Publications by Patrick Kain
Pflichten in Ansehung der Tiere
Zwischen Rechten und Pflichten – Kants ›Metaphysik der Sitten‹, ed. Jean-Christophe Merle and Carola von Villiez, 2021
[partial translation of “Duties Regarding Animals” (Kain 2010)) , trans. Jean-Christophe Merle an... more [partial translation of “Duties Regarding Animals” (Kain 2010)) , trans. Jean-Christophe Merle and Diogo Campos Sasdelli]
Motivating Humanity
Kant on Morality, Humanity, and Legality: Practical Dimensions of Normativity. Ed. Ansgar Lyssy and Christopher Yeomans, 2021
Kant on Animals
Animals: A History (Oxford Philosophical Concepts), ed. Peter Adamson and G. Fay Edwards, 2018
This chapter focuses on Kant’s position concerning the nature of nonhuman animals and the moral o... more This chapter focuses on Kant’s position concerning the nature of nonhuman animals and the moral obligations that humans have toward animals. It begins by describing Kant’s account of the nature of animals and the distinction between humans and nonhuman animals. It then moves on to explaining Kant’s account of the nature of moral obligation and his oft-misunderstood contention that we do not have “duties to” nonhuman animals but only “duties with regard to” these animals. The chapter corrects the orthodox reading of Kant’s position, which has it that he considers benevolence toward animals to be justified only by the effects of brutality on the human who commits brutal acts. Instead Kant argues that animals are worthy of admiration, love, sympathy and gratitude, despite not being “ends in themselves” like humans. Finally, the chapter considers Kant’s position in relation to that of another important eighteenth-century moral theorist, Francis Hutcheson.
Dignity and the Paradox of Method
Realism and Antirealism in Kant's Moral Philosophy, ed. Robinson dos Santos and Elke Elisabeth Schmidt, 2018
In this paper, I advocate a value realist interpretation of Kant’s ethics by examining, in some d... more In this paper, I advocate a value realist interpretation of Kant’s ethics by examining, in some detail, both Kant’s discussion of the grounding of the moral law in Groundwork II and his discussion of the “paradox of method” in the Critique of Practical Reason. On a plausible reading of both the Groundwork and second Critique, Kant maintains that human beings, and more generally, rational beings, have dignity or inner worth. We cognize through the moral law that our existence and inner value is the objective ground of the law and that we are the “subject[s] of the moral law.” This dignity of rational beings is fundamental and irreducible. This qualifies as a distinctive kind of value realism.
Leibniz and Kant, ed. Brandon Look (Oxford University Press, Forthcoming), 2021
In his lectures, Kant suggested to his students that the freedom of a divine holy will is “easier... more In his lectures, Kant suggested to his students that the freedom of a divine holy will is “easier to comprehend than that of the human will,”(28:609) but this suggestion has remained neglected. After a review of some of Kant’s familiar claims about the will (in general), and about the divine holy will in particular, I consider how these claims give rise to some initial objections to that conception. Then I defend an interpretation of Kant’s conception of the divine will, and of its historical development in relation to Leibniz and Spinoza, that identifies the content, origin, and role of God’s representations in a way that is responsive to some of the historical and contemporary problems. Finally, I trace a few of the implications of this account of the divine will for our understanding Kant’s account of freedom more generally, including human freedom.
Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution
Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theol... more Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting one or both of those belief sources? Should evolutionary accounts of the origins of our moral beliefs and our religious beliefs undermine our confidence in their veracity? This volume places challenges to moral belief side-by-side with challenges to religious belief, sets evolution-based challenges alongside disagreement-based challenges, and includes philosophical perspectives together with theological and social science perspectives, with the aim of cultivating insights and lines of inquiry that are easily missed within a single discipline or when these topics are treated in isolation. The result is a collection of essays--representing both skeptical and non-skeptical positions about morality and religion--that move these discussions forward in new and illuminating directions.
