interpretation placed on the condition
which attempted to justify the atrocities would amount
to nothing more than a submission that by the insertion
of the words
"mutatis mutandis"
the Japanese military
forces would be permitted with impunity to behave with
gross barbarity under the guise of complying with a
Convention which prescribed humane treatment as its
cardinal principle. Such a submission could not be accepted.
--1104--
Ill-Treatment of Prisoners of War a Policy
The Japanese Government signed and ratified
the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, which provided for humane
treatment of prisoners of war and condemned treacherous
and inhumane conduct of war. The reason for the failure
of the Japanese Government to ratify and enforce the
Geneva Prisoner of War Convention which it signed at
Geneva in 1929 is to be found in the fundamental training
of the Japanese Soldier. Long before the beginning of the
period covered by the Indictment, the young men of Japan
had been taught that "The greatest honor is to die for
the Emperor," a precept which we find ARAKI repeating in
this speeches and propaganda motion pictures. An additional
precept was taught that it is an ignominy to
surrender to the enemy.
The combined effect of these two precepts was
to inculcate in the Japanese soldier a spirit of contempt
for Allied soldiers who surrendered, which, in
defiance of the rules of war, was demonstrated in their
ill-treatment of prisoners. In this spirit, they made no
distinction between the soldier who fought honorably and
courageously up to an inevitable surrender, and the soldier
who surrendered without a fight. All enemy soldiers
who surrendered under any circumstance were to be regarded
as being disgraced and entitled to live only by
the tolerance of their captors.
Ratification and enforcement of the Geneva
Convention of 1929, it was thought, would involve abandonment
of this view of the Military. The Convention had
been signed by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries at Geneva
in 1929; but when the Convention came up for ratification
in 1934, both the Japanese Army and Navy petitioned
against ratification; and by that time, they had sufficient
political power to prevent ratification. They gave
as some of their reasons for resisting ratification,
that the obligations imposed by the Convention were unilateral,
that the Convention imposed new and additional
burdens on Japan, but that Japan could not gain anything
by ratifying it, for no Japanese soldier would ever surrender
to the enemy.
In this connection, it is interesting to note
that TOJO giving instructions to chiefs of prisoner of
war camps said: "In Japan we have our own ideology
concerning prisoners of war, which sould naturally
make their treatment more or less different from that in
Europe and America."
Japanese Purpose Was to Protect Japanese Nationals
The decision to create a Prisoner of War Information
Bureau was prompted by an inquiry from the
International Red Cross in Geneva, which was forwarded
to the War Ministry from the Foreign Ministry on 12
December 1941. The International Red Cross had telegraphed
the Japanese Foreign Ministry that, in view of
the fact that the war had extended to the Pacific, its
Committee had placed the services of the Central Prisoner
of War Bureau at the disposal of the belligerent States,
and inquiring whether the Japanese Government was disposed
to exchange, by the intermediary of the Central
Bureau of Geneva, list of information on prisoners of
war and, in so far as possible, on civilian internees.
Conferences were held by the officials in the War Ministry;
and on 28 December 1941, Vice-Minister of War
KIMURA informed Foreign Minister TOGO that the War
--1106--
Ministry was ready to exchange information, but that "it
is not that we 'declare that we are prepared to apply in
practice' the provisions of the Prisoner of War
Convention of 1929, but that we 'utilize them for
the convenience of transmission of information'." By
12 January 1942, the International Red Cross had received
replies from Japan and the United States declaring that
they were ready to proceed with the transmission of information.
Creation of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau
The Prisoner of War Information Bureau was
created by Imperial Ordinance on 27 December 1941. The
Bureau was charged with making investigations of the
following subjects: internments, removals, releases on
parole, exchanges, escapes, admissions to hospitals and
deaths of prisoners of war. It was also given the duty
of maintaining records for each prisoner of war and
managing the communications and correspondence regarding
prisoners of war, and of collecting information pertaining
to the condition of prisoners of war. The ordinance
provided that the Bureau should have a Director and four
Secretaries. This Prisoner of War Information Bureau
was placed under the supervision and control of the War
Minister and was organized as a section of the Military
Affairs Bureau, where at different times it came under the
control and supervision of MUTO and SATO. All personnel
of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau were appointed
on the recommendation of the War Minister. TOJO appointed
Lieutenant General Uemura as the first Director of
the Bureau.
Creation of the Prisoner of War Administration Section
On 31 March 1942, "Regulations for the
--1107--
Treatment of Prisoners of War" were promulgated, creating
what was called the "Prisoner of War Administration
Section" in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War
Ministry under the supervision and control of TOJO as
War Minister. TOJO exercised this control and supervision
through MUTO as Chief of the Military Affairs
Bureau. The regulations provided that the Section should
have a Director and other personnel to be appointed
upon the recommendation of the War Minister. TOJO
appointed Lieutenant General Uemura as the First Director
of the Section, thereby combining in one person the
administration of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau
and the Prisoner of War Administration Section. The
Prisoner of War Information Bureau was only an information
and records office related, as KIMURA said, to use
the provisions of the Prisoner of War Convention of 1929
for the purpose of gaining information; it had no power
of control or supervision over prisoners of war and
civilian internees. The Prisoner of War Administration
Section, on the other hand, was given authority to "conduct
all affairs relative to the treatment of prisoners
of war and civilian internees in the theater of war."
