Memory - Bibliography - PhilPapers

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Philosophy of Mind
Mental States and Processes
Memory
Memory
Edited by
John Sutton
Macquarie University
Assistant editor:
Sadegh Balal Niaki
University of Western Ontario
About this topic
Summary
Remembering takes many distinctive forms. Philosophers have
primarily discussed the form of memory in which I remember episodes and
experiences in my own past. Such ‘personal’ (or ‘experiential’ or ‘episodic’)
memories seem to represent the past events to which they refer, and to depend
on certain kinds of causal connections between past and present. In ‘factual’
or ‘semantic’ memory, in contrast, I need not have personally experienced what
I now remember. ‘Declarative’ memory of both these forms aims at truth, but can
go wrong in minor or dramatic ways. We also remember both to do certain things
(‘prospective’ memory), and how to do certain things (‘procedural’ memory).
Philosophers discuss the nature, functions, and mechanisms of memory; its
relations to perception, imagination, dreams, emotions, and knowledge; and its
connections with personal identity, responsibility, and our moral and social
lives. Memory is an active topic of interdisciplinary research between
philosophy, cognitive science, and the social sciences.
Key works
Theories of memory in the premodern history of philosophy
are discussed by
Draaisma 2000
Krell 1990
, and
Sutton 1998
. Rich and wide-ranging
theoretical treatments include
Campbell 2003
Hacking 1995
, and
Middleton & Brown 2005
. The causal theory of memory is developed in
Martin & Deutscher 1966
, while important work on personal or autobiographical memory
includes
Campbell 1997
Hoerl 1999
, and
Goldie 2012
Casey 1987
offers
a phenomenological treatment of memory, while
Stern 1991
develops a
Wittgensteinian approach.
Sheets-Johnstone 2003
discusses kinesthetic or
bodily memory. Ideas about social aspects of memory are developed by
Wegner et al 1985
Introductions
Warnock 1987
is a fine, wide-ranging first read on the
philosophy of memory, while
Engel 1999
and
Schacter 1996
offer provocative
introductions to the psychology of memory.
Sutton 2008
surveys a range of
ideas about situated and social memory, while
Boyer & Wertsch 2009
is a
good collection of interdisciplinary essays.
Show all references
Related
Subcategories
Theories of Memory
631
Epistemology of Memory
284
Memory and Cognitive Science
2,233
Autobiographical Memory
442
Time and Memory
168
Embodied Memory
160
Social and Cultural Memory
316
Conscious and Unconscious Memory
1,807
Amnesia
79
Memory, Misc
155
See also
Temporal Experience
903
| 313)
Externalism and Self-Knowledge
536
| 83)
Psychological Theories of Personal Identity
343
Time and Consciousness in Psychology
157
History/traditions: Memory
Plato: Theory of Recollection
96
Hume: Memory
12
Spinoza: Memory
31
Jobs in this area
University of Pennsylvania
Postdoctoral Fellowship in Philosophy, Politics and Economics
Christ Church, Oxford
Career Development Fellowship in Philosophy
Florida State University
Dean's Postdoctoral Scholar
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Embodied Orientation, Reconstructive Memory, and Bias: A Cartographic Model of Temporally Extended Conscious Life.
Lisandro Latorre Lafourcade
manuscript
details
This paper offers a synthetic conceptual framework for temporally extended conscious life. Its central claim is not that consciousness is literally produced by an inner cartographer, but that conscious life is structurally cartographic in a specific sense: it proceeds by selective orientation under embodied constraint, preserves usable but incomplete orientation-structures, reconstructs them in memory, and reuses them in later experience. The paper defends three connected claims. First, what is consciously available is never unconditioned possession of the outside world, but access
...
under embodied conditions. Second, memory is reconstructive rather than replay-like. Third, bias is not merely an occasional flaw added to otherwise pure cognition, but a structural possibility that arises when reconstructed orientation becomes resistant to correction across later interactions. The paper’s principal contribution is thus a narrower one than a general theory of consciousness: it argues that memory-generated bias belongs to the ordinary temporal structure of embodied experience. The cartographic model is defended as a structural description of selective orientation, historical layering, revisability, and misleading usability. It is not offered as a genetic explanation of consciousness, and the paper explicitly marks the limits of the metaphor. The result is a position best described as corrigibility realism: access to the world is mediated and revisable, yet not unconstrained, because ongoing interaction can expose failures in orientation and support better or worse revision. (
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A Signal-based Epistemology.
Jeffrey R. Palin, Jr
manuscript
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This paper proposes a unified framework for understanding knowledge, perception, and reality grounded in a single principle: all access to reality is mediated through detectable signals and constructed through processes of signal generation, detection, and interpretation. No observer—biological or artificial—has direct, unmediated access to external truth; instead, all knowledge arises from processes that involve the generation, detection, and interpretation of physical, chemical, or informational traces available in the present. Building on this premise, the paper distinguishes between belief and knowledge, arguing
...
