Suicide Terrorism

Suicide Terrorism Ami Pedahzur Contents Chapter 1 – What is Suicide Terrorism?...................................................................5 The Symbiosis between Terror and Death.................................................................9 What is Suicide Terrorism?......................................................................................12 General Features of Suicide Terrorism in the World...............................................17 Tactical Features of Suicide Terrorism....................................................................20 Methods of Operation ..........................................................................................20 Targets of Suicide Terrorism ...............................................................................23 Plan of the Book.......................................................................................................26 Chapter 2 – How Can Suicide Terrorism Be Explained? ......................................28 Strategic-Rational Decision-Making .......................................................................33 The Social-Cultural Aspect......................................................................................35 Recruitment of the Potential Suicide Bomber..........................................................40 The Organisational Procedure..................................................................................47 Summary ..................................................................................................................50 Chapter 3 – Turning to Suicide Terrorism: Hezbollah and the Palestinian Organisations..............................................................................................................52 Founding Fathers of Modern-Day Suicide Terrorism – The Hezbollah in Lebanon ..................................................................................................................................54 Suicide Terrorism – A Winning Strategy ............................................................56 Suicide Terrorism as a Tool for Gaining Power in Political Arenas in Lebanon and the Middle East .............................................................................................60 External or Internal Struggle? Suicide Terrorism in the Palestinian Arena.............64 Suicide Terrorism – A Strategy for Advancing the Peace Process?....................65 Suicide Terrorism as a Strategy in the Contemporaneous Struggle against both Israel and the Palestinian Authority.....................................................................68 Suicide Terrorism as a Tool in Rivalry among Organisations – The Case of the Al-Aqsa Intifada...................................................................................................72 Summary ..................................................................................................................78 Chapter 4 – Turning to Suicide Terrorism – The LTTE and the PKK................81 Overall Strategy or a Specific Tactic? – Suicide Terrorism of the LTTE in Sri Lanka........................................................................................................................82 Suicide Terrorism as a Tool in the Tamil Minority’s Struggle for Independence ..............................................................................................................................84 Suicide Terrorism and the Tamil Political Arena ................................................91 Factors Leading to the LTTE’s Suspension of Suicide Attacks ..........................96 2 Suicide Terrorism as a Means of Organisational Survival – The PKK in Turkey...98 Popular Support, Member Morale or Strategic Interest? The PKK’s Opting for Suicide Terrorism...............................................................................................101 The Role of Turkish Policy in Thwarting Further PKK Suicide Actions..........103 Summary ................................................................................................................108 Chapter 5 – The Transition to Suicide Terrorism: Al-Qaeda and the Network of the Islamic Fundamentalist Groups .......................................................................110 The Strategy of Ostentatious Suicide Terrorism – The Al-Qaeda Organisation ...111 Suicide Terrorism of the Islamic Fundamentalist Groups .....................................117 Summary ................................................................................................................129 Chapter 6 – Who Becomes a Suicide Terrorist? ...................................................132 Preconditions for the Emergence of Suicide Terrorism.........................................139 Commitment as a Motivation for Suicide Attacks.................................................141 Personal Motivation for Suicide Attacks ...............................................................150 Financial Crisis as Motivation ...........................................................................150 Personal Crisis as Motivation ............................................................................153 Revenge as Motivation ......................................................................................159 An Analysis of the Motivations of Palestinian Suicide Bombers..........................169 Summary ................................................................................................................172 Chapter 7 – The Recruitment and Socialisation of the Suicide Terrorist ..........174 The Environmental Setting of Suicide Terrorism ..................................................177 Recruitment............................................................................................................185 Training..................................................................................................................191 Dispatching ............................................................................................................200 Summary ................................................................................................................202 