(PDF) Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU- Turkey Cooperation

Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? May 2018 FEUTURE Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the 0 Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU- Turkey Cooperation? Thedoros Tsakiris Sinan Ulgen Ahmet K. Han Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? ABSTRACT This paper positions energy as a critical component of international relations as it has been both a driving force for cooperation between nations as well as a source of conflict and war. It provides an overview of energy resources and trends in the Eastern Mediterranean, debating the influence of the tensions on the exploitation of gas, the role of EU and Turkey and the possibilities for regional cooperation. The paper finds that the quantity of Eastern Mediterranean offshore gas, the evolution of natural gas prices, Turkey-Israel political relationship, Turkey-Egypt bilateral ties, Cyprus-Egypt-Israel cooperation and the growth performance of the Turkish economy are main energy drivers that will steer EU-Turkey relations either towards conflict, converge or cooperation. The question of whether energy resources and trends will create an inter-regional dynamic favoring peace and cooperation or prove as destabilizing factors is essential to understand the emerging regional political environment. At the same time, the assessment of how energy dynamics affects the intra-regional order needs to take into consideration the current state of affairs marked by ongoing geopolitical disputes, including the Cyprus issue, and distressed bilateral relations, as is the case between Turkey and Israel and Turkey and Greece. The authors argue that better inter-state coordination will de ease the osts i e plo atio a d e ploitatio a ti ities, hi h o e of the egio s countries can bear alone. ÖZET Bu çalış a enerji konusunu, hem uluslararası iş irliği i ir ara ı, he de çatış a ve savaşı bir kay ağı ol ası se e iyle, uluslararası ilişkileri kritik ir ileşe i olarak ko u la dır aktadır. Doğu Akde iz'de enerji kay akları a ve u a ilişki eğili lere genel bir akış su arak, gazı işletil esi üzeri deki gerili leri etkisi i, AB ve Türkiye' i rolü ü ve ölgesel iş irliği ola akları ı tartış aktadır. Rapor, Doğu Akde iz'i doğalgaz iktarı ı , doğal gaz fiyatları daki değiş eleri , Türkiye-İsrail siyasi ilişkilerinin, Türkiye-Mısır ikili ilişkileri i , Kı rıs-Mısır-İsrail iş irliği i ve Türkiye ekonomisinin büyüme perfor a sı ı , enerji konusunun AB-Türkiye ilişkileri i çatış a, yakı sa a veya iş irliği yönünde yönlendirecek ana dinamiklerini oluşturduğu u ileri sürmektedir. E erji kay akları ı ve tre dleri oluşturduğu ölgeler arası di a iği arış ve iş irliği i destekleyici veya bölgeyi istikrarsızlaştırı ı bir etken olarak ortaya çıkıp çık aya ağı sorusu, mevcut bölgesel siyasi orta ı a la ak içi şarttır. Bu u ya ı sıra, enerji di a iği i bölge-içi düzeni asıl etkilediği değerle dirilirke , Kı rıs meselesi gibi jeopolitik ihtilaflar ile Türkiye-İsrail ve Türkiye-Yu a ista gi i gerili li ikili ilişkiler de ev ut duru kapsa ı da dikkate alı alıdır. Türkiye ve İsrael, Türkiye ve Yu a ista . Yazarlar, daha verimli bir devletlerarası iş irliği i , ölgedeki hiç ir ülke i tek aşı a altı da kalka aya ağı e erji kay ağı araştır a ve işlet e faaliyetleri i aliyetleri i azalta ağı ı savu aktadır. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? Contents 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 2. The Hydrocarbon Potential of the East Med Region .......................................................... 1 3. EU and Turkish interest in the area .................................................................................... 5 3.1. The renewed emphasis of the European Union .......................................................... 5 3.2. Turkey and the relevance of East Med gas for Turkish energy security ..................... 7 4. The impact of political conflicts and controversies on the development of energy resources ................................................................................................................................ 8 4.1. The resolution of the Cyprus issue .............................................................................. 8 4.2 What future for Israel-Turkey relations? .................................................................... 13 4.3 Egypt and Turkey: competition or collaboration? ...................................................... 15 5. Players and solutions for regional coordination .............................................................. 16 5.1 The role of Egypt ......................................................................................................... 16 5.2 The role of Turkey ....................................................................................................... 18 5.3 Export options, and how they will shape gas developments in the region ............... 20 6. Drivers and Scenarios ....................................................................................................... 26 7. References ........................................................................................................................ 29 About the Authors ................................................................................................................ 35 This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? 1. Introduction Energy has always been a critical component of international relations. The study of this subject is replete with examples in which energy has been a driving force for cooperation between nations. The establishment of Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community) as the maiden institution for nurturing post-war cooperation in Europe is a case in point. But energy has also been a source of conflict and war. The quest for access to energy resources has historically been a driver of inter-state conflict. The relationship between energy and inter-state relations has become a topical issue in the eastern Mediterranean (East Med) with the discovery of offshore natural gas there. Therefore, the question of whether these resources will create an interregional dynamic favouring peace and cooperation or whether they will, on the contrary, be a destabilizing factor will be critical in understanding the emerging regional political environment. Any assessment of how energy dynamics will affect the interregional order will at the same time need to take into consideration the current state of affairs, which is marked by ongoing geopolitical disputes, as in the Cyprus issue; conflicts, as in the case of Syria; and distressed bilateral relations, as is the case between Turkey and Israel and Turkey and Greece. Yet, regional collaboration is the key to the development of East Med. Improved inter-state coordination will 1 decrease the costs of exploration and exploitation a ti ities, hi h o e of the egio s ou t ies can bear alone. This paper will provide an overview of resources and trends in the region, debating the influence of tensions surrounding the exploitation of gas, the role of the European Union (EU) and Turkey and the possibilities for regional cooperation. 2. The Hydrocarbon Potential of the East Med Region In an oft-quoted March 2010 study, the US Geological Survey (USCG) reported that the Eastern Mediterranean Levant Basin was hosting a mean probable 3.5 trillion cubic metres (tcm) of natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil (USCG, 2010). According to experts quoted at a conference o ga ized Pea e ‘esea h I stitute Oslo s P‘IO s C p us Ce te the Cyprus Mail, already in , o e tha bcm gas has ee dis o e ed i the East Med a d pote tial of e dis o e ies ould dou le o t e le this a ou t . The sa e epo t states that E i “.p.A., a Italian company with stakes in offshore fields around the island of Cyprus 1 and also in Egypt, esti ates that, afte suppl i g egio al a kets, pote tiall the e a e -50 bcm/year excess gas i the East Med a aila le fo e po t . Although the p ese t le el of fi di gs i the egio is barely 1.5 percent of global gas resources, they are still important within the bilateral and regional context. The said resources also have possible implications at the global level, given the proximity of this resource base to the European Union (EU), globally the third largest gas consumer (12.1 1 The island of Cyprus is divided between the Republic of Cyprus (RoC, or simply Cyprus), Member of the European Union and recognized by the international community and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), self-proclaimed in 1983 and not recognized by the international community with the exception of Turkey. This project has received funding from the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? percent of global consumption) and with no significant gas resources of its own (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2017: 28–9). Contrary to the overemphasis placed on Israeli and Cypriot gas discoveries, the Eastern Med is not a new hydrocarbon-producing area. Yea s efo e the Ta a dis o e i Is ael s E lusi e Economic Zone (EEZ), the first in a stream of successful exploration wells, Egypt was already a sig ifi a t gas p odu e a d the egio s p i ipal ese es holde . I , Eg pt o t olled . tcm of natural-gas reserves – al ost half of Is ael s u e t ese e asis. I – at the time that Israel made its first commercial discovery in the now-extinct Mari B field, estimated to contain 0.028 tcm – Egypt already controlled 1.4 tcm. In 2010 – by the time Israel had completed its stream of discoveries, including Tamar (0.318 tcm) and Leviathan (0.5 tcm) – Egypt still controlled 2.2 tcm. One year before the revolution that overthrew President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt was producing 61.3 billion cubic metres a year (bcm/y) and was exporting around 15 bcm/y, of which approximately one third was exported to Europe in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).2 E e efo e its supe -gia t )oh dis o e . t i , Eg pt as u uestio a l the epicentre of the eastern Mediterranean in terms of reverses. Between 2010 and 2015, despite a period of unprecedented political turmoil and very low domestic gas prices, Egyptian gas reserves in the offshore Nile Delta kept expanding thanks to the discovery of the Atoll a d WΜDW West 2 Med Deep Water) discoveries, which were estimated to contain 0.14–0.196 tcm and 0.14 tcm respectively. In less than two years, between 2014 and 2015, Egypt – as a result of the Zohr, Atoll and WMDW discoveries – added to its proven reserves basis more than the combined discoveries of both Cyprus (0.125 bcm) and Israel (0.894 bcm). More importantly, there are still many areas of the currently delimitated Egyptian EEZ that have yet to be explored – especially in the deep- offshore areas that lie adjacent to the Cypriot EEZ. The political and economic crisis that Egypt has been going through since 2011 has not allowed Cairo to utilize its expanding reserve basis to re-e e ge as the egio s pi otal e po te , although it is likely that Egypt will once again become a marginal net exporter by the early 2020s.3 Its first task, though, is to eliminate its current net import dependency by the end of this decade by pushing forward with the monetization of the Atoll, WMDW and Zohr fields. Egypt is on schedule to achieve this goal by also expanding the use of natural gas as its principal feedstock for electricity generation.4 The country is already using more natural gas than oil in its primary-energy mix, and this trend is set to expand as the government reduces energy subsidies and progressively deregulates its domestic gas market, allowing for more competition.5 Part of its strategy is to e e ge as the egio s atu al-gas hub through the construction of additional connecting 2 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011, (London: June 2011), data are for 2010, p.20 (reserves), p.22 (production) and (exports) p.29. 3 Eg pt: Bid to become a regional energy hu , BNP Paris Bank, Economic Research Division, (May 2017), pp.23- 26. 4 Eg pt sets sights on doubling natural gas output by , Reuters, 17/07/2017 & Ahmed Ismail, Cutti g Back on Imported Gas , Al-Ahram Weekly, 24/05/2017. 5 BNP Paris, Ibid, p.25-26. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? infrastructure with Cyprus and Israel, centred around the export of gas from Aphrodite and Leviathan Phase 2 fields to its two idle LNG liquefaction plants in Idku and Damietta. If the impact of gas discoveries in 2014–15 was important in helping Egypt to overcome its economic crisis, the discoveries of Tamar and Leviathan had a revolutionary effe t o Is ael s economy and energy security. They not only significantly reduced its electricity costs, they also e pa ded the ou t s a ilit to depe d o its o do esti e e g esou es fo the fi st ti e in its history. In 2011, before Egypt shut down its exports to Israel through the El Arish–Ashkelon pipeline, Tel Aviv produced less than 10 percent of its own energy consumption. In 2016, Israel produced 33 percent of its energy needs and covered100 percent of its expanding natural-gas demand. Gas consumption almost quadrupled between 2012 (2.6 bcm) and 2016 (9.7 bcm),6 and is expected to expand by more than 2.5 times to 24.8 bcm by 2040 fuelled – primarily from the use of natural gas in electricity. In 2015, Israel used natural gas to generate 50 percent of its electricity production, a share expected to rise to 75 percent by 2030. Electricity is, and will remain, the primary factor driving natural-gas demand in the country.7 The unprecedented level of energy self-sufficiency that these gas discoveries8 gave Tel Aviv have induced the Israeli Government to direct the majority of these reserves to its domestic energy market. In June 2013, Israel decided to reserve for domestic consumption 60 percent of its proven reserves while 3 directing the remaining 40 percent to regional and international markets. Such a strategy proved to be challenging, especially when it came to exports, for two reasons. First, the absence of i te atio al pla e s i Is ael s EE) ho ould help to fi a e the e essa e po t i f astructure; second, the over-concentration of existing reverses in the hands of two companies: Noble Energy, and two subsidiaries (Delek Drilling and Avner) of the Delek Group, which together control 85 percent of existing reserves.Unlike in the cases of Egypt and Cyprus, the current regulatory and investment framework has so far failed to attract major foreign investment to Israel,9 although Tel Aviv is auctioning off 24 of its 69 offshore blocks in its first international licensing tender. Offers for the tender, whose deadline was extended twice in 2017, indicated a lukewarm response on the part of the international oil industry given the regulatory upheaval in which Israel has 6 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017, (BP: June 2017), p.29. 7 Shaul Meridor, Director General of Israeli Energy Ministry, Israeli Gas Opportunities, (Israeli Energy Ministry: November 2016), p.14, http://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-Site/PublishingImages/Pages/Forms/EditForm/ Roadshow_2016_Presentation%20GD%20Shaul%20Meridor_Regulatory%20and%20Fiscal%20Regim.pdf 8 Is ael s gas reserves, all located offshore, are estimated by the Ministry of Is ael s latest review in November 2016 at 858,5 bcm, divided between the following fields: Leviathan (500 bcm), Tamar & Tamar Southwest (282 bcm), Shimshon (5 bcm), Karish & Tanin (55 bcm), Dalit (8 bcm), Ishai (7-10 bcm, average of 8,5 bcm used here). State of Israel, Ministry of Energy, Israeli Gas Opportinities, (Tel Aviv: November 2016), p.4, http://www.energy- sea.gov.il/English-Site/Pages/News%20And%20Media/ISRAELI%20GAS%20OPPORTUNITIES.pdf. To this estimate we need to add the recent update of the Tamar reserves completed in July 2017 that increase the proven volume of reserves to 318 bcm in the Israeli EEZ to 894,5 bcm. For Ta a s estimated increase, not yet confirmed by the Israeli Ministry of Energy, Hillel Koren, Ta a partners increase gas field estimate by % , Globes, 02/07/2017. See also Theodoros Tsakiris, The Energy Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Cyprus P o le , IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2017, (Barcelona: September 2017) pp.288-291. 9 Is ael s gas i dust is too i t o e ted a d a eed to e a p so e of its egulatio s su h as . % upf o t royalty payment that may endanger the development of smaller gas fields. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? e gulfed itself afte the de isio of the ou t s o petitio autho it to e oke Le iatha s export license in December 2014. The results of the round proved rather disappointing, since no major oil company even submitted a proposal for any of the fields offered. 10Yet, the potential for further discoveries is significant since currently less than 30 percent of the Israeli EEZ has been li e sed off fo e plo atio . The ou t s Mi ist of E e g has a ou ed its i te tio to lau h a second licensing round within 2018. It is difficult to see, though, how exploration efforts will advance if there is no major infusion of capital and expertise from the international oil industry. In the case of Cyprus, after its initial discovery of the Aphrodite field in Block 12 in 2011 and its certification in 2013, the country has been faced with a series of disappointments. In 2014 and 2015, Eni drilled two exploratory wells in Block 9, and in February 2015, Total pulled out of Block 10 while Eni chose to freeze additional exploration in Blocks 2 and 3 until it reassessed its previous assessment odelli g. Had it ot ee fo the dis o e of Aph odite i August , C p us offshore exploration efforts may have ended in failure. The Zohr discovery re-galvanized the interest of the international major oil companies. Total remained in Block 11, and drilled an exploratory well in the Onisiforos target in September 2017. The results were disappointing in that the 11 bcm discovery could not be autonomously developed, but they confirmed the existence of hydrocarbon reserves to the north of the Zohr 4 discovery and around the underwater Eratosthenes Seamount. In early 2017, the Republic of Cyprus tendered Block 8 to Eni; Block 6 to Eni/Total; and Block 10 to a consortium made up of Exxon and Qatar Petroleum, in which Exxon holds 80 percent of the joint venture. 11 Despite Tu ke s lai s that the o the pa t of Blo k elo gs to its o ti e tal shelf, E i a d Total started drilling in the block in January 2018, while Exxon is expected to drill two exploratory wells in Block 10 starting in October 2018. The exploratory drilling in Blocks 6 and 10 is expected to confirm whether or not a Zohr- or Leviathan-sized gas field e ists i side C p us EE). If positi e, these results will spearhead additional exploration, including the possibility of a fourth licensing round. If not, they are likely to dissuade Eni from pursuing all of its existing exploratory obligations in Blocks 2, 3 and 8. Clearly, the rapid emergence of the East Med as a potential global energy hotspot attracted the attention of the EU and Turkey, both of which regard energy hydrocarbons located in the region as a valuable asset in reducing their external energy dependence. 10 Ital s Ediso a d “pai s ‘epsol pulled out from submitting an offer. The only participants were a consortium of four Indian companies led by state-controlled ONGC and as well as a Greek company, Energean Oil & Gas, which in August 2016 bought the Tanin and Karish fields from Delek Drilling and Avner Oil. In December 2017, Is ael s Pet oleu Cou il g a ted fi e lo ks , , , a d to E e gea as ell as Blo k to the I dia consortium. 11 Theodoros Tsakiris, C p us Natu al Gas “t ateg : Geopoliti al & E o o i P e o ditio s , Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.27 / Issue 1 (March 2017), pp.20-57. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? 3. EU and Turkish interest in the area 3.1. The renewed emphasis of the European Union The prospective importance of East Med hydrocarbons for the EU initially emerged on the think- tank circuit in Brussels during 2012–13,12 but did not reach the level of official policy making until mid-2014 when the region was first mentioned in the EU s E e g “e u it “t ateg EUE““ as a potential supplier of natural gas. However, it has to be noted that natural-gas exports from the East Med are not a new phenomenon: between 2005 and 2012, several EU member states imported Egyptian LNG from the two currently idle LNG liquefaction plants located in Idku and Damietta. The renewed attention of EU authorities towards the region emanated not only from the fact that two new significant gas exporters came to the fore, one of which is a member state, but also from the need to enhance the Unio s e te al e e g poli at a ti e of e e ed te sio s ith ‘ussia over Ukraine. The EUESS proposed a series of internal policy measures to enhance the ability of the Union to deal with major supply/transit crises by boosting domestic-energy supply and completing the internal energy market through enhanced interconnectivity and solidarity, price liberalization and common crisis-management mechanisms. 5 It also proposed a series of external policy measures that centred around the need to improve the security of its increasing energy imports by diversifying its import sources and routes. In this regard, the EUESS alled fo the EU to e gage i i te sified politi al a d t ade dialogue ith Northern African and Eastern Mediterranean partners, in particular with a view to creating a Medite a ea gas hu i the “outh of Eu ope .13 However, the text fell short of proposing a specific policy action that would commit EU funds to any particular implementation project, and did ot see to diffe e tiate et ee the EU s established Southern Gas Corridor strategy and the resources of the East Med. This all changed a year later, as a result of the greater emphasis placed on the construction of common energy infrastructures that would further ameliorate intera-EU interconnectivity as well as facilitating the commercial linkage between EU markets and non-EU energy suppliers. The Connect Europe Facility (CEF) financial instrument was set up in order to materially support enhanced interconnectivity through the promotion of several Projects of Common Interest (PCI). Simultaneously, at the EU Commission and Council levels, a more detailed strategy focused on spe ifi a eas of i te est fo the U io s e e gi g EUE““ that ould se e the o e a hi g strategic priority of supply dive sifi atio . The EU s E e g Diplo a A tio Pla EU EDAP), published in July , si gled out the st ategi pote tial of the Easte Medite a ea egio 12 Igor Taranic, Eu opea energy policies and their relevance to the Eastern Medite a ea , in Angelos Giannakopoulos (ed.), Energy Cooperation and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean: A seismic shift towards peace or conflict?, The S.Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, (Tel Aviv University Press: 2016), p.109. 13 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the European Council: European Energy Security Strategy, SWD(2014) 330 final}, Brussels, 28/05/2014., p.16. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? as a ke p io it fo the EU s di e sifi atio of sou es, supplie s a d outes , o hi h the EU should fo us its diplo ati suppo t .14 The EU EDAP clearly distinguished the East Med from the Southern Corridor, indicating that it would prefer an independent development of East Med reserves. More importantly – in what could be perceived as an indirect warning to Turkey, which is questioning the right of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) to explore the waters of its demarcated Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) – the do u e t u de li ed the fa t that the EU s E e g pa t e ships a d dialogues […] should also ensure that the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Member States to explore and develop thei atu al esou es a e safegua ded .15 Two major projects emerged with strong EU backing under the PCI framework, promising to tap i to the egio s strategic potential: the high-voltage electricity-interconnector project EuroAsia and the East Med Gas Pipeline (EMGP) project. 