The Military Affairs Bureau Retained Control
The Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry
under MUTO, and later under SATO, retained control of the
system set up for enforcement of the Laws of War during
the Pacific War. Although the ordinance creating the
Prisoner of War Information Bureau provided: "In regard
to matters falling within his jurisdiction, the Director
may demand information from any military or naval unit
concerned," General Uemura and the Directors following
him were required to transmit all inquiries and other
--1108--
communications through the office of the Chief of the
Military Affairs Bureau. they had no power to take any
action without the approval of the Chief of the Military
Affairs Bureau.
According to TOJO, all orders and directives
relating to prisoners of war and civilian internees
were issued by the War Minister. He also says that
those orders and directives were drafted by the Military
Affairs Bureau after the Chief of that bureau had held
conferences with the General Staff and other agencies
of the Government concerned.
As we will discuss presently, bi-weekly conferences
of all Bureau Chiefs in the War Ministry were held
and attended by the War Minister and Vice-Minister of
War; TOJO and KIMURA attended most of these conferences.
KIMURA was Vice-Minister of War from 10 April 1941 to
11 March 1943. Matters relating to prisoners of war
and civilian internees were discussed at these conferences,
with TOJO and KIMURA at times attending. Orders
and regulations were formulated and forwarded to all
agencies of the Government concerned with the treatment
of prisoners of war and civilian internees.
Detention Camps and Their Administration
Detention camps for prisoners of war were
authorized by Imperial Ordinances and Regulations
issued by the War Ministry on 23 December 1941. These
regulations provided that prisoner of war camps were to
be administered by a commander of an Army or a commander
of a garrison under the general supervision of the
Minister of War. As we have stated, however, all these
camps were not under the Army commanders; in those areas
under the jurisdiction of the Navy, the camps were
--1109--
administered by Navy officers of corresponding rank
and authority.
Detention camps for civilian internees were
authorized by regulations issued by the War Ministry
on 7 November 1943. The regulations provided: "When
the commander of an army, which term shall herein
include persons of the equivalent status as a commander
of an army, has interned enemy nationals or neutrals
at the front, he shall establish an army internment
camp as soon as possible. The commander of an army
that establishes the army internment camp shall
administer the same."
General regulations were issued providing for
the administration of civilian internees, which were not
materially different from those providing for the administration
of prisoners of war. All regulations
applicable to prisoners of war were made applicable to
civilian internees, except in those cases where specific
regulations were issued applicable to civilian internees
alone. these regulations also provided that, "The
commander of an army that establishes the army internment
camp shall administer the same."
The following accused administered detention
camps as military commanders during the Pacific War,
namely: DOHIHARA as Commander of the Eastern Military
District in Japan and as Commander of the 7th Area Army
at Singapore; HATA as Commander of all Japanese Expeditionary
Forces in China and as Commander of the military
districts in Central and Western Honshu in Japan;
ITAGAKI as Commander of the Korean Army and as Commander
of the 7th Area Army at Singapore; KIMURA as Commander
of the Army in Burma; MUTO as Commander of the Japanese
Army in Northern Sumatra; SATO as Commander of the
--1110--
Army in French Indo-China; and UMEZU as Commander of
the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.
The regulations provided that, "A commander
of an army or a commander of a garrison may, whenever
necessary, delegate his subordinates to assist in the
management of a prisoner of war or civilian internee
camp. Persons delegated according to these provisions
shall be under the supervision and command of the
Commandant." Special supervisors or chiefs were
selected and trained in Tokyo to manage prisoner of war
and civilian internee camps; and after careful and detailed
instruction, which was completed by a personal
message from Prime Minister TOJO, these chiefs of camps
were sent out from Japan to all places where prisoner
of war and civilian internee camps were located to take
charge of those camps and manage them under the command
of the Army and Navy commanders. These chiefs of camps
were required by regulations to make monthly reports to
the Prisoner of War Administration Section in the
Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. These
reports were discussed at the bi-weekly conferences of
the Bureau Chiefs in the War Ministry, which were
usually attended by the War Minister and Vice-Minister
of War. These reports included statistics relative to
the high death rate in the camps due to malnutrition
and other causes. TOJO said that this item received his
particular attention. A summary of the monthly reports
from the chiefs of camps was filed in the office of the
Prisoner of War Information Bureau, which was under the
same director as the Prisoner of War Administration Section.
--1111--
The Navy Participated in the System
It was contemplated that the Navy would deliver
to the Army for detention and administration all prisoners
of war taken and civilian internees interned by it, but
in many cases this was not done or was delayed for
along time. Also, in some areas, the Navy exercised jurisdiction
for administration of occupied areas. For instance,
the Navy occupied such islands as Borneo, the
Celebes, the Moluccas, Timor and other islands east of a
line through Bali. It also occupied other islands, such
as Wake Island. In those areas occupied by the Navy, the
prisoners of war and civilian internees were administered
by the Navy Minister, and the enforcement of the laws of
war in those areas became the responsibility of the Navy,
under the direction of SHIMADA and OKA.