Chapter 8 - The Consequences of Suicide Terrorism...........................................204 The Effects of Suicide Terrorism...........................................................................204 The Response to Suicide Terrorism .......................................................................209 Short-Term Offensive Responses ......................................................................212 Short-Term Defensive Responses......................................................................213 Long-Term Offensive Responses ......................................................................216 Long-Term Defensive Responses ......................................................................217 3 Tables and Figures: Figure 3.1 .....................................................................................................................56 Figure 3.2 .....................................................................................................................65 Figure 4.1 .....................................................................................................................84 Figure 4.2 ...................................................................................................................101 Figure 5.1 ...................................................................................................................117 Figure 5.2 ...................................................................................................................124 Figure 8.1 ...................................................................................................................212 4 Chapter 1 – What is Suicide Terrorism? I will never forget that sunny, peaceful Saturday in my hometown on the 4th of October, 2003. Weekends at the beginning of the Israeli autumn are an ideal opportunity for family get-togethers, nature trips or attempts to enjoy the last moments of the hot summer sun on the beach. The Saturday quiet was disrupted by the screaming sirens of police cars and other rescue vehicles as the weekend calm was irrevocably shattered. A few minutes later, cellular phones started ringing and anxious relatives could be heard on the other end of the line, sighing with relief and then uttering remarks such as, “Thank God, you’re ok”, and, “Turn on the TV, quick”. At that point, it was evident to me that another suicide terror attack had taken place somewhere in Haifa, the city where I lived. The pictures flashing on the television screen were hard to look at and, at first, it was difficult to identify the site of the incident. All one could make out on the small screen were the skeletal remains of a building surrounded by dozens of ambulances and police. However, the calm sea in the background did not leave any room for doubt. These were the remains of “Maxim”, a Middle Eastern restaurant under the joint ownership of Jews and Arabs, located for more than forty years on one of the most beautiful sites overlooking the Haifa coastal area. Due to the restaurant’s convenient location on the main road leading from Haifa to Tel Aviv and its relaxed atmosphere, it became a “pilgrimage” site for many of the city’s residents, as well as for passers-by who happened to come this way and stopped for a Middle Eastern meal on their way to their destination. This suicide action in Maxim, perpetrated by Hanadi Jaradat, a 29 year-old female lawyer from the city of Jenin, which is under the control of the Palestinian Authority, in my case, was not the same as the hundreds of suicide attacks that preceded it. Each 5 act of terrorism in a small city such as Haifa brings you one step closer to the people who are the casualties of such an attack. The first question that strikes me each time the rumour spreads like wildfire regarding a new attack in the city is: Do I know the whereabouts of all my nearest and dearest? Immediately after having ensured that my family members are safe and sound, the fear then dawns on me that one of my friends or colleagues may have been at or near the site. In a similar incident which took place a year and a half ago, also at a Middle Eastern restaurant in Haifa, which I myself frequented quite regularly, fifteen people were killed. Among them was Suheil Adawi, the restaurant cook whom I knew quite well because he would often leave the kitchen to assist his younger brother in serving food and in the meanwhile also engage in conversation with his customers. About one year later, a suicide terrorist exploded himself on bus line number 37 which drove along its fixed route from the downtown part of the city to the University of Haifa, which lies along the crest of the Carmel mountains. In this attack, fifteen people were killed, most of them schoolchildren, and among them was Yuval Mendelevitch, 13½ years old, whose mother was participating in a seminar that I was teaching. However, this time, the noose was drawn a little bit tighter. The attack at Maxim restaurant took the lives of twenty-one people and among them were students from the University of Haifa. One of them, Nir Regev, was a political science undergraduate who was studying the subject of terrorism, which is how I became acquainted with this bright student and his work. On that same sunny Saturday, Nir was spending time on the beach. As it neared lunchtime, he asked his friend, Olga, if she would like to join him for lunch at the popular restaurant. When Jaradat activated the heavy explosive charge she carried on her body and which, besides the explosives, also 6 contained a great number of screws and pieces of metal, Nir was sitting with his back to her and was hit by flying screws and metal scraps. Tragically, the screws that impacted Nir’s head killed him on the spot. The truth is that during the course of his studies at the University, my encounters with Nir were few and inconsistent. My closer acquaintance with him, strangely enough, began after his death. On the visits I made to the Regev family house during the formal seven days of mourning, I learned quite a lot about this young man whose life was cut short at the age of 25. Like