that confirmation is a necessary condition for knowledge, while also recognizing intrinsic limits to what can be verified. It develops a signal-based epistemology in which perception, memory, and scientific inquiry are understood as structured methods of extracting and interpreting signals. Within this framework, memory is not treated as a literal recording of past events, but as a reconstructive process grounded in present neural states, and internal mental phenomena—such as intentions, desires, and emotions—are accessed through signal-mediated processes that involve both interpretation and active generation, rather than direct observation of fully formed internal objects. The analysis further examines constraints imposed by established physics, including limits from thermodynamics, relativity, and quantum mechanics, alongside computational and logical boundaries. These constraints reinforce the central claim that not all truths about reality are epistemically accessible, even if they are ontologically determinate. The paper also distinguishes between simulation and instantiation, arguing that digital systems can represent biological processes but do not constitute biological reality themselves, emphasizing the importance of substrate in discussions of mind, consciousness, and potential “uploading” scenarios. Across domains—including neuroscience, artificial intelligence, physics, and philosophy—the framework highlights a consistent structure: detection depends on signals, and understanding depends on interpretation. This leads to a broader conclusion that the limits of knowledge are not merely technological but are rooted in the fundamental structure of how systems interact with reality. The goal of this work is not to provide a complete theory of mind or physics, but to establish a coherent, cross-domain foundation for understanding the relationship between information, perception, and reality, and to clarify the boundaries within which knowledge can be meaningfully claimed. (
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Embedding mental files in the world.
Zhengxi Jin
2026
Mind and Language
42 (2):1-21.
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Cognitive scientific explanations can take either a mechanistic or design perspective. Some recent philosophical works propose to apply the mechanistic perspective to the influential mental file framework. The design perspective, however, remains underexplored. This paper takes on this task, arguing that mental files have been designed by natural selection to efficiently represent property cluster structures in the environment—such as objects and kinds—to facilitate our learning about them. It also shows that the design perspective can help resolve a previous debate between
...
two specific accounts of mental files. (
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Memory and Aesthetic Appreciation.
Patrik Engisch
Sant'Anna André
forthcoming
In Andre Sant'Anna & Carl F. Craver,
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
. Oxford University Press.
details
This chapter explores the relationship between memory and aesthetic appreciation by focusing on cases of the latter that are made possible by a specific form of memory, namely, episodic memory. We distinguish between five different kinds of cases in which episodic remembering could be said to be aesthetic in nature: Aesthetic Replay, Aesthetic Access, Aesthetic Progression, and Aesthetic Appreciation. We then focus on Aesthetic Appreciation, arguing that it constitutes a unique kind of aesthetic practice: the aesthetic of practice of appreciating
...
our personal pasts through memory. If correct, our argument shows that memory is an aesthetic faculty on a par with perception: it is a faculty that discloses aesthetic features of the world in a unique way. (
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The Codex Process: Time, Memory, & Recursive Continuum.
Shaddon Davis
2026
Zenodo
details
This paper argues that time is not an external dimension but the structure generated when continuity stabilizes recursive self-change. Memory, anticipation, and temporal flow arise from accumulated effect-traces across layered recursion, while temporal distortions reflect misalignment between recursive layers. The paper distinguishes internal and external time, establishes falsification criteria, and completes the internal temporal mapping of the Codex.
Cognitive Phenomenology
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Trauma, Memory, and Metabolic Transformation: A Phenomenological Framework for Clinical Practice.
Moreno Nourizadeh
manuscript
details
This paper argues that dominant metaphors structuring trauma therapy, storage, retrieval, processing, being "stuck in the past", derive from an archival model of memory that fundamentally misrepresents how human cognition operates and, consequently, how trauma manifests and resolves. Drawing on phenomenological analysis (Husserl, 1905/1991; Heidegger, 1927/1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, 1964/1968; Bergson, 1896/1991; Bachelard, 1938/2002), clinical trauma research (van der Kolk, 2014; Janet, 1889/1973, 1904, 1911/1923), neuroscientific findings on memory reconsolidation and prospective cognition (Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007; Nader, Schafe & Le
...
Doux, 2000), and case studies of pathological memory (Luria, 1968), we propose an alternative framework: the metabolic model of memory and trauma. Within this framework, healthy memory operates not through preservation but through continuous transformation, the selective degradation of specific experience into generalised capability. Forgetting emerges not as cognitive failure but as the constitutive mechanism enabling abstraction, learning, and futural projection. Trauma, correspondingly, represents not a "bad file" requiring deletion or relocation but a failure of metabolism, an experience that cannot be digested and integrated into the ongoing temporal flow of becoming. This reconceptualisation carries significant implications for clinical practice. When Broca's area shows 17% deactivation during traumatic recall (van der Kolk, 2014), demanding narrative is neurologically impossible, not therapeutically resistant. When survivors report that trauma "feels like it's happening now," they describe temporal collapse accurately, not metaphorically. The metabolic framework validates somatic and bottom-up therapeutic approaches (EMDR, yoga, neurofeedback, somatic experiencing) as interventions restoring the body's digestive capacity rather than bypassing "real" cognitive work. We do not present this framework as a completed doctrine but as an opening, a seam in the dominant paradigm that invites collaborative exploration among clinicians, researchers, phenomenologists, and survivors themselves. The paper concludes not with conclusions but with questions: What becomes possible when we stop asking clients to "process" memories and start asking what supports their system's metabolic capacity? What changes when we understand forgetting as healing rather than failure? (
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Deterministic Memory Architecture_ A Coherence-Bound Model for Cross-Context Reasoning.
Devin Bostick
manuscript
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Traditional theories of memory—spanning psychology, neuroscience, and computational models—describe representational structures but do not provide a principled account of when a memory trace remains valid, coherent, or integrated with the present state of a system. This paper proposes a deterministic theory of memory based on coherence invariants. PAS_h measures harmonic alignment between a stored trace and the current system state, while ΔPAS_zeta quantifies temporal drift. Together, these invariants define the legality conditions for storage, retrieval, updating, and forgetting. The resulting three-layer
...
architecture (episodic, semantic, identity) captures the functional distinctions recognized in cognitive science but situates them within a unified formalism. Reconsolidation, attractor dynamics, and entropy-minimizing frameworks are reinterpreted as special cases of invariant-governed coherence processes. Memory is thus conceptualized not as a repository of past states but as a deterministic operator maintaining continuity of identity, abstraction, and experience through time. This model has implications for theories of mind, cognitive architecture, and the philosophy of artificial intelligence, offering a structural account of how stable agency and reasoning emerge under bounded drift. (
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Dynamical Systems
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Memory
in
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Reasoning
in
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Representation in Cognitive Science
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Cognition, Culture, and Political Momentum: breaking down the silos in collective memory research.