Administration of the System in Japan Proper
Prisoners of war detained in Japan were under
the War Ministry in the same manner as prisoners in other
areas, but it is said that the Home Ministry was in
charge of the police in Japan, and was therefore considered
to be the proper Ministry to administer all matters
relating to civilian internees in Japan proper. It will
be noted that TOJO served as Home Minister from 18 October
1941 to 17 February 1942, and from 25 November 1942
to 6 January 1943. TOJO said that "there was a separate
body under the Home Ministry to deal with civilian
internees, but I don't know what the name of that was."
For the purpose of defence and military administration,
Japan was divided into eight military
districts. Each military district was occupied by an
army, the commander of which was also the military
administrator of the district and in charge of all
--1112--
prisoner of war camps within his district. The Eastern
District embraced the Tokyo-Yokohama Area and was
occupied by the 12th Area Army. DOHIHARA commanded that
army and administered the district from 1 May 1943 to
22 March 1944, and again from 25 August 1945 to the time
of the surrender on 2 September 1945. The Chugoku
Military District embraced the Hiroshima Area and the
western tip of Honshu Island, and was garrisoned by the
Second Army Corps. HATA commanded that Corps from 7
April 1945 until the surrender on 2 September 1945.
Administration of the System in Formosa, Korea and Sakhalin
In the overseas possessions of Japan, which
were not in a theater of operations, such as Formosa,
Korea and Sakhalin, civilian internees were under the
administration of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, but
prisoners of war in those possessions were under the
administration of the War Ministry in the same manner
as prisoners in other areas. The Ministry of Overseas
Affairs was established by Imperial Ordinance of 10
June 1929. That Ordinance provided that this Ministry
was to control all affairs relating to the Korea Governor-General's
Office, the Formosa Governor-General's
Office, the Kwantung Administration Office, and the South
Seas Administration Office. To provide for the major
wartime reorganization of the Japanese government, this
Ministry was abolished in 1943 and its functions divided
and transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the
Ministry of Greater East Asia. TOGO was Minister of
overseas Affairs from 18 October 1941 to 2 December 1941.
--1113--
Administration of the System in the Occupied Territories
The Ministry of Greater East Asia was created
by Imperial Ordinance on 1 November 1942. That Ordinance
directed that
"the Minister of Greater East Asiatic
Affairs shall administer the execution of various
political affairs, excepting purely diplomatic affairs,
concerning Greater East Asia, wich is hereinafter defined
as excluding Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and
Sakhalin. The Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs
shall superintend affairs concerning the Kwantung Bureau
and of the South Seas Government Office. There shall be
instituted in the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic
Affairs the following four Bureaux:
The General Affairs Bureau
the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, The Chinese
Affairs Bureau and the Southern Area Affairs Bureau.
This Ministry was organized to govern all areas which
had fallen or might fall under the military power of
Japan, except Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin. The Ordinance
further provided, "To extend cooperation to the Army and
the Navy, the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs
shall conduct affairs concerning administration of the
occupied areas within the Greater East Asia Area." The
first Minister was Aoki, who was followed by SHIGEMITSU,
who took over this Ministry on 20 July 1944 and served in
that capacity until 7 April 1945, when he was succeeded by
TOGO, who held the office until 16 August 1945.
Accused Who Administered the System
In the Occupied Territories
UMEZU became Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung
--1114--
Army on 7 September 1939, and served in that capacity
until 18 July 1944. He was the virtual ruler of
Manchukuo and was directly responsible for the treatment
of prisoners of war and civilian internees in
Manchuria. HATA was Commander-in-Chief of the
Japanese Expeditionary Force in China from 1 March 1941
to 22 November 1944. On 11 March 1943, KIMURA resigned
as Vice-Minister of War; he was appointed Commander-in-Chief
of the Japanese Army in Burma on 30 August 1944
and served in that position until the surrender. During
his tour of duty in Burma, he put into practice the
policies which he helped to develop during his term of
office as Vice-Minister of War. He first established his
headquarters at Rangoon. At this time, atrocities occurred
in that area, at Hsipaw, Moksokwin Reserve Forest, Henzada,
Ongun Cemetery, Tharrawaddy and at the Kempetai Jail
in Rangoon. At the end of April 1945, KIMURA moved his
headquarters to Moulmein. Thereafter, atrocities occurred
at or near Noulmein. The entire population of Kalagon, a
village 10 miles from KIMURA's headquarters, was massacred
on 7 July 1945 under order of his field officers. Massacres
occurred in Moulmein after KIMURA's arrival; the
Kempetai became more inhumane in their treatment of
Burmese, and the internees in the camp at Tavoy were
starved and beaten.