many of his age group, he had stood with one leg in the world of youth and the other in the adult world. Only a small number of papers remained in order for him to complete and receive the Bachelor’s Degree in political science and statistics, and he was indulging himself just a little while longer in his student days. At the same time, he had already started a professional career in the banking business. His personal life also reflected the transition from youth to adulthood. Nir, who had always been surrounded by friends and girls, was known for his youthful playfulness. Yet, in the last few months of his life, he had left his parents’ house in Nahariya, rented an apartment of his own in Haifa and started a fresh chapter of his adult life. Hanadi Jaradat was only four years older than Nir. Not long before, she had also completed her academic studies and was certified as a lawyer. Unlike Nir who, just several days before his death, returned from a vacation with his friends in Sinai, Jaradat’s last days were more sombre. After her brother, an operative in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organisation, was killed by IDF soldiers, most of the burden of caring for her cancer-ridden father fell on her shoulders. The last few weeks of her life were dedicated to efforts at bringing her father, a resident of the Palestinian 7 Authority, for medical treatment at the Rambam hospital in Haifa. Despite the fact that after the incident, there were those who told of the despair that overtook her, in the last moments before she activated the explosives belt, Jaradat was completely at peace with herself. Quite unlike numerous suicide bombers before her, she was in no hurry to set off the explosive charge attached to her body. She sat for quite a while in the crowded restaurant, ate to her heart’s delight, and had time to linger and observe the restaurant patrons, including one-year-old Noya Zer-Aviv, whose baby carriage stood fairly close to her. Only after rising to pay her bill, she pressed the button which activated the explosives belt. A short while after the suicide explosion at Maxim restaurant, there were comments directly associating the difficult experiences Jaradat underwent in the last few months of her life with the act she had just committed. On the face of things, these contentions sounded logical. The desire for revenge is indeed known as one of the most powerful forces that can drive a human to commit horrific acts. And yet, the deeper I probed into the study of suicide terrorism in the Palestinian realm, as well as in other locations, I realised that this argument sheds light on only a part of a phenomenon whose explanations are immeasurably more numerous and complex. The principal goal that I took upon myself in writing this book was to try and understand the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Although much has been written on the theory of its development in different places all over the world, it is my estimation, regarding all aspects of this phenomenon, that we are still at the beginning of the road and I therefore hope this book will help us take several steps forward. The book is divided into three major parts in the following order: In the first section, it is my intention to define the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and demonstrate its 8 features and manifestations. The most significant section, however, is the second part of the book where I consider the causes for the emergence and dispersion of suicide terrorism. I will present a model and put it to the test by drawing a broader comparison among several suicide terrorism campaigns that took place in the last two decades in different areas in the world. In the third part, and summary, I will examine the effects of suicide terrorism on the countries where it is prevalent and I will offer a number of ideas on ways of how to deal with it. The Symbiosis between Terror and Death Terrorism and death are closely intertwined. From the first appearance of modern terrorism, the majority of acts were directed at taking people’s lives. However, death was not only the fate of terrorism victims. It cast its long dark shadow on the terrorists themselves. I still remember quite well the picture of Ulrike Meinhof, leader of the German Red Army Faction, who committed suicide by hanging herself in prison in 1976. In addition, her four colleagues, led by Andreas Baader, also took their own lives after it was evident that their chances of being liberated from prison were nil in the wake of the failure of the Lufthansa jet hijacking in 1977. No less gruesome were the descriptions of the slow deaths of ten Irish Republican Army men who, in the famous hunger strike of 1981, starved themselves to death in their prison cells in Belfast after realising that their petition to be recognised as political, instead of criminal, prisoners was rejected by the British authorities. Scores of lives of other terrorists were cut short in the midst of terrorist actions in which they played a part. Towards the end of the 19th century, these included Russian anarchists, members of the Narodnaya Volya, and a few years later, also members of the IRA, who died accidentally while assembling crude bombs that blew up in their 9 hands before reaching their destination. Many members of the Irgun and Stern Gang organisations who fought to establish an independent Jewish state in the Land of Israel were killed in their attempts to attack British targets or were executed shortly after their capture. The same can be said for FLN activists in their struggle for independence in Algeria. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with the emergence of worldwide radical left-wing terrorism, members of terrorist groups such as the Italian Red Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Japanese Red Army, deliberately fought against countries that declared they would not succumb to terrorists’ demands and would engage with full resolve in counteractions against these groups. A great deal of counterterrorist actions led to the deaths of terrorists. It can therefore be argued, with a not inconsiderable degree of accuracy, that terrorism is a dangerous business and those who elect to take part in acts of terrorism by and large are conscious of the risks involved. However, there is a genuine difference between taking risks and wilfully setting out on what is going to be one’s certain death. The number of terrorists setting out on suicide missions is assuredly increasing in the last few decades and this tendency has provided a genuine challenge for social scientists. The lion’s share of research dealing in the broader subject of suicide addresses the phenomenon in which an individual takes his/her own life, most often without physically involving others and usually in consequence of personal circumstances. Suicide terrorism significantly strays from this description. It generally exemplifies a phenomenon whose principal goal is the physical injury of others while the death of the person committing the suicide is merely a means of achieving this goal.1 10 In the first comprehensive study of suicide at the conclusion of the 19th century by Emile Durkheim, it is already possible to detect, albeit partially, reference to this kind of incident. On the basis of Durkheim’s typology of suicide types, the most familiar type is the egoistic suicide (also contemporarily known as individualistic); however, the French social scientist also addressed altruistic and fatalistic suicide types which over the years were driven to the margins of sociological research.2 According to Durkheim, and quite contrary to egoistic suicide, whose motives are individual, committing the act of altruistic suicide intends to serve the will of the collective. This kind of suicide is the product of situations in which a person undergoes a highly compelling process of integration into a social group which champions the act of suicide. As a result, the interests and desires of the individual become secondary to the group and he/she will take any step needed to help it advance its goals.3 The signs of fatalistic suicide have already made their mark early on in the 21st century. This pattern of suicide is associated with an environment in which the individual or social category to which he/she belongs has been subject to a persistent oppression, thus leading to feelings of despair and a belief that the future does not portend any guarantee of improvement in these conditions. Although this brand of despair may rise from hopelessness stemming from economic conditions, this nevertheless does not preclude the possibility that similar feelings can arise under the circumstances of the restriction of political liberties.4 Years before the upsurge of suicide terrorism, it was argued that the difference between altruistic and fatalistic suicide types was not so significant. In contrast to the individualistic types of suicide which appear mostly in post-industrial societies, the 11 altruistic and fatalistic types are more common in traditional societies that have undergone political, social and economic transformation.5 The principal difference between altruistic and fatalistic types can be found in the social interpretation given to the suicide act. When a person, together with a sense of a profound calling, takes his/her own life as part of a social role required of him or her, the action is designated as altruistic suicide, whereas if he or she performs this act from within a sense of deep despair, in most cases, this will be referred to as fatalistic suicide.6 However, this does not exclude the probability that this despair might coalesce into a sense of social vocation and will thus create an additional combinative type of fatalistic-altruistic suicide.7 Whereas the greater part of Durkheim’s interest was focused on incidents where persons took their lives due to circumstances noted above, while not necessarily intending to do harm to others, in more recent times it appears that similar circumstances may lead to situations where suicide is just a means in the fulfilment of a considerably broader purpose, specifically, the intentional and more extensive harm to other people. What is Suicide Terrorism? Before plunging into the discussion of the question of the definition of modern-day suicide terrorism, the boundaries of the phenomenon should be defined. The most problematic question in this regard is what actions can be designated as suicide terrorism? For example, was Ibrahim Hasuna, the man who, in March 2002, sprayed automatic gunfire at customers who sat in the Tel Aviv Seafood Market restaurant and did not cease firing until he was overpowered, a suicide terrorist? Or should Baruch Goldstein, the man who performed a similar act of unrestrained killing of Moslems 12 praying in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron some nine years earlier, also be classified as a suicide terrorist? Or should the definition apply solely to acts such as the woman terrorist who detonated her explosives belt in a crowd of people waiting in line for a concert in the heart of Moscow? Or to the terrorist who drove a car loaded with dynamite straight into a recruitment office building of the new Iraqi army? Certain researchers tend to refer to all these terrorists as suicide terrorists.8 I am inclined to accept this approach. I believe that the phenomenon of suicide bombings, which will be at the centre of this book, is a contemporary manifestation of suicide terrorism and should be referred to as a sub category of this phenomenon. Suicide terrorism includes a diversity of violent actions perpetrated by people who are aware that the odds they will return alive are close to nought.9 Suicide terrorists do not take the trouble, in most cases, to prepare a getaway route and often leave behind some kind of testament in which they declare their conscious and willing intention to go to their death. The most common tactic employed by the contemporary suicide- terrorist, except for suicide bombing, is an attack by one or more terrorists wielding automatic guns and grenades and aimed at a populated target. The length of the operation is not predetermined; it comes to an end only after the terrorist has been overpowered by armed forces who were present or eventually reached the scene or by