(PDF) Armando Marques Guedes (Oct. 15, 2024), Submarine cables and their security. The growth of Russian and Chinese threats in

(PDF) Armando Marques Guedes (Oct. 15, 2024), Submarine cables and their security. The growth of Russian and Chinese threats in all Basins. Doctoral seminar, Law Politics and Security. NOVA School of Law, UNL.
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Armando Marques Guedes (Oct. 15, 2024), Submarine cables and their security. The growth of Russian and Chinese threats in all Basins. Doctoral seminar, Law Politics and Security. NOVA School of Law, UNL.
Armando Marques-Guedes
2024, Submarine cables and their security. The growth of Russian and Chinese threats in all basins.
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Abstract
All sorts of submarine cable, from optical ones to power cables and smart cables, as well as oleoducts and gazoducts nowadays lay at ocean and sea bottoms connect continents and islands. They are evermore important than ever as critical infrastructures conveying all sorts of data, energy, sensors, oil and gaz, etc., in our current world. As an example of their centrality stand the optical cables, as well over 90 percent of the Internet flows through them. Since their early laying they became targets of mapping and attack from Russia and now China -- using special classes of ships and mini submarines to sever them or graft on the them. Many States now have launched counter measures to neutralize such risks. This PowerPoint means to detail the ongoing processes, and offering academic links to all that.
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Submarine cables and their security
The growth of Russian and Chinese threats in all
Basins

Armando Marques Guedes
OCT. 15, 2024
DOCTORAL SEMINAR,
NOVA SCHOOL OF LAW, UNL

A 2-YEAR OLD MERCATOR PROJECTION GLOBAL MAP:

THAT OF OPTICAL SUBMARINE CABLES, THOSE THROUGH WHICH
FLOWS 98.3% OF THE INTERNET COMMUNICATION HIGHWAY

An optical sumarine cable, so a second generation cable, after the telegraphic ones. As.
We shall see, these second generation optical cables were soon followed by sumbarine
gasoducts spanning the world over. And, later, already in the 21st Century, to the second
and thrid generation cables wer e added photvoltaic ones. All of them with prone to
vulneranilities. The focuses, here, will mostly be centered on the optical cables, but with
systematic remmissions to the other three types of undersea cables systems.

I WANT TO BE CAREFUL READING THINGS, SO I BEGIN
HERE SOMETHING I SHALL LATER WANT TO RETURN
TO. HERE GOES THE GLOBAL DENSITY OF COMMERCIAL
EXCHANGES IN 2016-2017 –
SO, BEFORE COVID-19.
THE COLOURS: IN YELLOW, FOR THE MORE POPULATED REGIONS, IN
REDDISH, FOR THE LESS POPULATED ONES

MOVING ON, GLOBAL MARITIME COMMERCIAL ROUTES, 2022.

SHIPPING TRADE MAKES THE WORLD GO ROUND. AN INCREDIBLE 90% OF
WORLD TRADE IS RELIANT ON THE TRANSPORT OF GOODS BY SEA. FOR
COMPARISON’S SAKE, AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR, ONLY SLIGHTLY OVER
80% OF TRADE WAS MARITIME. WHY? LARGELY BECAUSE, THEN, THE USSR
HAD A LARGE AND PRETTY POWERFUL WAR NAVY…

MAP OF THE REGIONS WITH MORE INTENSE EMISSIONS OF CARBON
DIOXIDE, CO2, CODED IN COLOURS. IN GREEN,THE “GREENER”
ZONES, WHICH HUE FROM YELLOWISH TO RED, AS THINGS GET
WORSE.

ANOTHER BACKGROUND LOOK: ‘COORDINATED MIGRATIONS’
AND URBANIZATION, BEFORE THE ONSET OF THE ‘SYRIAN
CRISIS’: MAP OF COORDINATED MIGRATION, AND, IN YELLOW SHADE,
COUNTRIES WITH BIGGEST URBANIZATION GROWTH, FORM 2002 TO 2019

FAST FORWARD, I.E. NON-CLASSICAL
GEOPOLITICS:
IS THIS WHAT WE CALL ‘CYBERSPACE?50

THE FIRST ATLANTIC CABLE, A TELEGRAPHY ONE: THE VERY
FIRST MORSE CODE MESSAGE, SENT ON AUGUST 16TH, 1858, BY QUEEN VICTORIA TO
PRESIDENT JAMES BUCHANAN, WAS “EUROPE AND AMERICA ARE UNITED BY
TELEGRAPHY. GLORY TO GOD IN THE HIGHEST; ON EARTH, PEACE AND GOOD
WILL TOWARD MEN”. THE FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER THE CONNECTION WAS BROKEN. IT’S
PERMANENT TECHNICAL REPOSITION , CARRIED OUT BY THE ATLANTIC TELEGRAPH
COMPANY, OWNED BY THE SAME JOHN PENDER WHO HAD LAID THE FIRST CABLES 8 YEARS
EARLIERWAS ONLY FINISHED IN 1866. THE FIRST TRANSPACIFIC CABLES, RUNNING ACROSS
FROM S. FRANCISCO TO HAWAII, GUAM, AND THE PHILPPINES, WERE ONLY LAID ON 1902-1903.
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS BEGAN TAKING PLACE.

WINDING UP, WHILE STILL LOOKING BACK: “IN
1901, EASTERN TELEGRAPH CABLES”, AS THE
TRANSPACIFIC CABLES WERE ONLY BEING SKETCHED.
METASTATISING.

STEP BY STEP, SOME OF THE NEWER
DIMENSIONS
OF
GEOPOLITICS: OPTIC
INTERNE A SUBMARINE CABLE MAP 2017-2018

“OPTICAL SUBMARINE CABLE ON THE
OCEANIC DEPTHS OF THE NORTHERN
ATLANTIC BASIN”

AS MARK TWAIN SO APTLY WROTE, “HISTORY NEVER REPEATS ITSELF, BUT IT DOES
OFTEN RHYME”. OPTICAL FIBERS, ZOOMING IN: THE INTERNET AND OPTICAL CABLES
ATTACHED AROUND HERE, UP CLOSER, STILL IN 2015-2016, NOT VERY DIFFERENT FROM
TODAY’S PATTERNS. LOOK AT THE ATLANTIC LINES AND COMPARE PORTUGAL (NOT SPAIN OR
FRANCE, WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN BEND) WITH BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS (I.E. THE
FLANDERS) AND THE UK; SEE, ALSO, DENMARK.

A ‘REPETITION’ OF THE PATTERNS OF COLONIAL MARITIME
IMPERIAL CONNECTIONS?

201OPTICAL SUBMARINE CABLES & THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE MYTH OF
SOUTH-SOUTH CONNECTIONS LAID BARE: IN WHAT CONCERNS
DIGITAL, THOSE CONNECTIONS ARE NOTHING BUT DIPLOTALK
AND WISHFUL THINKING

OPTICAL CABLES IN ASIA, CENTERED OF THE STRAITS OF
MALACCA, 2017-2018

PROBLEMATISING MATTERS AND PONDERING – BOTH
POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY: NOTE THE ALMOST
INEXISTENT NUMBER OF CABLES ‘ATTACHED’ TO
PORTUGAL.
JUST A FEW…SO THE PATTERN REPETITION, AT LEAST IN THE
PORTUGUESE CASE, ACTUALLY IS RECENT...!!! WHY IS THAT?!?
WHAT DOES IT RESONATE WITH, OR RESPOND TO?