MUTO made an inspection trip to the southern
Regions from 20 March 1942 to 12 April 1942; he visited
Formosa, Saigon, Bangkok, Rangoon, Singapore, Palembang,
Java, Manila and other places. He returned to Tokyo
and was appointed Commander of the Imperial Guards
--1115--
Division on 20 April 1942, and stationed in Northern
Sumatra. He was the Japanese military commander in
Northern Sumatra, with his headquarters at Medan until
12 October 1944, when he was transferred to the
Philippine Islands. During his term of office as such
commander, he put into practice the policies which he
advocated as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of
the War Ministry in Tokyo. In the area occupied by
his troops in Northern SUmatra, some of the most disgraceful
atrocities of the war were committed. Prisoners
of war and civilian internees were starved, neglected,
tortured, murdered and otherwise mistreated, and civilians
were massacred. The laws of war were ignored. MUTO
further demonstrated his disregard for the laws of war
upon his transfer on 12 October 1944 to become Chief-of=-Staff
of the 14th Japanese Army in the Philippines
Islands under General Yamashita. On the night of
20 October 1944, MUTO arrived at Fort McKinley in the
Philippines to assume his duties as Chief-of-Staff to
General Yamashita. He held that assignment until the
Japanese surrender in September 1945. During his tenure
as such Chief-of-Staff, a campaign [of] massacre, torture
and other atrocities was waged by the troops under
Yamashita and MUTO on the civilian population of the
Philippines, including the massacres in Batangas and
massacres and other atrocities at Manila. these bore
the same features and followed the same pattern set eight
years earlier at Nanking when MUTO was a member of MATSUI's
staff. During this period, prisoners of war and civilian
internees were starved, tortured and murdered.
DOHIHARA commanded the 7th Area Army
--1116--
at Singapore from 22 March 1944 until he was relieved
by ITAGAKI on 7 April 1945 to become Inspector-General
of Military Education. During his period of
command, prisoners of war were treated as common criminals,
starved, tortured and otherwise ill-treated. After
ITAGAKI assumed the command of the 7th Area Army at
Singapore, there was no improvement in the condition of
the prisoners of war under the jurisdiction of that Army.
During June and July 1945, while he was in command, no
less that 17 Allied airmen were taken from their cells
in the Outram Road gaol and murdered.
Allied Protests
Formal and informal protests and warnings against
violations of the laws of war lodged by the Allied Powers
and the Protecting Power during the Pacific War were
ignored; or when they were answered, the commission of the
offenses was denied, or untruthful explanations were given.
The procedure followed in Tokyo was described to
us as follows: Formal protests from the Allied Powers
and the Protecting Power were regularly delivered to the
Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry then circulated
copies of these protests to the Ministries and Bureaux
of the Japanese Government concerned. All protests
concerning matters under the jurisdiction of the War
Ministry and the Prisoner of War Information Bureau were
first delivered to the Secretariat of the War Ministry.
The Secretariat forwarded the protests to the Military
Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau.MUTO was
Chief of this bureau from 30 September 1939 to 20 April
1942. SATO was Chief of this Section from 15 July 1938
until he replaced MUTO as Chief of the Military Affairs
bureau in 1942. SATO served as Chief of the Military
Affairs Bureau until 14 December 1944. The Military
Affairs Section discussed
--1117--
the protest with the various sections of the Military
Affairs Bureau concerned, such as the Prisoner of War
Administration Section or the Prisoner of War Information
Bureau. The protest was then taken up and discussed at
the bi-weekly meetings of the Bureaux Chiefs of the War
ministry, which were usually attended by the War Minister
and Vice-Minister of War. At these meetings, it was
decided whether a reply would be made to the protest and
the nature of the reply to be made. The Director of the
Prisoner of War Administration Section, who was also the
Director of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau,
attended these discussions and received orders on important
matters direct from the War Minister and the Vice-Minister;
he furnished copies of the protests and the
replies to be made thereto to the Prisoner of War
information Bureau for filing. This was the practice
even when the copies of the protests were addressed to the
War Minister or the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.
In addition to formal protests, radio broadcasts
were regularly made over Allied stations detailing the
atrocities and other violations of the laws of war being
committed by the Japanese armed forces and warning the
Japanese Government that it would be held responsible
for these offenses. These broadcasts were monitored by
the Japanese Foreign Ministry and distributed to all
ministries, bureaux and officials concerned. Lord Keeper
of the Privy Seal KIDO recorded in his diary on 19 March
1942 that: "The Imperial Household Minister came to the
office and told me about Eden's address in Parliament
concerning our soldiers' atrocities at Hong Kong, and
we exchanged opinions."
--1118--
The formal protests delivered were too numerous for
detailed mention here. In general, it may be said that
these protests related to the violations of the laws of
war which we have mentioned, as well as to many others.
in each case, specific and detailed facts were stated
which permitted complete investigation. The same things
may be said of the protests and warnings delivered over
the radio.
We will mention here, by way of illustration only,
some of those protests and warnings. As early as
14 February 1942, the United States Government delivered
a note through the Swiss Government stating that it had
received reports that the Japanese authorities in the
occupied areas of the Philippines were subjecting
American civilians to an extremely rigid and harsh
regime involving abuse and humiliation and that the
American Government desired assurances that immediate
steps had been taken to remedy the situation and to
accord to Americans in the Philippines moderate treatment
similar to that being extended to Japanese nationals
in the territories of the United States. Foreign Minister
TOGO replied on 24 February 1942 that, "conditions applied
to American Nationals in the Philippines by the Japanese
authorities are more favorable than contemplated by the
Geneva Convention of 1929." This statement was false.
He denied that American nationals were being subjected
to unfavorable treatment and said that the "Apprehensions
of the American Government were based on unknown sources
and cited no exact facts and therefore were without foundation."
