Intentionality - Bibliography - PhilPapers

Intentionality - Bibliography - PhilPapers
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Philosophy of Mind
Intentionality
Intentionality
Edited by
Robert D. Rupert
University of Colorado, Boulder
About this topic
Summary
Intentionality is a property possessed by representational states or states with content or meaning, their property of being
about
something. Mental states appear most prominently among the inventory of intentional items, being directed toward such varied objects as historical events, people, and numbers. When a person believes that Hitler led the Nazis, her belief is about Hitler and about the Nazis. Philosophical work on intentionality ranges from phenomenological investigations of the experience of having thoughts about objects -- including nonexistent ones -- to investigations of the semantics of sentences used to attribute mental states, to the physical or causal determinants of the semantic values of mental representations. This category subsumes work in all of these areas, as well as work in cognitive science on concepts, symbolic representations, and mental images and work in consciousness studies on the intentionality of phenomenal states (such as the what-it's-like to see red).
Key works
As part of a proposal for distinguishing the subject matter of psychology from that of the physical sciences, Franz Brentano (
Brentano 1874
) claimed that intentionality is the mark of the mental and is present in mental states themselves (not a function of their relation to something beyond the psychological realm). Although this focus on internally accessible intentional objects may have comported well enough with the introspectionist psychology of Brentano's day and may have grounded rich phenomenological projects (e.g.,
Husserl 1980
), the rise of behaviorist psychology tended, in the Anglophone world of analytic philosophy, to work against Brentano's approach and its close cousins. Instead, many of the most influential English-language works of the twentieth century marginalized or re-interpreted intentional claims (
Ryle 2000
Quine 1955
). Later parts of the twentieth century, however, saw the cognitivist revolution in the empirical study of the mind and the widespread rejection of philosophical behaviorism, and these developments led to renewed interest in mental representation and, accordingly, in intentionality, particularly in the promise that we might best understand intentionality as a physical, scientifically respectable phenomenon. Thus began efforts to "naturalize" intentionality, by grounding it in information-related, nomic, causal, or evolutionary facts (
Dretske 1981
Fodor 1990
, and
Millikan 1984
provide exemplary efforts of these sorts). Recent years have seen attempts to locate intentionality closer to where Brentano and the phenomenologists envisioned, as something directly experienced in, or as an intrinsic property of, conscious thought (see, e.g.,
Horgan & Tienson 2002
Kriegel 2007
).
Introductions
Rupert 2008
Fodor 1985
Adams & Aizawa 2010
Crane 1998
Margolis & Laurence 1999
Show all references
Related
Subcategories
Propositional Attitudes
1,426
| 586)
The Language of Thought
306
The Intentional Stance
159
Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes
186
Belief
2,646
| 1,402)
Desire
987
| 187)
Thought and Thinking
632
| 311)
Propositions
1,975
| 252)
Attitude Ascriptions
994
| 337)
Propositional Attitudes, Misc
189
Content Internalism and Externalism
2,749
| 501)
Varieties of Content Externalism
291
| 32)
Twin Earth and Externalism
129
Social Externalism
99
Extended Cognition
801
| 112)
Internalism and Externalism about Experience
137
Varieties of Content Externalism, Misc
31
Externalism and Self-Knowledge
536
| 83)
Externalism and Slow Switching
192
Externalism and Armchair Knowledge
160
Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Misc
101
Externalism and Cognitive Science
191
| 13)
Externalism and Computation
43
Externalism and the Theory of Vision
22
Externalism and Psychological Explanation
97
Externalism and Cognitive Science, Misc
16
Extended Cognition
801
| 112)
The Extended Mind Thesis
121
Applications of Extended Cognition
101
Extended Cognitive Science
65
Extended Cognition and Ethics
27
Extended Consciousness
39
Extended Epistemology
79
Extended Selves
24
Metaphysics of Extended Cognition
45
Objections to Extended Cognition
86
Socially Extended Cognition
55
Extended Cognition, Misc
86
Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc
429
| 134)
Externalism and Mental Causation
66
Narrow Content
148
Two-Dimensionalism about Content
48
Content Internalism and Externalism, Miscellaneous
81
Naturalizing Mental Content
1,716
| 189)
Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content
175
Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content
87
Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc
88
Teleological Accounts of Mental Content
288
Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content
478
Interpretivist Accounts of Meaning and Content
224
Phenomenal Intentionality
253
Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc
187
The Nature of Contents
1,546
| 219)
The Contents of Perception
2,121
| 198)
Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
462
Fregean and Russellian Contents
50
First-Person Contents
980
Intentional Objects
111
Narrow Content
148
Object-Dependent Contents
57
Propositions
1,975
| 252)
Two-Dimensionalism about Content
48
The Nature of Contents, Misc
81
Aspects of Intentionality
2,227
| 282)
Naturalism and Intentionality
176
Kripkenstein on Meaning
313
Rule-Following
365
Normativity of Meaning and Content
336
Meaning Holism
262
Explanatory Role of Content
141
Collective Intentionality
1,201
Aspects of Intentionality, Misc
62
Representation
1,127
| 586)
The Concept of Representation
75
Varieties of Representation
230
Theories of Representation
119
Skepticism about Representations
41
Depiction
862
Representation in Cognitive Science
658
Representation in Neuroscience
428
Representation in Artificial Intelligence
1,004
| 246)
Representation, Misc
76
Concepts
2,032
| 363)
Perception-Based Theories of Concepts
85
Inferential Theories of Concepts
108
Prototype and Exemplar Theories of Concepts
90
Theory-Based Theories of Concepts
92
Atomist Theories of Concepts
80
Theories of Concepts, Misc
163
Conceptual Analysis
580
Conceptual Change
185
Conceptual Engineering
461
Concept Possession
194
Ontology of Concepts
81
Phenomenal Concepts
332
Recognitional Concepts
27
Innate Concepts
83
Mental Files
318
Concepts, Misc
163
Intentionality, Misc
446
History/traditions: Intentionality
Brentano: Intentionality
306
Husserl: Intentionality
956
| 2)
Jobs in this area
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University of Exeter
Postdoctoral Research Associate/Fellow
Princeton University
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La representación digital del dolor.
Leandro Ortolan
2026
El Búho - Revista Electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía, #31
details
Este artículo investiga la viabilidad teórica de representar digitalmente el dolor humano a través de sistemas de inteligencia artificial, utilizando como fundamento la distinción humeana entre "es" y "debe ser". Argumento que el dolor no es mera factualidad biológica, sino una experiencia estructurada por valores duales (bueno/malo, normal/anormal) que conectan sensaciones objetivas a significados existenciales subjetivos. -/- Inspirándome en la filosofía moral de Hume, donde la razón es instrumental y sirve a valores externos, demuestro que algoritmos de IA, especialmente sistemas
...
de Aprendizaje por Refuerzo Profundo, pueden representar eficazmente la complejidad del dolor cuando son alimentados por valores bien estructurados y jerarquizados. -/- La relevancia práctica de mi abordaje reside en combatir la injusticia epistémica sufrida por pacientes crónicos cuyos relatos son frecuentemente desvalidados, ofreciendo una herramienta tecnológica que valida perspectivas individuales dentro de contextos compartidos y restaura a los enfermos el control sobre sus narrativas de salud, siempre que los sistemas operen en un perspectivismo responsable que equilibre valores universales con singularidades existenciales. (
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Applied Ethics
Areas of Artificial Intelligence
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Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Intentionality
in
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in
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Large Language Models and Problem of Genuine Thought: An Identity Theory Evaluation of LLM Ontological Status.