Astrid Erll
William Hirst
(eds.) -
2026
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
details
After more than two decades of research on collective memory across various disciplines, Breaking down the Silos in Collective Memory Research brings together psychological memory research with the field of memory studies in a systematic way. Astrid Erll and William Hirst have gathered expert authors from across disciplines to present a sustained dialogue between cognitive and cultural memory researchers. The book is arranged according to key fields of memory research, and for quick reference to existent memory research, each chapter is
...
structured in the same way, addressing the typical research questions, methods, and materials of a given approach. The chapters include discussions on familial, national, and transnational memory; memory and emotion; memory narratives; memory and digital media; memory conflicts; memory activism; and future thinking. Concise and accessible, this book offers a comprehensive overview of the multidisciplinary field of Memory Studies and intends to "break down the silos" that still exist in research on collective memory today. (
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Context in memory is reconstructed, not encoded.
Alexander Easton
Aidan Horner
Simon James
Jeremy Kendal
John Sutton
Jamie Ainge
2024
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
167 (105934).
details
Context has long been regarded as an important element of long-term memory, and episodic memory in particular. The ability to remember not only the object or focus of a memory but also contextual details allow us to reconstruct integrated representations of events. However, despite its prevalence in the memory literature, context remains difficult to define and identify, with different studies using context to refer to different sets of stimuli or concepts. These varying definitions of context have not prevented it from
...
being a key element of many models of memory. Within these models, context is usually explicitly encoded as an element of an event and processed through different neural pathways to other elements of the event, such as objects. Here we challenge the notion that context in memory is encoded. We offer an alternative where context in memory takes a variety of forms depending on the question being asked. (
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What aphantasia can teach us about episodic memory.
Margherita Arcangeli
forthcoming
L’Année Psychologique / Topics in Cognitive Psychology
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A recent proposal is to characterise aphantasia as an episodic memory condition. Aphantasics show difficulties in recalling details of situations from their distant and recent past. They are less confident about their episodic memories and also seem to be less emotionally affected by them. But can we really say that aphantasics have a poor episodic memory? The aim of this contribution is to analyse in depth four strands of research (i.e., pictorial memory tests, memory accuracy, hippocampal activity, and SDAM) that
...
challenge this idea and emphasise the necessity for a more in-depth understanding of episodic memory in aphantasics. Moreover, these studies prompt a reflection on the very definition of episodic memory and its relationship to both mental imagery and imagination, which may be weaker than previously thought, to the extent that aphantasia is primarily understood as a mental imagery condition and that aphantasics have troubles with imaginative projection into both future specific scenarios and atemporal situations. (
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Reference to the Past.
Megan Entwistle
2025
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
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We can know the past by accurately remembering events we experienced. Yet whether a memory accurately represents a past event depends on whether the memory successfully refers to the event. How do memories refer to their objects? One answer to this question falls neatly out of traditional causal theories of memory: reference is secured by a causal link, sustained through a memory trace. However, recent advances in memory science suggest that remembering is an inherently constructive rather than preservative process. Motivated
...
by these empirical findings, the new philosophical paradigm treats remembering as a species of constructive imagining. This paper raises a novel challenge for the most influential representative of the constructivist paradigm: simulation theory. The challenge is to explain how remembering, so understood, could secure the right referential link to past events. It argues that simulation is unable to perform the reference-fixing role previously assigned to memory traces. In dropping the causal condition on remembering, simulationism has no viable route to explaining memory-based reference to, and therefore knowledge of, the past. (
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The Memory That Forgets to Forget: Memory as Reconfiguration.
Moreno Nourizadeh
manuscript
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This monograph demonstrates that thinking operates through incalculable metabolic transformation where forgetting constitutes the explosive rupture enabling unprecedented emergence. Memory, creativity, imagination, and abstraction all belong to thinking's metabolic process, the continuous reconfiguration of experience into capability through selective erasure. Through analysis of Borges's Funes, Luria's mnemonist Shereshevsky, contemporary neuroscience, and Large Language Models' computational architecture, I establish that perfect memory creates pure difference perception, destroying the identity it promises to preserve. Drawing on Husserl's retention-modification structure, Bergson's virtual memory as
...
action tendency, Heidegger's threefold temporal ecstasis, Merleau-Ponty's invisible framework (membrure), Bachelard's epistemological rupture and temporal lacunae, and Kuhn's paradigm shifts as collective forgetting, I argue that thinking operates through what I term metabolic rupture, the incalculable explosion where inputs are destroyed to produce outputs that cannot be traced back to origins, with forgetting as the constitutive mechanism enabling this transformation. Memory serves as the system through which forgetting metabolizes experience into thought. This distinguishes living thought from computational synthesis, understanding from pattern matching, genuine creation from recombination. The distinction between synthesis (pattern combination preserving inputs) and metabolism (destructive transformation producing genuine novelty) reveals why current AI architectures cannot achieve thought despite sophisticated pattern matching. Through examination of Arendt's natality and Derrida's l'avenir (the to-come), I establish forgetting as the ontological foundation enabling genuinely new beginnings to enter existence through discontinuity itself, not cognitive failure but thinking's constitutive mechanism. (
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Memory and Causation.