individuals who were able to evade the deadly assault of the terrorists.10 Despite the fact, that terrorist organizations in different parts of the world still use other suicide tactics, 11 I accept the contention that these tactics has proven to be an anticipatory stage laying the foundations for suicide bombings,12 which can be described as one of the most dramatic developments in the history of terrorism. Prior to defining this contemporary form of suicide terrorism, it would be interesting 13 to take a look at the various acts of suicide which have been executed by terrorists throughout history. There is evidence of this type of terrorism as early as the beginning of the second millennium. The Shiite sect of the Assassins operated in the mountainous area between Syria and Persia (Iran) between the 11th and 13th centuries and trained young men to commit murders against prominent political notables with the aim of toppling the Sunnite reign in the region. The Assassins were termed fida’is and their primary weapon was the stiletto. They did not prepare getaway routes in advance and considered death in action a source of pride. The fact that they did not fear death augmented significantly the effectiveness of their operations. Substantiation of the bearing of their methods is evidenced by the annals of time which show how, in addition to the killing of two kalifs, wazirs, sultans and other figures of the ruling regime and administration, their campaign also had a far-reaching strategic impact on the whole area by successfully sowing seeds of fear and anarchy and undermining the stability of the Sunnite rule.13 During the rule of the Spaniards in the Philippines, there were also episodes of suicidal acts of terrorism. These were carried out by members of Muslim tribes who objected to Christian expansion in the southern islands of the Sulu Archipelago. Methods of warfare of tribal members were not significantly different from the Assassins. Seeming to appear from nowhere, they used to raid places with concentrations of people and brandishing sharp weapons in their hands, they would stab as many victims as possible until they were defeated and killed. Unlike the Assassins, however, the Filipino murderers did not act within a systematic organisational framework but rather carried out their aggression on their own 14 initiative. Nevertheless, every human being who chose to sacrifice himself, before setting out on a raid, first appealed for the blessing of his parents, relatives and occasionally even the Sultan, who was the chief political and religious authority in the area.14 With the termination of Spanish rule in the Philippines in 1898, the Americans took control of the country, including the Moslem areas. American attempts to establish direct control over Moslem areas led to the perpetration of these same methods of warfare. Once again, history shows the considerable strategic advantages of a warrior who is willing to sacrifice his life for, after protracted decades of a war of attrition between the American forces and Moslem martyrs, the former conceded defeat and enabled the institution of a partial autonomy in areas where there was a Moslem majority.15 In recent years, following the reappearance of suicide terrorism, mostly in the form of suicide bombing, the term has been defined in numerous ways, and while there is similarity among the various explanations, it is also possible to arrange these definitions along a continuum leading from minimum to maximum. The minimum definition perceives suicide terrorism as a diversity of actions that necessitate the death of the terrorist in order to ensure the success of the action.16 In a slightly expanded definition, Mia Bloom adds that the terrorist executes the action in order to achieve a political goal and with the complete awareness that he is going to his death.17 Another definition proposed by the same scholar stresses the tactical aspect, i.e. unlike other terrorists, a suicide terrorist blows himself up together with his victims.18 The broadest or maximum definition focuses on the goals of suicide terrorism and states that the suicide attacker’s intention is to cause harm to as many 15 people as possible (in most cases these are civilians), and with the ultimate purpose of effecting some type of political change. According to this definition, the terrorist’s action is in fact aimed at the destruction of a chosen target. However, the means for bringing about political change is anchored in the psychological pressure applied to a much greater populace than the group of people who are directly affected by the action.19 So, what conclusions can be drawn from the above definitions? Similar to other acts of terrorism, suicide terrorism also aims at destroying or damaging a specific target. However, its real intention is to create an atmosphere of terror amidst a population not necessarily exposed directly to the incident, but rather who are informed about it from a secondary source. As the terrorists perceive it, public pressure in the wake of this collective anxiety should also be translated into political gains. The principal difference between contemporary suicide terrorism and other types of terrorism, including manifestations of suicide terrorism in history, is embedded, therefore, in a tactical perspective, noted in Bloom’s definition. Or, in other words, the terrorist’s death by means of the detonation of an explosive charge is an integral part of the execution of the operation and constitutes an essential condition of its success. Deploying suicide bombers brings with it a wide range of advantages for the organisation dispatching the terrorist. First of all, the organisation predetermines the target where the terrorist will attack, but the terrorist himself decides on the precise location and timing of execution. In this way, by leaving room for some flexibility, the terrorist has a greater chance of succeeding in his mission.20 Second, suicide bombing has the benefit of some unique features which promote the likelihood of causing greater harm in comparison to other types of terrorism. Research based on 16 reports filed by the American State Department