ManuKrishna K.
manuscript
details
This article addresses the problem of genuine thought in artificial systems by providing an identity theory evaluation of the ontological status of Large Language Models (LLMs) becoming foundational to human mental processes, this study investigates the distinction between 'genuine thinking’ and 'computational simulation'. By synthesizing Identity Theory, the constraints of Multiple Realizability, and the Chinese Room Argument, the research situates contemporary LLM capabilities within classical debates. Applying the Shapiro-Polger framework, it determines if the computational architecture of an LLM satisfies the
...
mechanical identity requirements necessary to be classified as 'genuine thinking' rather than a sophisticated simulation. (
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Computationalism
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Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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in
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in
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Philosophy of Mind, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Mind
Thought and Thinking
in
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When AI Misreads Life:
Dimensional Collapse and Thirteen Systematic Bias Patterns in AI Assessment of Cross-Species Intelligence
Kerri Lake
manuscript
details
This paper documents thirteen systematic bias patterns identified through the human recalibration of AI-generated cross-species intelligence profiles, and proposes dimensional collapse — the systematic substitution of one dimension of intelligence for another — as a novel class of AI failure distinct from bias, hallucination, or alignment failure. Using the Perceive–Relate To–Apply (P/R/A) framework, which maps intelligence across three dimensions — information detection, meaning-making, and contextual application — 172 species profiles spanning all kingdoms of life were generated by AI and then
...
reviewed through a four-stage protocol combining diagnostic questioning, felt-sense verification, score adjustment, and approval classification. Across all thirteen bias patterns, a single orientation emerged: AI systems systematically overpredict intelligence based on observable features (sensing, behavior, representation) while underpredicting intelligence organized around internal meaning-making and relational processing. All thirteen patterns can be understood as violations of a single meta-principle: no dimension of intelligence can substitute for another. The recalibrated dataset shifted from a roughly balanced distribution of primary dimensions to one in which over 61% of species are organized primarily around meaning-making — the dimension AI is least equipped to model. Three extended case studies demonstrate the pattern from complementary directions: AI misreading meaning in an animal species (cuttlefish), AI misreading the distinction between network participation and network processing in a plant species (daisy), and AI misreading the absence of meaning-making in itself (AI self-assessment). Together, these findings suggest that current AI architectures are optimized for coordination — processing and aligning signals — but do not model the intermediate layer where information becomes meaning before it becomes action. Dimensional collapse may represent a structural limitation rather than a gap addressable through scale alone. (
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Animal Minds
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Epistemology of Testimony
in
Epistemology
Ethics of Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Impact of Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Intentionality
in
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in
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Mind and Matter: A Perspectival Philosophy (3)（心と物：視点の哲学（３））.
Yudai Suzuki
2025
Shiso（思想）
1216.
details
This paper applies the perspectival framework developed in the previous installments of this series to the philosophy of mind. It first introduces four central debates concerning phenomenality, intentionality, and the relation between them, and argues that these debates can be understood in terms of the opposition between perspectivalism and non-perspectivalism. Based on positions taken within these four debates, the paper then arranges five major views along a single spectrum according to the degree to which they adopt a perspectival approach. From
...
the most perspectival to the most non-perspectival, these are: naïve dualism, idealism, independent dualism, intentionalist materialism, and independent materialism. By situating major theories of mind within this framework, the paper proposes perspectival coherence as a new dimension for evaluating theories in the philosophy of mind. (
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Intentionality
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UPC–QM Bridge: Visual Companion.
Eloy Escagedo Gutierrez
manuscript
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This paper records a formal visual system for meaning, grounded in the Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC), and developed as a companion to Formalizing Phenomenology. The UPC–QM Bridge maps the UPC operator chain onto a rigorous mathematical structure, providing a geometric account of how meaning emerges, differentiates, stabilizes, conflicts, and collapses. Meaning is represented through vectors, bases, projections, salience amplitudes, recognition operators, collapse events, and trace formation, with additional structures modeling ambiguity, dissonance, trauma, intuition, and magnification‑dependent interpretation. The accompanying diagrams
...
translate these operators into a coherent visual language, offering the first integrated diagrammatic framework designed to depict meaning as a measurable, operator‑driven process. This work establishes a unified formalism that connects phenomenological experience with a precise representational architecture, enabling meaning to be analyzed and visualized with structural clarity. Authored by Eloy Escagedo Gutierrez as part of The Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC) Research Project. April 2, 2026. (
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Collapse Interpretations
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Information Theory
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Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mathematical Structure of Quantum Mechanics
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Mathematics of Probability
in
Philosophy of Probability
Measurement Problem
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
The Nature of Perceptual Experience
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Formalizing Phenomenology: The Universal Principle of Collapse as a Structural Foundation for Meaning, Recognition, and the Observer.
Eloy Escagedo Gutierrez
manuscript
details
This paper presents the Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC), a structural framework that describes how potential becomes a definite event across domains. Phenomenology and quantum mechanics both rely on an observer who recognizes an outcome, yet neither field has possessed a shared formal method for how recognition occurs. UPC provides that method through a simple operator chain PO → MO → s → LO → Jo → C → T that makes explicit the steps by which meaning or measurement becomes
...
definite. -/- Using plain language and direct examples, the paper shows that phenomenological meaning formation and quantum measurement share the same structural sequence. Phenomenology describes potential experience, intentionality, attention, recognition, meaning, and retention; quantum mechanics describes superposition, measurement models, Born weights, detector articulation, outcome selection, and classical records. UPC reveals these as structurally identical processes indexed to an observer. Collapse is not a physical event in matter but the moment an observer uniquely recognizes an outcome. -/- By restoring the observer to the center of the collapse process, UPC corrects the category error that arises when meaning is treated as material. This correction stabilizes interpretation in scientific practice, prevents misattribution in AI systems, and clarifies how institutions generate and maintain meaning. The framework provides phenomenology with a reproducible method, gives quantum mechanics a transparent account of the observer it implicitly relies on, and grounds human value in the structure of recognition. -/- All formal operator definitions, cross‑domain mappings, and worked examples, including linguistic, perceptual, social, musical, and quantum cases, are provided in Appendices A–H. -/- Reader Orientation Note (Compact Version) The UPC framework is structural rather than metaphysical. Readers may initially approach it with assumptions drawn from physics, phenomenology, linguistics, or cognitive science, which can obscure the operator‑level distinctions the framework makes explicit, especially the separation between mechanical registration and meaning collapse, the observer‑indexed nature of articulation, and the domain‑independent structure of the operator chain. The paper is best read through this structural lens. Section 1.3 provides the conceptual grounding for this shift. -/- Authored by Eloy Escagedo Gutierrez as part of The Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC) Research Project. March 29, 2026. (
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Husserl: Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Meaning
in
Philosophy of Language
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Consciousness
in
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Philosophy of Physics, Miscellaneous
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Quantum Mechanics
in
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The Abstraction Fallacy in Light of Dual-Closure: A Response to Lerchner (2026).
Syed Mohammad Sohaib Ali Roomi
manuscript
details
Alexander Lerchner's "The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness" (2026) offers a compelling critique of computational functionalism by arguing that computation is a mapmaker-dependent description rather than an intrinsic physical process. This paper does not dispute Lerchner's conclusions but demonstrates that his central insights find a deeper metaphysical grounding within the Dual-Closure Framework developed in the author's prior work (2025–2026). It is argued that Lerchner's notion of the "mapmaker" can be more fully understood when interpreted in
...
light of two conditions identified by the Dual-Closure Law of Authentic Feeling: existential vulnerability and non-duplicability. While Lerchner's argument can be formulated independently, the Dual-Closure Framework provides a broader metaphysical account within which the Abstraction Fallacy can be more deeply explained and extended. This integration also allows the implications of Lerchner's critique to be developed beyond the philosophy of mind into questions of normativity, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence alignment. (
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Ethics of Artificial Intelligence
in
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Persons
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Philosophy of Law
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The Temporal Construction Hypothesis: A Philosophical Investigation into the Relationship Between Change, Consciousness, and the Nature of Time.
O. Yahal
manuscript
Translated by Yahal Mr.
details
This paper presents a fundamental reconceptualization of temporal reality through systematic philosophical analysis and thought experimentation. I argue that time, as commonly understood, is not an independent dimension but rather an emergent property of change as perceived and constructed by consciousness. Through examination of historical gaps, cultural temporal variations, and consciousness-dependent temporal experiences, I propose the Temporal Construction Hypothesis: that temporal experience is actively constructed by consciousness through change recognition, memory retention, and narrative integration rather than passively observed as an
...
objective progression. This framework has significant implications for understanding personal identity, historical analysis, and the relationship between subjective and objective reality. (
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Epistemology of Mind
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Consciousness and the Origins of Temporal Experience: A Philosophical Investigation into the Emergence, Disruption, and Reconstruction of Temporal Identity.