Nikola Andonovski
forthcoming
In Andre Sant'Anna & Carl F. Craver,
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
. Oxford University Press.
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The emergence of the philosophy of memory as a distinct area of study coincided with a renewed focus on causation. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the debates about the relationship between episodic memory and causation. In the first part, I introduce the classical causal theory of memory and examine three anti-causalist arguments, devoting particular attention to simulationism. In the second part, I examine a family of recent causalist views, highlighting their methodological basis in philosophical naturalism. On a
...
naturalist construal of the causalist thesis, episodic memory is a natural kind that constitutively involves the formation, storage, and retrieval of memory traces. The new causalists see the thesis as foundational to the science of episodic memory, thereby providing a basis for a principled response to simulationism. (
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The past is the past : linear temporality, memory, and empire.
Tom Pettinger
2021
Critical Studies on Terrorism
12 (4).
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Constructing Memories, Episodic and Semantic.
Hunter Gentry
2025
Cognitive Science
49 (9):e70113.
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What is the nature of semantic memory? Philosophers and cognitive scientists have long held that semantic memory stores invariant knowledge structures to be retrieved as such. In this paper, I argue that this conception of semantic memory is likely false. In particular, I argue that if episodic and semantic memory share causal mechanisms, and episodic memory is (re)constructive, then semantic memory is likely constructive too. I review evidence that suggests that episodic and semantic memory are subserved by a domain-general system
...
that supports representing and navigating relations among various kinds of stimuli, including space, time, events, and semantic relations. I then review the supposed hallmark properties of constructivism in episodic memory and show that they appear in semantic memory as well. To increase the inductive support for my proposal, I show how the view predicts some of the evidence others have marshaled in favor of a constructivist semantic memory system. Finally, I close by providing a proof of concept for the view on offer, the semantic pointer architecture. (
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Veritas et subtilitas: Truth and Subtlety in the History of Philosophy. Essays in memory of Burkhard Mojsisch (1944 – 2015).
Tengiz Iremadze
Udo Reinhold Jeck
(eds.) -
2018
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
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Title descriptionThe book provides a collection of scientific papers which are dedicated to the memory of Burkhard Mojsisch. The collection includes highly qualified papers on ancient, medieval and early modern philosophy, and demonstrates the importance of the historical research of philosophy at the beginning of the 21st century and its current trends. It documents historical aspects of important philosophical discussions of contemporaneity (e.g. in the fields of intercultural philosophy and interdisciplinary philosophy, such as philosophy of neuroscience). The authors are leading
...
specialists of philosophy, especially of ancient and medieval philosophy. The collection includes papers in German, English, and French. (
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Moved by God.
William Sax
Karin Polit
2012
In Sabine C. Koch, Thomas Fuchs, Michela Summa & Cornelia Müller,
Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement
. John Benjamins. pp. 227-242.
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We review the history of the anthropological study of “body memory” and argue that it was developed in a fruitful way only with the advent of practice theory and performance studies, which focused on embodied meanings in addition to purely linguistic ones. We provide two case studies of embodied memory. In the first, collective memories of oppression and exploitation are activated by the recitation of particular stories, sometimes resulting in mass possession. In the second, practices associated with the periodic processions
...
of a Western Himalayan deity are shown to be based on local forms of embodied memory. (
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More About Traumas, Calamities, and Catastrophes.
Manuel Cruz
2016
In Richard Jacques,
On the Difficulty of Living Together: Memory, Politics, and History
. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 97-110.
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For an Urgent Typology of Memory.
Manuel Cruz
2016
In Richard Jacques,
On the Difficulty of Living Together: Memory, Politics, and History
. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 43-74.
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By Way of an Epilogue: A Future with Not Much Future (or About How the Perplexity of the Will Is Possible).
Manuel Cruz
2016
In Richard Jacques,
On the Difficulty of Living Together: Memory, Politics, and History
. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 111-122.
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Of Memory and Time.
Manuel Cruz
2016
In Richard Jacques,
On the Difficulty of Living Together: Memory, Politics, and History
. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-10.
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Index.
Manuel Cruz
2016
In Richard Jacques,
On the Difficulty of Living Together: Memory, Politics, and History
. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 147-156.
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The Present Breathes Through History.
Manuel Cruz
2016
In Richard Jacques,
On the Difficulty of Living Together: Memory, Politics, and History
. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 11-42.
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We Need to Start Defending Ourselves from the Past.
Manuel Cruz
2016
In Richard Jacques,
On the Difficulty of Living Together: Memory, Politics, and History
. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 75-96.
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Memory.
Nikola Andonovski
Kourken Michaelian
forthcoming
Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
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Memory is a capacity that enables an agent’s behavior to be modified and shaped by its past experience. Given this characterization, two central questions arise. First, what are the mechanisms by which such behavioral modifications are produced—that is, how does memory function? Second, should memory be treated as a unitary capacity or are there fundamentally different kinds of memory that should be distinguished? These two questions have been central throughout the long history of philosophical inquiry into memory and the shorter
...
but rich history of empirical memory research. Researchers have debated, on the one hand, the nature of memory mechanisms and processes and, on the other hand, the merits of rival taxonomies of memory. As memory is widely recognized as playing a central role in shaping human experience and cognition, this research is essential for advancing both theoretical knowledge and practical applications across domains as diverse as mental health, education, and artificial intelligence. (
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Dreams, Nightmares, and Memory in CSFT.
