Beyond Exceptionalism? New Security Conceptions in Contemporary Switzerland (Contemporary Security Policy)

Beyond Exceptionalism? New Security Conceptions in Contemporary Switzerland JONAS HAGMANN The collapse of the traditional Swiss threat image – war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact – in 1989 – 1990 seriously challenged the country’s traditional militarist and isolationist national security frameworks. As these issues began to be debated as Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 truly overt political struggles for the first time, two major disputes emerged in the 1990s. In the first, experts and politicians debated the basic themes that national security policy was to be actually concerned with. While one camp argued in favour of continuing the traditional military-centred conception, another advocated a policy framework that also addressed broader environmental, economic, and societal security challenges. The second controversy focused on foreign policy impli- cations of non-traditional security challenges. While some came to see security as best assured by international cooperation, national-conservative circles maintained that only continuation of neutrality would keep the country free from international security dilemmas. Both of these disputes arose in the early 1990s. By the turn of the millennium, disagreement had risen to such levels that scholars diagnosed an unprecedented and alarming erosion of the national security policy consensus. However, both debates have gradually lost salience since. The pronouncedly internationalist security strategy of 1999 remains alive and well. Internationalist security projects such as preparation of peacekeeping battalions, accession to the United Nations, membership in the Schengen and Dublin treaty systems, have won approval by national popular referendums. Nationalist-conservatives no longer proved able to decide the outcome of such votes. This observation raises the question of whether, in recent years, a new security and foreign policy consensus has been emerging in the Swiss public policy arena. This article addresses this question based on a methodologically mixed research design. In this design, qualitative analyses of governmental documents, parliamen- tary transcripts, and newspaper commentary trace the emergence and evolution of the two intertwined debates inside the Swiss arena. The results of the first comprehen- sive elite survey are used to map and differentiate current elite perspectives quanti- tatively. This approach is underpinned by the understanding that the views and opinions of elites matter to security politics, as elites effectively inform and lead public debates. It also is based on the understanding that deep case studies of the pro- duction and evolution of ideas are required in the security realm, and that qualitative and quantitative research methods can actually be fruitfully joined.1 Contrasting these mixed data, this article shows that conceptions of national security and assessments of Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.31, No.2 (August 2010), pp.249–272 ISSN 1352-3260 print/1743-8764 online DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2010.491367 # 2010 Taylor & Francis 250 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY foreign policy responses have stabilized, in new forms, amongst a surprisingly signifi- cant majority of Swiss policymakers. This stabilization, the article argues, is driven by two reasons. Disputes over the conceptual focus of security policy have been mitigated through an egalitarian enlargement of the scope of official security policy in the late 1990s. Focusing on ‘manifestations of violence’ rather than armed conflict, this conceptual reformu- lation transcended the traditional confrontation between military and civilian under- standings of national security. By making traditional, exclusionary, categories of contestation redundant, this facilitated the reconstruction of a new consensus among policy-makers. Over the years, new issues such as organized crime, inter- national terrorism, and climate change were acknowledged as viable national secur- ity challenges, independent of whether they were categorized as military or civilian Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 in nature. At the same time, post-Cold War foreign policy implications also became less contested among policy-makers, though dissent persists. The stabilization of this debate is derived from the consolidation of a broader globalized threat image among experts and policy leaders. In this view, current security challenges to Switzerland are no longer understood as exclusive national, but as collective themes shared, inevitably, with Europe and the international community. This perception of Switzerland caught up in the same security context as other states is novel. Opposing the traditional view of Switzerland as an exceptional country that stays aloof from the conflicts of others, it provides powerful, and for Swiss debates unprecedented, internationalist foreign policy rationales. These ratio- nales for intergovernmental cooperation prove all the more compelling because non- state actors, rather than foreign governments, are today identified as the primary source of contemporary security challenges. With this image of the international gaining traction, continuation of the historical, isolationist interpretation of neutrality is increasingly difficult to justify. Moving beyond an exceptionalist self-understand- ing, Swiss elites have come to embrace security in European terms. This article is structured in three sections. The first presents traditional Swiss security policy and foreign affairs assumptions and describes the breakdown of this consensus in the 1990s. The second section focuses on the evolution of the national security debates since the year 2000. Advocating a dedicated focus on elites as public agenda-setters, it continues to draw on qualitative data to suggest a gradual stabiliz- ation of the two debates in the early 2000s. The third section turns to quantitative survey data. Mapping the results of a first national elite survey onto different analyti- cal respondent segments, it shows how security policy has been conceptually recon- structed along new lines. Looking at foreign policy rationales, it also shows a convergent recognition of global threats and consequently, reliance on self-interested justifications for international cooperation in security affairs. The conclusion points to the practical policy implications of these shifts, such as the prospects for European defence cooperation or NATO membership. After discussing the extent to which the Swiss debates are representative for other small, post-modern states in Europe, it asks whether this new agreement can endure. BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 251 Historical Legacy: From Dogma to Debate With their strong public reverberations, the disputes of the 1990s stand in stark con- trast to the policy orthodoxy of the Cold War years, when government doctrines and parliamentary discussions left little doubt that Swiss security was exclusively a mili- tary affair. As the speaker of the lower house’s Military Commission, as the Defence Committee was called back then, suggested in 1966; ‘When designing a [security] doctrine, we must limit ourselves to the most probable forms of war. Anything else is unrealistic and utopian.’2 Like others, Swiss policy-makers had recognized the threat of military confronta- tions as the most destructive form of violence, consequently establishing armed conflict as the overriding national security concern. But the military framing of national security Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 was not the only dogmatic policy fixation of the time. Neutrality policy, too, went com- pletely unchallenged by critical discussion during that period. In this dogmatic and specifically ‘Swiss’ view, neutrality and autonomous defence effectively ‘removed’ the country from the tense security relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The understanding that a detached position outside of these two blocs provided ‘better’ national security than a merger of forces with obvious allies, the (mostly) democratic liberal NATO countries, was directly motivated by Switzerland’s positive experiences of neutrality during the Franco-German war of 1870–1871, World War I, and World War II.3 The unqualified assertion of neutrality in parliamentary discussions, here in the early 1970s, is telling; ‘That it would be irresponsible to abandon the principle of neutrality [. . .] does not need special justification; it is self-evident.’4 Also, rather romanticized popular images of the historical origins and cultural significance of Swiss neutrality shielded the government policy from critical engage- ments at home.5 At times, such framings even went so far as to deny the very nature of neutrality as policy: Neutrality is [. . .] a whole complex of attitudes, feelings, habits to which prac- tice has given birth little by little. It is a living thing, [. . .] born of fortuitous circumstances.6 As part of the very definition of Switzerland itself, neutrality is not a mere option chosen in view of particular circumstances [. . .] and not the result of a certain assessment of national interests at any given time.7 Until the later Cold War years, both the military and the isolationist conceptions of national security were hence deeply engrained in the public policy arena – ensur- ing not only an enduring and stable policy framework, but also permitting massive investments into the armed forces’ equipment and infrastructure. Although discus- sions on security affairs did take place during that period, they were largely confined to technical military issues: Should the conscript army be transformed into a more mobile force structure? Was nuclear armament necessary? What challenges did electronic warfare pose?8 With this, discussions on security affairs were essentially restricted to a small community of high-ranking military officers.9 Asserting expertise and leadership, these elites were neither willing nor eager to stimulate larger public discussions about national security. 