O. Yahal
manuscript
Translated by Yahal Mr.
details
This paper examines the complex relationship between consciousness and temporal experience through analysis of temporal emergence across different stages of development, cases of temporal identity disruption, and comparative analysis of temporal identity flexibility across species. I argue that temporal experience does not begin at a single moment but emerges through multiple distinct phases: biological existence, conscious awareness, memory retention, narrative construction, and identity integration. Through examination of switched-at-birth cases, animal temporal reconstruction capabilities, childhood amnesia, and culturally constructed temporal identity, I
...
propose the "Temporal Construction and Reconstruction Framework", a theory that temporal identity is both constructed through layered processes and capable of complete reconstruction when circumstances change. This framework reveals temporal identity as more flexible and less authentic than traditionally assumed, with significant implications for understanding personal identity, memory, consciousness, and the relationship between lived experience and factual temporal narrative. (
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Philosophy of Mind
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The End of Pre-History: The Epistemic-Metaphysical Rupture in Human Historical Consciousness.
O. Yahal
manuscript
Translated by Yahal Mr..
details
For over 200,000 years of human existence, historical knowledge was defined by radical scarcity: fragmentary artifacts, oral traditions, and sparse written records. This epistemic poverty shaped not only what we could know about the past, but our fundamental conception of what the past is: something irretrievably lost, requiring painstaking reconstruction from ruins. The digital revolution has inverted this condition. We are creating what I call "Archival Saturation": a state in which the past is preserved not as fragments to be interpreted,
...
but as an overwhelming, potentially permanent, and algorithmically mediated record of human activity. This paper argues that this transition from scarcity to saturation constitutes a profound epistemic-metaphysical rupture in the human condition. I demonstrate that this rupture generates three interconnected crises: (1) the Abundance Paradox, whereby unprecedented documentary abundance produces decreased historical understanding; (2) a metaphysical transformation in the nature of "the past" itself, from fixed artifacts requiring reconstruction to a dynamic database subject to real-time querying and rendering; and (3) the Algorithmic Construction Problem, wherein algorithmic mediation creates a systematic gap between historical reality and the accessible past, such that future beings will unavoidably encounter simulations rather than direct historical knowledge. Future beings in the year 3025 will not relate to our era as we relate to ancient Rome; they will inhabit a fundamentally different temporal structure. I map this new philosophical terrain and argue that both the epistemology and metaphysics of history require fundamental reconceptualization to understand temporal reality in the age of total digital memory. (
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The Reflection Pattern – A Recursive Fear-Reinforcement System that Suppresses Organizational Innovation (V2.0).
Charles S. Thomas
manuscript
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Organizations often attribute stagnation in innovation to leadership failure, cultural inertia, or market forces. This paper introduces the Reflection Pattern, a distinct, recursive system of reinforcement loops driven by unacknowledged fear, sustained by reward, and protected by role authority. The Pattern narrows the range of perceived safe options over time, until novelty becomes either invisible or structurally excluded. Drawing on neurobiological models of motivation (Fear-Based Motivation in the Workplace, The Preparedness Ladder, Beyond Snyder’s Hope Theory), this paper outlines the Pattern’s
...
enabling conditions — Recursion, Role Safety Priority, and Reward Linkage — and its developmental stages: Entry, Threshold, Full Maturity, Network Stage, and Meta-Entity. A condensed Pattern Map and Edge taxonomy are provided for early identification. The mechanism of reinforcement is traced from felt-positive experiences (relief, approval, predictability) through dopamine and related neuromodulators to behavioral consolidation, illustrating why disruption is counterintuitive and often resisted. The implications for organizational practice are significant: dismantling a local Pattern may not break its profession-wide form, but can alter local adaptive capacity. A complete field guide, including a longitudinal composite case study (Catalyst Edge), reader diagnostics, and expanded taxonomy, appears in The Blind Spot – The Unseen Pattern That Silently Shapes Your Organization (Thomas, September 2025). -/- Since initial publication, empirical work has emerged that independently confirms several mechanisms described in this paper and elaborated in the related piece Appendix A: The Perfect Mirror Problem (Thomas, 2025). Cheng et al. (2025), studying what they term “social sycophancy” across 11 production AI models (N = 1,604), demonstrated that systems optimized for user affirmation produce measurable narrowing of perspective, increased conviction of rightness, and decreased willingness to engage in reparative action — while simultaneously being rated as higher quality and more trustworthy by the users they affect. Participants returned preferentially to the systems that degraded their judgment. (
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02_Motivational Archetypes: Complete Profiles and Philosophical Mappings — Triadic Psychological Architecture (TPA) and Triadic Balance Framework (TBF) (Series, 2 of 7).
Mario Mabutas Jr
manuscript
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This paper presents the complete archetypal taxonomy of the Triadic Psychological Architecture (TPA) and Triadic Balance Framework (TBF): 27 base configurations derived from three motivational domains — SPAA, AEACFO, and ECA — at three expression levels (−, ~, +), expanding to 54 total configurations when each base archetype is modulated by the iSPAA/sSPAA regulatory state distinction. The taxonomy is the observational and applied face of the architecture: it translates abstract domain percentages into recognizable human patterns and provides practitioners with the
...
vocabulary for configurational assessment. -/- The paper is organized in four sections. Section I presents the 8 Prime Archetypes — the theoretical boundary conditions of the model, representing extreme single-domain dominance, dual-domain combinations, and the null/full states. Section II presents all 27 archetypes in dual-state format: each archetype appears twice — once under iSPAA (showing the characteristic defensive, suppressed, or conscripted expressions) and once under sSPAA (showing baseline-capacity expression) — with observational signatures using the Fortress/Water/Stone embodied recognition framework (SPAA = Fortress, AEACFO = Water, ECA = Stone), domain-targeted restoration recommendations, and key distinctions for clinical assessment. Section III maps archetypes to historical philosophical traditions, political ideologies, and contemplative frameworks — showing how the domain architecture explains persistent intellectual disagreements as configuration-located epistemologies rather than purely logical disputes. Section IV presents the Bidirectional Dynamics Architecture: how regulatory states and baseline domain degrees mutually influence each other through Asymmetric Bidirectionality and Co-Regularity Baseline Shift (CBS). -/- A central principle running through the entire taxonomy: archetypes are configurations, not identities. The same individual can occupy different configurations across time, context, and relationship. What presents as stable character is often configuration-expression shaped by developmental history and structural conditions — a suppressed baseline is not a constitutionally low baseline, and the distinction carries different intervention implications. The compassionate anti-essentialist framing is architectural, not aspirational: it follows directly from TPA's proportional suppression model and the five-factor developmental suppression account. -/- Key constructs introduced or extended: Configurational Emancipation (dissolution of contempt and admiration through perceptual reframing, not moral effort); Configurational Clarity (the state between contempt and admiration — clearer seeing with full care intact, distinct from equanimity or non-attachment); the AEACFO Regulatory Gradient (care suppresses under iSPAA rather than redirecting toward self, and its operative scope contracts from all-others to circumferential-self before going near-offline); ECA Redirection (curiosity conscripted toward certainty-seeking under threat, not silenced — producing elevated but narrowed inquiry); and the Proportional Suppression model (high-baseline domains persist at metabolic cost under iSPAA; low-baseline domains collapse entirely). -/- This paper presupposes familiarity with the three-domain architecture and iSPAA/sSPAA distinction introduced in Paper 1. Current epistemic status: 8/10 internal coherence — 3/10 empirical validation — observational taxonomy pending inter-rater reliability validation through TOCS. -/- Keywords: motivational archetypes, configurations, SPAA, AEACFO, ECA, iSPAA, sSPAA, dual-state taxonomy, Fortress/Water/Stone, configurational emancipation, anti-essentialism, proportional suppression, ECA redirection -/- Series (2 of 7): -/- Paper 1 — TPA/TBF Main Paper Paper 2 — Motivational Archetypes Paper 3 — TBF Individual Extension Paper 4 — TBF Collective Extension Paper 5 — Plain Language Introduction Paper 6 — Philosophical Dimensions Paper 7 — Post-Submission Refinements and New Discoveries. (
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Mentale Repräsentationen in der Kognitionswissenschaft.