L. R. Caldwell
manuscript
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This paper reinterprets dreams, nightmares, and memory through the lens of the Consciousness-Structured Field Theory (CSFT), which posits consciousness as a primordial field that structures experience through resonant interaction with the brain. Rather than viewing dreams as random neural activity, CSFT suggests that sleep—particularly REM sleep—enables the brain to reduce sensory noise and align more clearly with the deeper frequencies of the consciousness field. In this state, the brain translates non-local, multidimensional information into symbolic sequences we recognize as dreams. Nightmares
...
are reframed not as mere emotional byproducts but as disruptions in this resonance, often distorted by unresolved trauma or memory interference. Drawing on Leibnizian metaphysics, the paper proposes that memory is not stored in the brain but retained in monads—non-extended units of perception—which reflect universal experience. Memory, then, is not retrieval but resonance. This metaphysical perspective bridges neuroscience, depth psychology, and ontological field theory, offering a unified model in which dreams and memory serve as expressions of the brain's temporary harmony—or disharmony—with the consciousness field. (
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Dreaming and Memory: Editors’ Introduction.
Daniel Gregory
Kourken Michaelian
2024
In Daniel Gregory & Kourken Michaelian,
Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues
. Cham: Springer. pp. 1-7.
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This book explores what we can learn about two fascinating mental states, dreaming and memory, by investigating them in tandem. This brings to the surface several issues about the phenomena which are not apparent when we think about each in isolation. The 15 contributions are arranged into three parts: Part I: Remembering Dreams; Part II: Remembering Within Dreams; and Part III: Remembering and Dreaming Compared. The authors apply a range of methodologies: philosophical, exegetic, experimental, and formal.
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Self, Me, or I? Unravelling the Triumvirate of Selfhood in Pathological Consciousness.
Andrew and Alexander Fingelkurts
2025
Brain Sciences
15 (6):640.
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In this conceptual review, we explore how alterations in the configuration and expression of the three core aspects of experiential Selfhood—‘Self,’ ‘Me’, and ‘I’—both reflect and shape an individual’s susceptibility to neuropsychopathology. Drawing on empirical neurophenomenological evidence and theoretical insights, we examine a range of psychiatric and neurological disorders through the lens of the Selfhood triumvirate. Our findings indicate that, despite variations in the expression of Selfhood aspects across different pathologies, their proportional configuration remains remarkably stable in most conditions, with
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the ‘Self’ aspect consistently dominant, followed by the ‘Me’ aspect, and finally the ‘I’ aspect. This stability suggests a fundamental neurophenomenological hierarchy in Selfhood organization, which seems to be disrupted only in extreme cases such as vegetative (unresponsive) states and also schizophrenia. Ultimately, we propose that all neuropsychopathologies are best understood as disorders of Selfhood, where disruptions in the dynamic balance and configuration of the ‘Self’, ‘Me’, and ‘I’ aspects accompany neurophenomenological manifestations in distinct dysfunctions and pathologies. (
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Пошлость и достоинство.
Andrej Poleev
2025
Enzymes
23.
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Всякий грех является отпадением от образа и подобия Бога в человеке. В таком понимании, история человечества представляется и является искуплением вины отпадения от образа и подобия Бога, но также историей изживания образа зверя в человеке.
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Memory, Luck, and the Laudative Theory of Knowledge.
Boyd Millar
forthcoming
Oxford Studies in Epistemology
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According to the laudative theory of knowledge, “knowledge” is a mere laudative term—a term, such as “athletic,” “artistic,” or “masterpiece,” that expresses merely that some entity is good relative to some domain. (I.e., the laudative theory claims that for you to know some proposition just is for you to believe some true proposition in a good way.) I defend the laudative theory by contrasting inferential knowledge and memory. A central component of what it is for an inferential belief to constitute
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knowledge is that the subject’s belief being true is due to the subject’s competent reasoning, rather than due to luck (i.e., inferential knowledge is incompatible with veritic luck). Conversely, I argue that many instances of successful memory are accurate due to luck, and that many such instances of successful memory nonetheless constitute (or provide a basis for) knowledge. If so, then there is some feature that is a central component of what it is for an inferential belief to constitute knowledge, but that is not even necessary for a memory (or memory-based belief) to constitute knowledge; and this fact suggests that, rather than picking out a substantive, unitary phenomenon, “knowledge” is a mere laudative term. (
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Remembering and imagining as attitudes: an interpretivist view.
Matheus Diesel Werberich
2025
Synthese
205 (4):1-23.
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The (dis)continuism problem asks if episodic memory is continuous with imagination. Given its close proximity with the cognitive sciences, philosophers have traditionally taken this issue as part of a larger naturalistic framework in the philosophy of memory. Some philosophers have argued that such naturalistic methodology entails the need for philosophers to also take the mental attitudes of remembering and imagining into account. However, the naturalistic methodology is concerned with making ontological claims on the basis of the relevant explanatory terms inside
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the framework of the empirical sciences. It is unclear whether attitudes have such a role in the cognitive sciences, specially cognitive neuroscience. Without such an account of their relevancy, one could argue that it is unlikely that “remembering” and “imagining” have any significant role in naturalistic philosophy. Such is the _exclusion argument_. In this paper, I offer an account of how mental attitudes indirectly correspond to neural mechanisms to show how the exclusion argument is not sound. This account, named _interpretivism_, not only supports pluralism about (dis)continuism, but also indicates how empirical and epistemic meanings of “remembering” could be integrated in our thinking about memory. (
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Recall the Memory Argument for Inner Awareness.