On 12 December 1942, the United States Government
delivered another formal protest. It stated that it
--1119--
had learned of gross ill-treatment suffered by
American civilians and prisoners of war in violation of
the commitment of the Japanese Government to apply the
provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War COnvention of
1929 to American prisoners of war and, in so far as they
might be applicable, to civilian internees. The United
States stated that it was evident that Japan had failed
to fulfill its undertaking and that some Japanese
officers and agencies had violated the principles
of that Convention not only by positive ill-treatment,
but by failure to provide for those American nationals
the necessities of life. The United States then lodged
an emphatic protest and stated that it expected this
inhumane and uncivilized treatment of American prisoners
of war and civilian internees to be made a matter
of immediate investigation, that it expected those
responsible to be disciplined immediately, and that it
expected an assurance that ill-treatment of prisoners
of war and civilian internees would be discontinued.
Specific instances were cited, giving dates and other
facts to support this protest. No reply was made to
this protest until 28 May 1943, when Foreign Minister
SHIGEMITSU replied that an investigation was being
made and that he would communicate "in due course"
when the results of the investigation were known.
In the meantime, on 5 April 1943, the United
States had filed another protest against the ill-treatment
of the Doolittle fliers. The United States
Government warned: "The American Government also
solemnly warns the Japanese Government that for
any other violations of its undertakings as regards
--1120--
American prisoners of war or for any other acts of
criminal barbarity inflicted upon American prisoners
in violation of the laws of warfare, accepted and
practiced by civilized nations, as military operations
now in progress draw to their inexorable and inevitable
conclusion, the American Government will visit upon
the officers of the Japanese Government responsible
for such uncivilized and inhumane acts the punishment
they deserve."
A large number of specific protests was lodged by
the United States with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU
before he finally answered, on 24 April 1944, the
protest of the United States which had been made on
12 December 1942. In that reply, he indicated that the
investigation, which he had mentioned in his Note of
28 May 1943, had been completed, and that he had a
report thereon. He accused the Government of the United
States of "distorting and exaggerating the facts" and
rejected the protest; he went to great length to set out
what he claimed to be the facts as disclosed by the so-called
investigation. The United States replied to
this accusation on 1 March 1945 by a note reading:
"The United States Government cannot accept a statement
by the Japanese Government impugning its veracity.
The United States Government's protest concerning
treatment accorded by Japanese authorities to American
nationals in Japan and Japanese occupied territory is
based on documentary evidence, which cannot be refuted
in such an arbitrary fashion by the Japanese Government.
The statements contained in the Japanese Government's
reply of 24 April 1944 are so far removed
--1121--
from the facts as known to the United States Government
that it can only conclude that the Japanese Government
has permitted itself to be misled by fabricated reports
of local officials and had not made in independent
investigation of the matters protested in the United
States Government's Note of 12 December 1942. The
United States Government therefore considers the reply
unsatisfactory and will continue to hold the Japanese
Government answerable."
British protests were treated in the same fashion
as those from the Government of the United States. An
illustration is afforded by the protests and answer regarding
the treatment of prisoners of war in Rangoon
Gaol. On 8 July 1942, the British Government caused a
protest to be delivered to Foreign Minister TOGO in which
is was stated that a photograph had appeared in the
Japan
Times and Advertiser,
a newspaper published in Tokyo,
which showed British prisoners of war cleaning the streets
of Rangoon under the amused eyes of the public. The protest
was renewed on 1 August 1942. On 15 September 1942,
the British Government further protested that the prisoners
in Rangoon Gaol were furnished insufficient rations,
that they were forced to sleep on the bare floors of the
prison and that their boots had been confiscated. TOJO
acted as Foreign Minister from 1 September 1942 to 17 September
1942; and while occupying that office, received a Note
calling his attention to the foregoing protests. On 9
February 1943, Foreign Minister Tani, who had replaced
TOJO as Foreign Minister, replied, "the competent authorities
have stated after having made a full inquiry that the
--1122--
facts stated in said letters never happened."
The protests of the British Government against
the treatment of British prisoners of war in Burma and
Siam received similar treatment. The British Government
protested on 4 July 1944 in a Note delivered to SHIGEMITSU,
that it had learned from postcards printed by the
Japanese authorities that about twenty thousand British
prisoners of war had been transferred to the vicinity of
Moulmein without notification. It also protested against
the unfavorable conditions and ill-treatment to which
these prisoners were subjected. SHIGEMITSU replied
on 26 August 1944 that the "majority of British and
Allied prisoners of war, which were in Burma on 4 July
1944 were prisoners who had been attached to camps in
Thailand and Malaya and had been provisionally transferred
to Burma." SHIGEMITSU replied on 3 October
1944 to further protests from the British Government
relative to the health of prisoners laboring in Burma and
Sima. In that reply he said; "The Imperial Government,
by exercising great vigilance as to the health and
hygiene of prisoners of war, takes added measures,
such as monthly medical examination of each
prisoner of war camp, to enable sickness to be treated
in the firs stage." He then detailed the medical aid
which he claimed had been given to the prisoners on the
Burma-Siam Railway. The facts stated were entirely false,
--1123--
as the prisoners had not received medical attention and
had been dying by thousands from beri-beri, cholera,
malaria and other tropical diseases. The true facts
were learned when the
Rakuyo Maru
was torpedoed and sunk
in the South China Sea on 12 September 1944. there had
been 1300 prisoners of war aboard that unmarked Japanese
prison ship. The Japanese picked up the Japanese survivors,
but deliberately left the prisoners to their fate.