A GLOBAL PANORAMA OF
SUBMARINE OPTICAL CABLES, TWO
YEARS AND A BIT CLOSER TO NOW,
TO LAST JUNE 2022

WELL, HERE’S HOW TO LAY DOWN OPTICAL SUBMARINE
CABLES. ONE EXAMPLE, FRANCE-TELECOM-MARINE,
RENÉ DESCARTES; TO THE RIGHT, A "SUBMARINE
OPTICAL CABLE CROSS-SECTION”.
BUT LET US SEE MORE OF BOTH SHIPS AND CABLES

A SPECIALIZED CABLE-LAYING SHIP,
PURPOSE-MADE

GIANTS OF THE SEA:
CABLE INNOVATOR, A FIBRE OPTIC CABLE
LAYING VESSEL

FOUR METER DIAMETER STERN SHEAVES OF
FIBER-OPTIC CABLE LAYING OUR SHIP, CABLE
INNOVATOR

SIMPLER SHIPS TOO, EITHER FOR SHORTER LINKAGES OR
FOR PECUNIARY REASONS...

LESS SIMPLE ONES: FIBRE OPTIC CABLE
LAYING VESSEL TYCO RESPONDER IN
CURAÇAO, CARIBBEAN

UNROLLING: THE 12,184 TONNE CABLE SHIP RESOLUTE SITS A KILOMETRE OFF
THE PORTHCRESSA BEACH ON THE ISLE OF SCILLY, NORTHERN UK. THE CABLE
LAYING SHIP IS WORKING TO REPURPOSE A FIBRE OPTIC CABLE WHICH USED TO
CONNECT ENGLAND TO SPAIN SO THAT BT CAN DELIVER SUPER FAST BROADBAND
TO THE TINY ISLAND.

HERE IS ONE TYPE OF CABLE LAYING. THERE ARE
OTHER TYPES…

THE INNARDS: FIBER OPTICAL CABLE LAYING,
SHIP INTERIOR

VARIANTS: YET ANOTHER CABLE LAYING
VESSEL WITH ITS SPOOL OF CABLE ABOUT TO
BE LAID ACROSS THE OCEAN

ACCIDENTLY SELF-INFLICTED SAFETY RISKS,
2012: FRANCE TELECOM-ORANGE ON A FRIDAY ANNOUNCED THAT AN

UNEXPLAINED FIRE HAD ERUPTED ON ITS CABLE SHIP, THE CHAMAREL, OFF THE
SKELETON COAST OF NAMIBIA IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. ALL 54 CREW MEMBERS
WERE SAFELY. “THE ENTIRE CREW OF 56 ESCAPED THE CHAMAREL SAFELY, AND
WERE RECOVERED BY A NAMIBIAN FISHING VESSEL AND WERE TAKEN TO
WALVIS BAY”.

YET ANOTHER, LAYING THINGS OUT

ROLLING IT ALL OUT

DIFFERENT, BUT AGAIN LAYING OUT THE CABLES

ON A (UN)ROLL, COORDINATING THE LAYOUT:
SUBMARINE CABLE MARINE SERVICES

UNROLLING AND LAYING DOWN THE CABLES

AGAIN, HOW DEPLOYING THINGS WORKS: CABLE JOINT
AND AN OUTGOING 'VEHICLE'

THIS IS HOW THINGS GO, IN THESE TYPES: FIRST STEPS IN
DEPLOYING AN OPTICAL CABLE

AND DOWN IT GOES...

PLOUGHING IT DOWN AT BOTTOM, AS SEEN
FROM BELOW

SELF-EXPLANATORY...

IBIDEM, LAYING DOWN THE SUBMARINE FIBER-OPTIC
CABLES

BURYING A CABLE WITH A SORT OF
PLOUGH

PLOWING THE SEABED: HERE GOES A SUBMARINE
FIBER-OPTIC CABLE BEING LAID OUT DEEP DOWN

ESTABLISHING CONNECTIONS: FRANCE
TELECOM-ORANGE LAUNCHES-ACE
SUBMARINE-CABLE IN FIRST 13 COUNTRIES

FIBER-OPTIC CABLES OF ALL KINDS

MORE EXAMPLES…

A DIAGRAMATIC TAKE ON WHAT LARGER CABLES LOOK
LIKE DOWN THERE

GOOD MORNING, LIGHTS BEAMS!

DETAILS, AND THE SCALE OF A SMALL CABLE

ALL THE WAY TO LARGER OPTICAL FIBRE
CABLES

• submarine-cable-20-638

HOW TO CREATE A NETWORK: SUBMARINE
FIBER-OPTIC
CABLES
CENTRAL
NEXUS
SOMEWHERE ON THE COAST

LARGER STUFF: “CABLE EXTENSION FOR THE
SOUTHEAST NETWORK, ALASKA”, 2017

MENDING THINGS DOWN BELOW; AT DEPTHS OF 4,5
KILOMETERS (THE PLANETARY AVERAGE), ONE NEEDS A
REALLY STURDY BATHYSCAPH,
AND POWERFUL LIGHTING

HERE IS ONE EXAMPLE, THE FRENCH HROV ARIANE
(BEING TESTED BEFORE 2014), OONE OF THE MANY IN
USE FOR ALL SORTS OF PURPOSES)

THERE IT IS, DEEP DOWN

SMALL AND RARE RISKS: OF
SHARKS AND CABLES; NOW WE HAVE HARD KEVLAR CABLES...

DOUG MADORY (SEPTEMBER 20, 2023), DUAL SUBSEA CABLE
CUTS DISRUPT AFRICAN INTERNET

“On

Sunday, 6 August 2023, an undersea landslide in one of the world’s longest submarine
canyons knocked out two of the most important submarine cables serving the African Internet.
The landslide took place in the Congo Canyon, located at the mouth of the Congo River,
separating Angola from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.Seismic threats to
submarine cables.
By far, the greatest threat to the submarine cables connecting the global Internet is human
maritime activity. This usually involves seafaring vessels breaking submarine cables either by
snagging them during fishing operations (especially trawling) or by inadvertently dragging
their anchors along the seafloor, the cause of the 2008 submarine cable cuts in the
Mediterranean Sea.”Not an attack, in this case, just a natural disaster.