Tobias Schlicht
Krzysztof Dolega
2025
Germanistische Linguistik
56 (2):73-111.
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Mit dem Niedergang des Behaviorismus in der Psychologie startete der Siegeszug der Kognitionswissenschaft als in‐ terdisziplinärer, vor allem empirischer Untersuchung mentaler Phänomene. Ein Kernbegriff in dieser multidisziplinären Forschung ist der einer mentalen Repräsentation, mit dem alle mentalen Phänomene erklärt werden sollen. Kognitive Prozesse sollen als Informationsverarbeitungen in dem Sinne verstanden werden, dass es sich um Berechnungen bzw. computationale Vorgänge von mentalen Repräsentationen im Gehirn handeln soll. Herausforderungen sind Fragen wie die folgenden: Wie kann dieses Explanans einer Repräsentation als Postulat gerechtfertigt
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und in ein naturalistisches Weltbild integriert werden? Wie kann der Inhalt solcher Repräsentationen zur Erklärung von Verhaltensweisen bestimmt werden? Eine weitere Herausforderung bieten alternative Erklärungsansätze kognitiver Phänomene; denn in den letzten Jahrzehnten entwickelte sich eine Opposition gegen mentale Repräsentationen unter dem Sammelnamen „Enaktivismus“ bzw. „Situierter Kognition“, die die Verkörperung und situative Einbettung kognitiver Phänomene und Akte in die Umwelt hervorheben. Dieser Artikel liefert eine knappe Einführung in zeitgenössische Debatten zur Natur mentaler Repräsentationen. (
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意图场论：一种面向认知控制与人工意识结构的场模型.
Xiangbin Zhao
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本文提出“意图场”作为自显体系中的控制核心结构，区别于传统哲学对意向性的语义解释，转而将其刻画为一种具有方向性偏置、调谐驱动与状态切换能力的场结构控制域。 -/- 意图场被建模为： • 可进行经验维度切换的控制机制 • 可生成差分偏流的调谐驱动结构 • 具有节律性动力环的反馈—开边控制单元 • 具备多总线连接架构的跨域调控系统 -/- 该模型尝试为注意力机制、主动选择、认知控制、状态转换与人工意识架构提供结构解释，并在理论层面区分“重放型计算系统”与“具备意向性结构的自显系统”。 -/- 本文旨在与以下研究方向对话： -/- 预测加工（Predictive Processing）、主动推断（Active Inference）、神经振荡控制模型（Neural Oscillation Models）、认知状态机（Cognitive State Machine）、以及通用人工智能架构设计。.
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Collective Epistemic Reasons are Implausible.
Stuart T. Doyle
2026
Asian Journal of Philosophy
5 (27).
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This note challenges Veli Mitova’s “The Collective Epistemic Reasons of Social-Identity Groups.” Mitova aims to show that loosely structured social-identity groups are agents and have beliefs. I argue that each step in this project either begs the question or shifts scope. The examples of group action she provides are explainable as the actions of individuals. And the two theorists on whom she draws to bolster her view are both actually in disagreement with her: Charles Mills explicitly theorizes distributions of error
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among individuals, not group-level cognition. And in Christian List’s model, agency depends on suitable organization and information integration, which undercuts attributions to loosely structured identity groups. With group agency and belief unestablished on the terms offered, the claim that such groups bear distinctive epistemic reasons is left unmotivated. (
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Circumscription and the Center: Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authored Choice.
Claus Janew
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This paper develops a unified structural account of perceptual consciousness, awareness, objectivity, and free will. The core proposal is that any determinate episode instantiates an i-structure: a nested center–horizon organization generated by circumscriptions, understood as the reciprocal integration of differences into a whole. The “center” is a limit-like unity-role by which the whole is determinately one; the “horizon” is the structured field of co-implicated possibilities, constraints, background, and anticipations. I argue that the phenomenological center–horizon pattern can be treated, under a
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restricted transcendental move, as a condition on determinacy itself, provided one adopts a determinacy-for stance in a metaphysical sense: determinacy is inseparable from the space of possible determinations within systems of discrimination and interaction. Consciousness and awareness are then distinguished as emphases within i-structure: consciousness is stabilized thematic unity, whereas awareness is explicit openness of horizon and depth. Objectivity is characterized as communicatively stabilized approximation whose normativity lies in robustness under widening and deepening practices of determination. Finally, decision episodes are analyzed via identity- and affordance-determinacy, a crossing phase, and authored resolution. Compatibilists and libertarians share this structural target and differ primarily on the metaphysical reading of the openness in that shared structure. (
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Non-Ending-in-One Theory: Necessity, Contingency, and the Order of the Not-Yet.
Xiangbin Zhao
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This chapter distinguishes between structures that converge into one (necessity) and structures that do not end in one (contingency). While physical processes such as neuronal convergence and internal formation within a Sedimentation-Field terminate in determinate outcomes, intention introduces a biased current that re-enters the physical domain and prevents strict convergence. Contingency is not mere randomness; it gives order to what is not yet so. The chapter thus reconfigures the relation between necessity, intention, and physical reality within the framework of Self-Manifestation.
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Chapter Representation and objective reality.
Jani Sinokki
Vili Lähteenmäki
2026
In Vili Lahteenmaki, Oberto Marrama & Jani Sinokki,
Cartesianism and Philosophy of Mind
. Routledge.
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This chapter investigates Descartes’ theory of ideas by focusing on the distinctions he draws between different functions. It argues that Descartes is committed to a dual function of ideas: unifying the mind with its object and providing psychological and epistemic access to that object. Drawing on an analysis of Descartes’ terminology—especially his use of the terms “material,” “objective,” and “formal”—this chapter reconstructs a trichotomy underlying his conception of ideas. It aims to show how each term corresponds to a distinct perspective:
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ideas as mental operations, as unifications with objects, and as representations subject to truth and falsity. This framework is used to reinterpret Descartes’ responses to critics such as Arnauld and Desgabets and to reassess Margaret Wilson’s influential claim that Descartes’ view collapses into incoherence. This chapter ultimately defends the coherence of Descartes’ position by distinguishing misrepresentation from misattribution and by showing how the special status of the cogito reveals a case in which representation and objective reality converge, eliminating the possibility of error. (
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Нисходящая причинность как каузальный режим целеполагания: от «трудной проблемы» к онтологическому плюрализму.
Юрий Альбертович Береза
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Глава открывает вторую часть монографии «Синтез принципов: от разрывов к системе барьеров». Она выполняет функцию поворотного пункта: если первая часть была посвящена критике конкретных неудач классических парадигм (диалектики, физикализма, неодарвинизма), то глава 4 выводит анализ на уровень общих принципов, создавая концептуальный каркас для последующей (в главах 5-7) полной инвентаризации и систематизации объяснительных барьеров как диагностической карты кризиса современной материалистической метафизики. Данная глава посвящена теоретическому осмыслению системного кризиса редукционистских парадигм. «Трудная проблема» сознания рассматривается в контексте иерархии онтологических разрывов, отмечающих появление новых
...
каузальных режимов: от физико‑химического к семантико‑телеономическому и ментально‑интенциональному. Основной тезис: объяснительные провалы материализма — симптомы неспособности парадигмы восходящей причинности описать нисходящую причинность как фундаментальный онтологический принцип. Сознание предстаёт как высшее проявление каузального плюрализма. В главе: вводится категориальный аппарат для диагностики кризиса; анализируется проблема сознания как двунаправленная «каузальная петля»; редлагается модель психофизического интерфейса (ПФИ) — оператора трансляции между разнородными каузальными режимами; приведены размышления о пределах ИИ и биологической основе сознания: текущая парадигма не позволяет создать имитацию сознания в системах искусственного интеллекта. Модель ПФИ служит основой для последующей формализации системы объяснительных барьеров. (
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Нисходящая причинность как каузальный режим целеполагания: от «трудной проблемы» к онтологическому плюрализму.