shows that since the recent emergence of suicide terrorism in the form of suicide bombing, attacks employing this method have constituted only three percent of the sum total of terrorist incidents in the world; however, their toll has been disproportionately much higher – 48 percent of the fatalities. Third, the use of suicide bombing has in effect amounted to a break with all the previous, conventional rules of the exercise of violence in relatively low-scale conflicts. By upgrading their violence, these organisations are signalling that there is practically no means of dissuading them with traditional recourse.21 Fourth, in addition to the fact that methods have yet to be found that are able to deter organisations from sending suicide bombers off on their missions, it should frankly be noted that effective methods of protecting the assaulted populations are also wanting.22 After establishing the definition of modern-day suicide terrorism, the next stage will be to present its features in further detail, as well as the similarities and differences among its various manifestations. The following discussion is divided into two parts. In the first, I will demonstrate facts pertaining to suicide terrorism all over the world as shown by previous research and, in the second part I will focus on the tactical features of this type of terrorism based on the research I conducted.23 General Features of Suicide Terrorism in the World To begin with, contrary to the assumption held by many Westerners who believe that suicide terrorism is a phenomenon perpetrated primarily by religious zealots who were acting on impulse or unable to restrain an uncontrollable drive, today it is quite evident that these attacks are for the most part organisational undertakings. Ninety- five percent of the acts of suicide terrorism were devised by some type of 17 organisational structure which was part of an ably-planned and well-organised network that continued effectively over a length of time.24 In the second place, again, departing from an opinion shared by many, the decisive majority of conflicts in which suicide attackers have been mobilised were territorial conflicts involving the struggles of ethnic or nationalist groups opposing the presence of foreign military forces on what they defined as their homeland or native soil. The goal of these organisations was to bring about the withdrawal of the conquerors or expropriators, as the case may be, from these same lands. This applied to the struggle of the Hezbollah and other Lebanese organisations opposed to American, French and Israeli military presence in Lebanon, as well as the Palestinian campaign against Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The same can be said for the Tamil minority’s struggle in Sri Lanka to seize sovereignty from the Sinhalese majority in areas where there is a Tamil dominance, in the Kurd minority’s battle in Turkey for independence in Turkish Kurdistan, the Chechens’ fight for independence from Russia, and the Kashmir region campaign for independence. A more recent addition is the suicide missions of recent years aimed at the American military in Saudi Arabia,25 as well as against the Western military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. Third, only on rare occasions does a suicide terrorist act occur as an isolated event. In most cases, the suicide attack is part of a string of incidents extending over a certain period, which may be called a “campaign” of terror. The majority of suicide terrorist campaigns were led by a single organisation with a definite goal and suicide operatives were dispatched in order to blow up targets related to that goal.26 Each campaign of this type consists of a starting point, a climax period and an ending. During the course of the campaign, there are stages in which suicide attacks are more 18 frequent and some which are less intense. Fourth, nearly seventy percent of suicide terrorism occurrences in the world were aimed at democratic countries or at least at countries which uphold fundamental democratic properties such as Israel (33.5% of the incidents), Sri Lanka (19.1%), Russia (4.9%), Turkey (4.1%) and India (2.4%). These countries are perceived by terrorist groups as more vulnerable because their public is not willing to endure protracted and relentless security threats and is liable to express its dissatisfaction at the voting booth. Furthermore, there is a view, according to which terrorist groups assume that democratic countries, in contrast to more authoritarian countries, will tend to be more restrained in their reaction towards the organisation which dispatches the suicide assailant and the population which condones or supports the attack. As well as this view, an open, democratic environment is more convenient for introducing suicide bombers and advertising their actions in comparison to countries that are more concentrated and where there are many restrictions on the freedom of movement and expression.27 Fifth, the dynamic of rapid diffusion that has marked other terrorist strategies, such as the use of bombs or hijacking planes, has also occurred with suicide terrorists. Along with the assessment that terrorist organisations around the world are closely watching each other and will replicate modes of operation that appear successful to them, there is also the question whether the dispersion of this type of terrorist device was, to a great extent, a direct result of inter-organisation collaboration. So that, for example, militants of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard carried the suicide tactic over to Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon.28 These allegedly passed on information to members of the LTTE in Sri Lanka and, further cooperated with them in instructing Al-Qaeda 19 operatives on the aspects of activating suicide bombers.29 Further evidence of cooperation and conveying information among organisations can be found in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas. The beginning of the collaboration of these two groups was near the end of the 1980s and it intensified after the Government of Israel decided to expel four hundred Hamas