Papers by Michiru Nagatsu
Economists and philosophers disagree about the concept of choice used in economics. Some behaviou... more Economists and philosophers disagree about the concept of choice used in economics. Some behavioural economists argue that economic models of choice will improve as they become more and more psychologically realistic. Don Ross argues that this argument fails because its hidden assumption---that the economic concept of choice is the same as the psychological counterpart---is false. Ross conjectures that the economic concept of choice concerns a population-scale pattern of behavioural changes in response to incentives. We conduct a survey experiment to test two predictions that Ross's conjecture generates. The statistical analysis of our data confirms our predictions, although with some qualifications. In interpreting our results, we distinguish two versions of commonsensible realism, strong and weak, and propose the weak one as a plausible explanation of our results. Weak commonsensible realism also produces further testable hypotheses. Some methodological implications of our study are discussed.
The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boosts voluntary contributions to... more The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boosts voluntary contributions to public goods, in particular from individuals who otherwise prefer to free- ride. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects/Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information/No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the second phase. Common knowledge of selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics is triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that the group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others.
Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused on the sense of agenc... more Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused on the sense of agency and control in joint action, leaving aside questions on how it feels to act together. This paper tries to fill this gap in a way consistent with the existing theories of joint action and shared emotion. We first reconstruct Pacherie’s (2014) account on the phenomenology of agency for joint action, pointing out its two problems, namely (1) the necessary trade-off between the sense of self- and we-agency; and (2) the lack of affective phenomenology of joint action in general. After elaborating on these criticisms based on our theory of shared emotion, we substantiate the second criticism by discussing different mechanisms of shared affect -- feelings and emotions -- that are present in typical joint actions. We show that our account improves on Pacherie’s (2014), first by introducing our agentive model of we-agency to overcome her unnecessary dichotomy between a sense of self- and we-agency, and then by suggesting that the mechanisms of shared affect enhance not only the predictability of other agents’ actions as Pacherie highlights, but also an agentive sense of we-agency that emerges from shared emotions experienced in the course and consequence of joint action.
In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiment... more In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiments do not figure prominently in debates on the explanation and justification of joint action. Received philosophical theories analyze joint action in terms of common knowledge of cognitively complex, interconnected structures of intentions and action plans of the participants. These theories admit that collective emotions sometimes give rise to joint action or more typically, unplanned and uncoordinated collective behavior that falls short of full-fledged jointly intentional action. In contrast, minimalist theorists pay some attention to affective elements in joint action without much concern about their collective intentionality. They refer to an association between low-level synchrony in perceptual, motor, and behavioral processes, and increased interpersonal liking, feelings of solidarity, and cooperativeness. In this paper, we outline an account of collective emotions that can bridge this theoretical divide, linking the intentional structure of joint actions and the underlying cognitive and affective mechanisms. Collective emotions can function as both motivating and justifying reasons for jointly intentional actions, in some cases even without prior joint intentions of the participants. Moreover, they facilitate coordination in joint action.
In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiment... more In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiments do not figure prominently in debates on the explanation and justification of joint action. Received philosophical theories analyze joint action in terms of common knowledge of cognitively complex, interconnected structures of intentions and action plans of the participants. These theories admit that collective emotions sometimes give rise to joint action or more typically, unplanned and uncoordinated collective behavior that falls short of full-fledged jointly intentional action. In contrast, minimalist theorists pay some attention to affective elements in joint action without much concern about their collective intentionality. They refer to an association between low-level synchrony in perceptual, motor, and behavioral processes, and increased interpersonal liking, feelings of solidarity, and cooperativeness. In this paper, we outline an account of collective emotions that can bridge this theoretical divide, linking the intentional structure of joint actions and the underlying cognitive and affective mechanisms. Collective emotions can function as both motivating and justifying reasons for jointly intentional actions, in some cases even without prior joint intentions of the participants. Moreover, they facilitate coordination in joint action.