Approximately 100 Australian and United Kingdom survivors
were later rescued and taken to Australia and Great britain.
From these prisoners it was learned that all available
prisoners of war in Singapore and Java were moved
early in 1942 to Burma and Thailand to work on the Burma-Siam
Railway project. We have already described the conditions
under which they traveled and the terrible conditions
during the construction of the railway. SHIGEMITSU
was informed of the facts learned from these rescued
prisoners of war in a Note from the British Government
dated 4 December 1944, renewing the British protests.
Forced at last to reply, TOGO, who had succeeded SHIGEMITSU
as Foreign Minister, made a belated reply to these
protests on 15 May 1945. He said that it was regretted
that the situation was such that "the concerted efforts of
all the sanitary services of the Japanese troops cannot
prevent the spread of diseases of the digestive system,
etc." He denied that atrocities had been committed by
Japanese troops in Burma, and as to the protest against
the parading of British prisoners of war in Moulmein,
--1124--
which we have mentioned, he gave the conventional Japanese
answer that it "never happened."
In addition to the disregard shown these formal
protests, the many protests and warning given over the
radio were completely ignored, although these had been regularly
recorded in the Japanese Foreign Office and distributed
to the various ministries. On 24 January 1944, a
report from the United States Government giving the details
and results of the Bataan March was broadcast over the
British Broadcasting Corporation's network and recorded in
the Japanese Foreign Office. Again on 29 January 1944,
radio station KWID at San Francisco, California, broadcast
White House Secretary Stephen Early's disclosure that the
Japanese would not permit the United States Government to
send food and supplies to United States and Filipino
prisoners. Early said, "The time has come for releasing
the factual reports which have been carefully investigated
and authenticated because we cannot expect to get further
relief to our prisoners now in the hands of the Japanese."
This broadcast was recorded in the Japanese Foreign
Office. KWID again broadcast on 29 January 1944 statements
by United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull
and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Mr. Hull in
speaking of the treatment of prisoners of war in Japanese
hands stated: "According to the reports of cruelty and
inhumanity, it would be necessary to summon the representatives
of all the demons available anywhere and combine
their fiendishness with all that is bloody in order
to describe the conduct of those who inflicted those unthinkable
atrocities on the Americans and Filipinos."
--1125--
The vigor of this language was fully justified by the
evidence given before the Tribunal. Mr. Eden had stated
before the House of Commons that British protests had
drawn unsatisfactory results from Japan. He said that the
Japanese were violating not only international law but all
human, decent civilized conduct. He warned the Japanese
Government that, in time to come, the record of their military
atrocities in the war would not be forgotten. Mr.
Hull had closed his statement with the remark that the
United States Government waas assembling all possible
facts concerning Japanese treatment of prisoners of war
and that it intended to seek full punishment of the
responsible Japanese authorities. General MacArthur's
General Headquarters issued a warning on 22 October 1944
to the Japanese Commander of the 7th Area Army at Singapore,
who had jurisdiction over the Philippine Islands
as well as a large segment of the Pacific Area. General
MacArthur warned that he would hold th enemy leaders
immediately responsible for any failure to accord prisoners
of war and civilian internees proper treatment.
He said that although the Americans and Filipinos who
surrendered in the Philippines believed they would be
treated with the dignity, honor and protection to
which prisoners of war were entitled under the laws
of war, unimpeachable evidence had been received of the
degradation and even brutality to which they had been
subjected in violation of the most sacred code of martial
honor. All of these broadcasts were recorded in the
Japanese Foreign office and given a wide circulation
among the Japanese Ministries.
--1126--
Ill-Treatment of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees
Was Condoned and Concealed
The Japanese Government condoned ill-treatment of
prisoners of war and civilian internees by failing and
neglecting to punish those guilty of ill-treating them
or by prescribing trifling and inadequate penalities for
the offence. That Government also attempted to conceal
the ill-treatment and murder of prisoners and internees
by prohibiting the representatives of the Protecting
Power from visiting camps, by restricting such visits
as were allowed, by refusing to forward to the Protecting
Power complete lists of prisoners taken and civilians
interned, by censoring news relating to prisoners and
internees, and ordering the destruction of all incriminating
documents at the time of the surrender of Japan.
The following are examples of inadequate
sentences imposed for ill-treatment of prisoners. For
flogging, the punishment imposed was admonition, or a
few days confinement in quarters, or a few days extra
duty. A guard guilty of torturing prisoners of war was
admonished. A guard who was guilty of frequently
lynching prisoners of war was admonished. Several
guards were found guilty of lynching prisoners of war;
the most severe punishment imposed was discharge. The
penalty imposed on the officer responsible for the
burning alive of 62 allied fliers during an air raid
on the Tokyo Army Prison was an admonition. These
cases are evidence that the War Ministry knew there
was ill-treatment of prisoners. The trifling nature of
the punishments imposed implies condonation.