LET US QUICKLY GLANCE AT THE LAST NATURAL ACCIDENT CASE, IN AFRICA,
AUGUST 6, 2023.
THE SAT-3 CABLE WAS THE FIRST TO SUFFER AN OUTAGE, FOLLOWED HOURS LATER BY
THE FAILURE OF THE WACS CABLE. THE LOSS OF THESE CABLES KNOCKED OUT
INTERNATIONAL INTERNET BANDWIDTH ALONG THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA. IN THIS
BLOG POST, I DIMPLY VISUALLY REVIEW SOME HISTORY OF THE IMPACT OF UNDERSEA
LANDSLIDES ON SUBMARINE CABLES AND USE SOME OF KENTIK’S UNIQUE DATA SETS TO
EXPLORE THE IMPACTS OF THESE CABLE BREAKS. CLICK ON THIS LINK TO READ THE
SHOPRT DOUG MADORY’S TAKE OM AUGUST 17, 2023.
HERE IS THE LINK:
HTTPS://WWW.KENTIK.COM/BLOG/DUAL-SUBSEA-CABLE-CUTS-DISRUPT-AFRICAN-INTERN
ET/

NOW, CABLES AT MILITARY,
NON-NATURAL, RISK

NON-NATURAL, NOW, AND
2015, NATIONAL INTEREST, WAR STRATEGY – “ATTACK
THREAT AND DEFENSE ON DEEP-SEA FIBER OPTIC CABLES”

MID-ATLANTIC ALARM BELLS RINGING: HARSHER
GAME, SET, AND MATCH RISKS? ON (ONE OF) THE
RUSSIAN THREATS...

HIGH AND MORE RECENT RISKS, MORE STRIDENT ALARM BELLS, STILL
THE EARLY DAYS. ON DECEMBER 2015: RUSSIAN WARSHIPS
HOVERING ABOVE OPTICAL CABLE HUBS. SUCH AGGRESSIVE
MOVES HAVE BEEN REPEATED SINCE THEN...

RUSSIA HOVERING OVER CABLE HUBS, REACTIONS IN THE
VERY EARLY DAYS, 2015-2016, AND THE WESTERN (US AND
UK) RESPONSE

WARNING SIGNS OF LARGER RISKS: ”THE
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SUBMARINE DMITRIJ DONSKOJ SAILS
THROUGH DANISH WATERS IN JULY 2017”.

MOVING ON. WASHINGTON POST, DECEMBER 22, 2017,
”RUSSIAN SUBMARINES ARE PROWLING AROUND VITAL
UNDERSEA CABLES. UNDERSTANDABLY, IT IS MAKING NATO
NERVOUS”

NOT SMALL FRY...HAWKING OVER THE CABLES

“RUSSIAN SPY SUBMARINES ARE TAMPERING WITH”.
CAPTION: “UNDERSEA CABLES THAT MAKE THE INTERNET
WORK”.

ANOTHER RUSSIAN ATTACK TACTIC,
“DOWNUNDER”, AND STILL EARLY ON.
THE AUSTRALIAN, 2019, MAY 7TH, 2019)

UK CHIEF OF STAFF: "MILITARY PRIORITISING DEFENCE OF
UNDERSEA TELECOMS CABLES AMID RUSSIAN THREAT”, IN
QUEEN ELIZABETH’S TIME

COMING CLOSER TO OUR NOW. “RUSSIAN SUBS ARE
SNIFFING AROUND TRANSATLANTIC CABLES” (DEFENSE ONE,
JANUARY 17, 2022)

“OFFICIALS SAY PRESENCE HAS INCREASED TO LEVELS
UNSEEN SINCE THE COLD WAR” (REUTERS/PAVEL REBROV)

“RUSSIA COULD ATTACK UNDERWATER INTERNET
CABLES, WARNS BRITISH MILITARY CHIEF”,
BBC, 2022

“EVALUATING THE RUSSIAN THREAT TO UNDERSEA
CABLES” (LAWFARE, MARCH 5, 2022). ON HOW IT COULD
HAPPEN…

BY THE END OF THIS CENTURY’S SECOND DECADE,YET ANOTHER
MOVE, UPPING THE STAKES: RUSSIAN YANTAR 4000, A NEW CLASS
OF HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL MILITARY SHIPS,
WITH MINI-SUBS

HERE GOES: RUSSIAN YANTAR OBSERVED
THROUGH THE PERISCOPE OF A US SUB;
HERE, IN THE PERSIAN GULF

LOSHARIK DELTA, A SPECIALIZED CLASS
OF RUSSIAN SUBS DESIGNED TO
TARGET OPTICAL CABLES

A DETAILED VIEW OF A LOSHARIK SUB

SMALL BUT MEAN: A SENSE OF SCALE

WHAT WE THINK THEY LOOK LIKE INSIDE
A LOSHARIK CUTAWAY

A MAJOR DISASTER
IJULY 1, 2019, AS THE 14
RUSSIAN OFFICERS DIED
IN A SECURITY INCIDENT
“WHETHER OR NOT THE
SUBMARINE’S TITANIUM HULL
AND NUCLEAR REACTOR WERE
DAMAGED IS NOT CLEAR.
BUT MOSCOW’S
DETERMINATION TO RETRIEVE
THE DEEP-DIVING VESSEL,
BELIEVED CAPABLE OF
TAPPING INTO UNDERSEA
INTERCONTINENTAL INTERNET
CABLES, IS NOT IN DOUBT”.

KOMMERSANT SAYS KREMLIN OFFICIALS HAVE DELIBERATELY EXPLODED
SEVERAL SIMILAR BATTERY PACKS SINCE THE ACCIDENT TO DETERMINE
WHAT COMPONENTS FAILED — OR IF THE LOSHARIK HAD BEEN SABOTAGED.
THE PICTURE BELOW: “THE FUNERAL OF THE 14 OFFICERS KILLED IN THE
(JULY 1ST 2019) LOKSHARIK DISASTER”.

WELL, INSECURITY,YES. BUT EVEN WITHOUT THE RUSSIANS, REALLY
SERIOUS VULNERABILITIES: LAUNCHING THE INTER ISLAND CABLE FROM TOCO
WHILE THE CABLE SHIP INTREPID WAITS OFFSHORE TO BEGIN LAYING THE CABLE
ON THE SEA FLOOR BETWEEN TOBAGO AND TRINIDAD. IS THIS SAFE? ARE WE
REALLY THAT STUPID?

ONCE MORE, IS THIS SAFE?

NOW, REALLY, IS THIS THE SAFE WAY TO
GO? SUBMARINE FIBER-OPTIC CABLES FOR
ALL TO SEE

AN ABSURD CARELESSNESS: OPTICAL CABLES AT HAND, END OF 2016,
EARLY 2017. WELL, IT DOESN’T LOOK SAFE TO ME, NOT WHEN EVEN PENGUINS
KNOW WHERE THESE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES ARE... EVEN PINGUINS CAN
SEE THEM...

WHEN WE TAKE THESE RISKS, ARE WE STUPID? YES,
WE ARE.
OBVIOUS VULNERABILITIES
(TUMON BAY CABLE LANDING)

A VERY TANGIBLE LACK OF SECURITY;
SUBMARINE FIBER-OPTIC CABLES
FOR ALL TO SEE

PORTUGAL.
OPTICAL CABLE SAT 3, ARRIVING AT THE BEACH,
SESIMBRA, 2001

CABLE WORKS, SESIMBRA, 2009

LOW TECH HIG-TECH, 2017: “PHILIPPINES’ GLOBE-TELECOM
STRENGTHENS CONNECTIONS TO BORACAY WITH SUBSEA
FIBER-OPTIC CABLE. SECURE?