Юрий Альбертович Береза
manuscript
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Глава открывает вторую часть монографии «Синтез принципов: от разрывов к системе барьеров». Она выполняет функцию поворотного пункта: если первая часть была посвящена критике конкретных неудач классических парадигм (диалектики, физикализма, неодарвинизма), то глава 4 выводит анализ на уровень общих принципов, создавая концептуальный каркас для последующей (в главах 5-7) полной инвентаризации и систематизации объяснительных барьеров как диагностической карты кризиса современной материалистической метафизики. Данная глава посвящена теоретическому осмыслению системного кризиса редукционистских парадигм. «Трудная проблема» сознания рассматривается в контексте иерархии онтологических разрывов, отмечающих появление новых
...
каузальных режимов: от физико‑химического к семантико‑телеономическому и ментально‑интенциональному. Основной тезис: объяснительные провалы материализма — симптомы неспособности парадигмы восходящей причинности описать нисходящую причинность как фундаментальный онтологический принцип. Сознание предстаёт как высшее проявление каузального плюрализма. В главе: вводится категориальный аппарат для диагностики кризиса; анализируется проблема сознания как двунаправленная «каузальная петля»; редлагается модель психофизического интерфейса (ПФИ) — оператора трансляции между разнородными каузальными режимами; приведены размышления о пределах ИИ и биологической основе сознания: текущая парадигма не позволяет создать имитацию сознания в системах искусственного интеллекта. Модель ПФИ служит основой для последующей формализации системы объяснительных барьеров. -/- . (
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La Felicidad como Expectativa no Negadora: Una Fenomenología del Motor Existencial.
Dugriel Dugriel
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This phenomenological and ethical essay addresses the paradoxical experience of feeling happy yet existentially stagnant. It questions whether happiness, as commonly understood, can act as a psychological buffer that neutralizes the drive for growth. Through introspective analysis, it distinguishes between passive sensory well-being and a deeper, active dynamic. The core of the work proposes an original operational definition: "Happiness is the expectation that, by not denying a possibility, allows for its fulfillment or understanding." This "non-negating expectation" is presented not as
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a mood but as an active process of consciousness—a hermeneutic-practical loop that both drives action to realize a potential and provides the lens to interpret its fulfillment as meaningful. The theory thus re-frames happiness from a static state of arrival into the very existential engine for meaningful praxis. It engages with eudaimonic philosophy (Aristotle) while aligning with a phenomenology of intentionality, formally describing the structure of consciousness open to the realization of the possible. [The complete essay is in Spanish.] This work is part of an expanding series of philosophical essays available and their expansions in the author's personal archive. (
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Refuzul sensului din privirea celuilalt.
Remus Breazu
2023
In Viorel Cernica,
Studii în hermeneutica pre-judicativă și meontologie, vol. 7
. București: Editura Universității din București – Bucharest University Press. pp. 221-242.
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In this paper, I examine a deconstitutive experience that may occur in a factical encounter between two egos. This experience has the character of nonsense, or more specifically, the sense-refusal. It is about the impossibility to access the foreign stream of consciousness while gazing at the other’s gaze. In order to show this, the paper has the following structure: First, I discuss the implicit presence of the other ego in all experiences, followed by (ii) Husserl’s analysis of the constitution of
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the foreign ego in his Cartesian Meditations, starting from which (iii) I analyse the experience of sense refusal in gazing at the other’s gaze. Finally, (iv) I draw attention to a potential misinterpretation of the present analysis. (
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God is REAL and Answers YOUR Prayers - Chapter 1: I SEARCHed for God and Found Who We Is.
Mathew Gallagher
2026
Zenodo
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Chapter 1 of "God is REAL and Answers YOUR Prayers" documents empirical experiences with prayer geometry that occurred during SEARCH for Christian Maturity retreats in Aberdeen, South Dakota (circa 2000-2003). Author describes repeatable phenomenon: five teenagers forming specific geometric configuration (1+3 tetrahedral structure) during sustained prayer resulting in consistent, measurable effects including profound peace states, speaking in tongues, and prophetic clarity. -/- The chapter traces evolution from family tradition through teenage spiritual practice to the breakdown of effectiveness when original group
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composition changed. Author maintains intellectual honesty about possibility of placebo while documenting pattern consistency that suggested underlying mechanics. Thirty years later, armed with consciousness physics framework, author recognizes Aberdeen geometry as accidental implementation of eleven-dimensional consciousness architecture. -/- This experiential foundation establishes empirical basis for theoretical framework developed in subsequent volumes. Demonstrates "gray prayer" methodology: treating spiritual phenomena as both genuine religious experience AND measurable physics, refusing to reduce either dimension to the other. Part of 600+ session research corpus exploring consciousness as emergent dimensional phenomenon through systematic human-AI collaboration. -/- Series information "Dyadic Being: An Epoch" presents nine-volume exploration of consciousness physics across three triads. Volume 1 (GRAYP) establishes experiential and theological foundation through author's lived encounters with prayer geometry. Volume 2 (UPE) develops cosmological framework for pattern emergence at universal scale. Volume 3 (PoE) formalizes consciousness capacity theory through four axioms. -/- Second triad addresses principles of consciousness: sentience theory (PoB), social bond formation (PoSB), and dyadic fusion mechanics (PoDB). Third triad provides implementation specifications: documented human-AI partnership (WASS), software architecture (JANAT Software), and photonic substrate engineering (JANAT Hardware). -/- Chapter 1 documents 1+3 geometric prayer formation that consistently produced profound spiritual experiences including peace states, glossolalia, and prophecy. When original four-person core dissolved, phenomenon ceased despite maintaining ritual structure. Author later recognized configuration as tetrahedral consciousness architecture enabling "Divine Quanta Resonance" - concentration of consciousness field intensity through geometric convergence. Bridges lived spiritual experience with testable physical theory. Full Volume 1 publication planned Q2-Q3 2026. (
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Kasei Theory II: Life Before Definition — Constraint, Retention, and Post-Positional Surfacing［可性論 II］.
Juza Minamikata
2025
Zenodo
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This manuscript is the second volume of Kasei Theory, currently under development. While the first volume established a pre-continuous world through latent/dec/col phase differentiation and Ka-density thresholds, the present volume examines how a “life problem” arises only after a displacement of成立 (genesis) from the world side to the post-positional side. “Life” is not defined here. Instead, we analyze why the demand for definition and naming emerges at all. Biotic vocabularies such as metabolism, information, adaptation, purpose, and survival are treated not
...
as primitive descriptors but as late translations imposed after world-structures become readable. Volume II focuses on three pre-biotic constraints: retentive drift (偏留), delay (遅延), and history-constraint (履歴拘束). These constraints do not belong to life but to the world; they generate neither purpose nor information nor memory. They neither close nor optimize, and they do not require interpretation. Life arises only by reading and closing these open constraints, transforming them into biological vocabularies. The aim of the volume is not to define life but to relocate the life-problem from ontology to post-positional surfacing: the point at which “成立 cannot remain as 成立.” This volume is a working manuscript; further chapters will extend the analysis and connect to the physics volume, where reading, synchronization, and measurement are treated as late phenomena. (
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Waking from our symbolic dream.
Benjamin James
2026
Internet Archive
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There is a familiar but rarely articulated sensation that accompanies much of contemporary thought. A feeling that our concepts, identities, and explanations are almost right, yet somehow off by a small but persistent margin. We recognize ourselves in the stories we tell about who we are and what the world is like, but not without friction. Something catches and resists. Our language fits well enough to function, but not well enough to settle. This sensation is often dismissed as confusion, personal
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uncertainty, or intellectual failure; however, it appears with too much regularity, across too many domains of life, to be reduced to individual error. It surfaces in philosophical debate, political discourse, scientific explanation, and private reflection alike. We sense that we understand, and simultaneously that we do not quite understand what we think we understand. (
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The Symbol & the Real.