Amit Chaturvedi
2025
Journal of the American Philosophical Association
11 (3):601-621.
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An intuition about consciousness known as the 'Awareness Principle' states: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious only if S has an 'inner awareness' of M. Some have recently defended this principle by revising the 'memory argument' first offered by the sixth-century Buddhist philosopher Dignāga: from the fact that an experience can be episodically remembered, it should follow that a subject must have been aware of that experience. In response, I argue that defenders of the
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memory argument haven’t convincingly established the episodic memorability of experience, because they haven’t defused a countervailing claim that conscious perceptual experience is phenomenologically 'transparent'. This claim, if true, would suggest that what one can episodically remember is just how the (external or internal) world appeared through one's 'outer awareness', rather than how the past experience itself appeared through one's inner awareness. I further argue that the memory argument can accommodate phenomenological transparency only at the expense of making the Awareness Principle trivial. The memory argument defender may then claim that there is some non-introspectible feature of a past experience that is episodically memorable, namely, that experience's subjective character or phenomenal 'for-me-ness'. In response, I develop an objection from the tenth-century Śaiva philosopher Utpaladeva against the possibility of recalling a past experience's subjective character as such. Overall, while the objections this paper raises cannot falsify the Awareness Principle directly, they may motivate its proponents to recall their support for the memory argument. (
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Remnants of perception: Comments on Block and the function of visual working memory.
Jake Quilty-Dunn
2025
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
110 (1):284-293.
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Going through the Motions: Memory and Remembrance in Cavendish.
Tobias Sandoval
2025
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
33 (5):1120-1142.
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Margaret Cavendish’s conception of memory has received little scholarly attention. Here, I taxonomize various notions of memory within her system, focusing primarily on a crucial distinction between what she calls ‘memory’ and what she calls ‘remembrance.’ I argue that Cavendish considers remembrance a more general and pervasive action in nature than memory. Memory, an action uniquely associated with animal creatures, refers to the animal’s reason storing past sense perceptions and conceptions such as thoughts, ideas, imaginations, etc. Remembrances, or voluntary repetitions
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of past motions, manifest in two varieties. In the first, the animal retrieves perceptions or conceptions stored in memory. In the second, which all creatures exhibit, a creature’s parts voluntarily repeat past actions via custom or habit, such as in respiration and photosynthesis. These remembrances do not rely on anything stored in memory but derive directly from what Cavendish calls a creature’s ‘self-knowledge.’. (
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Watsuji Tetsurō’s Memory of Natsume Sōseki: A Translation of “Until I met Sōseki” and “Sōseki’s Character”.
Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth
2025
Journal of East Asian Philosophy
4 (2):171-188.
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The following translation is an extract from the third chapter of Watsuji Tetsurō’s Hidden Japan [埋もれた日本] 1951. The translation is composed of two sections: “Until I met Sōseki” [漱石に逢うまで], and “Sōseki’s Character” [漱石の人物]. The former section discusses Watsuji’s indirect encounters with Natsume, namely, reading Natsume’s work as it was serialized in literary magazines during the Meiji era (1868–1912) and the impression Watsuji formed of Natsume as a teacher at Tokyo First Higher School (Ichikō). The latter section discusses Natsume as Watsuji’s
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personal acquaintance. Here the focus is on how Watsuji came to know Natsume through participating in the famous Thursday Club [木曜会], which was held at Natsume’s home, Sōseki Sanbō [漱石山房]. The contributions of this translation to the literature are threefold: it i) provides a multidimensional account of Natsume, ii) offers insight into the legendary Thursday Club, and iii) also tells us about Watsuji himself. (
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Ethics and Memory (2025).
Marina Trakas
2023
In Lucas Bietti & Pogacar Martin,
The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies
. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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This entry examines the most significant ethical questions surrounding memory, both at the collective and individual levels, as discussed in the literature. It begins by exploring the values associated with memory, including truth, accuracy, integrity, and broader social and political dimensions. The concept of a duty to remember is then addressed, particularly in the context of genocide and other human atrocities, along with the complex questions this concept raises. Ethical challenges posed by forgetting are subsequently analyzed, with a focus on
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its collective implications for forgiveness and its individual dimensions, such as the responsibility for forgetting and the right to be forgotten. After a brief discussion of memory virtues—a topic that remains underexplored in the literature—the entry considers the ethical issues surrounding the wishes of individuals with severe memory loss, such as those with dementia. Finally, it summarizes ethical debates related to current and hypothetical cases of memory modification, erasure, and enhancement, highlighting their potential impacts on personal identity, agency, authenticity, moral responsibility, testimony, and overall desirability. (
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Augustine on memory, the mind, and human flourishing.
T. Parker Haratine
2024
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
32 (6):1220-1240.
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Augustine maintains that the mind at least consists of memory, intellect, and will (De Trinitate 10.9.13 & 10.11.17). While it is easy to understand the intellect and will as essential to the mind’s activities, memory proves more difficult to understand. It is not immediately clear, for example, whether a human mind could operate without memory, whether people without memory have minds, and what distinguishes memory from the intellect. To understand the role of memory and its respective activities, this article addresses
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Augustine’s philosophy of mind and places it in the context of human teleology. By philosophy of mind, I mean an account of what is necessary for the constitution of a mind and to execute a mental act. I argue that, for Augustine, memory is necessary to have a human mind, to execute any mental act, and thus to know God. (
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Speak, Memory: Dignāga, Consciousness, and Awareness.