252 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY Only by the 1970s did challengers to these established positions emerge, largely from a heterogeneous group of peace activists and ecologists; the Social Democratic Party had been accepted into the Swiss grand coalition government and began to challenge the framework of autonomous military defence. Nonetheless, the concep- tualization of official doctrines as such remained fully in the hands of the established policymaking circles, which devoted considerably more attention to the latest American, British, and French strategic thinking than to contending proposals from domestic civil society. Indeed, as their public visibility increased, domestic demands for broader policy conceptions were rather suppressed than embraced. The Swiss Peace Council’s prop- osition for gradual and partial disarmament for instance, was denounced as utopian and irresponsible – even treacherous – in parliament.10 In another episode, govern- Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 ment officials published a manual against what they regarded as the ‘subversive demands’ of the trade unions, peace activists, intellectuals, artists, professors, journalists, and priests. Still in the late 1980s, challenges to the militarist doctrine were publicly denounced as signs of ‘moral decadence’ and ‘hedonism’.11 During the Cold War, then, policy reproductions – and very rarely, policy refor- mulations – derived almost exclusively from independent decisions of established, small policymaking circles. The identification of economic supplies as a factor of national security in the 1970s, for instance, merely echoed these policymakers’ reading of Anglo-American doctrinal thinking, i.e., a concern that oil embargos could paralyse military arsenals.12 Still, critical positions did not go completely unnoticed. The 1979 security doctrine, for instance, acknowledged for the first time a holistic approach to ‘comprehensive defence. . . concerned with so-called wider challenges to the population including food and health safety’. But the doctrine forcefully reasserted a focus on ‘security politics proper, that is, the mitigation and prevention of actual threats posed to the country’.13 This authoritative focus on armed conflict was fully supported by the ruling political parties, all the more so after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.14 As shown below, only since the 1990s was the military-centred and isolationist conception of national security challenged more forcefully. Critiques of Military Security Indeed, genuinely open public debates on national security unfolded only after the revolutionary events of 1989 – 1990. As elsewhere, the Cold War’s end also marked the end of stable and totalizing military threat images in Switzerland, even if, in contrast to other European nations, this threat image was focused on the clash of both blocs rather than a single bloc’s political project. What was more, national voting on a popular initiative for abolition of the armed forces happened to coincide with the fall of the Berlin Wall. With 35 per cent voter support, this initiat- ive received surprisingly substantial popular backing, challenging the military- centredness of Swiss security policy. In this way the international revolutions and domestic voting results interacted to pose a significant test to the defence establish- ment. This test was challenging the government, all the more given that it had just BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 253 FIGURE 1 THE SWISS ISLAND OF PEACE AND ITS LABORS OF LOVE. THE TRADITIONAL SWISS SECURITY CONCEPT PORTRAYED IN A POSTCARD FROM 1917. Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 Notes: The rays of hope for the world include: relief to refugees, repatriation of evacuees, care of sick POWs, exchange of civilian internees, information on troops missing in action, exchange of the seriously injured, care of war orphans, infor- mation on persons in war zones, and relaying prisoners’ mail. Source: # Zentrum fu¨r Elektronische Medien, reproduced with permission. revised the national doctrine. The procurement of new fighter jets, which the doctrinal update advocated, became more difficult to justify in the new context.15 Soliciting inputs from security scholars, the drafters of the 1990 doctrine reacted to the situation by prefixing a new threat assessment to the unpublished text.16 Since the late 1980s, scholars had argued that societal change and economic modernization 254 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY required broader conceptualizations of national security.17 In stark contrast to earlier government policy, the 1990 doctrine so came to identify HIV/AIDS, drug-related organized crime, energy shortages, declining birth rates, resources overuse, natural disasters, and food dependency as current national security challenges.18 However, even though these themes were discussed, they were also categorized as secondary topics. Although mentioned in the new doctrine, they were not considered part of ‘security policy proper’, which remained exclusively limited to questions of armed conflict. With this subordination the traditional focus on military security instruments was not being discussed at all. The continuing reliance on ‘old’ military instruments for ‘new’ security chal- lenges may have moderated traditionalists’ opposition to policy redefinitions sub- sequently. Namely, although the primacy of territorial military homeland defence Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 had initially been upheld,19 new issues such as environmental disaster relief and inter- national peace support were soon framed as ‘mitigating effects resembling armed conflict’.20 In this way they were co-opted into the conscript army’s mission basket. Outside the ministerial circles, however, positions became much more conten- tious. In the legislature, dominant centrists were critical but approved the governmen- tal doctrine, which in its earlier versions almost always had been accepted unanimously.21 Fringe parties, in contrast, openly challenged the national strategy. Ecologists forcefully disqualified the document as ‘completely removed from people’s real concerns’, while national-conservatives rejected the broadening of security policy as a ‘perfidious assault on the army as a national institution’.22 Since 1990, then, the earlier consensus on the nature and content of national security showed signs of deterioration. When a foreign policy document restated armed conflict as primary security concerns, and issues such as migration, organized crime, and underdevelopment as secondary security concerns in 1993, for instance, the parliamentary Defence Committee went so far as to formally challenge the Foreign Policy Committee’s review competence.23 Similar to debates in other European countries, Switzerland’s conception of security had hence become widely contested, and an unprecedented broad and intense public debate unfolded. Throughout the decade, it remained uncertain what the essential characteristics of Swiss security policy were or should be. Challenges to Dogmatic Neutralism Critiques of Switzerland’s neutrality strategy came to parallel this security debate. Swiss foreign policy, it has to be recalled, traditionally sought to achieve national security through permanent neutrality, that is, the precautionary avoidance of any international commitment that could later, in the event of an actual armed conflict, associate Switzerland with a warring faction. Doctrinally, neutrality policy was subdivided into an ‘economic’ and a ‘political’ component. This meant that neutral Switzerland was allowed to associate with seemingly apolitical organizations such as the European Free Trade Association, but it was not permitted to join defensive pacts or customs unions.24 During the Cold War, the neutrality policy was consensually supported by the political elites, interest groups, and the Swiss people. Backed by a large conscript BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 255 army, it was conceived as a particularly independent national security strategy. Yet in practice, and in stark contrast to its independentist framing, neutrality was not void of international components. Neutrality’s effectiveness, as successive governments realized, derived less from domestic assertions than international recognition. Since neutrality protects from international conflict only when belligerent parties respect such a status, its acceptance had to be gained abroad. Formally, Swiss foreign policy thus not only consisted of neutralite´, but also universalite´, solidarite´, and disponibilite´.25 These doctrinal addenda suggested that Switzerland was a willing mediator between warring parties. Practically, they empowered selective Swiss con- tributions to international