HERE IS HOW IT ALL WORKS, IN ONE
EXAMPLE: HOW INDIA IS CONNECTED

TO THE INTERNET

NOW, BACK TO CONTEXT AND
INTERPRETATIONS, AS I CLAIMED: GIVING IT ALL
CONTEXT: “WORLD MAP OF INTERNET USERS”,
RE-SCALED

FOCAL POINTS: DISTRIBUTION-LOCALIZATION OF
FRIENDSHIP SHARING ON FACEBOOK, AT THE END OF
SECOND DECADE …

WHAT A WONDERFUL WORLD, 2016: PAUL BUTLERS MAP OF LOCAL, REGIONAL,
AND GLOBAL FACEBOOK FRIENDSHIPSTHE CLEAR PREFERENCE OF MULTIPLE
CONNECTION HUBS TO THE LOCAL, ‘THE ECONOMIY, STUPID’ , DEMOGRAPHY,
AND RISING PATTERNS OF URBANIZATION. A TRULY “GLOBAL
VISUALIZATION OF EVERY CONNECTION BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE ON
FACEBOOK”

A VERY SIMILAR MAP;THIS ONE CHARTING
CURRENT GLOBAL GDP DENSITY

SIMILAR, BUT NOW WHEN LOOKING AT TWITTER
(NOW X):THE SO-CALLED GEOLOCATED TWEETS, 2015;
ECHOES OF GALLOPING URBANIZATION AND OF
GROWTH IN THE ECONOMY. TO

BREAKING IT DOWN AND CHECKING ;THE MOBILITY FLOWS OF
TWITTER USERS BETWEEN 58 CITIES, 2015. THE TWITTER CITY
FLOWS – A REPEATED PATTERN? IT DID NOT CHANGE MUCH AFTER
TRUMP’S DEFEAT – HIS IS A PRETTY POOR FLOP....

ARE ELON MUSK’S STARLINKS A GAME CHANGER?
STARLINK IS NOW AVAILABLE IN OVER 50 COUNTRIES AROUND
THE WORLD. PEOPLE ORDERING
FROM AREAS MARKED “AVAILABLE” WILL HAVE THEIR STARLINK
SHIPPED IMMEDIATELY” LINK: HTTP://STARLINK.COM/MAP

POLITICALLY ‘CENTRALIZED’ ACTION VS. DECENTERED
CHOICES:
AN EXAMPLE OF SELECTIVITY AS CONCERNS THE OLD SOCIAL MEDIA: COUNTRIES
COMPRESSED OR STRECHED ACCORDING THE THE NEWS ON THEM PUBLISHED BY
GUARDIAN ONLINE, FROM 2010 TO 2012

“THE INTERNET GROWS UNDERWATER
SUBMARINE CABLES ARE THE BACKBONE OF THE GLOBAL COMMUNICATION
INFRASTRUCTURE, ACCOUNTING FOR AROUND 95 PERCENT OF ALL
TRANSATLANTIC DATA TRAFFIC, ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL CABLE
PROTECTION COMMITTEE. THERE ARE 530 ACTIVE OR PLANNED SUBMARINE
CABLES AS OF 2022.”. “WORLD MAP OF ACTIVE AND PLANNED SUBMARINE
CABLES”

AND CHINA? BACK THEN, AND BECAUSE RISKS RARELY HAPPEN
ALONE: ASIA SENTINEL, JANUARY 31, 2019 - “TAIWAN FEARS CHINA
COULD CUT UNDERSEA CABLES”.
WELCOME TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD (DIS)ORDER...

STILL IN THE PAST – THE AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS TIMES,
OCTOBER 22ND, 2019: “THE SHIP GEOEXPLORER IN CHILE
AT THE START OF SUBMARINE EXPLORATION FOR AN
UNDERSEA CABLE PROJECT BY HUAWEI MARINE.”

IN THE AUSTRALIAN, OCTOBER 22ND, 2019: “HUAWEI MARINE NETWORKS, MAJORITY-OWNED BY THE
CHINESE TELECOM GIANT, COMPLETED A 6000KM CABLE BETWEEN BRAZIL AND CAMEROON IN
SEPTEMBER. IT RECENTLY STARTED WORK ON A 12,000KM CABLE CONNECTING EUROPE, ASIA AND AFRICA
AND IS FINISHING UP LINKS ACROSS THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA IN MEXICO. ALTOGETHER, THE COMPANY
HAS WORKED ON SOME 90 PROJECTS TO BUILD OR UPGRADE SEABED FIBRE-OPTIC LINKS, GAINING FAST
ON THE THREE US, EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE FIRMS THAT DOMINATE THE INDUSTRY”. IT IS NW MUCH
LARGER…
UHHH!?!?

TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE.

THE COLONIAL PIPELINE MOVES FUEL OIL FROM TEXAN
REFINERIES TO CITIES ON THE US’ EAST COAST, ENDING AT WASHINGTON DC. APPROXIMATELY
380 MILLION LITRES OF OIL WOULD FLOW THROUGH IT ON AN AVERAGE DAY, BUT ON 7

MAY 2021, THIS STOPPED. THE HACKING GROUP DARKSIDE DEMANDED PAYMENT TO BRING
THE PIPELINE BACK ONLINE, KNOWN AS A RANSOMWARE ATTACK. THEIR INTRUSION INCLUDED
BILLING AND ACCOUNTING SOFTWARE USED BY COLONIAL PIPELINE, CAUSING THE COMPANY TO
SHUT
SYSTEMS
DOWN
TO
PREVENT A POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS
SPREAD……
ACT

WHEN “ONE YEAR ON FROM THE COLONIAL HACK, CYBERSECURITY IS NEVER

FAR FROM MIND."

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME BY THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, DO HEREBY
PROCLAIM OCTOBER 2022 AS CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS MONTH

JANUARY 2022, THE FOLLOWING WAS NEWS: “RUSSIAN SUBMARINES
CUTTING UNDERWATER CABLES IS 'ACT OF WAR', UK DEFENCE
CHIEF WARNS”
THE SUNDAY TIMES,2022: “DEFENCE FORCES ASSESS RISK TO SUBSEA
CABLES AMID FEARS OF RUSSIAN ATTACK”

ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, NEW
ATLANTICIST, JANUARY 31, 2022
Cord-cutting, Russian style: Could the Kremlin sever global internet cables? YES IT COULD. AND
DID.

TO NO ONES’ SURPRISE, A COUPLE OF YEARS ON
MOSCOW MOVED, RUSSIA MONITOR,
WARSAW INSTITUTE, 17 JANUARY, 2022:
RUSSIA’S ATTACK ON NORWAYS’
SVALBARD/SPITZBERGEN CABLES,
JANUARY 7, 2022
“One of two undersea fiber optic cables which provide vital internet
connection and communications links between mainland Norway and
the Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic Ocean was put out of action on
January 7. The new chief of the UK defense staff told Russia any attempt
by submarines at damage would be treated as act of war. In recent
months, Russian vessels have been active close to cables linking the
United States and Europe.”
• https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-cripples-natos-undersea-communications/

• CLICK ON THE LINK ABOVE TO READ THE RATHER
DETAILED, IF BRIEF, POLISH REPORT

POLITICO, SEPTEMBER 29, 2022:
“WILL RUSSIA ATTACK UNDERSEA INTERNET CABLES
NEXT?
ATTACKS AGAINST TWO NATURAL GAS PIPELINES HAVE
RAISED CONCERNS THAT UNDERSEA CABLES CONNECTING
THE WORLD TO THE INTERNET ARE AT RISK.”