Nicholas Silins
forthcoming
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
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When someone is in a conscious state, must they be aware of it? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to answering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a constraint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusions it might be used to establish, and then turn to explain why it fails. The first main problem is that, contrary to his contemporary defenders, there is no good way to use it to reach
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a conclusion about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the proposed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic, in tension both with ancient objections as well as current psychology. (
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The philosophy of Brentano: contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in memory of Rudolf Haller.
Mauro Antonelli
Thomas Binder
Rudolf Haller
(eds.) -
2021
Boston: Brill, Rodopi.
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This volume, originating from the centennial Second International Conference Graz 1977-2017 on Franz Brentano's philosophy, collects eighteen essays written by nineteen distinguished specialists covering the main areas of Brentano's philosophy: his epistemology, ontology, ethics, and logic, and his contributions to psychology and philosophy of mind. Its goal is to explore the significance and impact of Brentano's thought, to promote a deepening of the ongoing renaissance of interest in Brentano, and to advance the project of understanding Brentano's actual philosophical positions and
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correcting entrenched misunderstandings. (
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Perception in Dreams: A Guide for Dream Engineers, a Reflection on the Role of Memory in Sensory States, and a New Counterexample to Hume’s Account of the Imagination.
Fiona Macpherson
2024
In Daniel Gregory & Kourken Michaelian,
Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues
. Cham: Springer. pp. 353–381.
details
I argue that dreams can contain perceptual elements in multifarious, heretofore unthought-of ways. I also explain the difference between dreams that contain perceptual elements, perceptual experiences that contain dream elements, and having a dream and a perceptual experience simultaneously. I then discuss two applications of the resulting view. First, I explain how my taxonomy of perception in dreams will allow “dream engineers”—who try to alter the content of people’s dreams—to accurately classify different dreams and explore creating new forms of perception
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in dreams. Second, I consider the consequences of the view for the role of memory in dreaming and imagination. I argue that not every element of dreams or sensory imaginations must rely on memory. The resultant view of sensory imagination provides a counterexample to Hume’s account of sensory imagination, according to which sensory imagination must be built up from faint copies of sensory impressions stored in memory. (
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Memoria y emoción.
Marina Trakas
(ed.) -
2021
La Plata, Argentina: Revista de Psicología UNLP.
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Verónica Adriana Ramírez, Eliana Ruetti: Memoria emocional en niñas y niños preescolares de diferentes condiciones socio-ambientales; Anne-Lise Saive: Reír para recordar: mejora de la memoria en relación con el humor; Veronika Diaz Abrahan, Maria Benitez, Leticia Sarli, Maximiliano Bossio, Nadia Justel: Memoria emocional. Una revisión sistemática sobre la capacidad modulatoria de la música, la actividad física y el bilingüismo; Matías Bonilla, Camila Isabel Jorge, Malen Daiana Moyano, Cecilia Forcato: Modificación de memorias maladaptativas durante el sueño y la vigilia: una visión
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interdisciplinaria; María Angélica Fierro: Éros el memorioso; Marina Trakas: Dimensiones de análisis de los recuerdos personales como recuerdos afectivos; Marcelo Vieira Lopes: Sentimentos existenciais e memória corporal: Dois casos em filosofia da psiquiatria. -/- . (
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Explaining Phenomenal Explanationism: A Précis of Appearance & Explanation.
McCain Kevin
Luca Moretti
2024
Asian Journal of Philosophy
3 (2):article number 85.
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In this article, we offer a précis of Appearance & Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology. We explain the central features of our theory of epistemic justification, Phenomenal Explanationism (PE). Further, we describe how PE applies to justification of various kinds and how it solves problems that plague its closest rival, Phenomenal Conservatism (PC).
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Violence in mass-mediated images and memory. Phenomenological account of prosthetic memories.
Remus Breazu
forthcoming
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
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In this paper, I analyse Alison Landsberg’s concept of prosthetic memories from a phenomenological perspective. Prosthetic memory, while sharing similarities with both personal and collective memory, is neither exclusively personal nor strictly collective, emerging as a product of new media in mass communication. According to Landsberg, prosthetic memories have four main characteristics: the recaller experiences them as firsthand accounts despite not personally living through the events, these memories often revolve around traumatic events, have a commodified form, and are ethically useful.
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Using Husserl’s theories on memory consciousness and image consciousness, and contemporary phenomenological research on violence, I provide a phenomenological account for the first three characteristics of prosthetic memory. The key factors contributing to their quasi-personal and quasi-collective nature lie, on the one hand, in the presence of imagistic violence and, on the other hand, in their mass-mediated image character. (
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Remembering is an Imaginative Project.
Seth Goldwasser
2024
Philosophical Studies
181:2897–2933.
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This essay defends the claim that episodic remembering is a mental action by arguing that episodic remembering and sensory- or experience-like imagining are of a kind in a way relevant for agency. Episodic remembering is a type of imaginative project that involves the agential construction of imagistic-content and that aims at (veridically) representing particular events of the personal past. Neurally intact adults under normal conditions can token experiential memories of particular events from the personal past (merely) by intending or trying
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to. An agent’s ability to actively remember depends not only on her being able to determine that some memory event occurs but on her ability to construct the relevant scene at will as well. I claim that the ability to guide construction with respect to imagistic-content is distinctive feature of a subset of active imagining. Episodic remembering is of a kind with that subset of active imagining by being a process of agential construction of imagistic-content, in this case, scene construction that aims at (veridically) representing the personal past. Agential scene construction in the context of remembering is the agent’s exploring her personal past as a highly circumscribed region of modal space. (
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A Powers Framework for Mental Action.