security such as truce supervision missions, diplomatic good offices, and humanitarian aid. Despite these international dimensions, however, neutrality continued to be pre- Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 sented in public as a strictly independentist, and at times morally superior policy; any proactive foreign affairs initiative was quickly dismissed as an improper departure. It was not until 1973 that the government recognized diplomacy as a possible contri- bution to national security. But even this fleeting pondering of foreign affairs was the product of domestic party politics.26 Parliamentarians made clear that it did not herald a strategic change towards a proactive enlisting of allies.27 Much as in the case of the security debate, however, the dogmatic (though in fact inaccurate), isolationist understanding of neutrality came to be criticized too. Remarkably, early critiques of neutrality policy did not suggest abandoning neu- trality, for instance, for the purpose of allying with NATO. Instead, tensions inside policymaking circles emerged from governmental efforts to obtain further inter- national recognition of Swiss neutrality. In the 1970s and 1980s, such recognition was sought via membership in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and accession to the United Nations. In both cases, membership was promoted to validate permanent neutrality.28 Over the years, however, the idea of UN membership, which was officially justified to better position Switzerland’s solidarity efforts, became subject to strong political contestation. In 1986, national- conservative policymakers, supported by industry leaders fearing political entangle- ment, successfully defeated a national referendum on UN membership. In their view, accession would have betrayed the national interest of remaining aloof from external conflicts.29 Similar to the re-conceptualization of security, the foreign affairs dimension was subject to unprecedented controversy during the Cold War’s final years. The public salience of these discussions quickly grew. The cautiously more internationalist outlook of the incoming 1990 security doctrine, for instance, was immediately con- tested. In 1990, that outlook had still been based on a discourse of solidarity, i.e., ‘a universal need to combat [the] poverty and to eradicate suffering’ of others. Until the mid-1990s, however, fear of international isolation constituted what was probably the most central rationale for a slightly less isolationist foreign policy agenda. Especially after the rejection of European Economic Area membership by popular vote in 1992, the government announced its ‘deep concerns with diplomats’ inability to influence international framework agreements’.30 These concerns notwithstanding, national- conservatives forcefully maintained the traditional isolationist interpretation of 256 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY neutrality as the only viable foreign policy choice. In their view, ‘[o]ne has to remain disentangled from the power politics clique. This is why we should develop our solidarity in the area of humanitarian aid [. . .]. This is true peace policy!’31 In the mid-1990s, this political rift deepened. In 1994, the so-called Blauhelmge- setz, a federal law to establish a dedicated international peacekeeping battalion, was again justified as an international solidarity contribution and an instrument of good offices. That is to say, it was promoted as an altruistic strategy and not to improve Switzerland’s own security.32 But here too, national-conservatives convinced the electorate that such solidarity was costly financially and would embroil the country in the problems of others.33 Between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, national-conser- vatives successfully campaigned against a more internationalist interpretation of neu- trality. Seemingly, governmental justifications for international contributions had Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 failed to strike a chord with the electorate, and so the international dimension was given much lower profile: By rotation, the presidency of the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE) fell to Switzerland in 1995, providing diplomatic rationales for deployment of a few Swiss yellow berets to Bosnia. By executive decree and almost without telling the public, the government also joined NATO’s loose and non-binding Partnership for Peace consultation and training framework in 1996. But national-conservatives resisted even such low-profile activities, and debates between isolationists and internationalists were heated throughout the 1990s. Towards New Policy Conceptions Considering the increasing salience of the intertwined policy debates on security and foreign affairs, and recognizing the stark contrast with their Cold War orthodoxy, it is not surprising that by the year 2000, researchers observed a strong erosion of the national security policy consensus also among the population: While the Swiss population had supported military national defence almost unanimously during World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, citizens came to adopt extreme positions. On the one side, there was profound doubt about the desirability and effectiveness of classical defensive instruments. On the other side, the preservation of proven remedies was sought by ardent conventionalism. The polarization of security policy perspectives was con- nected to the fact that Swiss security policy had essentially been reduced to military policy before.34 This assessment echoed the results of large-N surveys of the Military Academy and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Eidgeno¨ssische Technische Hochschule, or ETH Zurich) on questions of national security and foreign affairs.35 It also reflected the polarization of views amongst the political elites. Indeed, it seems plausible that the divergence of elite views is a key explanatory factor for the popular positions. In public discourse-setting, elites play fundamental roles framing and directing public debates,36 including in the security realm.37 This is not to deny that popular views play an important role in construction of BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 257 political positions, especially in Switzerland where popular referenda form a vital part of policymaking. Nevertheless, as studies of voter responsiveness to partisan campaigning and analyses of parliamentary receptiveness to governmental foreign policymaking have shown, public policymaking is, content-wise, remains elite- and expert-driven in Switzerland, too, notwithstanding the instruments of direct democracy.38 The following sections of this article focus more closely on the elite positions, arguing that the political stances that they have recently been adopting have stabilized both the debate on security politics and the controversy about foreign affairs implications. Reconstruction of the Security Policy Consensus? Qualitative data lend weight to the argument that conceptual discussions have gradu- Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 ally been brought to a new and differentiated agreement in the new millennium. An important catalyst for this reconstruction appears to have been the reversal of tra- ditional conceptual categories in the 1999 security doctrine. Drawing on the rec- ommendations formulated by its preparatory commission, this doctrine no longer departed from an a priori focus on armed military conflict. Instead of defining secur- ity only in military terms, it directed attention to the generic notion of ‘violence of strategic extent’ – thus acknowledging issues such as organized crime, weapons pro- liferation, or migration as equally viable current security challenges.39 In contrast to the earlier debates, this new conception was barely challenged at all in the legislature; representatives from all parts of the political spectrum lent support, qualifying this new framework as ‘excellent’, ‘realistic’, or ‘incontestable’.40 One reason for this sudden support may have been the integrative process that produced the 1999 doctrine. With unprecedented outreach, the preparatory commission had brought together over 40 representatives from the public and private sectors, anchor- ing security politics more broadly.41 However, a seemingly more important factor for the longer-term evolution of debates was the 1999 doctrine’s specific, non-discriminatory conceptual outlook. The focus on ‘violence of strategic extent’ ruled out smaller, local security problems, skilfully avoiding federal intervention in cantonal and communal prerogatives. But since the core notion of ‘violence’ is an elastic one, the expression provided a conceptual umbrella for a wide array of themes.42 In practical terms, this meant that the identification and recognition of security problems was no longer guided by an a priori focus on military violence or classical war. Broader civilian themes could be accorded legitimate recognition, and they would not have to be relegated to inferior status. By no longer giving weight to traditional conceptual categories, the 1999 doctrine outflanked the constitutive registers of ongoing disputes, breaking new ground on which a new consensus could be negotiated. Indeed, few voices chal- lenged the new national security framework as such. Follow-up discussions such as that on USIS, an integrated reassessment and realignment of homeland security struc- tures, also suggested that policymakers no longer