--1127--
The Government actively concealed the ill-treatment
to which prisoners of war and civilian internees
were being subjected by refusing visits by representatives
of the Protecting Power designated by the Allies. The
Swiss Minister in Tokyo, as early as 12 February 1942,
delivered a note to Foreign Minister TOGO in which he
said: "I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of
Your Excellency that the Government of the United
States is prepared to facilitate, at the request of
the representative of the Protecting Power, their
visits to Japanese subjects who are temporarily
detained, interned, or at liberty on parole. I would
be greatly obliged to Your excellency if you would
facilitate in part the task of my Legation so far as
it concerns visits to internees." He delivered
another note to Foreign Minister TOGO on 17 February
1942 in which he said: "The Government of the United
States of America has already informed the Spanish
Ambassador,k protecting Japanese interests in the
United States, that he is at liberty to visit prisoner
of war camps as well as places where civilian internees
are detained. The Government of the United States
requests, in conformity with the Geneva Prisoner of
War Convention, that the Swiss representatives in
Japan and in the territories occupied by Japanese
forces be authorized as soon as possible to commence
their visits of inspection to places where American
citizens, who are prisoners of war or civilian
internees, are located." He delivered other notes
to TOGO in March and June 1942 repeating those
requests. During June 1942, he requested the same
--1128--
permission to visit the subjects of Great Britain and
the Dominions, who were detained as prisoners or
internees. TOGO at last replied to these requests on
30 July 1942 by a note in which he said: "I desire to
inform Your Excellency that the Imperial Government
having in principle refused to recognize the representation
of any interests in the occupied territories
comprising the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, Malaya
and the Netherlands East Indies, it follows that
permission cannot be given to your delegates to visit
American prisoners of war and civilian internees in
the above-mentioned territories; but that in respect
of Shanghai only, in occupied China, the competent
authorities can give this permission." The Governments
of the United States and Great Britain protested
immediately and renewed their requests. The correspondence
between the Swiss Minister and Foreign
Minister Tani, who succeeded TOGO, reflects that this
policy of refusing permission to visit prisoners and
internees detained in the occupied territories and in
Japan's overseas possessions was continued. The Swiss
Minister continued to press for permission, however;
and on 22 April 1943, SHIGEMITSU, who had become
Foreign Minister, delivered a Note Verbal to the Swiss
Minister in which he said: "As the Foreign Minister
has communicated to the Swiss Minister by Note dated
20 July 1942, the Imperial Government shall not permit
visits to prisoners of war and civilian internee camps
in occupied territories." Although the Swiss Minister
had been informed by Foreign Minister TOGO that
representatives of the Protecting Power would be
--1129--
allowed to visit camps at Shanghai, the visits were not
made because the so-called "competent authorities",
to which TOGO referred the Swiss Minister, refused to
give permission for the visits and the permission
was not forthcoming from the TOJO Cabinet in Tokyo.
SHIGEMITSU was informed of this in a Note from the
Swiss Minister dated 12 May 1943. In response to these
persistent and repeated requests from the Swiss
Government for permission to visit prisoners of war
and civilian internees, a few selected camps, which
had been prepared for the occasion, were allowed to
be visited in Japan. The Swiss Minister, on 2 June
1943, requested permission from SHIGEMITSU to visit
the remaining camps in Japan as well as the camps in
the occupied territories, and inquired when a second
visit might be made to the camps which had been visited
in Japan. Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU replied on 23
July 1943 and said: "A regards prisoner of war camps
in the occupied areas, a notification will be made to
Your Excellency if the time comes when permission can
be granted; and as regards prisoner of war camps in
Japan proper, which have not yet been visited,
permission will be granted gradually at a favorable
opportunity. Permission for periodic visits to
those camps, that have already been visited, shall
not be granted in advance; but in case a visit is
desired, consideration will be given to applications
made on all such occasions." However, consideration
was not given to these applications; and on 12
February 1944, the Swiss Minister complained to
SHIGEMITSU that no reply had been made to requests to
--1130--
visit detention camps between August 1943 and february
1944. This complaint was repeated in a Note to
SHIGEMITSU on 30 March 1944, in which the Swiss
Minister said: "You know that I am not satisfied with
my activities as representative of foreign interests
in Japan. The results do not correspond to the
efforts. I can see this in a concrete fashion as
shown by the statistics of my services and requests
which have been made by my Government at the request
of the Governments who have confided their interests
in us. I desire to confine myself for the moment
to my requests to visit prisoner of war camps.
Reviewing my requests made over more than two years,
I find that from 1 February 1942 to 15 March 1944,
I have intervened 134 times in writing. These 134
notes have brought exactly 24 replies from the Foreign
Ministry. Most of these replies are either negative
or forward to me decisions made by competent authorities.
I have received three replies in nine months."
It was not until 13 November 1944, that he was notified
by SHIGEMITSU's Foreign Ministry that the time had
come when permission could be granted to visit
prisoners of war and internees in the occupied
territories; and then the visits were limited to Manila,
Shonan and Bangkok. In a note addressed to the Swiss
Minister in Tokyo on 17 November 1944, SHIGEMITSU informed
the Swiss Minister that visits would be allowed
to prisoner of war camps in the occupied territories on
condition of reciprocity if they did not interfere with
military operations. The Swiss Minister in a note
dated 13 January 1945, asked SHIGEMITSU when these
visits could be commenced. It was not until 7 April
--1131--
1945, that TOGO, who had succeeded SHIGEMITSU as
Foreign Minister, replied to the many urgent requests
to visit detention camps in the occupied territories.
In that reply, TOGO stated that Japan "would lose no
time" in making preparations for visits in THailand.
By the use of one excuse or another, visits were never
freely allowed throughout the war.