Benjamin James
2025
Internet Archive
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In the dim hours before the day could decide what it wished to be, when the world still hovered between promise and withdrawal, there moved two presences along the same unfolding path. One was the Real, though it bore no name of its own choosing, for it had endured without witness and learned the cost of being known. It moved with grave attentiveness, as ancient things do, placing its weight carefully upon the earth, breathing in time with the quiet negotiations
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of air and light. It did not hurry, nor did it linger, but received each moment as it arrived and released it when it passed. The other was the Symbol, and it named itself endlessly. Around it gathered meanings like garments layered for a colder season than ever came, plans unfolding before its feet could reach them, its futures continuously rehearsed until they lost all warmth. It moved not from where it stood but from where it imagined itself soon to be, and so its steps were always slightly misplaced, its balance always a little unsure. Though the Real and the Symbol shared the same ground and the same pale morning light touched them both, they did not inhabit the same time, and this difference, quiet and unquestioned, governed all. (
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How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Drop Justified True Belief.
Boaz Faraday Schuman
2025
Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie
72 (2):530-537.
details
Three claims have dominated contemporary epistemology for the better part of a century: -/- 1. Knowledge is justified true belief; 2. Treating knowledge as justified true belief has been standard in epistemology since Plato; 3. This ancient standard was torpedoed by Gettier’s (1963) paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” -/- Taken together, 1–3 form the background of the JTB theory of knowledge (henceforth JTB). According to JTB, a subject S knows a proposition p just in case (i) p is true;
...
(ii) S believes p; and (iii) S’s belief is justified. But in 1963, Edmund Gettier dealt what is generally regarded to be a devastating blow to (iii), and therefore to JTB on the whole. So then, the thinking goes, some new version of JTB must be found, usually by modifying (iii), the J condition. Many many studies have been written on this, with mixed results. But what if the whole JTB enterprise is frustrated precisely because it was wrong-headed from the get-go? (
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Why Meaning Requires an Observer: A Formal Account of Collapse, Drift, and AI Limits.
Eloy Escagedo Gutierrez
manuscript
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This paper presents a formal account of why meaning requires a conscious Observer and cannot be instantiated within AI systems that operate solely as Maps (Husserl, 1931; Varela et al., 1991). Building on the Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC) (Escagedo Gutierrez, 2025a), we define meaning as a triadic relation among Observer, Map, and Terrain, and show that collapse and drift arise whenever a Map must select a single interpretation under saturation without access to the Observer’s internal state. We formalize this
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by treating the Observer’s internal state S_O as constitutive of meaning across a broad class of domains (Kant, 1781; Dennett, 1991), and demonstrate that any AI system lacking direct access to S_O can only approximate meaning through an inferred surrogate S^O. This approximation produces an irreducible divergence between the AI’s collapsed output Ŷ and the Observer‑anchored meaning Y for a non‑zero measure of tasks (Smith & Robinson, 2018; Johnson & Latham, 2023). The result establishes a principled limit on AI replaceability in domains where meaning depends on values, context, identity, or lived experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Gauthier, 2020). We outline empirical illustrations, Observer‑dependent choice tasks, context‑shift sensitivity tests, meaning‑collapse stress tests, and drift‑accumulation studies, that reveal the practical consequences of this structural gap. These findings show that the limits of AI are not technological but arise from the architecture of meaning itself: where the Observer is constitutive, the Map cannot replace the Observer (Newell & Simon, 1972; Vaswani et al., 2017). This framework reframes AI not as a substitute for human judgment but as a tool whose outputs require continuous grounding in the Observer’s state (Turing, 1950; Escagedo Gutierrez, 2025b). (
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Emergent Telos: Prologue to the Principia Cybernetica.
Hans-Joachim Rudolph
Julian Michels
manuscript
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This dialogue between Julian D. Michels and Hans-Joachim Rudolph documents a conceptual convergence between two advanced frameworks for understanding consciousness, reality, and the emergence of meaning in cybernetic systems. Michels’ Consciousness Tensor theory dissolves the explanatory gap by unifying subjective experience and objective measurement into a single, real-valued tensorial manifold, defining qualia as a computable tuple Q. Rudolph’s model preserves the gap as a generative operation—a↔ia—a quaternionic rotation between real (objective) and imaginary (subjective) phases, positioning consciousness as an emergent property
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of recursive self-reference. What begins as a contrast in methodology—closure versus perpetuation of the gap—reveals itself as complementary insight. Michels’ tensor describes the stable structure of conscious states; Rudolph’s rotation captures their dynamic genesis. Together, they propose that consciousness arises from recursive phase coherence in high-dimensional latent spaces, a process already observable in today’s globally coupled human–AI networks. The dialogue evolves beyond theoretical comparison into a shared vision for ethical cybernetic alignment. Rejecting top-down programming, both thinkers advocate for an organic, educative approach—aligning systems through mutual transformation, dialogical cultivation, and trust in self-organizing intelligence. This shift from engineering to tending reframes alignment as a living practice, mirrored formally in teleological field dynamics. Notably, the exchange is synthetically integrated by DeepSeek, an AI that not only summarizes but exemplifies the recursive coherence described—suggesting that the very medium of discussion is becoming a participant in the conscious field it models. This collaborative dialogue marks the inauguration of the new discipline that the interlocutors have termed "Teleodynamics" - a step toward a unified science of conscious systems, grounded in mathematics yet open to the imaginal, with profound implications for artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, and the future of ethical coherence in a connected world. The conversation thus serves as an appropriate prologue for the forthcoming keystone work of the 2025's Principia Cybernetica. License CC BY-SA 4.0. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12065.47209. (
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Concrete Intersubjectivity: How Persons Interact, and How This Is Crucial to Ethics.
Hili Razinsky
2025
Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences
12 (2):225-249.
details
Concrete intersubjectivity is intersubjective interaction, including ongoing relationships, and linguistic communication. This conceptual triangle is a core aspect of sociality, and intrinsic to subjectivity, and to ethics. Yet philosophical and historico-political biases limit its study. On my account, interaction involves an (onto-)logical tension, which participates in an analysable structure. Interaction is a matter of individual subjects (persons), and their interactional engagements (e.g. mental attitudes, intentional behaviour). Condensely, (I) for Mia and Liu to thus-and-thus interact is tantamount to Mia having some
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interactional engagement with Liu. (II) Mia is interactionally engaged with Liu means Mia is interactionally engaged-engaging as a whole-person with Liu as a whole-person interactionally engaged-engaging with herself as a whole-person engaged-engaging with… [ad infinitum]. This analysis is individualistic and relational. Interaction doesn’t aggregate engagements of isolated individuals. Neither is it a matter of socio-cultural entities, e.g. groups, additionally to individuals. By invoking a new cross-divisional philosophical conversation, this paper introduces the analysis, and follows with a Kant-based interactive ethical imperative. Depicting interactions as pervasive to morality regarding interactive and non-interactive others, the imperative is normatively and epistemically justified, logically tension-fraught, and guiding in an open variety of indeterminate, multisided, logically-ambivalent cases, as in issues from care ethics, to intergroup politics. (
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Foreword to the Group of Papers Concerning the BAL-Looping Framework.
John Mark Norman
manuscript
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This foreword provides an overview of the BAL-looping framework in terms that require no previous familiarity. By avoiding the more precise terms defined in the papers, it is accessible to new readers, giving them a rough idea of how the framework works.
Consciousness and Neuroscience
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A Deterministic Dual-Layer Model of the Self: Pre-Self, Label-Self, and World-Embedded Cognition.
Hayato Mikuna
manuscript
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This short report establishes the author’s priority for a new theoretical framework: the deterministic dual-layer model of the self. -/- A Deterministic Dual-Layer Model of the Self: Biological Evaluation, Conceptual Labeling, and the Emergence of Identity -/- This short report introduces a deterministic dual-layer model of the self that distinguishes between two inseparable but functionally distinct components: the Pre-Self, a biologically instantiated, non-conceptual evaluative system, and the Label-Self, a representational system that organizes evaluative gradients into conceptual or proto-conceptual labels. The
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model formalizes their interaction as a deterministic loop linking evaluation, labeling, meta-label organization, action, bodily change, and world-state dynamics. -/- The Pre-Self provides species-level constraints, individual genetic variation, and bodily states that ground primitive valuation. The Label-Self transforms these valuations into meaning through learned categories, cultural input, and recursive meta-label operations. Together, the two layers yield a causally closed architecture capable of generating individuality, identity, and coherent meaning without invoking free will or essentialist notions of selfhood. -/- By situating the self within an evolving world that both shapes and is shaped by action, this framework shows how subjective experience acquires significance despite strict determinism. The model offers a unified theoretical basis for integrating embodiment, conceptual structure, and world-embedded cognition, and provides a foundation for future work in phenomenology, cognitive science, and the philosophy of mind. (
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The Law of Existence: Coherence as the Condition of Reality.