challenged threats such as terror- ism, organized crime, and environmental degradation.43 From this point of view, it is not surprising that influential commentators identified neither a demand nor a need for a policy revision in the mid-2000s.44 258 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY Triumph of the Cooperative Security Strategy? Debates on foreign affairs have stabilized in recent years. The term ‘stabilized’ does not imply that the topic has become non-controversial. There is little doubt that important groups remain engaged in tense, emotional, and at times populist opposition. Public opinion also remains sceptical.45 Nonetheless, all four related national voting projects of the early and mid-2000s – authorization of international military training in 2001, arming international peacekeeping deployments in 2001, UN membership in 2002, and the Schengen and Dublin accords in 2005 – were accepted by popular vote. Similarly, qualitative data also support the claim that discussions stabilized amongst policy leaders. National-conservative quarters, especially the Swiss People’s Party, still challenge any international dimension of national security, Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 arguing that international cooperation is costly and ineffective, and that only tra- ditional neutrality will keep Switzerland safe. In 2001, advertising images of cemeteries with fallen conscript soldiers were used to warn against foreign entangle- ment. One year later, UN membership was rejected based on vague concerns about entanglement in ‘conflicts of others’.46 Nationalist leaders argued that, At the UN glass palace in New York, Switzerland would have to take position in each and every power struggle [. . .]. When we associate with the problems of others, we are in danger of becoming implicated in war.47 In 2005, association with the Schengen and Dublin accords was criticized for opening borders to ‘uncontrollable waves of organized crime’.48 Despite traditionalist opposition, however, and contrary to popular votes the 1990s, the electorate approved all four post-2000 security projects. Even if these votes were narrowly decided, a strategy of soft opening had become successful. As internationalist policy projects win more popular support, it appears plausible that the very transformation and convergence of political agenda-setting work helped bring this result about. Effectively, internationalist campaigners had rather congruently revised their strategies in the early 2000s. While international security cooperation had been justified as solidarity contributions to others’ problems in the early 1990s, and then as a way of avoiding international isolation, ‘self-interested’ rationales have been stressed since the late 1990s and early 2000s. Elites no longer justified Swiss contri- butions as a means to solidify international recognition of neutrality, but as responses to security challenges that Switzerland has come to share with others. This change was not fully synchronous. Some quarters adopted the new self-interested rationales faster than others. At the turn of the millennium, some internationalist parliamentarians combined old and new rationales. Commenting on the 1999 doctrine, one centrist representative, for instance, argued that ‘[o]ur legitimate self-interests, though also our solidarity, are determining our contributions to international peace and security.’49 Federal authorities in contrast more consistently shifted their foreign policy argu- mentations away from the traditional solidarity rationale. Today’s conflicts no longer challenge us in moral way. Instead, they affect us very directly through effects that do not stop at neutral borders [. . .]. The threats we oppose today are no longer primarily military in nature, but more diffuse. BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 259 They cannot be mastered autonomously. They can only be countered though international cooperation.50 Gradually, internationalists arrived at the novel view that Switzerland’s safety was inevitably being challenged by the security context’s new and inherently trans- national nature, an understanding also connected to their recognition of new and non-traditional security challenges. The 1999 security doctrine and the 2000 foreign policy report, for example, argued: The current threats are transnational. They affect our neighbours and partners as they do us. They can only be successfully solved through international cooperation, to which we are contributing our own strengths.51 Globalization does not only characterize economic and cultural activities. Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 States’ security problems are becoming increasingly global as well: terrorism, organized crime, criminal sabotage of critical infrastructure, and the production of and trade in narcotics are dangers that increasingly disturb the international community. Switzerland is required to cooperate with other states if it is to find effective and sustainable solutions to the major contemporary issues [. . .]. The response to modern dangers must become more efficient. This includes measures against organized crime, the production of drugs and drug trafficking, money launder- ing, and terrorism.52 Only secondarily was it also ‘an international [moral] responsibility of our country to contribute to peace and security.’53 This particular, and for Switzerland novel, understanding of the international context was repeated and successively expanded during the four popular votes of the early 2000s.54 Arguing that the security context had become inherently transna- tional, internationalists identified the need for a more cooperative neutrality policy. With this, they also disqualified the traditionalist view of Swiss non-entanglement. The earlier, restrictive neutrality policy – designed as a direct response to the threat of armed inter-state conflict – came to be seen as little help protecting the population from complex, non-military and transnational security challenges. UN membership campaigners provide some of the most explicit examples of such rejec- tions of the national-conservatives’ ontology: Each and every instability has direct implications for Switzerland [. . .]. It is wrong to argue that we can take refuge to an island because world society is ‘bad’ [. . .]. This is stylized nationalist romanticism [. . .]. The question is not whether we associate ourselves with the problems of others – we are implicated anyway. The question is how to deal with this implication [. . .]. It lies in our own interest to cooperate with each other.55 The world in which we live is based on interdependence. Conflicts, tensions, environmental catastrophes, and drought, famine, and poverty – the crises are constantly taking broader dimensions and no longer respect political borders [. . .]. Each and every state needs a stable environment, yet, confronted with these complex situations, none of them can claim to act alone.56 260 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY Taken together, then, qualitative data support the argument that both the security policy controversy and the foreign affairs debate associated with it have stabilized since the late 1990s, but for different reasons. On the one hand, the broad and non- hierarchical extension of the very notion of security politics proper had outflanked the constitutive conceptual registries of this particular controversy, facilitating con- struction of a new consensus. On the other hand, increasingly widespread recognition of an inherently transnational security context has been paralleled by the advance- ment of self-interested foreign policy arguments, rationales which were augmented by the recognition of new and non-traditional security issues themselves. Both the new security conception and the new foreign policy rationales were increasingly shared by the broader electorate, as the popular votes of the early 2000s confirm. Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 Elite Conceptions of National Security Today If these qualitative arguments are correct, they should also resonate in the quantitative data of the Swiss elite survey conducted in the winter of 2008. If the definitional debate about security policy has been reconstructed outside the traditional conceptual categories, one would expect a convergence of views on a new and not necessarily military definition of top security themes. If this perspective has stabilized among FIGURE 2 SWISS ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL HENRI GUISAN ADDRESSES MILITARY LEADERS ¨ TLI. ON 25 JULY 1940 AFTER THE FALL OF FRANCE, RU Note: The oath of the Swiss confederacy was sworn at Ru¨tli in 1307, preparing the country for defence in the ‘National Redoubt’. Source: RDB/ATP, reproduced with permission. BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 261 elites, a majority should frame the international context in terms of transnational challenges. At the same time, they should also converge on internationalist foreign policy rationales, with demands for solidarity being less important than self- interested rationales of national security effectiveness and efficiency. Survey Background Elite surveys are difficult to conceptualize, not least because the concept of ‘elite’ is often construed in divergent ways.57 In the sociological perspective adopted here, elites are neither understood in classical terms of classes, nor in the more rationalist understandings of formal institutional power positions. Instead, and in order