In the few cases where the representatives of
the Protecting Power were allowed to visit detention
camps, the camps were prepared for the visit, and the
visits were strictly supervised. Regulations issued by
the TOJO Cabinet early in the Pacific War provided that
when an interview with a prisoner of war was authorized,
restrictions regarding the time and place of the interview
and the range within which the conversation was to
be conducted would be imposed and that a guard would
be present during the interview. These regulations
were enforced notwithstanding the repeated objections
of the Protecting Power. In a note to the Swiss
Minister, dated 22 April 1943, SHIGEMITSU said: "The
Imperial Government shall not allow delegates of the
Protecting Power to interview prisoners of war without
the presence of a guard." The Swiss Minister protested
and SHIGEMITSU replied on 24 June 1943: "The Ministry
hastens to inform the Legation that Article 13 of our
country's detailed regulations stipulates that a
guard shall be present when prisoners of war are
interviewed, and that it is not possible to modify
our treatment of prisoners of war practiced in
conformity with said Article." After a visit to
the prisoner of war camp at Motoyama in Japan in the
--1132--
spring of 1943, the senior prisoner at the camp,
who had dared to complain of the working conditions
to which the prisoners had been subjected, was
tortured. He was forced to kneel for five hours
before a Japanese guard. The next time this camp was
visited, this senior prisoner was placed in confinement
and was not allowed to speak to the representative,
although that representative demanded to interview him.
The fate of prisoners of war and civilian
internees was further concealed by refusal to forward
to the Protecting Power a list of the names of
prisoners of war and civilian internees detained. An
example of the refusal to supply such lists is the case
of the prisoners of war and civilian internees detained
after the capture of Wake Island. The Swiss Minister
on 278 May 1942, requested of TOGO the names of the
prisoners of war and civilian internees captured on
Wake Island and their present whereabouts. On 6
October 1942, the Swiss Minister informed the Foreign
Minister, then Tani, that the United States Government
was still without report on approximately 400 American
civilians who were on Wake Island at the time of its
capture. On 8 April 1943, the list not having been
furnished, the Swiss Minister informed Foreign Minster
Tani that the United States Government was insisting
upon being furnished the names and location of the
remaining 400. Foreign Minister Tani replied on 19
April 1943 that all information to be furnished had
already been given. On 21 August 1943, the Swiss
Minister furnished the new Foreign Minister, SHIGEMITSU,
a list of 432 American civilians who should have been
--1133--
on Wake Island at the time of its occupation by the
Japanese forces, but whose names were not found on
the lists furnished to the International Red Cross
Bureau by the Japanese, and requested information
regarding those civilians. On 15 May 1945, the Swiss
Minister informed Foreign Minister, now TOGO, that no
answer had been received to the request for information
regarding the remaining 432 civilians from Wake Island.
The information was not obtained until after these
surrender fo Japan. In truth, all these unfortunate
people were murdered by the Japanese Navy in October 1943.
News reports and mail were specially censored,
no doubt to prevent disclosure of the ill-treatment to
which prisoners of war were being subjected. Censorship
regulations issued by the Information Bureau of
the War Ministry on 20 December 1943, while TOJO was
War Minister, provided, among other things, the following:
Care should be taken to avoid issuing twisted reports
of our fair attitude which might give the enemy food
for evil propaganda and bring harm to our interned
brothers. For this reason, any reports including
photographs, pictures, etc., which come under the
following categories are prohibited: Anything that
gives the impression that prisoners of war are too well
treated or are cruelly treated; any concrete information
concerning facilities, supplies, sanitary conditions,
or other matters pertaining to living conditions within
prisoner of war camps; any information giving the names
of any location of prisoner of war camps other than
the following:"
Then followed twelve general names
--1134--
such as Tokyo, Korea, Borneo, etc. The mail which
prisoners of war were allowed to send was restricted
almost to the point of prohibition. Prisoners in
some camps, such as those at Singapore, were told by
their guards that unless they reported favorably on
conditions at the camp, their cards would not be sent.
This appears to have been the general rule.
When it became apparent that Japan would be
forced to surrender, an organized effort was made to
burn or otherwise destroy all documents and other
evidence of ill-treatment of prisoners of war and
civilian internees. The Japanese Minister of War
issued an order on 14 August 1945 to all Army headquarters
that confidential documents should be destroyed
by fire immediately. On the same day, the Commandant
of the Kempetai sent out instructions to the various
Kempetai Headquarters detailing the methods of burning
large quantities of documents efficiently. The Chief
of the Prisoner of War Camps under the Prisoner of War
Administration Section of the Military Affairs
Bureau sent a circular telegram to
the Chief-of-Staff of the Formosan Army on 20 August
1945, in which he said: "Documents which would be
unfavorable for us in the hands of the enemy are to
be treated in the same way as secrete documents and
destroyed when finished with." This telegram was
sent to the Korean Army, Kwantung Army, North China
Army, Hong Kong, Mukden, Borneo, Thailand, Malaya
and Java. It was in this telegram that the Chief of
Prisoner of War Camps made this statement: "Personnel
--1135--
who ill-treated prisoners of war and internees or who
are held in extremely bad sentiment by them are permitted
to take care of it by immediately transferring
or by fleeing without trace."
--1136--
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