WEAPON OF SUBMARINE OPTICAL CABLE! HUAWEI IS BACKED BY
GERMANY AND FRANCE, BREAKING THE US MONOPOLY”, HOW AND
WHY? “THE U.S. REFUSES TO BUILD INEWS, MARCH 24TH, 2022 (SO, CLOSE
TO THE ‘INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE).
ARE WE STUPID? YES, WE ARE… TOTALLY DUMB

SUBMARINE TELECOMS FORUM
SEPTEMBER 22, 2022
GEOPOLITICS OF SUBSEA CABLES IN THE
ARCTIC

Hcheck the link
ttps://subtelforum.com/stf-mag-feature-geopolitics-of-subsea-cables-in-the-arctic/

HERE IT IS: THIS IS WHAT THE DAMAGED SVALBARD CABLE
LOOKED LIKE WHEN IT CAME UP FROM THE DEPTHS
EXCLUSIVE PHOTOS SHOW THE DAMAGE IN DETAIL. THESE MAY EXPLAIN

WHAT HAPPENED, BUT THE QUESTION OF GUILT, OR OF
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY, REMAINS…

A FEW MORE IMAGES OF THE SVALBARD RUSSIAN
ATTACK ON ONE OF THE TWO EXTANT OPTICAL
CABLES

HERE, NORWEGIAN POLICE IMAGES FROM THE SEABED NEAR
SVALBARD, FILMED WITH AN UNDERWATER DRONE, SHOW
THE AREA WHERE THE DAMAGE OCCURRED. THE IMAGE IS

TAKEN FROM THE DOCUMENTARY SERIES APTLY
ENTITLED
"PUTIN’S SHADOW WAR."

BACK TO NOWISH, AGAIN WITH CHINA: SLO/HELSINKI, OCT 18, 2023
(REUTERS) - A NORWEGIAN NAVY SHIP SHADOWED A CHINESE CONTAINER SHIP INVESTIGATED
OVER DAMAGE TO A GAS PIPELINE AND A OPTICAL COMMUNICQATIOS CABLE IN THE GULF OF
FINLAND FOR ABOUT 15 HOURS
HTTPS://WWW.REUTERS.COM/WORLD/EUROPE/NORWEGIAN-NAVY-SHADOWS-CHINESE-VESSEL-PROBEDOVER-BALTIC-PIPE-DAMAGE-2023-10-18/

CRUSSIA, BACK ON STAGE
BACK ON

ON STAGE
IN EASTERN BALTIC, IN 2023;
HERE IS THE OCTOBER 7 TRIP AS
FOLLOWED…

SCOTTISH DAILY EXPRESS, OCTOBER 26, 2022, ECHOING BRITISH MILITARY INTEL:
FEARS THAT RUSSIA COULD LAUNCH DEEP WATER ATTACK ON BRITISH UNDERSEA
CABLES AND PIPELINES
“THE UK SHOULD FOCUS ON PROTECTING UNDERSEA ENERGY AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE FROM RUSSIAN ATTACKERS”, A
LEADING EXPERT WARNS

ATLANTIC COUNCIL, September 2021
yber-defense-across-the-ocean-floor-The-geopolitics-of-subma
rine-cable-security.pdf
ENERGY, Industry Review, March 2022
ks-and-security-threats/

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, June 2022
02557/EXPO_IDA(2022)702557_EN.pdf

SO, AND WHAT ABOUT THEN, IN LATE 2023?
“EUROPE AND NATO HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED
ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
AROUND AND UNDER THE BALTIC SEA.”
VILNIUS/HELSINKI, Oct 27 (Reuters) - The three incidents that resulted in damage to a
gas pipeline and two telecom cables between Estonia, Finland and Sweden "are
related", Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said. (…) Finnish police leading the
pipeline investigation have named the Hong-Kong-flagged container carrier NewNew
Polar Bear as the prime suspect in damaging the gas pipeline early on Oct. 8
CHECK THIS:
Anne Kauranen and Terje Solsvik (October 10, 2023),Finland says 'outside activity' likely
damaged gas pipeline, telecoms cable
cted-pipeline-leak-media-2023-10-10/
AND ALSO:
Andrius Sytas and Anne Kauranen (October 27, 2023), Three Baltic pipe and cable incidents
'are related', Estonia says
-2023-10-27/

AS A REACTION, CHECK WHAT THE UK WAS DOING IN LATE
2023, HOW THEY WERE REACTING:
“AS THE FIRST MULTI-ROLE OCEAN SURVEILLANCE (MROS) SHIP IS FORMALLY NAMED AND
BROUGHT INTO SERVICE TODAY (OCTOBER 10, 2023), WE HAVE COMPILED A BASIC GUIDE TO THE
SHIP AND ITS POTENTIAL FUTURE OPERATIONS”. (…) “RFA PROTEUS WILL BE DEDICATED TO
SAFEGUARDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE (CUI) FOLLOWING INCREASING CONCERN
ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS CABLES “ND ENERGY PIPELINES TO
INTERFERENCE BY HOSTILE STATES”.

HERE IS THE BRITISH DEFENSE SHIP PROTEUS,
DEDICATED TO SAFEGUARDING CRITICAL
UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE (CUI)

“RFA PROTEUS WILL BE DEDICATED TO SAFEGUARDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE
(CUI) FOLLOWINGINCREASING CONCERN ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS
CABLES AND ENERGY PIPELINES TO INTERFERENCE BY HOSTILE STATES. MROS A HIGH-PROFILE
PROJECT FOR THE NAVY, WAS INITIATED UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF FORMER DEFENCE SECRETAR
BEN WALLACE WHO UNDERSTANDABLY CANCELLED THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP PROJECT IN
FAVOUR OF MROS. DESPITE BEING A ‘GOOD NEWS STORY’ WITH SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC
RESONANCE, IN A BIZARRE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT DECISION, THE MOD HAS EXCLUDED
JOURNALISTS FROM VISITING THE SHIP OR COVERING THE NAMING CEREMONY.
ACCORDING TO THE BRITISH ROYAL NAVY, “THE BIGGEST CONCENTRATION OF VULNERABLE
INFRASTRUCTURE FROM A UK PERSPECTIVE IS CLEARLY IN THE NORTH SEA AND THIS WILL
PROBABLY BE THE MAIN FOCUS. THERE ARE ALSO CRITICAL DATA CABLES CONNECTING EUROPE
WITH NORTH AMERICA IN THE ATLANTIC AS WELL AS INSTALLATIONS OF INTEREST TO THE UK
AND NATO PARTNERS IN THE BALTIC AND NORWEGIAN SEA. RFAS ARE NOT USUALLY
PERMANENTLY BASE-PORTED LIKE RN VESSELS BUT SHE IS LIKELY TO OPERATE OUT OF
PORTLAND AND PORTSMOUTH. TO BE EFFECTIVE, A SINGLE MROS VESSEL MUST BE P ART OF A
MUCH WIDER EFFORT. IN FEB 2023 NATO ESTABLISHED A NEW CUI COORDINATION CELL AT ITS
HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND INDUSTRY
STAKEHOLDERS. THE SABOTAGE OF THE NORD STREAM PIPELINE IN SEPT 2022 RESULTED IN A
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED NATO PRESENCE AROUND KEY INFRASTRUCTURE INVOLVING
WARSHIPS AND MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT. THE SCALE OF INSTALLATIONS THAT STRETCH
OVER HUNDREDS OF MILES AND THE COST OF OPERATING CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ASSETS
MAKES IT UNSUSTAINABLE TO MAINTAIN A CONTINUOUS WATCH ON ALL CUI. RFA PROTEUS WILL
LIKELY ACT AS A PATHFINDER FOR GREATER SURVEILLANCE UTILISING OFF-BOARD
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS AND WILL HOPEFULLY INSPIRE OTHER NATO NATIONS TO MAKE SIMILAR
INVESTMENTS”.
NAVY LOOKOUT, INDEPENDENT ROYAL NAVY NEWS AND ANALYSIS (OCTOBER 10, 2023), A GUIDE TO
RFA PROTEUS – THE UK’S NEW SEABED WARFARE VESSEL
THE FULL LINK: HTTPS://WWW.NAVYLOOKOUT.COM/A-GUIDE-TO-RFA-PROTEUS-THE-UKS-NEW-SEABED-WARFARE-VESSEL/