to capture ideational perceptions on security and foreign affairs, the notion of elite focuses on individuals recognized as most capable steering public debate on these Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 issues. The notion of elite adopted here focuses on individuals whose organizational, material, legal, or intellectual resources allow them to influence the emergence and circulation of ideas in this relevant public policy arena.58 The identification of individuals is methodologically demanding. As Pierre Bour- dieu has shown in his seminal work on academic influence, there are countless criteria that can be applied to identify influential individuals.59 Sociological and ethnographic studies, however, have suggested that reputation analyses can effectively mediate this methodological problem. Through chain-referral sampling – one elite designating other elites – it is possible to empirically construct and purposively sample an extended network of policy leaders. Arguably, this sociological identification strategy allows insider informants to weigh various forms of policy leadership resources against each other, thus providing a practicable methodology for elite identification.60 The Swiss elite survey, the first of its kind, was conducted through a questionnaire and direct interviews.61 Chain referrals identified 84 respondent candidates across a broad range of governmental and non-governmental institutions and groupings. Of these candidates, 44 participated in the survey. Almost all respondents occupied the highest positions in their respective organizations. Based on this approach, judging from expert reactions to the survey design and conduct, and considering the close congruence of the results with the self-representations of the institutions and political parties covered, there is strong confidence that in the small Swiss polity, the community of security and foreign affairs policy-makers has been captured representatively. In the following presentation, the survey results were regrouped at an intermedi- ary analytical level to avoid individual institutional profiling, and to permit compari- son with the national level (i.e., aggregation of all responses). In the analysis here, these categories were loosely specified as military and defence institutions, federal (civilian) administration, political parties, the research and the specialized press (see Table 1). This ideal-typical differentiation follows the model of Jordan et al., who proposed this broader role-differentiation in the case of American security pol- icymaking.62 In this view, the military elites and government officials are understood to be representative of important institutional and bureaucratic interests. Parties are seen as governed by logics of political competition, while the research community and press fulfil a watchdog function by providing (largely) independent external analysis. Differentiating and contrasting these four analytical segments allows us 262 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY TABLE 1 INSTITUTIONS AND PARTIES COVERED BY ELITE SURVEY Analytical segments Institutions and parties Military and defence Air Force Doctrine, Armed Forces College (HKA), Army Doctrine, Central School (ZS), Chief of Staff IR Section (IBV), Directorate for Security Policy (DSP), Directorate for Strategic Intelligence (SND), Federal Council Security Commission (SiA), General Staff School (GS), Military Academy (MILAK), Swiss Armed Forces International Command (SWISSINT) Federal civilian Agency for Development and Cooperation (DEZA), Federal Chancellery administration (BK) Crisis Management, Federal Office for Civilian Protection (BABS), National Conference of Cantonal Police Commanders, Foreign Affairs Division IV (PAIV/Human Security), Foreign Affairs Political Secretariat, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 Political parties Swiss People’s Party (SVP, 29% of votes in the 2007 federal election), Social Democratic Party (SPS, 19.5%), Free Democratic Party (FDP, 15.6%), Christian-Democratic Party (CVP, 14.6%), Green Party (GPS, 9.6%) Research and specialized Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift (ASMZ), ETH Zu¨rich Center press for Security Studies (CSS), Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung (NZZ), Swisspeace Bern to assess convergences and divergences of views on security policy and foreign affairs inside the Swiss policy arena, and thus to also better understand policymaking as a multifaceted and contestable negotiation process. Reconstruction of Security Policy Consensus Which phenomena constitute national security threats today? The survey results show how Swiss elites ranked 33 threat themes as more or less serious contemporary dangers. The results support the claim that there has been a convergence of views about the top security themes facing Switzerland today: the leading dangers were all rated at a similarly high level by the different respondents and their analytical seg- ments, with little variance among them. Only the more mid-level ranked themes – institutional ‘pet projects’ such as armed attacks on Switzerland – a high-priority notion for the military, or criminal foreigners – a favoured topic for parliament – are noticeably contested by individual analytical segments, and subject to debate as to whether they should be recognized as even more (or even less) relevant. By the same token, the results also suggest that security politics has indeed been reconstructed thematically. Although the top threat themes include issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, they are clearly not centred on classical military themes. Effectively, diverse issues such as organized crime, failing states, energy shortages, political radicalization, or even global poverty – and not inter-state war – lead the ranking (see Table 2 for prioriti- zations). Indeed, the danger of a military attack on Switzerland ranks among those security threats which elites judge least likely. The predominance of a non-traditional security conception can be confirmed by ideal-typical regrouping of the threat themes. In this view, military, political, BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 263 TABLE 2 ELITE PERSPECTIVES ON RELEVANCE OF CURRENT SECURITY THREATS ( PERCENTAGE AGREEMENT ON THREAT IDENTIFICATION) Analytical segments Research & Sector Threat National Military Admin. Parties Press POL Organized crime 100 100 100 100 100 MIL WMD proliferation 99 94 100 100 100 MIL International terrorism 96 94 100 90 100 POL Failed and failing states 95 94 94 100 93 EPH Energy shortages 94 89 100 100 88 POL Violent partisanship 94 89 100 90 95 Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 POL Global poverty 89 72 100 100 86 SOC Illegal immigration 87 89 100 80 81 EPH Global climate change 85 64 94 100 81 MIL Civil wars (in Europe) 84 83 75 90 88 SOC Drug trafficking 83 89 94 60 88 MIL Civil wars (outside Europe) 81 81 69 90 86 EPH Global pandemics 80 89 78 70 83 EPH Water shortages 78 58 100 70 83 SOC Trafficking in human beings 76 78 78 70 79 MIL Interstate wars (outside Europe) 75 81 61 80 79 MIL Small arms trafficking 75 67 100 80 52 POL Subversion/agitation by states 71 78 67 80 60 ECO Economic repression by states 71 75 75 60 74 EPH Food shortages 67 64 83 70 50 SOC Juvenile delinquency 65 64 39 80 79 SOC Criminal foreigners 65 64 56 80 62 ECO Economic globalization 65 61 58 60 79 SOC Demographic change 59 50 67 70 48 EPH HIV/AIDS 55 53 42 70 57 POL Dictatorships 53 50 56 60 45 MIL Interstate wars (in Europe) 52 50 67 50 40 ECO Unemployment 50 44 42 50 64 ECO Trade deficit 44 61 19 40 55 SOC Societal (values) change 42 28 39 60 43 MIL Direct military attack by foreign 35 47 33 40 19 state(s) SOC Legal immigration 26 17 14 60 14 SOC Domestic violence 25 17 14 40 29 economic, societal, and environmental and public health issues can be differentiated. As Barry Buzan has argued: Military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states’ perceptions of each other’s inten- tions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions of evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. 