16 EuroAsia, a joi t e tu e et ee a p i ate C p iot i esto Qua tu E e g a d G ee e s Public Power Corporation (PPC), aspires to transfer up to 2 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from Israel and Cyprus to Attica in Greece over a distance of 1,518 km. Although the project may struggle to find a market in Greece and could duplicate a venture promoted by ADMHE, the Greek Electricity 6 TSO (Transmission System Operator), to connect Attica to Crete, it would significantly enhance the security of electricity supply for the RoC by terminating its energy isolation while progressively connecting it to the EU grid via Greece. In 2015, the EuroAsia Interconnector received from the CEF € , illio i o de to o plete all e essa desig , te h i al i ple e tatio a d environmental-assessment studies, which it finished in late 2016. In April 2017, the project was upgraded to the next level of pla i g atu it , hi h allo ed it to se u e € . illio f o the CEF to complete its final FEED (Front End Engineering and Design) study. The study is expected to be completed by 2020, and will allow the investors to take the FID (Final Investment Decision) leading to the construction of the first 1 GW underwater cable by 2022. The CEF has covered 50 percent of all project-associated costs so far.17 The EMGP – the second, and even more important – project comprises the construction of an ambitious East Med Gas Pipeline, which aspires to transport by 2025 between 10 and 16 bcm/y of East Med Gas to Greece and, via Greece, to Italy – promoted by the Greek–French–Italian IGI Poseidon consortium. In May 2015, the EMGP – analysed in section 4.2.1, below – e ei ed € 14 European Council, Council conclusions on Energy Diplomacy, 10995/15, CFSP/PESC 414, Brussels, 20/07/2015, p.3. 15 Ibid, p.4. 16 More on the EU and Greek approach on East Med Energy, Theodoros Tsakiris, Greece and the Energy Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, Strategic Update 14.1, LSE Ideas, London School of Economics, (LSE: June 2014). 17 European Commission, Eu oAsia Interconnector - Design, Implementation and Environmental “tudies , 3.10.1-0028-CY-S-M-14, https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/projects-by- country/multi-country/3.10.1-0028-cy-s-m-14; "Grant agreement to finalise the design of the EuroAsia interconnector signed in INEA toda , April 5, 2017, This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? million to complete its pre-FEED studies, which confirmed the technical and financial viability of the project although serious challenges remain regarding its eventual implementation.18 Ne e theless, these halle ges did ot dis ou age the Italia Go e e t o the EU s e e g commissioner, Miguel Arias Cañete, from joining the original promoters of the project in Tel Aviv in April 2017 in order to sign the first quadrilateral political framework agreement in support of EMGP s i ple e tatio .19 In their joint declaration the energy ministers of Italy, Greece, Cyrus a d Is ael st essed that the suppo ted the esta lish e t of the Easte Medite a ea as a othe o ido fo gas supplies to Eu ope , u de li i g the fa t that the p oje t ep ese ts a strategic priority for exporting into Europe part of the current gas reserves of the Eastern Medite a ea .20 Commissioner Cañete, who said that EMGP is eligible for additional financial assistance from the CEF i o de to ea h its FID le el, oted that the pipeli e is a a itious p oje t, hi h as the Commission, we clearly support, as it will have a high value in terms of security of supply and diversificatio ta gets ,21 hile addi g that i the e t de ades, gas flo s f o the Easte Medite a ea egio ill pla a ital ole i the e e g se u it of the Eu opea U io .22 In January 2018, in another indication of tangible support for the project from the EU, the European Co issio g a ted a othe € . illio to EMGP de elope s i o de fo the to o plete 7 their FEED study and cover all licensing and permitting expenses for the project in Cyprus and Greece.23 3.2. Turkey and the relevance of East Med gas for Turkish energy security As fossil fuels remain the main energy source for Turkey, hydrocarbon resources located in the East Med a pla a ele a t ole i A ka a s e e g st ateg . Glo all , the o ld s st la gest energy consumer in 2016, Turkey does not hold significant amounts of global reserves itself (BP “tatisti al ‘e ie of Wo ld E e g , : , hi h akes the ou t the o ld s th la gest individual importer of natural gas and 17th largest importer of oil. 18European Commission, Eu oAsia Interconnector - Design, Implementation and Environmental “tudies , 3.10.1-0028-CY-S-M-14, https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/projects-by- country/multi-country/3.10.1-0028-cy-s-m-14ttps://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef- energy/projects-by-country/multi-country/7.3.1-0025-elcy-s-m-15 19 Sharon Udasin, Is ael, European states advance plans for o ld s largest underwater gas pipeli e , Jerusalem Post, 03/04/2017 20 Joi t Declaration of the East Med Pipeline Ministerial Summit in Tel A i , Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 03/04/2017, https://www.pio.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio2013.nsf/All/3E481E83C28B5163C22580 F7004DD29C?OpenDocument&L=E 21 Michael Tanchum, EU Backs Israel to Italy pipeline to alter East Med energy hess oa d , Hurriyet Daily News, 13/04/2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-backs-israel-to-italy-pipeline-to-alter-east-med-energy- chessboard aspx?pageID=238&nID=111949&NewsCatID=396 22 Ital , Greece, Cyprus and Israel agree on implementing a gas pipeline through the Eastern Medite a ea , Iemed, 03/04/2017, http://www.iemed.org/actualitat/noticies/03-04-italy-greece-cyprus-and-israel-agree-on- implementing-a-gas-pipeline-through-the-eastern-mediterranean 23 The European Commission will fund the technical studies and permitting costs of the East Med with € , illio , Energypress, 18/01/2018, https://energypress.gr/news/me-345-ekat-eyro-i-komision-hrimatodotei-tis- tehnikes-meletes-kai-tis-adeiodotiseis-toy-eastmed, (accessed 18/01/2018) This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? Hence, Turkey is highly exposed to risks in its energy security, and therefore it is of paramount importance fo the ou t to de ease its e isti g ul e a ilities. A ka a s st ateg fo itigati g these vulnerabilities is crystallized in its vision of becoming an energy hub – an active contributor to the dynamics of international/regional energy markets as both a transit and trading centre, with enhanced infrastructure including storage, processing and conversion facilities as well as pipelines. In this context, diversified resources and routes would enable the country to establish mechanisms of pricing and trade, with opportunities for re-export that go beyond the need to secure domestic demand. F o a esou e pe spe ti e, Tu ke s st ategi e e g poli is e t ed a ou d atu al gas rather than oil. The East Med is important for Turkey in terms of resource diversification and its o t i utio to Tu ke s e e g -hub ambitions. 4. The impact of political conflicts and controversies on the development of energy resources 4.1. The resolution of the Cyprus issue 8 The Turkish perspective The intractability of the Cyprus problem has negatively affected the prospects of energy cooperation in the region. The Turkish position on the future of the existing and prospective natural-gas reserves of the island maintains the collective and indivisible ownership of these resources. Turkey categorically rejects the issuance of any concession blocks by the Greek Cypriots until a final settlement is reached between the parties. The country is adamant that no exploration or production activity should take place in the blocks claimed by the Greek-Cypriot authorities,24 as it does ot a ept the G eek side as the ightful hei a d sole legal ep ese tati e of the e tit known today as the Republic of C p us Ça uşoğlu, . Fu the o e, he it o es to the deli itatio of a iti e zo es to the est of C p us, e o d the este pa t of the lo gitude 32○ Base e , : , Tu ke asse ts that it has ab initio and ipso facto rights that are inherent and do not need to be proclaimed, and views Greek-Cypriot claims on parts of concession blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 as a violation of its sovereignty. 25 Turkey has declared that under no i u sta es ill it allo fo eig oil o pa ies to o duct unauthorized oil/natural gas e plo atio a d e ploitatio a ti ities i these a eas E i es, : . To the o th, east a d south of the island, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has promulgated an 24 This position has been reiterated, albeit in slightly different wording according to the context and occasion, time and again, latest of which was, P ess Release Regarding The Greek Cypriot Ad i ist atio s Hydrocarbon- Related Activities In The Eastern Medite a ea , Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No: 228, 13 July 2017. 25 The Greek Cypriot unilateral actions do not only disregard Turkish C p iots existing rights but also challenge Tu ke s maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean in the west of the Isla d . Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, G eek C p iot s Unilateral Activities in The Eastern Medite a ea , October 25, 2017, (online) http://www.mfa.gov.tr/greek-cypriot_s-unilateral-activities-in-the-eastern-mediterranean.en.mfa. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? agreement dividing the continental shelf between the parties,26 and with a separate agreement has granted Turkish Petroleum Inc. (TPAO) exploration rights in the designated concession blocks – namely, parts of Block 1 as well as 2, 3, 8, 9, 12 and 13. Turkey sees the matter going beyond the Cyprus issue and the delimitation of maritime zones concerning the island, with an additional bearing on long-standing issues of maritime-zone delimitation and jurisdiction with Greece and other states in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. Also, Turkey intends to respond to ongoing Greek-Cypriot efforts to exploit offshore-gas esou es. A ka a pe ei es a ess to easte Medite a ea e e g esou es to e as important as the Baku-Tiblisi Ceyhan TurkishStream, Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and Trans- Anatolia Natu al Gas Pipeli e TANAP p oje ts fo its di e sifi atio st ateg .27 Furthermore, Turkish Minister of Energy Berat Albayrak has explicitly declared that Turkey will be exploring for oil and gas in the Mediterranean,28 having added another ship to its existing fleet29 – a statement echoed by the Minister of Energy of the TRNC.30 A declaration by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affai s stati g that the o l a to e ploit the atu al esou es of the isla d is ith the lea consent of the Turkish Cyp iot side ega di g the sha i g of these atu al esou es su s up the Turkish stance, and this position should not be expected to change in the future in the absence of a settlement of the Cyrus issue (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).31 9 26 Ag ee e t on Delimitation of Continental Shelf in the Mediterranean Between Republic of Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern C p us , September 21, 2011, Resmi Gazete, “a ı 28437, October 10, 2012. 27 Baka Albayrak: Doğalgaz İleti Şe eke izi Günlük Taşı a Kapasitesini İki ζıl İçi de 400 Milyon Metreküpe Çıka a ağız , T.C. Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Baka lığı, July 11, 2017, (online) http://www.enerji.gov.tr/tr- TR/Bakanlik-Haberleri/Bakan-Albayrak-Dogalgaz-Iletim-Sebekemizin-Gunluk-Tasima-Kapasitesini-Iki-Yil-Icinde- 400-Milyon-Metrekupe-Cikaracagiz 28 Bakan Albayrak: Son çeyrekte sondaj gemimizi Akdeniz'de devreye ala ağız , Sabah, August 10, 2017. It should be noted though that Minister Albayrak also set the date of the said exploration activity for Autumn 2017 and so far no activity as such has been carried out. Nevertheless, the posturing of the Turkish Armed Forces and Navy has not changed from November 2014 until now. During the Blue Whale biannual exercises than Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Admiral Bülent Bosta oğlu has declared that Turke s answer to any threats would be devised within the ules of e gage e t that has been transferred to the Navy by the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces. Büle t Bosta oğlu: Angajman ku alla ı Deniz Kuvvetlerine de edildi , Deniz Haber Aja sı, November, 10, 2014, (online) www.denizhaber.com.tr/bulent-bostanoglu-angajman-kurallari-deniz- kuvvetlerine-devredildi-haber-586 66.htm. As stated these rules of engagement are based on protecting Turkish and T‘NC s rights in the Eastern Mediterranean and are implemented on a logic of progressive stages of escalation, the last stage including use of arms. Turkey holds two biannual invitex military exercises in Eastern Mediterranean titled Blue Whale and Easte Medite a ea and deploys a standing task force of a frigate, two fast attack crafts, two patrol boats and a submarine in ports on its Eastern Mediterranean board, as well as in Cyprus, under Operation Mediterranean Shield since 2006. The unchanging character of the Turkish stance has further been confirmed by Admiral Bosta oğlu s visit to TCG Gaziantep, and the new sismic research vessel of Turkish Petroleum Inc. Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa as they have been on duty in the Mediterranean off the coast of Cyprus. O a i al Bosta oğlu' da 'Doğu Akdeniz' esajı , Anadolu Aja sı, 30 Nisan 2017, (online) http://aa.com.tr/tr/analiz-haber/oramiral-bostanoglundan-dogu-akdeniz-mesaji/808317. 29 Tü ki ede Akdeniz ve Karadeniz Ha lesi , Yeni Akit, March 9, 2017. 30 KKTC Akde iz de petrol ve gaz aramaya devam edi o , Enerji Enstitüsü, Sept., 8, 2017, (Online), http://enerjienstitusu.com/2017/09/08/kktc-akdenizde-petrol-gaz-aramaya-devam-ediyor/ 31 “tate e t Regarding the Claims of the GCASC on Hydrocarbon Resources in the Eastern Medite a ea , Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No: 83, 23 March 2013. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? The Greek and Greek-Cypriot perspective Fo the ‘epu li of C p us, the dis o e of the Aph odite field as see as a fa to that ould a elio ate its positio at the egotiati g ta le ith Tu ke a d the Tu kish C p iots. The halle ge fo the ‘oC is to fi d the app op iate i of i e ti es fo the Tu kish C p iots that ould ge e ate the i petus fo a o p o ise ithout e da ge i g its so e eig t , legall e og izi g the self- p o lai ed Tu kish ‘epu li of No the C p us o f eezi g its h d o a o de elop e t i ase a o p o ise p o es i possi le. This is a deli ate ala e a d ould p o e to e a i possi le task fo the ‘oC, si e the poli ies of Mustafa Aki i, the P eside t of the self-p o lai ed T‘NC a e ide ti al – as e e those of his p ede esso s – to those of Tu ke he it o es to the iti al issues of a ho should o t ol the li e si g p o ess fo the issui g of e plo atio /e ploitatio pe its i the ‘oC s EE), ho the gas e e ue should e di ided a d the opti al optio fo the e po t of C p iot gas. With espe t to these issues, M Aki i a d the Tu kish C p iots a de a d a e ual ight ith the ‘oC i g a ti g li e ses to I te atio al Oil Co pa ies IOC o f eezi g all h d o a o - elated a ti ities i o de to a oid te sio s ,32 i sist o a sha e of the p ospe ti e p ofits e e efo e a solutio is ea hed a d ha e al a s p o oted the o st u tio of a e po t pipeli e 10 to Tu ke as the opti al optio fo the o etizatio of C p iot gas.33 The ‘oC s politi al pa ties u a i ousl eje t all of the afo e e tio ed Tu kish-C p iot de a ds i the a se e of a solutio to the C p us uestio . The ai easo fo this app oa h elates to hat the pe ei e as Tu ke s out ight hostilit to a ds the ‘oC s atte pts to o etize the isla d epu li s e e g pote tial ithi its de a ated o de s, esta lished i the EE) ag ee e ts that Ni osia sig ed ith Eg pt , Le a o a d Is ael . Tu ke has ot e og ized a of these th ee EE) ag ee e ts, a d has suppo ted Le a ese lai s agai st Is ael s o the EE) ou da ies, despite the fa t that oth Ta a a d Le iatha a e lo ated fu the to the south of the o tested a ea.34 A ka a s efusal to e og ize Ni osia s EE) ag ee e ts ste s f o the fa t that it does ot e og ize the e iste e of the ‘epu li of C p us si e it lai s that the e a e t o states o the di ided isla d epu li . Tu ke lai s the ea e ti et -esti ated at app o i atel %- of the ‘oC s EE) eithe di e tl Blo ks , , , a d o o ehalf of the Tu kish C p iots Blo ks , , , , , a d ,a d atte pted to use its ilita ight i o de to dete Ni osia a d No le E e g f o a i g out the e plo ato d illi g that dis o e ed the Aph odite field i “epte e . 32 It is notable that upon the announcement of the 3d Licensing Round Mr. Akinci protested that the Greek Cypriots did not include him in the decision making process and warned such actions ill create tensions as it has happened in the past , http://www.reporter.com.cy/politics/article/50027/akintzi-yparchoyn-themata-sta- opoia-echoyme-plisiasei, 28/03/2016 33 Menelaos Hadjicostis, Tu kish Cypriot Head: Gas May Fund Peace Deal , Associated Press, 04/04/2016, http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-04-04/ap-interview-turkish-cypriot-head-gas-may-fund- peace-deal 34 Simon Henderson, Tu ke 's Threats to Israel's New Gas ‘i hes , The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 13/09/2011,http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-threat-to-israels-new- gas-riches This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? Figure 4.1 – Gas fields and T/C claims in the eastern Mediterranean 11 Source: The Economist To a G eek C p iots it is i o p ehe si le that the Tu kish C p iots ha e auto ati all alig ed the sel es ith Tu kish lai s si e, u iousl , A ka a does ot lai the Aph odite field as eithe Tu kish o Tu kish-C p iot ut at the sa e ti e efuses to e og ize C p iot so e eig t o e it. “o, p esu a l , fo Tu ke , Aph odite a elo g to Is ael. As it is lea l i di ated i Figu e . , a o e, the field is lo ated outside the a eas lai ed the self-p o lai ed T‘NC – a eas that it the li e sed to the state-o ed TPAO i . The uestio ust su el e: ho a the Tu kish C p iots lai o-o e ship o e a gas field that e e a o di g to thei o aps does ot ha e a so e eig o e – u less, of ou se, the a k o ledge the ‘oC as the field s so e eig ? Mo eo e , G eek C p iots ote that if Tu ke s asse tio s a e a epted ith ega d to the este de a ated lo ks of the ‘oC s EE), hi h A ka a lai s to fall ithi its o ti e tal shelf, the e e t O isifo os dis o e , as ell as a othe pote tial dis o e ies i Blo ks a d a d the iggest pa ts of Blo ks a d , ill elo g to so eo e else other tha the ‘oC o its fede al su esso state should a solutio is fou d.35 35 Nicholas Ioannides, Turkish Maritime Claims Offshore Cyprus, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note #18, (September 2017), Cyprus Center for European & International Affairs, University of Nicosia, p.3. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? Figure 4.2 – Turkish claims in the Cypriot EEZ as areas falling within its Continental Shelf 12 Source: Ionnides (2017) Ho ould the Tu kish C p iots de a d a sha e of the p ofits f o a pote tial dis o e i those a eas u de a fede al C p iot state if Tu ke asse ts that these lo ks elo g to so eo e othe tha the ‘oC? EE)s a e defi ed th ough the appli atio of i te atio al la o e geog aphi al e tities su h as the isla d of C p us. I te atio al a iti e la does ot a e hat t pe of politi al s ste fede ati e o ot, fo i sta e C p iots a hoose to go e the sel es . P esu a l , if e follo Tu ke s li e of thought, those a eas a d thei p ospe ti e e e g esou es a elo g to Eg pt – ut Cai o is ot halle gi g Ni osia o e the . No othe egio al state, IOC o i te atio al po e has suppo ted, o e e e og ized, the a o e e tio ed Tu kish o Tu kish-C p iot lai s i the easte Medite a ea . O the o t a , all a to s espe t a d suppo t the legalit of the ‘oC s a tio s i spite of Tu ke s a ti e oppositio a d ega dless of the o ti ued i esolutio of the C p us uestio . Eg pt has e e uestio ed its EE) ag ee e t ith the ‘oC, a d i De e e sig ed a Co o U itizatio Ag ee e t CUA that late allo ed Ni osia to p o ess the seis i a d geologi al data f o the dis o e of the )oh field. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? Those data e e used Ni osia to lau h its su essful thi d li e si g ou d i – , hi h te de ed Blo ks , a d to, espe ti el , E i/Total, E i a d E o Mo il/Qata Pet oleu . Le a o has et to atif its ag ee e t ith the ‘oC, ut this has o e to do ith its o e lappi g lai s ith Is ael athe tha Tu ke s i flue e. “i e , Bei ut has e e halle ged ‘oC s so e eig t o e Blo ks a d , hi h a e adja e t to the li e of de a atio ag eed te ea s ago, a d did ot oppose the p ese e of ‘oC-li e sed IOCs – spe ifi all , E i i Blo k . Despite its halfhea ted app o he e t ith Tu ke , Is ael, has ot halle ged its EE) ag ee e t ith the ‘oC, o is it likel to do so i the fo eseea le futu e. E e the U“ a d the UK, ho ha e pu li l oted the eed to ea h a e uita le p ofit sha i g of the ‘oC s esou es et ee the isla d o u ities, ha e e e said that su h a p ofit-sha i g a a ge e t should happe efore a solutio is ea hed a d ha e e e e og ized a Tu kish o Tu kish-C p iot lai s o e pa ts of the ‘oC s EE). Neithe Washi gto o Lo do ha e e e pu li l atte pted to dissuade IOCs ope ati g f o o head ua te ed i thei ju isdi tio f o i esti g i the ‘oC s EE), as is e ide ed the p ese e of “hell a d No le i Blo k a d E o Mo il i Blo k . Fi all , o IOC that sig ed a p odu tio - sha i g-ag ee e t o t a t ith Ni osia o pa ti ipated i Ni osia s th ee li e si g ou ds i , 13 – a d – as dissuaded f o doi g so as a esult of A ka a s ilita a d e o o i a i gs – hi h i lude, si e , a th eat to i pose sa tio s o a IOC doi g usi ess i the ‘oC. 36 A pote tial esolutio of the C p us uestio ill fa ilitate the o etizatio of C p iot ese es, se u i g a ess fo the Tu kish-C p iot o u it to the additio al e e ues ge e ated the e po ts of h d o a o s. But its i esolutio has ot hi de ed, o is it likel to stop, the o etizatio of the ese es dis o e ed i side the ‘oC s u e tl de a ated EE). 4.2 What future for Israel-Turkey relations? Given their geopolitical influence on the region and their roles as, respectively, key producer and consumer of hydrocarbon resources, Israel and Turkey have an important stake in the establishment of an enduring regional-cooperation framework. Despite this objective, Turkish– Israeli interaction comprises a surprisingly uneasy and reluctant relationship. Most importantly, the level of visibility of their relations was, and still is, strongly correlated with the outlook for Palestinian–Israeli relations. Its relations with Is ael also fo pa t a d pa el of Tu ke s do esti politi s a d the o sti ate, i e st uggle o e Tu ke s ide tit . I this espe t, the e a d flo of relations can be connected to the political attitudes and behaviors of social forces in Turke s 36 Theodoros Tsakiris, The Gifts of Aphrodite: The Need for Competitive Pragmatism in Cypriot Gas “t ateg , in Angelos Giannakopoulos (ed.), Energy Cooperation and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Seismic Shift towards Peace or Conflict?, (Tel Aviv University Press: February 2016), pp.22-36 This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? do esti politi al spa e Bal ı a d Ka daş, : .37 It has to be noted that another factor pertinent to Turkish–Israeli relations is surely the role of the United States. The nature of the relationship remained largely unchanged from 1996 until 2009, when Israel executed Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A bitter exchange of words during the World Economic Fo u eeti gs at Da os et ee Tu ke s p i e i iste , ‘e ep Ta ip E doğa , a d the Is aeli president, Shimon Peres, substantially worsened relations; the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara flotilla, which had been aiming to break the Israeli embargo on Gaza, that led to the killing of nine Tu kish atio als put the fi al ail i the offi i . Follo i g the esig atio of Ah et Da utoğlu – the the Tu kish p i e i iste , ho had also ee the go e i g AKP s Justi e a d De elop e t Pa t s fo eig -policy guru up to that point – a rapprochement became possible. Although this was in part due to the prospect of hydrocarbon deals between Turkey and Israel, the p i a easo s ehi d it a e su el o e o ple a d o e Tu ke s la ge st ategi habitat. At the lowest point of bilateral relations, the Israeli side seemed to be restraining itself in its diplomatic tone. The reasoning behind this attitude has been attributed by some in Turkey to pressure on Israel to get its new-found gas reserves to European markets through a pipeline from Is ael s gia t Le iatha field to the Turkish port of Ceyhan,38 where Turkey is investing to create a 14 Special Energy Industry Zone. It could be said that overall Turkish attitudes towards the issue of East Med gas-transportation routes have been (and largely still are) predicated on the indispensability of the Turkish route.39 Since June 2016, Turkish–Is aeli elatio s ha e displa ed all the ha a te isti s of a Cold Colla o atio – and will most likely continue to do so. Full, long-term reconciliation will require patience, persistence and prudence on both sides. This may prove to be no easy task under the 37 Even though these two analysts, perhaps due to their own political preferences, are somehow largely underestimating the Realpolitik aspect of the bilateral relations their assertion is accurate. Ali Bal ı and Tuncay Ka daş, The Changing Dynamics of Turke s Relations with Israel: An Analysis of “e u itizatio , Insight Turkey, Vol. 14 / No. 2 / 2012 pp. 99-120 38 This attitude was reflected in various statements coming from the Turkish side. Then Minister of Energy Taner ζıldız went on record to say that; Is ael is destitute to Turkey for the p oje t as the project would not be feasible if the gas is not transported over Tu ke . İs ail de özür e e jisi , AHaber, April 3, 2014, (online) https://www.ahaber.com.tr/ekonomi/2013/04/03/israilden-ozur-enerjisi; The Turkish view to this end is also observable in the way that Turkish press has reflected statements of the Israeli side on the gas issue. İs ail de açıkla a: Türkiye olmazsa ol az… , Feb. 8, 2016, (online) http://akademikperspektif.com/haber/2016/02/08/israilden-aciklama-turkiye-olmazsa-olmaz/; Also Turkish energy industry executives have at times declared similar opinions. İs ail gazı için olmazsa olmaz ota… Nov., 28, 2014, (online) http://uzmanpara.milliyet.com.tr/haber-detay/gundem2/israil-gazi-icin-olmazsa-olmaz-rota-- -/8000/8509/. 