activists to Lebanon in the year 1992.30 In recent years, the extent of cooperation between the organisations has reached a point where Hezbollah were regularly transmitting to the Hamas and additional Palestinian organisations precise directions and means for fabricating explosive belts. Tactical Features of Suicide Terrorism Methods of Operation Following the description of the general features of suicide terrorism, it seems appropriate now to focus on its operative aspects. Despite the tendency to view suicide operations as cast from a single mould, attention should be paid to the broad diversity of operational methods employed by the different organisations. According to the findings I have analysed, it is possible to see that the most common modus operandi and the one most preferred by the majority of organisations is the detonation of an explosives belt directly attached to the militant’s body. So far, this method has been in use in 53.3% of the cases of suicide terrorism in the world. Other frequently used methods are driving a car or a truck rigged with explosives of some kind towards the operation target with the intention of smashing into it (25.1% and 5.3% from the sum of all incidents, respectively). Some less conventional methods are carrying the explosive charge in a handbag (4.5%), activating explosive boats (4.1%), detonating hand grenades (3.3%), use of booby-trapped bicycles (1.7%) 20 and as demonstrated by the events of the 11th of September, 2001, even hijacking a means of transportation with the purpose of crashing it into a chosen target.31 Over the course of years, a trend developed in which most organisations chose one method and stayed with it so that, for example, the first suicide aggression in Lebanon was executed by means of a car bomb which was detonated in front of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, December, 1981.32 The use of vehicles loaded with explosives remained a common terrorist technique in the Lebanese arena in the following years as well. Out of the sum total of suicide attacks mounted by the Lebanese organisation of the Hezbollah, 70.6% were initiated by means of car bombs and truck bombs. A similar trend is prominent among the Al-Qaeda organisation where 62.5% of suicide operations employed booby-trapped cars. The Sunnite forces in Iraq also prefer the use of booby-trapped cars; 58.6% of all the operations used this method. The hypothesis regarding the way in which an organisation decides on its preferred method of operation assumes that organisations are inspired by each other; either by imitation and learning from afar, or by way of simple cooperation. However, in many cases, after adopting the idea of staging suicide attacks, they are required to adapt this technique to the specific properties of the environment in which they operate.33 This hypothesis is further confirmed in the circumstances of Palestinian suicide terrorism. The Hamas who, under the inspiration of the Hezbollah, embarked upon its campaign of suicide attacks with the detonation of a car bomb in the settlement of Mechola in the Jordan Valley, quickly shifted its customary method to terrorists who carried bombs on their person. A review of attacks committed by the organisation in the years 1993 to 2004 shows that the percentage of attacks employing explosive-clad terrorists gradually increased over the years and presently stands, on the basis of a 21 general calculation, at 64.3% of the sum total of suicide actions perpetrated by the organisation. At the same time, the emphasis of suicide attacks using car and truck bombs decreased and now stands, on the basis of a general calculation, at only 20% of all incidents. A similar profile can be seen among operations of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Like the Hamas, this organisation also prefers the use of explosive belts. The percentage of assaults with explosive belts is 64.3% of all the attacks, whereas car bombs have been used in only 23.8% of the incidents. In regard to the Fatah (its military wing, called the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, is responsible for dispatching suicide attackers), the picture is even more conspicuous. It appears that the heads of the military arm of the Fatah—who joined the cycle of suicide terrorism only in the beginning of the year 2002, nearly ten years after the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad had already instigated this method—quite capably internalised the lessons of their precursors. Except for the Kurdish PKK, the Fatah became the organisation making the greatest use of explosive belt-wielding terrorists (85.7% out of the sum total of actions) and the fewest attempts at car bombs (8.6%). The fact that all Palestinian organisations employ similar modes of action may in fact attest to a trend of imitation and learning from one another but, at the same time, it is worth noting that all these organisations are up against the same, single enemy—Israel, and operate in a specific part of the world, i.e., the West Bank and Gaza. Therefore, it seems that constraints created by Israeli defence strategy as well as terrain conditions have an effect on the modes of action assumed by the organisations and their adherence to these particular methods. Other than the tactical orientation of the organisation, local topographical features and tight security arrangements distinguishing countries already accustomed to terrorism 22 (who attempt to make it difficult to penetrate defences with cars or trucks laden with explosives and driven by suicide operators into crowded areas), it is possible to detect two additional reasons which have made explosive belts the most prevalent tactic among organisations orchestrating suicide missions. First, this type of weapon is very effective. While the average fatality quotient in shooting attacks is 2.11 individuals and in attacks executed by means of delaying mechanisms it is 2.01, then the average number of fatalities in a suicide attack committed by a terrorist carrying an explosive belt on his body is 8.11. When the weapon is a car laden with explosives driven by a suicide terrorist, the average number of