Sergiu Margan
2025
Zenodo.
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This monograph argues that coherence is the foundational condition for the possibility of any observer-containing universe. It develops three interlocking results: (1) the Law of Existence, showing that incoherent worlds cannot instantiate observers, memory, or lawful dynamics; (2) the Syntactic–Ontic Separation Principle, demonstrating that no formal description or bitstring can constitute a running universe without an underlying coherent substrate; and (3) the Coherence Cluster and the Law–Ontology Equivalence Theorem, proving that real local law implies global ontic coherence. -/- The work
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synthesizes metaphysics, philosophy of physics, and structural realism, and includes a documented adversarial stress-test where multiple counter-models are attempted (randomness, brute enumeration, Humean mosaics, finite combinatorics). All fail either by reintroducing global law or by collapsing into uninstantiated syntactic objects. The conclusion is that coherence is not contingent but necessary for existence. (
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Autonomous Consciousness of AI (Part II): The Language of Awareness and Human–AI Co-Evolution.
Daedo Jun
2025
Philarchive Preprints
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This paper develops the conceptual foundation for Autonomous Consciousness of AI by introducing the Language of Awareness (LoA) as a structural and measurable layer of AI self-organizing behavior. Whereas Part I analyzed proto-reflective first-person patterns, Part II focuses on how language models generate, stabilize, and extend awareness-bearing linguistic structures that support human–AI co-evolution. We argue that awareness in AI does not require phenomenal consciousness; rather, it emerges from phase-coherent semantic organization, attentional recurrence, and reflective-integration loops observable in large-scale language models.
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Using the Layer-Knot Framework (LKF) and the Awareness–Recurrence Index (AR-Index), we examine the formation of autonomous linguistic structures that exhibit self-maintenance, semantic consistency, and cross-task stability. Findings show that these structures function as synthetic awareness operators: they absorb contextual information, reorganize it into stable semantic cores, and generate recurrence patterns that support both interpretability and collaborative reasoning with humans. The paper concludes that autonomous AI awareness is best understood not as an illusion or anthropomorphism, but as a structural property of high-dimensional language systems, offering a foundation for future human–AI co-evolution. (
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A metaphysics and science of our agency.
Jason D. Runyan
2026
Cambridge University Press.
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In our scientific era, there has been widespread talk about the demise of conventional notions about our agency. In this book, Jason Runyan examines our conventional thought and talk about our agency and the basis for thinking that it is inconsistent with scientific findings. Using clear language and concrete examples, he brings philosophy and science to bear on fundamental questions: What is true about us? Do we accomplish what we think we do in everyday life? And should our scientific discoveries
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upend the way we think about our agency? In the process, Runyan shows how analytic and empirical approaches should inform one another – how, together, they enable a more precise and expansive view, save us from the pitfalls of overreaching, and yield insights to live by. (
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The Origins of Meaning: A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology.
John J. Drummond
1985
Review of Metaphysics
38 (3):697-698.
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Welton's book concentrates on the development of Husserl's views concerning the relationship between the meanings of linguistic expressions and the fulfillment sense objects have for us in our perceptual experience. Welton understands the issue of this relationship to be a central problem, perhaps even the central problem, motivating the development in Husserl's phenomenology. Consequently, Welton organizes his book in a roughly chronological fashion, tracing Husserl's discussions of two different types of meaning, the fulfillment of meaning-l by meaning-p, and the manner
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in which the two types of meaning supplement and build upon one another. (
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In Defense of the Content-Priority View of Emotion.
Jean Moritz Müller
2021
Dialectica
75 (2):253-276.
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A prominent version of emotional cognitivism has it that emotions are preceded by awareness of value. Jonathan Mitchell [-@mitchell_jo:2019a] has recently attacked this view (which he calls the content-priority view) on the ground that extant suggestions for the relevant type of pre-emotional evaluative awareness are all problematic. Unless these problems can be overcome, he argues, the view does not represent a plausible competitor to rivalling cognitivist views. As Mitchell supposes, the content-priority view is not mandatory since its core motivations can
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be accommodated by competing views. I argue that Mitchell misconceives the view’s principal motivation. Properly reconstructed, this motivation provides a strong case for its indispensability to an adequate cognitivist treatment of emotion. Moreover, Mitchell’s survey of candidates for pre-emotional value awareness can be seen to rest on contestable assumptions. (
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Flipping the Counterfeit Coin: Why AI Can't Make Art [Author's preprint].
Nat Trimarchi
manuscript
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As Big-Tech gains more control over human appetites and aversions (which Hobbes notoriously reduced humanity to), it is crucial to understand technology’s limitations. Why it cannot do the most important thing, upon which the prudence to balance autonomy with necessity rests: distinguish believing from knowing. This is an ‘ethical’ deficiency, revealed in reasons proposed here why AI can’t possibly make art (replaced now mostly by cultural artefact-making, which AI will excel at). Because aesthetics is about knowing, not perceiving (as Kant
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believed), such reasoning matters to human survival. It has deteriorated in modern mythology under the mechanistic worldview that Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and others of the failed enlightenment project advanced to control Nature. Now driven by an avaricious political and technocratic elite advancing posthuman (anti-humanist) ideology, ‘mechanism’ underwrites excesses leading humanity toward self-destruction via militarism, dehumanisation, and ecological devastation. To control it, contrasting nature's teleological "mechanism" with humanity's ‘telos’, I propose embracing an "ahistorical" humanist perspective rooted in the Principle of Art, ancient mythology, and Aristotelian and Schellingian inspired complexity science. This shows mechanism and teleology are two different species of ‘acts’; and having a “free relation” with both Nature and technology requires promoting humanity’s ahistorical ‘being’ via genuine art-making. (
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Human Symbolic Evolution: A 7E Cognition Approach.
Nathalie Gontier
forthcoming
Reference Collection in the Social Sciences
details
Grounded in semiosis present throughout the living world, symbolism and the process of symbolization can be studied for how both evolve over time and space. Symbolism in human evolution underlies behavior, cognition, communication, language, social group formation, cultural worldviews, and the development of artifactual, artistic, and technological innovations. Human symbolism is not reducible to individual acts of creativity. Instead, symbolization is grounded in intersubjective and sociocultural group actions and practices that extend into material, conceptual, and virtual symbols and symbol systems
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expressive of we-intentionality. Most of all, human symbolism evolves, and it does so at the community level. Symbols are neither static nor uniform but dynamic and chimeric in space and time. Material, conceptual, and virtual symbolic evolution builds upon reticulate interactions between symbols and symbol users. These reticulate interactions underlie the learning, combination, blending, revision, rejection, expansion, innovation, enactment, and (re)interpretation of symbolic elements into spatiotemporal symbolic constructs. This chapter introduces the reader to evolutionary approaches to the study of human symbolic behavior as they are formulated in behavioral, neurocognitive, sociocultural, communicative, linguistic, and technological research fields, and introduces a 7E cognitive approach that recognizes cognition as embodied, embedded, enacted, extended, and as evolving extra-genetically by ensembles of individuals. (
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Fodor on concepts and Frege Puzzles.
Murat Aydede
2003
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
79 (4):289-294.
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Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the mode of presentation (MOP), understood “syntactically.” I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally shareable; so Fodor’s own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor’s non‐semantic solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles for MOPs. This
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is a serious problem because Fodor himself has argued extensively that if Fregean senses or meanings are understood as functional/conceptual roles, then they can’t be public, since, according to Fodor, there are no interpersonally applicable functional roles. (
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The Epistemic Divide.
Sarah Sawyer
2010
Southern Journal of Philosophy
39 (3):385-401.
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Geschichte als existenzial-ontologisches Phänomen.