264 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.63 The coding of results in terms of these sectors reconfirms the argument that policymakers’ convergence on top-ranked security items is no longer guided by the conceptual categories of military versus non-military threats. Indeed, these ranked themes belong to a mixture of political, military, and economic sectors. Calculated across the full list, political themes clearly outweigh all others, with environmental and public health issues ranking second, military themes third, and economic and societal topics fourth and fifth (see Table 3 and the first column of Table 2). Taken together, this survey in late 2008 confirms a significant convergence of elite perspec- Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 tives on a broad and non-traditional understanding of national security. Convergence on a New Foreign Policy Strategy As shown in the qualitative section, the Swiss foreign policy debate is increasingly driven by contending readings of the international security context, each of which empowers different foreign policy arguments. The elite survey polled these different readings and argumentations. As regards the international security context, survey results show a convergence on perception of transnational, and increasingly global, collective security challenges (see Table 4, upper half). Only in parliament were views more sceptical towards toward this characterization, indicating that the traditional national-conservative conception of the security context is essentially limited to the political arena. Remarkably, not a single respondent suggested that current security challenges would be directed exclusively against Switzerland. The recognition of a collective security context is novel to Switzerland. It marks a considerable departure from the historical exceptionalist self-representations. Yet, it is not the only defining characterization of the current context. Indeed, the elite survey also shows, in another departure from traditional threat images, that non- state actors are judged to pose more important security problems than foreign govern- ments, and that they are expected to become even more prominent challenges in the near future (see Table 4, lower half). To be sure, foreign governments are still recog- nized as important, but mostly inadvertent, security challenges to Switzerland. TABLE 3 ELITE RANKING OF THREAT SECTORS ( PERCENTAGE AGREEMENT ON THREAT IDENTIFICATION) Analytical segments Threat ‘sectors’ National Military Admin. Parties Research & Press Political (POL) 84 81 86 88 80 Environmental and public health (EPH) 77 70 83 80 74 Military (MIL) 75 75 76 78 71 Social and societal (SOC) 59 55 56 67 58 Economic (ECO) 58 60 49 53 68 Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? TABLE 4 ELITE READINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT ( PERCENTAGE AGREEMENT) Analytical segments National Military Administration Parties Research & Press Identified challenges Yes Partly No Yes Partly No Yes Partly No Yes Partly No Yes Partly No Only concern Switzerland – 19 81 – – 100 – 26 74 – 50 50 – – 100 European problems 98 – 1 97 – 3 100 – – 93 2 5 100 – – Global problems 69 21 9 61 39 – 71 29 – 61 1 38 86 14 – Increasingly global problems 82 12 6 100 – – 76 6 18 61 34 5 92 8 – Largely generated by states 22 38 39 6 30 64 35 41 24 22 39 39 29 42 29 Deliberately generated by states 11 31 57 – 42 58 26 15 59 5 51 44 14 19 67 Largely generated by non-state actors 57 28 14 50 28 22 24 44 32 87 13 – 69 31 – Increasingly generated by non-state actors 79 11 9 83 17 – 53 15 32 87 8 5 93 7 – 265 Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 266 TABLE 5 ELITE WEIGHTING OF FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES AND ARGUMENTATIONS (PERCENTAGE AGREEMENT) Analytical segments National Military Administration Parties Research & Press International security cooperation Yes Partly No Yes Partly No Yes Partly No Yes Partly No Yes Partly No Shield against technically complex threats 89 10 1 67 33 – 94 6 – 93 2 5 100 – – Secure other states, increasing Swiss security in return 89 1 9 94 6 – 100 – – 61 1 38 100 – – CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY Protect Switzerland 87 12 1 100 – – 100 – – 61 34 5 86 14 – Protect against increasingly global challenges 85 12 3 83 11 6 94 6 – 61 34 5 100 – – Intercept dangers before they reach national borders 80 11 9 100 – – 78 22 – 61 1 38 79 21 – Swiss international solidarity 74 13 13 92 8 – 81 19 – 66 2 32 58 23 19 Extorted as solidarity contributions 2 23 75 – 31 69 – 14 86 9 34 57 – 14 86 Undermines Swiss room for manoeuvre – 14 86 – – 100 – – 100 – 50 50 – 7 93 Not necessary to protect Switzerland 3 9 88 11 – 89 – 6 94 – 34 66 – – 100 No efficiency gains in security politics – 12 88 – 11 89 – 6 94 – 34 66 – – 100 Efficiency, resources lost to int. institutions 8 4 88 – 6 94 – 6 94 32 2 66 – 5 95 Undermines security, dangers by association 8 1 91 – – 100 – – 100 32 2 66 – 6 94 BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 267 This dominant conception of the international is directly reflected in the kinds of foreign policy strategies and arguments that Swiss elites approve of. There is pro- nounced support for a more internationalist, cooperative national security strategy, and there also is clear rejection of continuation of an isolationist strategy. At the same time, reflecting the emergent understanding of a shared transnational security context, this strategic orientation has is marked by a stronger emphasis on self-inter- ested foreign policy rationales rather than on traditional solidarity arguments. Again, it is the parliamentary arena that remains most sceptical towards an international security strategy, though this segment largely approves of it too (Table 5, upper and lower halves, respectively). Taken together, the survey results correspond with the qualitative arguments made earlier. They suggest that Swiss elites recognize a broad and non-traditional set of national insecurities; that they have started to Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 conceive of national security in collective terms – mainly European, though also increasingly global – and that they increasingly understand international security cooperation in self-interested terms. Conclusion The evolution of Swiss security thinking and policy-making has been substantial. On the one hand, the traditional military notions of security have been replaced by a less rigid policy predicated on challenges emanating from global violence. In the early 2000s, Swiss elite understandings of security are close to human security paradigms. This re-interpretation is translating into practical effects. The conscript army con- tinues to shrink. Public funding is redirected away from the military, to the point that outdated equipment is no longer replaced. This applies even to the air force, which in a traditionalist perspective is a centrepiece of national defence. In 2002, Swiss efforts at international civilian peace promotion were substantially expanded. Tellingly, these efforts to promote international democratic control of armed forces, peace-building, human rights protection, and schooling in humanitarian law are now led by the Foreign Ministry’s Human Security Division.64 Finally, there is a broad agreement for now – another consequence of the shift away from military security conceptions – that NATO membership is simply unnecessary in the current context. On the other hand, the traditional understanding of international politics too has essentially been replaced. No longer conceiving of the nation as an island of peace surrounded by rival powers, Swiss elites see the country sharing complex security challenges with the rest of Europe. In the 2000s, the consolidation of this novel view empowers an increasingly internationalist interpretation of neutrality. Since the turn of the millennium, the nation acceded to the United Nations, and to the Schengen and Dublin treaty systems. Swiss peacekeepers continue to work with other European forces for the stabilization of Kosovo. Bilateral security cooperation expanded as well. In 2003 and 2008, for instance, substantial European police forces were invited to Switzerland to help secure the G8 summit (held in neighbouring French Evian) and the UEFA European Football Championship (co-hosted by Switzerland and Austria). Similarly, newly concluded intergovernmental treaties with France, Italy, Austria, and Germany now allow the 268 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY respective air forces to use other countries’ airspace in the event of airborne terrorist threats, creating zones of mixed transnational security management. Remarkably, then, it is largely due to the recognition of new and non-traditional security agendas that Switzerland has recently been associating more closely with Europe. With its post-modern trajectory, it is tempting to perceive Switzerland as a case study of the wider transformation of European defence establishments. Yet, the neutr- alist legacy makes it difficult to generalize from Swiss security transformation or apply its lessons to comparable other European states such as Austria or Sweden. Clearly, however, Swiss security is increasingly conceived in continental terms today, and European states are increasingly seen as natural partners in the pursuit of national security. After decades of security policymaking based on military ratio- nales and an exceptionalist self-representation, Swiss elites have started to embrace Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 security as a multi-faceted and collective pan-European challenge. With the consoli- dation of these views, security arrangements with Europe are likely to expand. But this is equally likely to unfold in a piecemeal fashion: having privileged bilateral relations with the European Union rather than full membership, Switzerland cannot pursue comprehensive, non-military European security cooperation in supranational ways for the time being. By the same token, constitutional requirements for popular voting on major international treaties, combined with the national-conservative portrayal of the nation as an exceptional case, will permit little more than slow and incremental change. Will the emergent Swiss security conception endure? Security perceptions are always subject to reproduction and reinterpretation. The current national security policy overhaul, expected to be finalized in summer 2010, will become an important indicator of continuing evolution. Most likely, this overhaul will perpetuate newly established conceptions. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that traditional military themes will re-emerge in the near future. Classic military threats are difficult to identify in the European neighbourhood, and alternative, economic, migration- and energy-related challenges continue to dominate the domestic political arena.65 Whether the strategy of soft opening will endure on the foreign policy side as well, however, is less clear. Even though powerful impressions of security interdependence continue to flour- ish in the wake of globalization, and although a substantial political majority backs the strategy, domestic and international changes might stall further consolidation of the pan-European security perspective. Domestically, an influential traditionalist defence minister has come to office, raising doubts about the forthcoming doctrine’s foreign policy orientation. Also, the global economic recession has forced significant federal budget cuts, with particularly strong effects on international peace promotion program.66 Finally, diplomatic quarrels with Libya and confrontations with several European and North American countries over taxation further weaken assumptions of a shared security context. The new security conception, then, remains vulnerable to arguments for preservation of strict independence and non-entanglement. Even if Swiss security policy has been moving beyond exceptionalism in recent years, moving closer towards harmonization with Europe, the process of coming to see security through a continental perspective will remain a hard fight. BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 269 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I thank Curt Gasteyger, Chris Findlay, the anonymous referees and the editors of CSP for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. The usual disclaimers apply. NOTES 1. Henry Brady et al., ‘Toward a Pluralistic Vision of Methodology’, Political Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2006), pp. 353– 68. 2. This statement introduced the presentation of Switzerland’s first published national security doctrine. Schweizerischer Nationalrat (Swiss National Council, or lower house of parliament), ‘Milita¨rische Landesverteidigung’, Amtliches Bulletin, Item no. 9478 (1966), p. 475/National Councillor Harder. The translation of this and other German and French texts cited in this article are the author’s own. 3. Thomas Fischer, Die Grenzen der Neutralita¨t: Schweizerisches KSZE-Engagement und gescheiterte Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 UNO-Beitrittspolitik im kalten Krieg 1969–1986 (Zu¨rich: Chronos Verlag, 2004). Arguably, neutrality historically also served the national cohesion of the multilingual country and the consolidation of its elaborate, direct democracy-centered, political system. Daniel Thu¨rer, ‘Sicherheitspolitik und Neutra- lita¨t’, in Rene´ Rhinow (ed), Die schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im internationalen Umfeld (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1995), pp. 121–36. 4. Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Sicherheitspolitik: Bericht des Bundesrates’, Amtliches Bulletin, Item no. 11740 (1974), p. 771/National Councillor Barchi. With this statement, Barchi introduced the new 1973 national security doctrine to the legislature. 5. Luc van Dongen, ‘La me´moire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale en Suisse dans l’imme´diat apre`s-guerre (1945–1948)’, Schweizerische Zeitschrift fu¨r Geschichte, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1997), pp. 709– 29. 6. David Lasserre, Etapes du fe´de´ralisme: expe´rience Suisse (Lausanne: Rencontres Suisses, 1967), p. 229. 7. Jean-Jacques de Dardel, ‘New Challenges Facing Swiss Foreign Policy’, in Marko Milivojevic and Pierre Maurer (eds), Swiss Neutrality and Security: Armed Forces, National Defence and Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 126. 8. For instance Wilhelm Mark, ‘De quoi s’agit-il?’ Unvollsta¨ndige Konzeption der milita¨rischen Land- esverteidigung’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 132, No. 8 (1966), pp. 441– 3; Gustav Da¨niker, ‘Die Armee im Rahmen der neuen Sicherheitspolitik’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 139, No. 12 (1973), pp. 56– 7; Dominique Brunner, ‘Die milita¨rische Lage Europas (1. Teil)’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 142, No. 11 (1976), pp. 409– 12 and ‘Die milita¨rische Lage Europas (2. Teil)’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 142, No. 12 (1976), pp. 457 –9. 9. Kurt R. Spillmann et al., Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik seit 1945: Zwischen Autonomie und Kooperation (Zu¨rich: Verlag Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, 2001), p. 43. 10. Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Bericht des Bundesrates’ (note 4), p. 773/National Councillor Allgo¨wer. 11. See Herve´ de Weck and Pierre Maurer, ‘Swiss National Defence Policy Revisited’, in Marko Milivo- jevic and Pierre Maurer (eds), Swiss Neutrality and Security: Armed Forces, National Defence and Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 79ff. 12. Schweizerischer Bundesrat (Swiss Federal Council, or federal government), ‘Zwischenbericht zur Sicherheitspolitik’, Bundesblatt, Item no. 79.085, Vol. I (1979), p. 4; Lukas Landmann, ‘Gedanken zur Konzeption der milita¨rischen Landesverteidigung’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 146, No. 5 (1980), pp. 251 –7. For the Anglo-American debates, see for instance Robert Ellsworth, ‘New Imperatives for the Old Alliance’, International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1978), pp. 132– 48, or Stanley Hoffmann, ‘New Variations on Old Themes’, International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1979), pp. 88– 107. 13. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, ‘Zwischenbericht zur Sicherheitspolitik’ (note 12), p. 4. 14. The 1979 doctrine’s publication preceded the Soviet invasion; its parliamentary discussion followed to the invasion. Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Sicherheitspolitik: Zwischenbericht’, Amtliches Bulletin, Item no. 79.085 (1980), pp. 713– 34. 15. Ju¨rg Martin Gabriel, Szenarien schweizerischer Integrations- und Sicherheitspolitik (St. Gallen: Insti- tut fu¨r Politikwissenschaft, 1990); Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Sicherheitspolitik: Bericht 1990’, Amtliches Bulletin (1991), pp. 913/National Councillor Hubacher. 16. Especially the members of National Research Program NFP 11. 17. Jacques Freymond, La paix dangereuse (Neuchatel: Editions de la Baconnie`re, 1986); Beat Na¨f and and Kurt R. Spillmann, ‘Die ETH Arbeitstagung zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik vom 29. 270 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY Juni/7. Dezember 1987: Bericht und Auswertung’, Zu¨rcher Beitra¨ge, Vol. 4/5 (1987); Dominique Wisler, ‘Politique de Se´curite´: The´ories de la se´curite´’, Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik (1991), pp. 1– 6. 18. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, ‘Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel: Bericht 90 zur schweizer- ischen Sicherheitspolitik’, Bundesblatt, Vol. III (1990), pp. 8–14. 19. Kurt R. Spillmann, ‘Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik heute und morgen’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Mili- ta¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 155, No. 1 (1990), pp. 14–9; Ivan Rickenbacher, ‘Sicherheitspolitik: Anspruchsvoll wie noch nie’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 156, No. 6 (1990), pp. 329–31. 20. Andreas Ku¨hner, ‘Bewa¨ltigung von Katastrophen im “Bericht des Bundesrates zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel” vom 1.10.90’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 156, No. 5 (1991), pp. 252–3; Laurent F. Carell, ‘Die Friedensfo¨rderung im Spannungsfeld schweizer- ischer Sicherheitspolitik’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 159, No. 2 (1993), pp. 55– 9. 21. Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Bericht 1990’ (note 15), pp. 903– 7. 22. Ibid., p. 916/National Councillor Stocker and p. 918/National Councillor Reimann respectively. Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 23. Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den neunziger Jahren’, Amtliches Bulletin (1994), p. 180. 24. Rudolf Bindschedler, ‘Der Begriff der Neutralita¨t’, Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz, E 2800- 1990/106/8, DoDiS 9565 (1954). Arguably this differentiation wasn’t convincing for the Eastern bloc, however, which counted Switzerland in the Western camp. Mauro Mantovani, Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Kalten Krieg (1947-1963): Zwischen angelsa¨chsischem Containment und Neu- tralita¨tsdoktrin (Zu¨rich: Orell Fu¨ssli, 1999). 25. Or ‘universality, solidarity and stand-by duty’. See especially Max Petitpierre, ‘De´claration sur la pos- ition de la Suisse dans le monde et sa politique e´trangere, 16–17 septembre 1947’, in Louis-Edouard Roulet, Seize ans de neutralite´ active. Aspects de la politique e´trange`re de la Suisse (1945– 1961) (Neuchaˆtel: La Baconnie`re, 1980). 26. Having been excluded from a preparatory commission, the Social Democrats had temporarily adopted a contrarian stance. Spillmann et al., Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik (note 9), pp. 103–12. 27. Especially Schweizerischer Sta¨nderat (Swiss Council of States, or upper house of parliament), ‘Sicher- heitspolitik: Bericht des Bundesrates’, Amtliches Bulletin, Item no. 11740 (1973), p. 722/State Coun- cillor Hefti. Similarly Roger Mabillard, ‘Die Armee und unsere Sicherheitspolitik’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 145, No. 2 (1979), pp. 53–8 and Dominique Brunner, ‘Die stra- tegische Lage Europas um die Jahrzehntwende 70er/80er Jahre’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨r- zeitschrift, Vol. 146, No. 2 (1980), pp. 63–7. 