AS THE FIRST MULTI-ROLE OCEAN SURVEILLANCE (MROS) SHIP IS FORMALLY NAMED
AND BROUGHT INTO SERVICE TODAY (OCTOBER 10, 2023), WE HAVE COMPILED A
BASIC GUIDE TO THE SHIP AND ITS POTENTIAL FUTURE OPERATIONS”. (…) “RFA
PROTEUS WILL BE DEDICATED TO SAFEGUARDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA
INFRASTRUCTURE (CUI) FOLLOWING INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT THE
VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS CABLES AND ENERGY PIPELINES TO
INTERFERENCE BY HOSTILE STATES”.

YES, “EUROPE AND NATO HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY
CONCERNED ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE AROUND AND UNDER THE BALTIC SEA”…

FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO SPEAK FRENCH,
AN OVERVIEW
FLORIAN MANET (5 NOVEMBRE, 2023), “THALASSOPOLITIQUE
DES FONDS MARINS, THÉÂTRE D’UNE NOUVELLE
CONFLICTUALITÉ INTER-ÉTATIQUE ?”, DIPLOWEB.COM, LA
REVUE GEOPOLITIQUE

HERE IS THE LINK:
HTTPS://WWW.DIPLOWEB.COM/THALASSOPOLITIQUE-DES-FONDS-MARINSTHEATRE-D-UNE-NOUVELLE-CONFLICTUALITE-INTER-ETATIQUE.HTML

MVING ON TO THE SO-CALLED “SMART
CABLES”: UNDERSEA CABLES CAN DETECT
EARTHQUAKES—AND MAY SOON WARN OF
TSUNAMIS

OLDISH NEWS, BACK TO THE FUTURE: DRONES THAT CAN
GRAFT ON TO AND, WITH AI, SIFT THROUGH MUCH OF THE BIG
DATA BY USING GEOLOGICAL, SEISMIC AND THERMIC SENSORS
"Dr Sidarth Kaushal, a Research Fellow at the Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI), has further warned such a move had the potential to cause
“massive disruption”, especially when it came to financial transactions. ...Dr
Kaushal told Express.co.uk Russia has a “whole host of deep diving
capabilities” at its disposal, including unmanned drones. He added: “They
are not only for cutting cables but also for things like in placing sensors on
seabed floors, which is one of their major functions.”

RUSI (UK’s Royal United Services Institute), inNov. 3,
2022
Here, again, goes a link:
-drones-could-cause-massive-disruption-severing-internet-cables

NATO TURNS TO UNDERWATER DRONES AND AI IN BID TO
DETER RUSSIA
“ALLIANCE TESTS NEW TECH TO BETTER MONITOR UNDERWATER LINKS
NORD STREAM BLASTS ONE YEAR AGO HIGHLIGHT UNDERSEA CHALLENGE”.

BLOOMBERG, 28 SEPTEMBER, 2023

A drone during the Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping with Maritime
Unmanned Systems (REPMUS) NATO exercise in Troia, Portugal. Source: NATO
Link:

CHANGING TACK: THE GROWTH OF A
WORLD MARKET FOR SUBMARINE
PHOTOVOLTAIC POWER CABLES, 2022-2026

SUBMARINE POWER CABLES. THE PURPOSE OF SUBMARINE POWER
CABLES IS THE TRANSPORT OF ELECTRIC CURRENT AT HIGH
VOLTAGE.
THE ELECTRIC CORE IS A CONCENTRIC ASSEMBLY OF INNER
CONDUCTOR, ELECTRIC INSULATION, AND PROTECTIVE LAYERS,
RESEMBLING THE DESIGN OF A COAXIAL CABLEAL CABLE).

CNN. ANGELA DEWAN, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EDITOR, JUNE 26, 2024

“THE GROUP WANTS TO BUILD WHAT WOULD BE THE WORLD’S
LARGEST SUBSEA ENERGY INTERCONNECTOR BETWEEN
CONTINENTS, LINKING EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA WITH
THREE PAIRS OF HIGH-VOLTAGE CABLES. THE CABLES WOULD
STRETCH MORE THAN 2,000 MILES ACROSS THE ENTIRE FLOOR
OF THE ATLANTIC OCEAN TO CONNECT PLACES LIKE THE
UNITED KINGDOM’S WEST WITH EASTERN CANADA, AND
POTENTIALLY NEW YORK WITH WESTERN FRANCE.
THE INTERCONNECTOR WOULD SEND RENEWABLE ENERGY
BOTH EAST AND WEST, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SUN’S
DIURNAL JOURNEY ACROSS THE SKY.
“WHEN THE SUN IS AT ITS ZENITH, WE PROBABLY HAVE MORE
POWER IN EUROPE THAN WE CAN REALLY USE,” SAID SIMON
LUDLAM, FOUNDER AND CEO OF ETCHEA ENERGY, AND ONE
OF THE TRIO OF EUROPEANS LEADING THE PROJECT. “WE’VE
GOT WIND AND WE’VE ALSO GOT TOO MUCH SOLAR. THAT’S A
GOOD TIME TO SEND IT TO A DEMAND CENTER, LIKE THE EAST
COAST OF THE UNITED STATES.”
“FIVE, SIX HOURS LATER, IT’S THE ZENITH IN THE EAST COAST,
AND OBVIOUSLY, WE IN EUROPE HAVE COME BACK FOR
DINNER, AND WE GET THE REVERSE FLOW,”.

MY LAST TAKES, ARE OF THE FOURTH TYPE OF
CRITICAL SUBMARINE INFRASTRUCTURE THAT SHALL
NEED PROTECTION:
HERE, ONGOING A BIDIRECTIONAL POWER CABLE
TAKING ELECTRICTY FROM ITALY TO GREECE AND
FROM GREECE TO ITALY.