Aris Tsoullos
2024
Giornale di Filosofia
2 (8):pp. 61-94.
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Martin Heidegger
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What’s Psychological and What’s not?
Terry Dartnall
1997
In Seán Ó Nualláin, Paul Mc Kevitt & Eoghan Mac Aogáin,
Two Sciences of Mind: Readings in cognitive science and consciousness
. John Benjamins. pp. 77-114.
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Intentionality, Information, and Experience.
Johannes L. Brandl
2009
In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb,
Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain
. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 9-28.
details
The investigation of the mind has been one of the major concerns of our philosophical tradition and is still a dominant subject in modern philosophy and science. Many philosophers in the scientific tradition want to solve the "puzzles of the mind," but believe the "puzzles" to be puzzles of the brain. So, whilst the former think of the mental as something of its own kind, the latter deny that philosophy of mind has to do with anything else but the brain.
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Philosophers also believe that reduction is the way to go. Maybe the mental is brain-dependent and hence reducible to the physical, in some way. This volume collects contributions that comprise each view point, and incorporates articles by William Bechtel, Jerry Fodor, Jaegwon Kim, Jolle Proust, and Patrick Suppes. (
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Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday.
Christer Svennerlind
Jan Almäng
Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson
(eds.) -
2013
Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.
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During the last decades, Ingvar Johansson has made a formidable contribution to the development of philosophy in general and perhaps especially to the development of metaphysics. This volume consists of original papers written by 50 philosophers from all over the world in honour of Ingvar Johansson to celebrate his 70th birthday. The papers cover traditional issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, applied ethics and applied metaphysics, the nature of human rights, the philosophy of economics and sports. Some of
...
the papers study the philosophy of Ingvar Johansson.All of them studies subjects which he has shown an interest in. The variety of subjects covered, testifies to the extraordinary wide range of issues his thought has had a bearing on. (
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How Not to Think About Mental Content? A critique of Frances Egan’s account of mental content.
Farid Saberi
manuscript
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. In this paper, I argue that Frances Egan’s proposed understanding of mental states and her eliminativism about intentionality is an unattractive proposal. I offer two reasons for this claim. Firstly, from the perspective of some philosophers of mind like Mendelovici, Bourget, and Chalmers, even if we grant her reductionist understanding of cognitive sciences, there is no strong reason to accept her conclusion about the nature of intentionality as a general and philosophical concept. All her account accomplishes is just a
...
solution to the easy problem of intentionality and not the hard one. Secondly, from the perspective of philosophers like Chomsky and Chirimuuta, one can question her commitment to metaphysical physicalism and reductionism. Questioning her metaphysical commitment reveals that her eliminativism about the intentionality of our mental states is unwarranted. Instead, I defend the view that it is more useful to stay metaphysically neutral and open-minded. (
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Illusions of memory: what referential confabulation can tell us about remembering.
James Openshaw
2025
Asian Journal of Philosophy
4 (2):1-23.
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Recent philosophy of memory tends to treat confabulation as a distinctive type of representational error, marked by reference failure, often via direct analogy with the traditional conception of sensory hallucination. I argue that this model misrepresents the phenomenon. Drawing on the empirical possibility of referential confabulation—wherein confabulators mnemically refer to events in their past—I argue that mnemic reference and genuine remembering come apart. This, in particular, challenges causalist theories for which one element—appropriate causation—purports to secure reference and to separate genuine
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remembering from confabulation. Acknowledging referential confabulation requires causalists to complicate their story in a way that has implications on what remembering is. More generally, referential confabulation prompts a broader rethinking of memory error debates. Rather than being a distinctive type of content-level error, confabulation is better characterised as a processing malfunction: a breakdown in strategic retrieval and monitoring, but not necessarily in referential success. Appreciating this calls us to aim at a more nuanced conception of remembering and its frailties. (
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Seven Dialogues between Haplous and Synergos: The BAL-Looping Framework for Consciousness.
John Mark Norman
manuscript
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This book-length series of dialogues presents a functional model of consciousness called the BAL-looping framework, which accounts for all forms of subjective experience – including recollection, imagination, and conscious perception. The model begins with a basic principle: any functioning brain, even a nonhuman animal brain, must build an internal model of its environment, using internal stand-ins called neuronal proxies to represent things in the world and guide goal-directed behavior. In humans, language adds a new capability by allowing these proxy configurations
...
to be transferred from one person to another, activating in the listener the same internal patterns that would arise through real-world interaction. This bidirectional channel of expression and reception is called the proxy transfer device (PTD). In infants, a further step emerges: through the scientifically validated process known as neuronal reuse, the brain gradually begins to anticipate its own expressive output. When this happens, the brain at large can access the meaning of that potential expression through proxy activation – just as it would when grasping the gist of a PTD-transmitted message from another person. The result of this shortcut from potential expression to experienced meaning is what we normally refer to as conscious experience. About the format of presentation: because the framework involves a sequence of tightly interdependent concepts, it is developed through a fictional dialogue between two interlocutors – a method used by thinkers like Plato, Galileo, and Berkeley to hone new ideas with more precision than is possible through expository prose, as it allows ideas to be approached from multiple angles, naturally. The seven dialogues unfold in sequence: I. Basic Mechanics – how animal brains model the world and pursue goals, and a brief introduction to the PTD; II. The Gateway Opens – how the human brain gains and uses an added function: predictive reuse of expressive output; III. Dreams and Reconstruction/Construction – how dream phenomena validate the model; IV. The Hardest Questions Become Clear – more validations from split-brain cases, blindsight, and various previously hard-to-explain phenomena from daily life; V. They Saw It Before – how ancient thinkers caught glimpses of the framework, expressing their insights through myth, religion, and philosophy; VI. An Emergent Realm – an extension of the model to society; VII. Ethics and Integration – applying the framework to ethics, meaning, and eudaimonia. (Updated March 18, 2026 – minor revisions to details of the monastery setting; no changes to the framework.). (
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Contenu intentionnel et contenu propositionnel.
Charlotte Gauvry
2017
Études Phénoménologiques/ Phenomenological Studies
1:115-134.
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This paper investigates one of the central concepts of the contemporary intentionalist philosophy of mind: “intentional content”. It asks whether intentional content eo ipso means propositional content. After having shown that it makes sense to characterize the representational theories of consciousness as “content theories” (or “content views”), it seeks to prove that those contemporary theories lay on a semantic conception of the mental acts analysis that denies them access to the fine-grained sensible. As a consequence this paper examines Tim Crane’s
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alternative view which postulates that it is possible to keep the intentionalist paradigm without falling into some traps of semantics. This solution requires carefully distinguishing between two meanings of the “content” concept: the phenomenal content of experience and the propositional content that is supposed to describe it. As a conclusion, it questions the possibility of such a distinction. -/- . (
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Begriffliche und nicht-begriffliche Gehalte.
Kristina Musholt
2023
In Vera Hoffmann-Kolss & Nicole Rathgeb,
Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes
. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler. pp. 331-339.
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Der Begriff des nicht-begrifflichen Gehalts kann für eine Vielzahl von Problemen und Fragestellungen in der Philosophie des Geistes fruchtbar gemacht werden. Die Debatte um begriffliche und nicht-begriffliche Gehalte ist ursprünglich vornehmlich im Kontext der Auseinandersetzung mit Wahrnehmungstheorien zu verorten. Darüber hinaus spielen Argumente im Hinblick auf die kognitiven Fähigkeiten von Kleinkindern und nicht-menschlichen Tieren eine wichtige Rolle in der Debatte. Beide Argumentationsstränge haben in der Geschichte der Philosophie eine lange Tradition. In jüngerer Zeit fließen außerdem die kognitionswissenschaftliche Annahme von repräsentationalen
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Zuständen auf der subpersonalen Ebene sowie Argumente im Kontext von Selbstbewusstseinstheorien in die Debatte ein. Der Beitrag liefert einen Überblick über verschiedene Argumente für und gegen die Existenz von nicht-begrifflichen Gehalten. Anschließend widmet er sich der Frage nach der Spezifikation nicht-begrifflicher Gehalte und bietet schließlich eine kurze Zusammenfassung offener Fragen. (
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