In this paper we argue for the importance of studying interdisciplinary collaborations by focusin... more In this paper we argue for the importance of studying interdisciplinary collaborations by focusing on the role that good choice and design of model-building frameworks and strategies can play overcoming the inherent difficulties of collaborative research. We provide an empirical study of particular collaborations between economists and ecologists in resource economics. We discuss various features of how models are put together for interdisciplinary collaboration in these cases, and show how the use of a coupled model framework in this case to coordinate and combine background models from ecology and economics provided particular collaborative affordances and clear collaborative gain.
Online survey on "choice" concept
forthcoming in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
In this paper I argue that the use of social nudges, policy interventions to induce voluntary coo... more In this paper I argue that the use of social nudges, policy interventions to induce voluntary cooperation in social dilemma situations, can be defended against two ethical objections which I call objections from coherence and autonomy. Specifically I argue that the kind of preference change caused by social nudges is not a threat to agents’ coherent preference structure, and that there is a way in which social nudges influence behavior while respecting agents’ capacity to reason. I base my arguments on two mechanistic explanations of social nudges; the expectation-based and frame-based accounts. As a concrete example of social nudges I choose the “Don’t Mess With Texas” anti-littering campaign and discuss in some detail how it worked.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychologi... more Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favour of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden’s fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that the social motivation hypothesis not only stands as a proximate account in its own right; it also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g. fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications the social motivation hypothesis has on existing modeling practice.
In this monograph, Don Ross argues for a highly original view on economics visà-vis its immediate... more In this monograph, Don Ross argues for a highly original view on economics visà-vis its immediate neighboring disciplines, that is, psychology and sociology. Ross develops his view on economics as a discipline distinct from and irreducible to psychology (chapter 4), and argues to the effect that instead economics should be seen and practiced as unified with sociology or social science in general (chapter 5). This focus on interdisciplinarity is motivated by the author's particular view on the naturalized philosophy of science (chapter 1), and his proposal is supported by the analysis of the historical and contemporary developments in economic theory, methodology and technology (chapters 2 and 3). Since covering the whole of his overwhelmingly rich discussion would go beyond both the word limit and my expertise (mostly in behavioral economics), this review highlights the main line of arguments concerning the interdisciplinary relations between economics on the one hand, and psychology and sociology on the other. I will comment on specific points as I go along, but I hope these comments won't distract the reader's attention too much.
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychologi... more Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favour of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden's fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that the social motivation not only stands as a proximate account in its own right; it also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g. fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications the social motivation hypothesis has on existing modelling practice.
Synthese, Jul 3, 2011
In this paper I examine Don Ross's application of unificationism as a methodological criterion of... more In this paper I examine Don Ross's application of unificationism as a methodological criterion of theory appraisal in economics and cognitive science. Against Ross's critique that explanations of the preference reversal phenomenon by the 'heuristics and biases' programme is ad hoc or 'Ptolemaic', I argue that the compatibility hypothesis, one of the explanations offerd by this programme, is theoretically and empirically well-motivated. A careful examination of this hypothesis suggests several strengths of a procedural approach to modelling cognitive processes underlying individual decision making, compared to a multiple-agent approach which Ross promotes. I argue that the debate between economists and psychologists are both theoretical and empirical, but cannot be resolved by appealing to the ideal of unification.
(Online publication January 18 2011)
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Jan 1, 2010
"In this paper, I examine metaphysical aspects in the neuroeconomics debate. I propose that part ... more "In this paper, I examine metaphysical aspects in the neuroeconomics debate. I propose that part of the debate can be better understood by supposing two metaphysical stances, mechanistic and functional. I characterize the two stances, and discuss their relations. I consider two models of framing, in order to illustrate how the features of mechanistic and functional stances figure in the practice of the sciences of individual decision making.
Keywords: function; mechanism; metaphysics of science; framing."
Talks by Michiru Nagatsu
Concern-based we-framing in social dilemmas: a case for green nudges
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Papers by Michiru Nagatsu
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Keywords: function; mechanism; metaphysics of science; framing."
Talks by Michiru Nagatsu