39 In a statement Davutoğlu outright called what he dubbed as the Greek Cypriot Pla to transport the gas through alternative routes, namely East Med Gas Pipeline, ot ealisti ,. He said: "Turkey is the only place where that gas can go. It cannot go anywhere else. When you look at this area, which country has the energy deficit and the energy demand? Very well, if it is wanted to be transported to Europe which route would it take? Either from under the sea to Crete, from there to Greece, there are such large fault lines there that it is impossible to pass there. So they are o st ai ed . Nuh ζıl az, Kı ıs ta Kesin Çözüm için Rumlara 3 Alternatifli Pla , Star, March 28, 2013. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? i u sta es defi ed the egio s geopoliti s, hi h a e u e tl ha gi g faste tha e e . However, it is worth noting that, since 2009, the two countries have in fact found a way of compartmentalizing their relations. Bilateral trade has enjoyed a solid upward trend since they ratified a free-trade agreement that had been in force since May 1997. In fact, trade between the two has been on a very solid footing for the seven years since 2009 and, despite political issues, has never fallen below its 2008 level after what one might call the initial shock of 2009. In the near future, Turkish–Israeli relations will remain susceptible to the ups and downs of Palestinian–Israeli relations. This is the case not only because of the ideological disposition of Tu ke s u e t go e e t, e e though this fa to su el has its i flue e, ut also e ause of the fact that the history of Turkish–Israeli relations is a testimony that Turkish public opinion vis- à-vis Israel tends to sway according to the circumstances of Palestinian issue. 4.3 Egypt and Turkey: competition or collaboration? Do esti poli ies affe t elatio s et ee Tu ke a d Eg pt, ith i pli atio s o those ou t ies willi g ess to st e gthe e e g oope atio i the Le a t Basi . I deed, the o set of the A a “p i g has upset elatio s et ee Tu ke a d Eg pt, hi h si e Fe ua has had a agreement with Cyprus on the delimitation of its EEZ with the island. The initial years of the Arab 15 Spring coincided with a particularly strong rapprochement between the two, which turned into a deep alienation after the ousting of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. The coming to power of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), with Morsi as elected President of Egypt, was greeted positively by Turkey partly because even before the AKP won power itself, the mainstream Turkish political Islamist movement – o ga ized u de its si e , Ne etti E aka – saw itself as part of a larger net o k of Isla ist o e e ts Düzgit, ith a espe ial s path fo the MB.40 However, even though the AKP could be seen as the s io of E a aka s National Outlook movement, going beyond ideological affinity, the support that it lend to Morsi and the MB should also be attributed to the opportunity that Turkey saw for advancing its interests in the region. For instance, Turkey i ediatel e te ded a U“$ illio edit li e to Mo si s Eg pt.41 A High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was established in September 2011, according no less than 40 bilateral agreements during the two meetings that it held in 2011 and 2012.42 Whe E doğa isited Eg pt in September 2011, he was welcomed almost as a local political leader (Kirkpatrick, 2011). 43 The tide de isi el tu ed ith the ousti g of P eside t Mo si. Tu ke s st o g a ki g of the MB overnight became a liability for the bilateral relationship. Following the coup in Egypt, Ankara repeatedly branded its government illegitimate and pressured the international community to 40 Senem A dı -Düzgit, The Seesaw Friendship Between Tu ke s AKP and Eg pt s Muslim B othe hood , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 24, 2014, (online) carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/24/seesaw-friendship-between-turkey-s-akp-and-egypt-s-muslim- brotherhood-pub-56243. 41 Mısı ı istik a ı a bizden 2 milyar dola , Star, Sept. 15, 2012. 42 ζüksek Düzeyli İş i liği Meka iz ala ı , T.C. Baş aka lık Kamu Diplomasisi Koordi atörlüğü, (online) https://kdk.gov.tr/haber/yuksek-duzeyli-isbirligi-mekanizmalari/452 43 David D. Kirkpatrick, P e ie of Turkey Takes Role in ‘egio , The New York Times, Sept. 12, 2011. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? follow suit (Kader, 2013: XX). After Turkey asked the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on the e Eg ptia Ad i ist atio i , Tu kish Fo eig Mi iste Me lüt Ça uşoğlu accused Egypt, along with Saudi Arabia and so e othe Gulf states, of a ti el lo i g agai st Tu ke s bid for a seat on the Council in 2014.44 In November 2013, the countries also expelled their respective ambassadors. As Turkey is said to be hosting news channels affiliated to the MB, and as a considerable number of Brotherhood members found refuge there, Egypt has reportedly detained 29 individuals on alleged charges of espionage on behalf of Turkey. 45 At present, therefore, Turkey and Egypt are at loggerheads. From Syria to Qatar, on almost all regional issues, the two countries could be said to be on the opposite sides of the aisle. Even though Turkish– Egyptian Council meetings were convened in Cairo in January 2017 after a gap of four years,46 and a delegation of Turkish parliamentarians has visited Egypt for a meeting on cooperation in the easte Medite a ea Şi şek, ,47 a full-fledged normalization of relations between the two countries seems highly improbable in the near future. This prospect also renders any cooperation on East Med energy resources between the two countries, or facilitation of such cooperation by one of the parties between the other and third parties, a rather distant prospect. 5. Players and solutions for regional coordination 16 5.1 The role of Egypt Egypt – the second largest gas producer in Africa after Algeria, and a gas exporter to Israel and Jordan since 2003 – owns one of the most highly developed LNG and export infrastructures 48 in the eastern Mediterranean. Largely because of high demand spurred by the share of natural gas in electricity production, which stands at 75 percent (Samir, 2017),49 and an insufficient diversification of both resources, Egypt had to stop exports in 2012. In such a context of resource scarcity, the gas and power shortages that the country has suffered since then had an important i pa t o Mo si s fate.50 44 FM: Certain Gulf countries lobbying against Tu ke , Daily Sabah, January 13, 2015 45 Eg pt detains 29 people who allegedly spied for Tu ke , The Jordan Times, Nov. 22, 2017. 46 Dö t ζıl Aradan Sonra Türk-Mısı İş Forumu Düze le di , Yeni Şafak, January 30, 2017. 47 Yurdagül Şi şek, Tü ki e-Mısı İlişkile i No alleşi o u? , Sputnik News, Oct. 20, 2017 (online) https://tr.sputniknews.com/columnists/201710201030686938-turkiye-misir-iliskileri-normallesiyor-mu/ 48 The Egyptian infrastructure is composed of two LNG plants, located in Damietta and Idku, and two pipelines, the El Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline and the Arab Gas Pipeline. The total LNG export capacity is calculated at 19 Bcm/year. (Tagliapietra,2017; 14) Simone Tagliapietra, Energy: A Shaping Factor for Regional Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, European Parliament Directorate General for External Policies Policy Department, June 2017 49 Mohammed Samir, Eg pt s Energy Future Between Reality and Fa tasies , Daily News Egypt, June 6, 2017. 50 Ahmad Rahim, Eg pt's Electricity Crisis Poses An Early Challenge for Morsi “, Al Jazeera, July 24, 2012 (online) https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/07/worsening-living-conditions-in-e.html This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? Figure 4.1 – Eg pt s gas-export infrastructure 17 “ou e: O se atoi e Médite a ée de l É e gie Egypt s fo tu es see ed to e ha gi g i ith the dis o e of the supe gia t Zohr field, which came into production at the end of 2017. With a pote tial ea plateau p odu tio le el of 20- / ea a d esti ated ese es of 850 bcm, )oh ould e a ajo elief fo Eg pt s o st ai ed gas a ket Tagliapiet a a d Zachmann, 2015).51 In 2016, Zohr minority stakes in the Shorouk concession, where Zohr is located, have been sold to BP (10 percent) and Russian oil company Rosneft (30 percent).52 However, the question remains: will Egypt have excess capacity to pool and export together with other producers and potential producers, like Israel and Cyprus? Indeed, Egypt s gas de a d has i eased al ost pe e t pe ea du i g the last de ade, and gas has come to represent 50 percent of its energy supply – up from 35 percent in 2000. The domestic demand in Egypt for natural gas will keep on growing; the Egyptian Government recently sig ed a € illio o t a t fo th ee high-efficiency natural-gas power plants at a total capacity of . GW i additio to se u i g a . billion dollar project to connect 1.5 million households to atu al gas “a i , . U de the i u sta es set i t ai these de elop e ts, Eg pt might remain a net gas importer – or, at least, a non-exporter – into the foreseeable future. A 51 Simone Tagliapietra and Georg Zachmann, Eg pt Holds The Key To The Eastern Mediterranean's Gas Futu e , Forbes, Nov. 29, 2015, (online) www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/11/29/egypt-holds-the-key-to-the- eastern-mediterraneans-gas-future/#16a78ce4b7bf 52 Eni, The History of )oh , Eni, (accessed) Nov. 22, 2017, (online) www.eni.com/en_IT/operations/ upstream/exploration-model/zohr-egypt.page This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? study on the level of energy security in Egypt found that the ratio of total energy resources to total consumption53 sta ds at fou ea s u de a usi ess-as-usual s e a io Atla a d 54 Rapiea, 2016: 693). This context might also provide an opportunity fo Eg pt s eigh ou s. “hould Eg pt ot e a le to export for whatever reason, its LNG export infrastructure might also be available for them to utilize rather than it lying idle – especially when one considers that, when it comes to companies, the ownership of exploration rights of the fields in this part of the world presents important overlaps. Hence, at one level, cooperation between different interests and the integration of projects located in different sovereign zones might seem to be relatively easy at a first glance.55 In terms of existing circumstances, this could hold true especially for both Israel and Cyprus, where )oh s ai sha eholde , E i, has ele a t i te ests. After reaching their 2003 arrangement on delimitation, Egypt and Cyprus initialed a document intended to further their cooperation in August 2016. However, drilling activities in these blocks are expected to create heightened tensions as Turkey is adamant on protecting its rights in its maritime jurisdiction areas.56 In addition to these geopolitical risks, the commercial dynamics affecting the markets – such as decreasing prices of LNG – will remain a critical issue.57 Therefore, even though Egypt might choose to further its coordination and cooperation with third parties, it 18 might prove difficult to realize these regional, capital-intensive, long-term export projects – and the cooperation schemes on which they are based – without a certain consensus being present amongst all of the interested parties. Indeed, although Egypt might hold the key to the future prospects of East Med hydrocarbons, the complexity of the issue makes it difficult for any one party – or even a convenient combination of parties – to overcome the risks and burdens involved. 