Seth Goldwasser
2024
Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
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Mental actions are things we do with our minds. Consider inferring, deliberating, imagining, remembering, calculating, and so on. I introduce a non-reductive alternative to standard causalist accounts of mental action that understands such action in terms of dispositions for performing mental actions. I call this alternative the powers framework. On the powers framework, habitual and skillful mental actions are themselves infused with practical intelligence by being expressions of the agent’s rational tendencies and capacities, respectively. The intelligence exemplified in the performance
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of habitual and skillful mental actions stems from the agent’s having shaped the corresponding tendencies and capacities through training and practice. In this way, mental habits and skills are ‘second nature’ to us. I substantiate the powers framework by giving an account of imagining as a type of skillful mental action. In particular, I argue that imagination is a power to construct representations and select their contents as a means to performing learned behaviors like pretending, engaging with fiction, predicting others’ behavior, reasoning about possibility and necessity, reasoning hypothetically or counterfactually about contingent matters of fact, and even imagining for its own sake. I extend the account of imagining to episodic remembering. I argue that such remembering, considered as a mental action, is a kind of imagining by virtue of the agent’s constructing a representation and selecting its content as a means of performing the learned behavior of navigating her personal past. (
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Philosophie du souvenir: le temps et son double.
Avishag Zafrani
2023
Paris: PUF.
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Le souvenir ajoute au temps une mémoire et une gestation. Il dispose à un retour sur le réel et double l'existence d'images inactuelles - suscitées parfois par le présent - comme chez Proust. Deux intuitions président à ce livre : le souvenir recèle un sens qui excédait les choses vécues sous la modalité du présent, et il organise une vision du monde qui s'oppose à l'idée d'une temporalité décadente. L'excédent porté par le souvenir suppose une dimension inassouvie du temps, dès
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lors doté d'une force motrice, créatrice - et sans doute émancipatrice."--Page 4 of cover. (
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Costruzione e distruzione di memorie: riflessioni storiche e filosofiche.
Irene Kajon
Francesco Giuseppe Trotta
(eds.) -
2023
Roma: Lithos.
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The Profile of Imagining.
Robert Hopkins
2024
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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What is sensory imagining and what role does it play in our lives? How does visualizing a castle, running through a tune in one's head, or imagining the taste of fish ice cream relate to perceiving such things, or to remembering them? What are the connections between imagining and agency, and how does it relate to emotion and other affect? The Profile of Imagining offers a theory that answers these and many other questions. It argues that sensory imagining involves the
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redeployment of resources central to perception, though in a radically different context and to very different effect. The result is a view that explains central features of imagining's phenomenology and functional role, including its capacity to capture what it would be like to perceive its objects, while acknowledging the many and striking differences between imagining and sensing. Hopkins shows how the view can be extended to imagining in other forms, especially the imagining of affect; and uses it to argue for some surprising conclusions: that imagining something is not a way to engage with its aesthetic character; and that imagining provokes real feeling much less often than is usually assumed. -/- Table of contents: Introduction; Ch.1 Imagining and agency; Ch.2 To be given as a representation; Ch.3 Knowledge of sensory profiles; Ch.4 Profiles in imagination; Ch.5 Observation, overflow and attention; Ch.6 Episodic memory; Ch.7 Learning from imagining; Ch.8 Aesthetic engagement, imagining and the draw of the real; Ch.9 Reacting to imagining?; Conclusion. (
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Reimagining narrative of voices: violence, partition, and memory in Bapsi Sidhwa’s Ice Candy Man.
Ghulam Rabani
Binod Mishra
2024
Journal for Cultural Research
28 (2):179-193.
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This article studies the narratives of voices identifying the harrowing aftermath of the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan, and the representations of the contemporary effects of partition in Bapsi Sidhwa’s novel Ice Candy Man. The narrative unfolds past experiences through the eyes of different characters and surroundings from different social, political and religious backgrounds. The novel vividly portrays the horror of violence during the partition, as communities that once coexisted peacefully become engulfed in a whirlwind of hatred and bloodshed.
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Sidhwa’s polyphonic narrative experiences reflect the multifaceted nature of violence, from communal riots to personal tragedies creating a poignant portrayal of human suffering and resilience. The theme of partition, violence, and memory permeates throughout the novel, encapsulating the socio-political upheavals that marked the birth of two nations – India and Pakistan. This paper, therefore, attempts to analyse the novel in order to understand the ideas of the ‘polyphonic narrative’ of Mikhael Bakhtin’s theory and many other postcolonial critic’s ideas. For portraying the human experience amidst a backdrop of partition and historical turmoil in shaping narratives as presented in the text by applying the theoretical framework of Postcolonial theory. (
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Norm-induced forgetting: When social norms induce us to forget.
Marta Caravà
2024
Philosophical Psychology
38 (6):2668–2690.
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Sometimes subjects have sufficient internal and external resources to retrieve information stored in memory, in particular information that carries socially charged content. Yet, they fail to do so: they forget it. These cases pose an explanatory challenge to common explanations of forgetting in cognitive science. In this paper, I take this challenge and develop a new explanation of these cases. According to this explanation, these cases are best explained as cases of norm-induced forgetting: cases in which forgetting is caused by
...
social norms in a relevant sense. These cases draw attention to the normative aspects of the mechanisms of forgetting. This is an important but neglected aspect of cases of everyday forgetting, in particular of those characterized by a social dimension. By investigating some ways in which the psychology of social norms is causally relevant in the mechanisms of retrieval failure, I begin to fill this gap. (
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