Contributors:
Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame
Michael Bergmann, Purdue University
Sarah Brosnan, Georgia State University
William FitzPatrick, University of Rochester
John Hare, Yale University
Timothy P. Jackson, Emory University
Patrick Kain, Purdue University
Jordan Kiper, University of Connecticut
Dustin Locke, Claremont McKenna College
Charles Mathewes, University of Virginia
Mark C. Murphy, Georgetown University
John Pittard, Yale Divinity School
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University
Richard Sosis, University of Connecticut
Sharon Street, New York University
Joshua Thurow, University of Texas at San Antonio
Ralph Wedgwood, University of Southern California
Contributors:
Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame
Michael Bergmann, Purdue University
Sarah Brosnan, Georgia State University
William FitzPatrick, University of Rochester
John Hare, Yale University
Timothy P. Jackson, Emory University
Patrick Kain, Purdue University
Jordan Kiper, University of Connecticut
Dustin Locke, Claremont McKenna College
Charles Mathewes, University of Virginia
Mark C. Murphy, Georgetown University
John Pittard, Yale Divinity School
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University
Richard Sosis, University of Connecticut
Sharon Street, New York University
Joshua Thurow, University of Texas at San Antonio
Ralph Wedgwood, University of Southern California
Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Overview and Future Directions
Review of Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays, ed. Timmons and Baiasu (OUP 2013)
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Dec 2014
Der Charackter der Gattung
In the concluding section of his *Anthropology* textbook, Kant offers the outlines of a portrait ... more In the concluding section of his *Anthropology* textbook, Kant offers the outlines of a portrait of the human race and of its collective character and vocation. The section is of interest for students of Kant’s Geschichtsphilosophie because of what it reveals about Kant’s conception of human progress, and the processes responsible for it. On Kant’s view, we can only expect collective progress through incremental political reform, and our expectation of progress rests significantly upon our own, specifically moral, reflections upon human activity.
Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason
In Benjamin Lipscomb & James Krueger (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality. pp. 211-230, 2010
Kant’s claims about supersensible objects, and his account of the epistemic status of such claims... more Kant’s claims about supersensible objects, and his account of the epistemic status of such claims, remain poorly understood, to the detriment of our understanding of Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological system. In the Critique of Practical Reason, and again in the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that we have practical cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen) of the moral law and of our supersensible freedom; that this cognition and knowledge cohere with, yet go beyond the limits of, our theoretical cognition; and that this knowledge grounds rational belief (Vernunftglaube) in the existence of God, the immortality of our soul, and the real possibility of the “highest good.” This essay untangles some of these claims about practical cognition, practical knowledge, and practical belief and their relation to Kant’s account of theoretical cognition and theoretical knowledge. There is a core conception of cognition and knowledge underlying the accounts of theoretical cognition and practical cognition, which allows for a principled distinction between cases of practical knowledge and practical belief. Kant’s doctrine of the “fact of reason” turns out to be crucial to his claims about legitimacy of and distinction between the two forms of practical cognition, one which constitutes knowledge and another which cannot.
Duties Regarding Animals
in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, ed. Lara Denis, 2010
A better appreciation of Kant’s commitments in a variety of disciplines reveals Kant had a deeper... more A better appreciation of Kant’s commitments in a variety of disciplines reveals Kant had a deeper understanding of human and non-human animals than generally recognized, and this sheds new light on Kant’s claims about the nature and scope of moral status and helps to address, at least from Kant’s perspective, many of the familiar objections to his notorious account of “duties regarding animals.” Kant’s core principles about the nature of moral obligation structure his thoughts about the moral status of human beings and non-human animals. Kant’s commitments in biology, psychology, anthropology and physical geography support his account of the nature of and distinction between humans and non-human animals. This account supports Kant’s judgment that we have duties to every human being and significant duties regarding non-human animals, duties which involve direct concern for animals because of their nature. A comparison of Kant’s account with some recently proposed Kantian alternatives provides additional perspective on some of the distinctive features, and strengths and weaknesses, of Kant’s approach.
Kant’s Defense of Human Moral Status
Journal of The History of Philosophy 47 (1):59-101., 2009
The determination of individual moral status is a central factor in the ethical evaluation of con... more The determination of individual moral status is a central factor in the ethical evaluation of controversial practices such as elective abortion, human embryo-destructive research, and the care of the severely disabled and those in persistent vegetative states. A review of recent work on Kant reveals the need for a careful examination of the content of Kant’s biological and psychological theories and their relation to his views about moral status. Such an examination, in conjunction with Kant’s practical-metaphysical analysis of the origins of freedom, reveals Kant’s principled basis for his contention that all human beings possess moral status.