5.2 The role of Turkey Turkey perceives issues related to Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons not merely as part of a broader energy deal that would contribute to its energy security but, even more importantly, as central to the debate concerning its wider sovereign territorial rights – and not limited to the 53 This indicator measures the number of years in which available energy resources can meet the expected demand. (Atlam and Rapiea, 2016; 685) 54 The same study foresees 25,8 years under a new discoveries scenario. (Atlam and Rapiea, 2016; 694) An earlier study finds the same ratios at 16,7 years for oil and 36 years for gas (Ediger, Devlen, McDonald, 2012; 81 -82) Volkan Ediger, Balkan Devlen and Deniz Bingöl McDonald, Le a t ta Büyük Oyun: Doğu Akde iz i Enerji Jeopolitiği , Uluslararası İlişkiler, Vol. 9, No. 33, Spring 2012, pp 73 – 92. 55 For example while Aphrodite and Leviathan has overlapping ownership structures, while the same company that discovered and holds majority stakes at Zohr is declared to have an intention to start a drilling campaign in so- alled concession blocks declared by the GCA, namely 8, 3, and 6 with slightly differing partnership structures. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that some of these so-called blocks in the Mediterranean fall squarely on the Turkish continental shelf. 56 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed its reaction to such intentions by informing companies, and calling the situation a conflict waiting to happe . 57 Remarkably an expert opines that, gas from Israel and Cyprus exported to be liquefied at Eg pt s two idle LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, for export to Europe, cannot o pete with the present market prices. (Ellinas,2016) Charles Ellinas, Eg pt impact on Cyprus and Israel (Part II , Strata Insight, May 8, 2016, (online) https://stratainsight.com/2016/05/06/egypt-impact-on-cyprus-and-israel-part-ii-by-charles-ellinas/ This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? eastern Mediterranean. As such, the issues of delimitation and exploration activities by third pa ties i the East Med a e topi s of e high se siti it fo the ou t . I this se se, Tu ke s approach to East Med hydrocarbons should be expected to be both preventive and proactive. This is ot o l pa t a d pa el of Tu ke s C p us poli , e e though that ea s u de ia l hea il o Tu ke s app oa h, ut A ka a s pe spe ti e is also losel dete i ed o e s a out maritime security and the issue of the delimitation and sovereign rights on areas of maritime jurisdiction. For Turkey, these matters are not limited to the eastern Mediterranean but also encompass its long-standing issues in the Aegean with Greece. Under the circumstances, the Tu kish app oa h to East Med e plo atio a ti ities e essitates e og itio of the ou t s sovereign rights as set forth by the map below. Figure 4.2 – The Turkish EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean and overlapping Greek-Cypriot blocks 19 “ou e: Başe e , : a d ζa ı, : . Tu kish Mi iste of E e g Al a ak has ope l de la ed that Tu ke is, i p i iple, ead fo a a d all ki ds of oope atio fo the o e ializatio of the Easte Medite a ea gas , a d strongly believes in the a gu e t that the e e g se u it of Eu ope sta ts at Tu ke . Al a ak has also stated that Tu ke is the egio s ke sto e state he it o es to e e g , a d a important regional actor, as well as a reliable partner and shouldnot be assessed through the lens of dail politi al de ates, o je tu al de elop e ts o t a sie t politi al o ies. 58 At the same time, the Le iatha Co so tiu s offi ial p ese tatio s put thei e phasis o the Tu kish oute as an alternative to the utilizatio of Eg pt s idle LNG infrastructure.59 The Egypt LNG option is not a foregone investment opportunity either: the International Energy Agency (IEA) states in its Global Gas “e u it ‘e ie that [e] e a ou ti g fo u a aila ilit of suppl […] LNG a kets a e ot 58 Al a ak: 10 ıl sonra enerji ih a atçısı ola ağız E erjiGü lüğü, November, 2, 2017, (online) http://www.enerjigunlugu.net/icerik/24757/albayrak-10-yil-sonra-enerji-ihracatcisi-olacagiz.html 59 Delek Drilling, BOAML Emerging Markets Corporate Conference P ese tatio , June 2017, http://www.delekdrilling.co.il/sites/default/files/media/document/field_ev_presentation/DD%2023052017%2 0vf.pdf, See Slide 24. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? expected to rebalance before the mid- s , as fo o , LNG p i es e ai lo […] a d de a d, while growing robustly, is not keeping pace with the addition of supply (IEA, 2017: 13). The low prices and existing political and market risks and uncertainties make the commercialization of the easte Medite a ea ese es u h o e diffi ult Elli as, .60 On the export-route issue, the prevalent mood in Turkey (Karagöl and Özdemir, 2017: 55–62)61 considers the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline project to be trul just a othe Eu opea pipe d ea Tagliapiet a, ,62 despite the fact that it has been declared a project of common interest by the EU and claimed to be technically feasible, economically viable and complementary to other projects63 in the face of a € . illio p i e tag; de li i g gas p i es; a d the s ale of e isti g ese es, hi h e essitates the pooli g of the gas as a p e e uisite . He e, f o a purely feasibility point of view, Turkey feels reasonably comfortable that neither a Greece– Cyprus–Israel (or, possibly an Italy) deal nor an Egyptian–Israeli–Cypriot trilateral cooperation would create a challenge to its status as the most attractive route, and probably market, for the easte Medite a ea s gas esou es. 5.3 Export options, and how they will shape gas developments in the region Although much of the focus on the potential exportation of natural gas from the region has been 20 on the construction of new LNG facilities in either Cyprus or Israel, the option of building a new liquefactio pla t i the easte Medite a ea has ee effe ti el take off the ta le as a result of the following reasons: Cost. If one were to add together the existing net export capacity of Israel (360 bcm) and Cyprus (110 bcm), there would, theoretically, be more than enough gas to build a new, two-train LNG- export facility capable of liquefying anywhere between 10 and 14 bcm/y to global markets – especially in Europe, where East Med gas would not face strong competition from Qatari, Australian and established South East Asian LNG exports to China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. U fo tu atel fo oth C p us a d Is ael, LNG-li uefa tio pla ts ha e e o e e t e el ostl to de elop – e e fo the Is aelis, ho do ha e the e essa ese es to uild a t o-t ai LNG- e po t fa ilit , to the det i e t of o e o o e of thei egio al pipeli e-e po t optio s to e a al sed elo . “i e Is ael s et e po t apa it is li ited its o do esti egulatio , sig ed i Ju e , to ,o pe e t of its e isti g p o e ese es of al ost , the it ould eed to o it at least / out of the / that it has a aila le fo ea s i o de to fi a e 60 Charles Ellinas, Futu e Challenges for East Med E e g , Cyprus Mail, Oct. 15, 2017, http://cyprus- mail.com/2017/10/15/future-challenges-east-med-energy/ 61 Erdal Tanas Karagöl and Büş a Zeynep Özdemir, Türkiye’ i ENerji Ticaret Merkezi Ol ası da Doğu Akde iz’i Rolü, SETAV, 2017. 62 Simon Tagliapietra, Is the EastMed gas pipeline just another EU pipe d ea ? , Bruegel, May 10, 2017, (online) http://bruegel.org/2017/05/is-the-eastmed-gas-pipeline-just-another-eu-pipe-dream/ 63 A Direct Link to New Sources for Eu ope , IGI Posedion, Nov. 22, 2017, (online) http://www.igi- poseidon.com/en/eastmed This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? a o e iall ia le t o-t ai LNG fa ilit i Is ael. Is ael, hi h has the ight to app o e all e po t deals ade o pa ies de elopi g its atu al-gas ese es, has, e e si e the i te - i iste ial )e a h Co ittee ‘epo t of “epte e , e luded the possi ilit of li uef i g its gas ese es outside a eas of its so e eig t . B i tue of this de isio , it has effe ti el uled out si e at least the o st u tio of a joi t Is aeli–C p iot LNG fa ilit i Vassilikos that ould e pa tiall fed Is aeli gas. C p us has e e itself had e ough gas to self-fi a e a o e iall ia le LNG optio . This lea es a ou d / , of hi h Le iatha s de elope s ha e al ead ag eed i “epte e to sell / to the Jo da ia a ket f o Phase of Le iatha s p odu tio – a deal that has ee app o ed the Is aeli state. The e ai i g 64 / a e ot e ough to fi a e a / pipeli e to Tu ke , ut ould e e po ted to Eg pt th ough a joi t C p iot–Is aeli e po t pipeli e that li ks Aph odite a d Le iatha to the Eg ptia g id o its t o idle LNG-li uefa tio te i als i Da ietta a d/o Idku. A LNG optio fo Is ael, i sho t, is o e iall det i e tal to a offsho e pipeli e to Tu ke , ut ot to Eg pt espe iall if e isti g i f ast u tu e is utilized like the El-A ish-Ashkelo gas pipeli e. Investors. E isti g Is aeli de elope s do ot ha e the e essa il fi a ial apa it a d te h i al e pe tise to shoulde alo e the osts of a ajo LNG-e po t p oje t, hi h ould easil su pass a 21 $ – illio p i e tag o top of the $ – illio that the eed to fi a e the p odu tio ta get of the fi st phase of gas f o Le iatha . The ost of the upst ea phase alo e fo ed the de elope s No le, Delek a d ‘atio to edu e thei i itial p odu tio ta get fo Phase f o / to / he the su itted a e ised Field De elop e t Pla FDP to the Is aeli Go e e t i Fe ua 65 B the ti e that the FDP ega to e i ple e ted i Fe ua , the p odu tio ta get set to e a hie ed the e d of had sh u k fu the – to / – e ause the de elope s ould o l o ilize $ . illio fo its fi a i g. The pla i ludes the o st u tio of t o k offsho e pipeli es o e ti g the field ith the e isti g Is aeli g id i the o the pa t of the ou t , hi h ill a so th ee ua te s of the e ti e output ith the e ai i g o e ua te ei g e po ted to Jo da .66 A LNG optio as si pl i possi le to fi a e ithout the pa ti ipatio of a ajo IOC. No su h o ga izatio sought to joi the Le iatha o so tiu afte a atte pted pu hase of a pe e t sha e Aust alia s Woodside Pet oleu e ded i failu e a k i Ma . 