28. Also, the quasi-universal membership of the two organizations appeared to make the participation of a neutral country unproblematic. Benedikt Von Tscharner, ‘Die Schweiz und die OSZE’, in Rene´ Rhinow (ed.), Die schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im internationalen Umfeld (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1995), pp. 73–86; Hansrudolf Hoffmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die UNO’, in Rene´ Rhinow (ed.), Die schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im internationalen Umfeld (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1995), pp. 57–72. 29. Fischer, Die Grenzen der Neutralita¨t (note 3). 30. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, ‘Bericht u¨ber die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren’, Bundes- blatt, Item no. 93.098, Vol. I (1999). 31. Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Aussenpolitik der Schweiz’ (note 23), p. 180/National Councillor Fehr. 32. Willy Loretan, ‘Warum dieser Kleinmut? Ja zu freiwilligen Schweizer Blauhelmen’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 159, No. 5 (1994), pp. 12– 4; Flavio Cotti, ‘Mehr Gute Dienste dank Blauhelmen’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 15, No. 6 (1994), pp. 5 –8. 33. Marc Bu¨hlmann et al., Verteidigungspolitik in der direkten Demokratie: Eine Analyse der sicherheits- und milita¨rpolitischen Abstimmungen in der Schweiz zwischen 1980 und 2005 (Zu¨rich: Verlag Ru¨egger, 2005); Gu¨nther Unser, ‘Das Nein des Schweizervolkes zum Blauhelmgesetz’, Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik (1994), pp. 1 –12. 34. Spillmann et al., Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik (note 9), pp. 225–6. 35. Tibor Szvircsev Tresch et al., Sicherheit 2009: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Mei- nungsbildung im Trend (Zu¨rich and Birmensdorf: Center for Security Studies and Military Academy, 2009). 36. Matthew Gabel and Kenneth Scheve, ‘Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 4 BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM? 271 (2007), pp. 1013–28; Andrew Chadwick, ‘Studying Political Ideas: a Public Political Discourse Approach’, Political Studies, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2000), pp. 283– 301. 37. Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and De-securitization’, in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed), On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46–86; but already also Arnold Wolfers, ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (1952), pp. 481–502. 38. Ulrich Kriesi et al., De´mocratie directe et politique exte´rieure e´tude de la formation des attitudes en votation populaire (Bern: Swiss National Funds, 2000); Antoine Fleury et al., L’Assemble´e fe´de´rale et la conduite de la politique e´trange`re de la Suisse de 1848 a` nos jours (Bern: Swiss National Funds, 2000). 39. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, Sicherheit durch Kooperation: Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesver- sammlung u¨ber die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz (Bern: Eidgenossenschaft, 1999), pp. 10ff. 40. Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz’, Amtliches Bulletin, Item no. 99.056 (1999), pp. 2647– 69/National Councillors Tschuppert, Borer, Cuche, Fehr L., Fehr M., Teuscher; also Schweizerischer Sta¨nderat, ‘Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz’, Amtliches Bulletin, Item no. 99.056 (2000), pp. 145– 7/State Councillor Paupe. Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 41. Christian Catrina, ‘Shaping a New Security Policy – The Case of Switzerland’, Paper presented at the OSCE Democratic Control of Security Policy and Armed Forces seminar, Sarajevo, 29 January 1999. 42. Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 167– 91. 43. For instance, Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Armeereform XXI und Revision der Milita¨rgesetzgebung’, Amtliches Bulletin (2002), pp. 791ff; also FEDPOL, USIS U ¨ berpru¨fung des Systems der Inneren Sicherheit der Schweiz: Analyse des Ist-Zustandes mit Sta¨rken-/Schwa¨cheprofil (Bern: EJPD, 2001). 44. Fred Tanner, ‘Muss der Sicherheitspolitische Bericht aktualisiert werden? Ja, aber. . .’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 171, No. 11 (2005), pp. 16–7; Christian Catrina, ‘Brauchen wir eine grosse sicherheitspolitische Debatte? Perso¨nliche und inoffizielle Betrachtungen’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 172, No. 7-8 (2006), pp. 5– 6. 45. Tresch et al., Sicherheit 2009 (note 35). 46. Bu¨hlmann et al., Verteidigungspolitik in der direkten Demokratie (note 33). 47. National Councillor Mo¨rgeli, quoted in Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, ‘Streitgespra¨ch zwischen Ulrich Siegrist und Christoph Mo¨rgeli zum Uno-Beitritt’, No. 20, 25 January 2002, p. 13. 48. Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, ‘Der Schweiz droht keine Kriminalita¨tswelle’, No. 115, 20 May 2005, p. 15. 49. Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz’ (note 40), p. 2653/National Councillor Leu. 50. Theodor Winkler, ‘Auf dem Weg zu einer modernen Sicherheitspolitik’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 164, No. 12 (1998), pp. 4 –5; also Adolf Ogi, ‘An der Schwelle zum sicherheit- spolitischen Bericht 2000’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 164, No. 10 (1998), pp. 5 –10. 51. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, ‘Sicherheit durch Kooperation’ (note 39), p. 40. 52. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000: Pra¨senz und Kooperation: Interessen- wahrung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt (Bern: Eidgenossenschaft, 2000), p. 273 and p. 289, respectively. 53. Ibid., p. 263. 54. Philippe Welti, ‘Bedeutung der Milita¨rgesetz-Teilrevision fu¨r die Armee XXI’, Allgemeine Schweizer- ische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 166, No. 3 (2000), pp. 5– 7; Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, ‘Bewaffnung von Schweizer Friedenstruppen: Ein folgerichtiger sicherheitspolitischer Schritt’, No. 68, 22 March 2001, p. 15; Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, ‘Schengen verlangt eine differenzierte Debatte’, No. 271, 12 November 2004, p. 15; Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, ‘Wir machen Interessenpolitik’, interview with Secretary of State Ambu¨hl’, No. 16, 14 April 2005, p. 17; Dieter Wicki, ‘Sicherheitspolitik ist unberechenbarer geworden: Gedanken zur aktuellen Bedrohungslage der Schweiz’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 171, No. 11 (2005), pp. 4 –5. 55. Ulrich Siegrist, quoted in Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, ‘Streitgespra¨ch’ (note 47), p. 13. Similarly Sigrist, ‘UNO-Beitritt und nationale Sicherheit’, Allgemeine Schweizerische Milita¨rzeitschrift, Vol. 168, No. 2 (2002), p. 6. 56. Schweizerischer Nationalrat, ‘Fu¨r den Beitritt der Schweiz zur UNO: Volksinitiative’, Amtliches Bulletin (2001), p. 991/National Councillor Dupraz. 57. Anthony Giddens, ‘Elites in the British Class Structure’, in Philip Stanworth and Anthony Giddens (eds), Elites and Power in British Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Alan Zuck- ermann, ‘The Concept “Political Elite”: Lessons from Mosca and Pareto’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1977), pp. 324– 44; John Higley, ‘The “Ruling Class” Revisited’, Contemporary Sociology, 272 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY Vol. 13, No. 2 (1984), pp. 143–6; Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, Global Security Governance Competing Perceptions of Security in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2007). 58. Also see Albert S. Yee, ‘The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies’, International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1996), pp. 69– 108; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). 59. Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), pp. 39–40 especially. 60. William Trochim, The Research Methods Knowledge Base (Cincinnati, OH: Atomicdog, 2001); also Patrick Biernacki and Dan Waldorf, ‘Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques in Chain Referral’, Sociological Methods and Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1981), pp. 141–63. 61. On survey conceptualization and methodology Jonas Hagmann, ‘Sicherheitspolitische Konzeptionen und Projektionen nationaler Experten’, Military Power Revue, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2009), pp. 28– 41. 62. Amos Jordan et al., American National Security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). Note that also in the Swiss case, the segments are not always perfectly distinct. 63. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 19–20. 64. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, ‘Botschaft u¨ber einen Rahmenkredit fu¨r zivile friedensfo¨rdernde Downloaded By: [Center for Security Studies] At: 08:52 17 August 2010 Massnahmen im Rahmen des VBS’, Bundesblatt, Vol. 2003, Item no. 02.091 (2002), pp. 622– 43. 65. Incidentally, not the least also because of nationalists’ preoccupation with migration. Center for Security Studies, Schlussbericht SIPOL Web (Zu¨rich: ETH Zu¨rich, 2009). 66. Eidgeno¨ssisches Finanzdepartement, Aufgabenu¨berpru¨fung: Massnahmenliste (Bern: EFD, 2010).