THE FOURTH TYPE OF SUBMARINE INFRASTRUTURE WILL NEED
PROTECTION: PHOTOVOLTAIC POWER CABLES. A GOOD EXAMPLE
IS NAMELY THE PERHAPS UP AND COMING 6GW NORTH
ATLANTIC TRANSMISSION ONE-LINK: ONE PRIVATE
COMMERCIAL EXAMPLE, NATO-L

• NATOL will connect North America to Western
Europe via Eastern Canada and UK & Ireland
through a 6GW HVDC set of subsea cables.
• The length of the cables is 3,500 kms or 2,200
miles.
• The link will be carrying only “green electronsˮ,
between allies, strong load demands zones,
active
financial
markets, and
developed
economies.

THE EU AND NATO: HERE GO SOME LINK SO
HAVE BEEN MOVING TO REGULATE AND ACT
ON THE EVER-GROWING RISKS

• Links for the EU 2022 Christian BUEGER, Tobias LIEBETRAU, Jonas FRANKEN
European Parliament
document:https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/702557/EXPO_IDA(2
022)702557_EN.pdf

• As for NATO. In May 23, 2024, NATO held its first meeting of Critical Undersea Infrastructure

• Google them, please…

A PRIVATE EURO-NORTH AMERICAN CONSORTIUM IS
BETTING ON THIS. IS IT A “UNICORN” OR A JOKE? THE
PITCH COULD SOUNDS ABSURD, BUT MAY WELL,
NEVERTHELESS,
BE
FULLY
FEASIBLE…

Already, energy cables run between several countries in Europe,
most of them allied neighbours. (…) The UK, where land space for
power plants is limited, is already connected with Belgium,
Norway, The Netherlands and Denmark, mostly under the sea.
The Consortium has signed up to a solar and wind link with
Morocco to take advantage of the North African country’s many
hours of sunlight and strong trade winds that run across the
equator”.
Some background support; Italy proposes to feed electrical energy to
Greece via 1 GW cables; the Annoucement came in November 2023.
Here goes a link:
terconnection-cable/
Australia is betting on photovoltaic submarine cables to send electrical
energy to Singapore.

NOOR ENERGY'S SOLAR POWER PLANT OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL MOROCCAN TOWN
OF OUARZAZATE ON THE EDGE OF THE SAHARA DESERT. FADEL SENNA/AFP/GETTY
IMAGES

SOLAR POWER PLANTS, LAND OR MARINE WINDMILLS PRODUCE ELECTRICITY
THAT CAN BE BIDIRECTIONALLY SEND BY PHOTOVOLTAIC SUBMARINE CABLES.
THEY SHALL FACE SIMILAR SECURITY RISKS FROM MALEVOLENT ACTORS AS DO
OPTICAL
INTERNET
CABLES…

HERE GOES A USEFUL RATHER RECENT DOUBLE BLIND PEER-REVIEWED
ACADEMIC ARTICLE.
A FEW MORE PDFS WILL BE AVAILABLE IN OUR WHATSAPP GROUP.
JUST CHECK AND INCORPORATE THEM HERE…

Frontiers | “The Contribution of Submarine Optical Fiber
Telecom Cables to the Monitoring of Earthquakes and
Tsunamis in the NE Atlantic”
November 29, 2024
Armando Marques-Guedes
UNL - New University of Lisbon, Faculty Member
Armando Marques Guedes
Studied Government at the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas (ISCSP), Social Anthropology at The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), in Paris. He was awarded a summa cum laude Doctorate in Social and Cultural Anthropology by the Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas (FCSH), Universidade Nova de Lisboa, where he was from 1990 to 1999, and his Agrégation in Law at the NOVA School of Law (NSL, UNL) in 2005..
Received a Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation longterm scholarship, a University College, London (UCL) Mary Scharlieb Scholarship, another from The British Museum (Museum of Mankind), and more than half a dozen others throughout the years. Was elected Ivor Evans Fellow, University of Cambridge, and also Tweedie Fellow, University of Edinburgh; this allowed him to live for 3 years in the Philippines northern tropical rainforest with Atta hunter-gatherers, to write his PhD on their politics and rituals .Academically, he became, at FCSH, Professor of Anthropology, then Theory and History of Ideas, and then also Political Studies. He was made a Professor honoris causa in History, by and at the University of Bucharest, Romania.
He is a Tenured Full Professor (beginning in 1999-2000, now retired, since late 2022) of the NOVA School of Law, UNL of the Instituto Universitário Militar (IUM), Ministério da Defesa, where he for 22 years was the professor responsible for Geopolitics, and at the Instituto Superior de Ciências Policiais e Segurança Interna (ISCPSI), Ministério da Administração Interna, in those two now also retired.
Professionally, among other posts held, he began as first Cultural Counsellor at the Portuguese Embassy in Luanda, Angola, for 5 years. Later, he was President of the Instituto Diplomático, at the Portuguese Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros and Director of Policy Planning of the same Ministry, and President of the General Assembly of the Portuguese Society of International Law (SPDI), in Lisbon.
He is the author of twenty one books and over one hundred and thirty articles, and a member of over twenty scientific societies, both in Portugal and abroad. He carried out intensive fieldwork in the Philippines, in Angola, São Tomé e Príncipe, Cape Verde, and East-Timor. His work has been published in 15 countries and in 12 languages, and he has given papers and/or organized courses in 43 countries.
My Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2622-3312