67 64 Sharon Udasin, Is ael to supply gas to Jordan in $10 billion deal , Jerusalem Post, 26/09/2016 65 The initial development plan submitted in 2014 had a production target of 21 bcm/y at a cost of $6-7 billion. It has since been revised down to 16 bcm/y according to the revised plan submitted in February 2016. ‘e ised plan pushes Leviathan de elop e t , Oil & Gas Journal, 25/02/2016, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2016/02/revised-plan-pushes-leviathan-development.html 66 No le Energy Sanctions Leviathan Project Offshore Is ael , 23/02/2017, https://globenewswire.com/news- release/2017/02/23/926886/0/en/Noble-Energy-Sanctions-Leviathan-Project-Offshore-Israel.html, (accessed, 04/10/ 2017) 67 James Paton, Woodside Scraps $2.6 Billion Israeli Gas Deal as Talks Fail , Bloomberg, 21/05/2014, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-20/woodside-scraps-2-6-billion-leviathan-gas-deal-after- talks-fail, (accessed 01/10/2017) This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? Figure 5.3 – East Med Gas Export Options 22 Source: A.Dimou If a LNG optio is off the ta le, does this ea that all of the egio s e po t pote tial ill e consumed inside the region without any exports reaching the EU? Not necessarily. Pipeline options do exist that could monetize, in conjunction with existing LNG-liquefaction facilities, the egio s p o e ese es i a s that ould ha e a ajo , positi e effe t o the EU s i po t- diversification strategy by as early as 2021-2022. Theoretically, there are three pipeline options allowing Europe to import East Med gas: (i) the East Med Gas Pipeline (EMGP), connecting Israel, Cyprus and Greece; (ii) a pipeline connecting Israel with Turkey, with a potential extension to Tu ke s EU o de ; a d iii a pipeli e o e ti g Aph odite a d/o Le iatha ith Eg pt s idle liquefaction plants. The East Med Gas Pipeline (EMGP) Although the option of a direct pipeline linkage between the East Med and EU markets has been revived by the improvement of deep-offshore pipe-laying technology and the signing in April 2017 of a preliminary framework agreement between Israel and the three EU states (the RoC, Greece and Italy) championing the project, its implementation remains debatable. The EMGP, estimated to ost a ou d € . illio , is heape to uild tha a t i -train LNG-liquefaction plant, but its construction will prove very challenging. Crossing over 1,900 km, it would be the longest pipeline ever to operate at depths close to 3,000 m.68 Due to its length and depth, it would need a minimum 68 Simone Tagliapietra, Is the East Med gas pipeline just another EU pipe d ea ? , Bruegel, 10/05/2017, http://bruegel.org/2017/05/is-the-eastmed-gas-pipeline-just-another-eu-pipe-dream/ This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? booking capacity of 10 bcm/y, and because of its technical characteristics it would be more difficult to scale up so as to transport additional volumes. The pipeline may end in mainland Greece, but Greece is not its principal market; Italy is, and currently there is no pipeline connection between Italy and Greece. More importantly, Cyprus does not have sufficient additional reserves to commit to the project, whereas Israel, which has additional reserves, understands that a 10 bcm/y commitment to the EMGP will eliminate any ha es fo e po ti g gas to Tu ke . “hould Is ael de ide to ook pe e t of the EMGP s capacity – an unlikely probability in the absence of new discoveries – it would still be able to export 3 bcm/y to Jordan and ook al ost a thi d of Eg pt s idle li uefa tio apa it . I this s e a io, Israeli companies could also export their remaining 5 bcm/y to independent gas operators in Egypt like Dolphinus, provided that they use in reverse one of the existing, although currently inoperable, pipeline connections between Israel and Egypt – namely, the Ashkelon–Arish pipeline or the trans- Arabian pipeline that links Israel and Egypt via Jordan. A pipeline connecting Israel with Turkey The second option is that of the Leviathan–Ceyhan Gas Pipeline (LCGP), which, given its depth (1,500–1,800 m) and length (500–550 km), would also need a minimum gas commitment of 8–10 23 bcm/y in order to become financially viable. Since Israel would sell to Jordan, an LCGP pipeline – estimated to cost anywhere between $2 billion and $4 billion69 – would mean that Israeli o pa ies ould ha e o o e tha / to dedi ate to eithe Eg pt s do esti a ket –if, of course, they use existing infrastructure – or the idle LNG-liquefaction capacity in Idku or Damietta. An 8 bcm/y LCGP would provide around 12 percent of Turkish demand – e pe ted, a o di g to p oje tio s the Tu kish E e g Mi ist , to ea h a ou d i , he Le iatha s se o d p odu tio phase is e pe ted to o e o st ea . 70 Tu ke s p i ate gas t ade s – ho, led Tu as, a e lo i g fo the p oje t – a e e offe a highe p i e to Is aeli p odu e s o pa ed ith Eg ptia i po te s i o de to i p o e the pipeli e s o e ial att a ti e ess. Tu ke s do esti a ket akes e o o i se se fo Is aeli e po te s; a atte pt to t a sit ia Tu ke to the EU does ot ake a e o o i se se – so ethi g that is ad itted e e the leadi g Tu kish de elope s of the LCGP.71 The e a e those 69 Hedy Cohen, Gas execs see Israel-Turkey gas deal by , Globes, 28/06/2016, http://www.globes.co.il/en/ article-gas-execs-see-israel-turkey-gas-deal-by-2017-1001135479. For a detailed analysis, Theodoros Tsakiris, The Leviathan-Ceyhan Pipeline: Political & Commercial Arguments Against the Construction of a Turkish-Israeli Pipeli e , in Sami Andoura & David Koranyi (eds.), Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Promise of Peril?,Egmont Institute & U.S. Atlantic Council, (Academia Press: May 2014), pp.47-58. 70 Gulmira Rzayeva, Natural Gas in the Turkish Domestic Market: Policies and Challenges, OIES Paper#82, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (Oxford: February 2014), p.9 71 As Platts noted in a recent interview with Batu Aksoy, the CEO of Turcas, the leading developer of the Leviathan-Ceyhan consortium on the Turkish side While previous reports have said that if Israeli gas was brought to Turkey, the bulk of it would be transited on to Europe, Aksoy said I moderate to high growth cases, most of the gas to be imported to Turkey may be for local Turkish o su ptio , European Gas Daily, 21/04/2016, p.2. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? ho lai that Is aeli a d/o C p iot gas ould e el t a sit to Eu ope ia Tu ke ia the TANAP/TAP T a s A atolia Natu al Gas Pipeli e/T a s Ad iati Pipeli e s ste .72 Ho e e , the p opo e ts of a Tu kish t a sit optio fo East Med gas fail to take i to a ou t that:  the e is o o e tio et ee TANAP a d the Ce ha egio ;  TANAP, ith the e eptio of / , is full ooked fo the t a spo tatio of Aze i gas e po ts f o “hah De iz a d f o othe Aze i fields i the Caspia “ea, hi h ill o e o st ea the id- s;  the e is o f ee apa it i TAP fo East Med gas, fo the sa e easo s si e Aze i- ased p odu e s f o the “hah De iz o so tiu ill gi e p io it to thei o gas  the e is o pipeli e s ste -othe tha TAP- p ese tl a aila le to a the gas f o the Tu kish–EU o de to its fi al EU a ket desti atio s; a d  the o ti ued i esolutio of the C p us uestio ould ea that the o st u tio of the LCGP th ough the ‘epu li of C p us s EE) ould se iousl da age the ultifa eted oope atio et ee Is ael a d the ‘oC. This oope atio is so ethi g that a politi al fo es i side Is ael a alue o e tha the o e ial i te ests of Le iatha s de elope s. 24 I a ase u de u e t o ditio s the EU has othi g to gai f o i easi g its t a sit-gas depe de e o Tu ke , a d that is pa tl h the U io has ef ai ed f o e p essi g a suppo t fo a Tu kish t a sit optio o pa ed ith its e pu li a d e ta gi le suppo t of the EMGP. A pipeline connecting Aphrodite/Leviathan with Egypt’s liquefaction plants The la k of suffi ie t esou es to uild its o LNG pla t, the o ti ued i esolutio of the C p us p o le a d the i atu it of the EMGP ha e left the ‘oC ith esse tiall o e ealisti all attai a le optio , hi h did ot e e e ist as late as – a el , Eg pt s LNG fa ilities. C p iot E e g Mi iste Geo ge Lakkot pis has also e tio ed Eg pt s do esti gas a ket a d Jo da 73 as pote tial e po t desti atio s. Both alte ati es, ho e e , a e highl u likel si e Jo da ia de a d ill e o e ed Is aeli e po ts a d the dis o e of )oh has li ited a p ospe t fo di e t i po ts to the Eg ptia a ket the ti e that Aph odite o Le iatha Phase a o e o st ea . P ospe ti e Is aeli e po ts a go to Eg pt s do esti a kets ia Ta a o Le iatha Phase o ly if p e-e isti g pipeli e i f ast u tu e, i pa ti ula the Ashkelo -El A ish pipeli e is utilized to ut the fi al ost to the e d o su e . This is ot the ase fo C p iot ese es, hi h eed a e pipeli e o e tio to e o st u ted i o de to ea h thei a ket desti atio i eithe Idku o Da ietta. Aph odite gas a egi p odu tio ithi – o ths afte the sig i g of a sales o t a t, hi h a o e at the ea liest i . This ea s that C p iot e po ts a egi o soo e tha late to id– . 72 Jonathan Ferziger and Elliott Gotkine, U.“. Says Israel Gas May Help Europe Diversify From Russian Fuel , Bloomberg, 07/04/2016. 73 Henderson, Jordan’s Energy Supply Options, op.cit, pp.7-8. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? Idku a d Da ietta a e ot e uall att a ti e optio s, a d e ui e a diffe e t suppl i to e o e ia le. The p ospe ti e e po t of Aph odite s gas, esti ated at app o i atel . / o e 5 ea s, does ot suffi e to ook all of Idku s li uefa tio apa it esti ated at . / ut it is more than enough to book the entire capacity at Damietta for 17 years. Damietta is also much closer to Aphrodite, at a distance of 200 km, whereas the Idku facility is 400 km away from the Cypriot field – thereby doubling the cost of the necessary offshore pipeline. Cypriot gas can book Damietta alone; for Idku, an Israeli contribution is necessary. The biggest challenge for the RoC, which its current administration has been unable to overcome, is the fact that Shell – which joined the Aphrodite consortium in January 2016 – is a major shareholder not in Damietta but in the Idku facility. Shell controls 35 percent of the Aphrodite consortium, while Delek a d No le, ho o t ol the e ai i g pe e t, a t to p io itize Le iatha s de elop e t so as to li k it fi st ith Eg pt s a ket, a d ha e ee agg essi el lo i g Tel A i in favour of the Leviathan–Ceyhan pipeline. This non-alignment between the commercial preferences of the RoC, which remains the biggest si gle o e of Aph odite s futu e gas p odu tio , a d the a keti g st ategies of Delek a d No le is se iousl dela i g, a d a e e tuall de ail, the p oje t to o etize Aph odite s gas fo the benefit of the RoC and the EU. These LNG volumes, part of which will be sold to the EU, may 25 ep ese t the fi st e po ts of C p iot gas a i i g i EU a kets a de ade afte Aph odite s i itial discovery in 2011. Israeli exports, primarily from Leviathan, are quite likely to follow once Tel Aviv and Cairo resolve their $1.76 billion dispute over the compensation that Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company EGAS has to pay to the Israeli Electricity Company for the disruption of a 2012 contract that supplied, at the time, 60 percent of Israeli demand. If, by 2021- C p iot a d Is aeli gas is fed to Eg pt s e isti g LNG fa ilities, hi h a e a le to liquefy up to 15.86 bcm/y,74 then the EU will be importing East Med LNG in significant volumes for the first time since the beginning of the Arab revolts in early 2011. Historically, these facilities, commissioned in 2005, reached their peak utilization rate in 2010 with a total liquefaction volume of 9.71 bcm, while 48.6 percent of that LNG (i.e. 4.72 bcm) was eventually consumed in the EU – primarily in Spain, which imported 2.62 bcm in 2010.75 If the facilities are indeed booked at capacity and the 2010 patterns are reconfirmed, then the EU may get easily 50 percent of the combined Damietta/Idku liquefaction capacity, amounting to 7.93 bcm/y. If Damietta restarts operations first in 2021, fed only by Cypriot gas, then the EU can import up to 7.4 bcm/y from the region – a volume equal to three quarters of the Azeri gas exports scheduled to arrive via the TANAP/TAP system in late 2020. 74 The Damietta facility is a single-train LNG plant with a 6,5 bcm/y liquefaction capacity. Idku has two LNG- trains each with a 4,68 bcm/y capacity. International Gas Union, World LNG Report-2015, (IGU: 2015), p.77. 75 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011, (London: June 2011), data are for 2010, p.29. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? 