Philosophy Compass 1 (5):449–465, 2006
This article surveys recent work on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, with a particular focus ... more This article surveys recent work on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, with a particular focus on his doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates, assessing the implications of such work for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations raised by Kant's first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I survey recent work on the Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and argue that it does not support an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics. In section 3, I argue that recent work on Kant's doctrine of the practical postulates does not support an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics.
Constructivism, Intrinsic Normativity, and the Motivational Analysis Argument
In Heiner Klemme, Manfred Kuehn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.), Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. (Kant-Forschungen 16)., 2006
This essay addresses the relationship between Kant's theory of moral motivation and theories of n... more This essay addresses the relationship between Kant's theory of moral motivation and theories of normativity. Constructivist or "ideal agent" theories of normativity claim that what makes a principle normative is that rational agents endorse or possess a motive of a certain kind to comply with it, or that they endorse or possess such a motive to comply with it insofar as they are rational. Korsgaard has argued that Kant's "motivational analysis" of the concept of obligation in Grundlegung I provides an argument for such a constructivist theory of normativity. In this examination of Korsgaard's argument, I defend two important modifications of the concept of "intrinsic normativity" and suggests that once these modifications are made, the motivational analysis argument fails to establish the constructivist claim that the normative authority of the supreme principle of morality is constituted by or depends solely upon agents' motivational states. While Kant's motivational analysis helps to reveal the nature of the alleged internal relation between the supreme principle of morality and the nature of the rational will, it does not demand the adoption of a constructivist theory of normativity.
Interpreting Kant's theory of divine commands
Kantian Review 9 (1):128-149, 2005
Several interpretive disagreements about Kant's theory of divine commands (esp. in the work of Al... more Several interpretive disagreements about Kant's theory of divine commands (esp. in the work of Allen Wood and John E. Hare) can be resolved with further attention to Kant's works. It is argued that Kant's moral theism included (at least until 1797) the claim that practical reason, reflecting upon the absolute authority of the moral law, should lead finite rational beings like us to believe that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and holy being who commands our obedience to the moral law and proportions happiness to virtue. Kant's apparently contradictory claims about the relationship between morality and religion reflect his view that our acceptance of the authority of the moral law is incomplete or rationally unstable absent such a theological postulate.
Self-legislation in Kant's moral philosophy
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 86 (3):257-306, 2004
Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legisl... more Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to theological voluntarist accounts of morality and his engagement with conceptions of obligation found in his Wolffian predecessors. In order to defend important claims about the necessity and immediacy of moral obligation, Kant drew and refined a distinction between the legislation and authorship of the moral law in a way that precludes standard theological voluntarist theories and presents an obstacle to recent constructivist interpretations. A correct understanding of Kant's development and use of this distinction reveals that his conception of legislation leaves little room for constructivist moral anti-realism.
Essays on Kant's Anthropology
Kant's lectures on anthropology capture him at the height of his intellectual power. They are imm... more Kant's lectures on anthropology capture him at the height of his intellectual power. They are immensely important for advancing our understanding of Kant's conception of anthropology, its development, and the notoriously difficult relationship between it and the critical philosophy. This collection of new essays by some of the leading commentators on Kant offers the first systematic account of the philosophical importance of this material that should nevertheless prove of interest to historians of ideas and political theorists. There are two broad approaches adopted: a number of the essays consider the systematic relations of the anthropology to critical philosophy, especially speculative knowledge and ethics. Other essays focus on the anthropology as a major source for the clarification of both the content and development of Kant's work. The volume will serve as an interpretative complement to a forthcoming translation on the lectures in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.
Within the theory of rational agency found in Kant's anthropology lectures and sketched in the mo... more Within the theory of rational agency found in Kant's anthropology lectures and sketched in the moral philosophy, prudence is the manifestation of a distinctive, nonmoral rational capacity concerned with one's own happiness or well-being. Contrary to influential claims that prudential reasons are mere prima facie or "candidate" reasons, prudence can be seen to be a genuine manifestation of rational agency, involving a distinctive sort of normative authority, an authority distinguishable from and conceptually prior to that of moral norms, though still overridable by them. The anthropology lectures make an important contribution to the understanding of Kant's account of the distinctive prudential task: despite Kant's familiar complaints about human finitude and the natural dialectic of our desires, Kant offers useful suggestions about how prudential reflection can generate genuine practical guidance. Even with several significant developments in Kant's anthropological theory over time, prudential norms can still be regarded as distinctive and conceptually independent of morality.