Estudou Administração Política no Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas (ISCSP), Antropologia Social na London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), e na École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), em Paris. Doutorou-se em Antropologia Social e Cultural na Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas (FCSH), Universidade Nova de Lisboa, onde esteve de 1990 até 1999. Agregou-se em Direito na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Nova de Lisboa (NSL, UNL) em 2005.
Recebeu uma bolsa de longa duração da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, outra do University College, London (UCL) a Mary Scharlieb Scholarship, outra ainda do British Museum (Museum of Mankind) e mais de meia dúzia de outras ao longo dos anos. Foi eleito Ivor Evans Fellow, University of Cambridge e também Tweedie Fellow, University of Edinburgh; o que lhe permitiu passar 3 anos na floresta tropical húmida no norte das Filipinas, onde viveu com caçadores-recoletores Atta, sobre cujos ritos e política redigiu o seu Doutoramento. Foi nomeado Professor honoris causa em História, pela Universidade de Bucareste, na Roménia.
É Professor Catedrático (jubilado em finais de 2022), de nomeação definitiva, da NSL, UNL, na qual esteve desde 1999 e até 2022, do Instituto Universitário Militar (IUM), Ministério da Defesa, onde foi durante 22 anos o professor responsável pela Geopolítica, e do Instituto de Ciências Policiais e Segurança Interna (ISCPSI), Ministério da Administração Interna, também jubilado nestas duas desde 2022.
Profissionalmente, entre outras posições, foi o Primeiro Conselheiro Cultural da Embaixada Portuguesa, em Luanda, Angola, depois Presidente do Instituto Diplomático, no Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Director de Policy Planning do mesmo Ministério, e Presidente da Assembleia Geral da Sociedade Portuguesa de Direito Internacional (SPDI), em Lisboa.
É autor de vinte e um livros e mais de cento e trinta artigos e membro de mais de uma vintena de Sociedades científicas, cá e no estrangeiro. Fez trabalho intensivo de terreno nas Filipinas, em Angola, São Tomé e Príncipe, Cabo Verde, e Timor-Leste. Os seus estudos foram publicados em 15 países e 12 línguas, e fez conferências e/ou organizou cursos em 43 países.
O meu Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2622-3312
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Emmie Hine
2024
The international network of submarine cables plays a crucial role in facilitating global telecommunications connectivity, carrying over 99% of all internet traffic. However, submarine cables challenge digital sovereignty due to their ownership structure, cross-jurisdictional nature, and vulnerabilities to malicious actors. In this article, we assess these challenges, current policy initiatives designed to mitigate them, and the limitations of these initiatives. The nature of submarine cables curtails a state's ability to regulate the infrastructure on which it relies, reduces its data security, and threatens its ability to provide telecommunication services. States currently address these challenges through regulatory controls over submarine cables and associated companies, investing in the development of additional cable infrastructure, and implementing physical protection measures for the cables themselves. Despite these efforts, the effectiveness of current mechanisms is hindered by significant obstacles arising from technical limitations and a lack of international coordination on regulation. We conclude by noting how these obstacles lead to gaps in states' policies and point towards how they could be improved to create a proactive approach to submarine cable governance that defends states' digital sovereignty.
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Legal regime regulating the laying and protection of submarine cables in the Republic of Croatia
Sandra Tominac Coslovich
Pomorstvo, 2021
One of the strategic development priorities of the Republic of Croatia is the development and construction of a modern telecommunications network and the availability of high-speed Internet throughout its territory, especially in rural areas and on islands. To enable this, it is important to build a reliable and resilient communication infrastructure. With the cooperation of all stakeholders in the construction, from telecom operators to local and state administrations responsible for the maritime demesne, and with efficient legislation, it is possible to achieve sustainable development of submarine cable infrastructure. The paper provides an overview of the legal aspects of submarine optical cable infrastructure design and application at the national and international levels. Special attention is dedicated to the analysis of a national legal regime regulating the protection and sustainable use of submarine cables. Thus, the authors will provide critical analysis of a kind of dualis...
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SUBMARINE CABLES IN THE ARCTIC: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Anjali Sugadev
SubOptic, 2019
The 21 st century is often called the "century of the Arctic". Due to melting of sea ice, the Arctic has been a source of continuous development in various fields like shipping, oil and gas explorations and so on. One such activity that has begun to be experimented is the laying of submarine cables, passing through the polar ice as an alternative route to its conventional counterpart around the Mediterranean or Cape Horn connecting Asia, North America and Europe. Against this background, the paper will look closely into the cable regime under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the context of the Arctic region (including the exception clause under Article 234 for ice-covered areas) and relevant international and area-specific legal instruments governing the Arctic. The interplay between these instruments and the unilateral national regulations in the Arctic along with the laws governing the potential effects of cable laying and repairing on the sensitive marine ecosystems of the Arctic will be scrutinized. The study will prove useful for companies planning to develop an arctic route, for policy-makers, lawyers and students.
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Protecting Submarine Cable Infrastructure through Satellite Surveillance + Artificial Intelligence
Lars Hilse
2025
Submarine cables are critical to global connectivity. They transmit over 99% of global data traffic. Yet they are also crucial for the energy security of Europe, for instance, where they transmit power between nations. Their vulnerability to accidental damage and deliberate sabotage has become increasingly evident, particularly with the rise of “shadow fleets”, which refers to vessels that operate covertly to evade detection. Traditional methods of tracking like AIS and radar systems, have repeatedly proven insufficient in addressing these sophisticated threats. This paper suggests the merger of satellite surveillance and artificial intelligence (AI) as a scalable and proactive solution for protecting subsea cable infrastructure against these threats. By leveraging satellite imagery, AI-driven methods like anomaly detection, and predictive analytics, this approach offers unparalleled capabilities in monitoring vessel movements, threat detection through “unusual behaviour”, and swifter responses to incidents. Additionally, the deployment of SMART cable technology can help to enhance underwater situational awareness. This paper details the implementation of such framework, as well as evaluating its advantages over existing technologies, and underscores its potential to mitigate economic and geopolitical risks associated with cable disruptions.
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Law of the Sea and Environmental Law acting together: Experience of laying submarine cable in the Arctic
Daria Shvets
Revista Catalana de Dret Ambiental
All states have the right to lay submarine cables on the seabed according to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 1982 (LOSC). Unlike submarine pipelines, cables are generally considered being environmentally friendly, having minimum impact on the marine environment. Currently, there are several projects on submarine cables planned to be laid in the Arctic. In particular, the Quintillion Subsea Cable System is an ongoing large-scale project, which major part will go through the Arctic waters. Despite mostly local and moderate disturbance to the environment in other regions, it causes certain concerns regarding the influence on the Arctic environment due PARAULES CLAU: Cables submarins-LOSC-Àrtic-Protecció mediambiental-Codi polar-Dret del mar. PALABRAS CLAVE: Cables submarinos-LOSC-Ártico-Protección del medio ambiente-Código polar-Derecho del mar. LIST OF CONTENTS: I. Introduction. II. Historical background. 1. The 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables. 2. The 1958 Geneva Conventions a) Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958. b) Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958. III. Current legal regulation of submarine cables under the LOSC. 1. Maritime zones under the coastal states jurisdiction. 2. Maritime zones where coastal states enjoy certain rights. 3. Maritime zones beyond coastal states jurisdiction. IV. Submarine cables and the environment. V. Projects of submarine cables in the Arctic. 1. Completed projects. 2. Proposed projects. 3. The current project of Quintillion Subsea Cable System. VI. Environmental law aspect of submarine cables in the Arctic. 1. Application of the precautionary principle. 2. The Polar Code requirements for cable ships. VII. Conclusion. VIII. Bibliography
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Data as Sovereign Rights and UNCLOS: Protection of Undersea Cables through Legislative Mechanisms
Dr. Pooja Bhatt
NATO 4th Maritime Security Conference Proceedings, 2025
This working paper argues that while undersea cables are largely owned and operated by private conglomerates, the transnationality of data being transferred between various nations should be seen enough for using the 'sovereign rights' clause for their protection in the EEZ, Archipelagic waters and High Seas. It invokes the United Nations Convention for the Laws of the Seas that provides rights to the coastal states in these maritime zones. Data flowing in and out of a country needs to be seen as a sovereign property that travels through the undersea cables that would allow states to build their domestic and regional laws and mechanisms. This would also allow like-minded nations to pool their resources and form undersea cables protection task forces that can preemptively avoid an attack, espionage, and damage from state or non-state actors and also legislate against the perpetrators as a remedial measure. In case of damage to the cable, the task force can help safeguard the civilian repair ships that might have to operate in unstable or unfavourable natural or geopolitical conditions. As an additional measure, this paper also suggests that maritime law enforcement agencies of the nations and also at the transnational level must attempt to be members of the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), a multinational organization that protects the world's submarine cables.
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