6. Drivers and Scenarios In the light of the foregoing geopolitical and geoeconomic analysis, focused on the eastern Mediterranean region, we are able to define a set of drivers that will affect the specific potential scenarios of conflict, cooperation and convergence. The quantity of eastern Mediterranean offshore gas. The eventually exploitable amount of offshore natural gas is considered to be a key driver in so far as it will impact on the requirement to collaborate with Turkey. At the one extreme is the scenario whereby the eventually exploitable natural gas that can ultimately be exported to EU markets is relatively low. This scenario may push the various stakeholders to choose one of the less-expensive option, which is the construction of a pipeline linking these offshore fields to the Turkish grid to then be exported to Europe. A low exportable quantity will preclude more expensive infrastructure options like the construction of an LNG facility in Cyprus or longer pipeline projects bypassing Turkey. Under these conditions, the natural-gas parameter would also have a benign influence on ongoing Cyprus negotiations to the extent that a political settlement on the island would be almost an economic and financial precondition for the commercialization of those resources that fall under the sovereignty of Cyprus. Therefore, somewhat paradoxically, a low volume of exploitable offshore- 26 gas resources would strengthen the prospects of a cooperation scenario. A potentially high volume of exploitable resources would act in the opposite direction by esse tiall o iati g the possi ilit of Tu ke s olla o atio . The highe olu e ould eate a sufficient economic endowment to justify investment in more costly gas-transport infrastructure, precluding the possibility of creating a transport link through Turkey. In the same vein, this prospect of higher potential economic gain would create a stronger incentive to push ahead with these projects even without the collaboration of Ankara. So, from this angle, the higher volume of exploitable offshore gas in the East Med would act as a driver leading to the conflict scenario between Turkey and the EU on account of an increase in the political tension between EU member Cyprus and Turkey. 2000s, it was believed that they would trigger more cooperation between the two communities on the island and therefore play a constructive role in negotiations facilitating the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. The argument still stands. In other words, offshore gas findings could, under these conditions, be interpreted as a driver for the convergence and/or cooperation scenario between Turkey and the EU. Yet, the energy issue has not by itself been a strong enough motivating factor for a Cyprus settlement thus far. Other political issues, ranging from power- sharing arrangements to the future of the guarantee and security system, were clearly more important in determining the outcome of these as-yet failed negotiations. But to the extent that the prospects of a settlement are dimming, the energy issue has the potential to play a totally different role in terms of creating a more confrontational situation between Cyprus and Turkey and therefore becoming a strong driver for a conflict scenario. The se tio s of this pape that add ess the o goi g dispute o C p us s E lusi e E o o i )o e illustrate this potential for conflict. Indeed, if the parties have conclusively to reach a settlement This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? under the UN-led talks, there is a strong possibility for Cyprus and Turkey to find themselves in a direct conflict in the regions of the Mediterranean that form the subjects of this dispute. The u e t Tu kish positio , as a e te sio of the ou t s fo mal recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), is to recognize its EEZ to the south of the island where, on the basis of an agreement with the TRNC, Turkey would be willing to engage in exploration for natural-gas resources. In an interview with the Greek daily Kathimerini in early February 2018, Tu kish Fo eig Mi iste Ça uşoğlu o fi ed that Tu ke has a pla to o du t e plo atio a ti ities i the easte Medite a ea egio soo : It is ou so e eig ight to seek a d e plo e these resources so we plan to start drilling in the eastern Mediterranean region in the near futu e .76 In return, Egypt warned Turkey against any infringement of its economic rights in the eastern Mediterranean under a maritime-border-demarcation agreement signed in 2013 with Cyprus that allows exploration for gas in the area – thereby clearly illustrating the potential for conflict.77 The evolution of natural-gas prices. Spot prices for natural gas are also considered to be a similar driver to the previously identified one of volume of exploitable offshore gas. Higher natural-gas prices would raise the economic value of these resources and create more economically feasible transport options that preclude Turkey. As such, higher natural-gas prices could lead to a conflict 27 scenario based on dynamics very similar to those explained in the previous paragraph. Again, similarly, lower natural-gas prices would, in return, force the various stakeholders to choose less costly transport options to EU markets – a scenario i hi h elia e o Tu ke s oope atio would become more necessary. This outcome would raise the prospect of a cooperation or even convergence scenario. The evolution of the Turkey–Israel political relationship. An improved political atmosphere between Turkey and Israel could potentially allow Turkey to direct the offshore gas under Israeli sovereignty to Turkey through a newly constructed pipeline. This outcome would severely dent the feasibility of the tripartite (Israel, Egypt, Cyprus) pooling of offshore resources to be exported to Europe, bypassing Turkey. Such a development would strengthen the cooperation scenario. The more likely outcome, however, is a continuing deterioration in the Turkey–Israel relationship leading to an increased likelihood of the tripartite effort succeeding in bypassing Turkey for exports to Europe. Turkey would then seek to deter these efforts, leading to the scenario of conflict with Europe. The evolution of the Turkey–Egypt political relationship. A very similar analysis to the one above can be undertaken with respect to this driver, with an even higher likelihood of a continuing deterioration in the bilateral relationship and the emergence of the conflict scenario as an outcome. 76 http://aa.com.tr/en/energyterminal/natural-gas/turkey-plans-to-explore-resources-in-e-mediterranean- /18696 77 https://in.reuters.com/article/egypt-energy-zohr-turkey/egypt-warns-turkey-over-eastern-mediterranean- economic-interests-idINKBN1FR1IT This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? The evolution of Cyprus–Egypt–Israel cooperation. The strengthening of this tripartite collaboration – which would either use the Egypt-based LNG facilities (more likely) or build a new pipeline to Greece (less likely) to export gas from the East Med fields to EU markets – would lead to the conflict scenario for reasons explained above. Turkey would want to undermine any such initiative that sought to bypass Turkish territory for exports to Europe. The growth performance of the Turkish economy is also seen as a driver. A strong and sustainable growth performance would increase natural-gas consumption and the need for additional imports purely for domestic consumption. Ankara would then be more inclined to devise an approach that would help it to leverage the East Med offshore resources – in particular, by fast-tracking the o st u tio of a pipeli e to Is ael. F o Is ael s pe spe ti e as ell, di e t a ess to a la ge a d growing natural-gas market in close proximity would create a strong incentive to cooperate with Turkey and to direct its exportable natural gas exclusively to Turkey. “u h a de elop e t ould o t i ute to Tu ke s st ategi isio of i p o i g its positio as a energy hub, and enhance the prospects of a cooperation scenario with Europe. At the same time, by exclusively drawing Israel-owned resources, Turkey would undermine the prospects of the tripartite Cyprus–Egypt–Israel cooperation that would have led to a conflict scenario. 28 This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? 7. References AA E e g , Tu ke pla s to e plo e esou es i E. 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This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? “a i , Moha ad, Eg pt s E e g Futu e Bet ee ‘ealit a d Fa tasies , Dail Ne s Eg pt, Ju e 6, 2017. “put ik Ne s, ζu dagül Şi şek, Tü ki e-Mısı İlişkile i No alleşi o u? , O t. , o li e https://tr.sputniknews.com/columnists/201710201030686938-turkiye-misir-iliskileri- normallesiyor-mu/ “ta , Mısı ı istik a ı a izde il a dola , “ept. , . State of Israel, Ministry of Energy, Israeli Gas Opportinities, (Tel Aviv: November 2016), p.4, http://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English- Site/Pages/News%20And%20Media/ISRAELI%20GAS%20OPPORTUNITIES.pdf. 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Enerji ve Tabii Kaynakla Baka lığı, Baka Al a ak: Doğalgaz İleti Şe eke izi Gü lük Taşı a Kapasitesi i İki ζıl İçi de Mil o Met eküpe Çıka a ağız , Jul , , o li e This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? http://www.enerji.gov.tr/tr-TR/Bakanlik-Haberleri/Bakan-Albayrak-Dogalgaz-Iletim- Sebekemizin-Gunluk-Tasima-Kapasitesini-Iki-Yil-Icinde-400-Milyon-Metrekupe-Cikaracagiz Tsakiris, Theodoros, The Le iatha -Ceyhan Pipeline: Political & Commercial Arguments Against the Construction of a Turkish-Is aeli Pipeli e , i “a i A dou a & Da id Ko a i eds. , Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Promise of Peril?,Egmont Institute & U.S. Atlantic Council, (Academia Press: May 2014), pp.47-58. Tsakiris, Theodoros, Greece and the Energy Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, Strategic Update 14.1, LSE Ideas, London School of Economics, (LSE: June 2014) Tsaki is, Theodo os, The Gifts of Aph odite: The Need fo Co petiti e P ag atis i C p iot Gas “t ateg , i A gelos Gia akopoulos ed. , E e g Coope atio a d “e u it i the Easte Mediterranean: A Seismic Shift towards Peace or Conflict?, (Tel Aviv University Press: February 2016), pp.22-36 Tsakiris, Theodoros, C p us Natu al Gas “t ateg : Geopoliti al & E o o i P e o ditio s , 34 Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.27 / Issue 1 (March 2017), pp.20-57 The Jorda Ti es, Eg pt detai s people ho allegedl spied fo Tu ke , No . , . “ha o Udasi , Is ael, Eu opea states ad a e pla s fo o ld s la gest u de ate gas pipeli e , Je usale Post, / / ; Is ael to suppl gas to Jo da i $ illio deal , Jerusalem Post, 26/09/2016 Nuh ζıl az, Kı ıs ta Kesi Çözü içi ‘u la a Alte atifli Pla , “ta , Ma h , . This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. Online Paper No. 22 Gas Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean: Trigger or Obstacle for EU-Turkey Cooperation? About the Authors Theodoros Tsakiris Coordinator, Energy Programme, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens and Assistant Professor in Geopolitics & Energy Policy, University of Nicosia Prof. Ahmet K. Han Ahmet Han is with the faculty of International Relations at Kadir Has University in Istanbul and a Board Member of EDAM. His research interests are strategic thinking, negotiations foreign policy analysis and energy geopolitics. Dr. Han has worked as a columnist in Turkish dailies Radikal and Referans. He is also the chief editorial advisor of the Turkish edition of the New Perspectives Quarterly. 35 Sinan Ulgen “i a Ulge is the e e uti e hai a of EDAM a d the leade of FEUTU‘E s Work Package 2, security drivers. He is a former Turkish diplomat. His area of expertise includes Turkey-EU relations, security policy, international trade, transatlantic relations and the digital agenda. This project has received fu di g fro the Europea U io ’s Horizo 2020 resear h a d innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. ABOUT FEUTURE FEUTURE sets out to explore fully different options for further EU-Turkey cooperation in the next decade, including analysis of the challenges and opportunities connected with further integration of Turkey with the EU. To do so, FEUTURE applies a comprehensive research approach with the following three main objectives: 1. Mapping the dynamics of the EU-Turkey relationship in terms of their underlying historical narratives and thematic key drivers. 2. Testing and substantiating the most likely scenario(s) for the future and assessing the implications (challenges and opportunities) these may have on the EU and Turkey, as well as the neighbourhood and the global scene. 3. Drawing policy recommendations for the EU and Turkey on the basis of a strong evidence-based foundation in the future trajectory of EU-Turkey relations. FEUTURE is coordinated by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels, Director of the Centre for Turkey and European Union Studies at the University of Cologne and Dr. Nathalie Tocci, Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome. The FEUTURE consortium consists of 15 renowned universities and think tanks from the EU, Turkey and the neighbourhood. Coordination Office at University of Cologne: Project Director: Dr. Funda Tekin Project and Financial Manager: Hanna-Lisa Hauge Email:

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