fatalities in effect rises to 19.08 and the record is 39.33 dead, which is a direct outcome of the use of truck bombs handled by suicide operatives; however, dispatching suicide attackers in vehicles is a more complicated undertaking and its success rate is smaller. Second, in most instants where explosive belts are used, the organisation does not lose more than one terrorist, unless one is speaking of an operation that is executed in several places at the same time. In the detonation of a truck bomb, the average number of suicide attackers is 1.3; when it is a car bomb, the number increases to 1.4, whereas, in the case of a boat bomb, the number is 3.3. This economy in manpower is liable to lead to a reduction in the operation’s dramatic effect; however, it will also prevent a more rapid depletion of suicide potentials in the organisation. Targets of Suicide Terrorism In more recent years, it has become apparent that the primary target for the activation of suicide attackers has become concentrations of civilian populations. In the year, 2002, this inclination reached a high point when 48% of worldwide suicide assaults 23 were directed at civilian populations. However, it would be inaccurate to assume that only civilian targets are the objects of terrorist interest. In the early years of suicide terrorism, the bulk of attacks were in fact aimed at targets that were not civilian. This becomes evident when calculating the long-term, total number of attacks against military and police installations, i.e., 44.1%, in comparison to civilian targets, specifically, 42.6%. An analysis of these events indicates a further and significant correspondence between the selected targets and the tactics employed against these targets. For example, while 54.5% of the attacks employing truck bombs set their sights on military facilities or troops, only 18.2% of the incidents using this same tactic were aimed at civilian targets. A similar tendency, although somewhat less prominent, can be perceived regarding the use of car bombs activated by suicide operatives. While 41.3% of the operations using cars were directed at military targets, only 25% were executed against civilians. On the other hand, a statistical analysis of the use of explosive belts worn by individual perpetrators gives an altogether different picture. In this case, 53.6% of the actions using this method were aimed at civilians whereas only 28.6% set their sights on military objectives. Six organisations can be noted for their preference for civilian targets. The most prominent among them is the Hamas which has launched some 74.3% of its assaults against civilians. A close second is Fatah (68.6%) and then the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (61.9%). In addition to these organisations, there are the Sunnite groups operating in Iraq (46.7%), the PKK (43.8%) and the Al-Qaeda network (31.3%). In contrast, there are three organisations that are noteworthy in their preference for dispatching suicide attackers against police or military objectives. The Hezbollah is 24 the most prominent among them with 88.2% of their suicide actions perpetrated against soldiers and police. The LTTE is not far behind with 71.9%, as well as Chechen rebel groups (60.9%). One of the assumptions regarding the preference of some organisations for civilian instead of military targets stems from the great difficulties involved in the attack of a military installation and the prolonged planning required for this purpose. Terrorist groups that notwithstanding prefer military targets are generally those operating in an environment where this type of target is fairly prevalent and where penetrability is not too complicated. Another supposition is that the nature of the target will be determined according to the degree of legitimacy the organisation has from the group or population in whose name it operates. As the conflict becomes more drawn out and violent, and the more the population represented by the organisation perceives the stronger side in the conflict as ruthless, the prospect of broad public support in dispatching suicide attackers towards civilian targets increases.34 Another type of target, which is entirely excluded from the activities of all Palestinian organisations but is significant in the schemes of other organisations, is the use of suicide terrorists in political assassinations. The organisation responsible for the development and enhancement of this method is the LTTE. The target of nearly one quarter of suicide actions mounted by the organisation was politicians, and the most prominent among them was the assassination of the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, in May, 1991 and the fatal attempt on the life of the President of Sri Lanka, Premadasa, in May, 1993. Iraqi organisations, the PKK and Al-Qaeda also dispatched suicide bombers in the attempt to carry out political eliminations on enough occasions to reach substantial percentages (20%, 18.8% and 12.5%, respectively). One example 25 is the assassination of the leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Masoud, by two members of Al-Qaeda who masqueraded as journalists. This slaying became especially impressed upon many people’s memories all over the world because it took place only two days before the attacks of the 11th of September, 2001. Additional organisations that employed this method of aiming to harm political figures, but with less frequency, were Chechen organisations (8.7%) and Hezbollah (2.9%). Plan of the Book In this opening chapter, I presented some of the dilemmas involved in the definition of suicide terrorism; I then conceptualized the phenomenon of suicide bombing as a sub- category of suicide terrorism, and I performed an evaluation of its sources and features. After indicating the features of suicide terrorism, the ground is now prepared for Chapter 2, in which I introduce the common explanations for the appearance of modern-day suicide terrorism and its rapid expansion in the last few decades, and offer my model for describing and explaining suicide terrorism. This model challenges the idea that suicide terrorism is related to a specific culture or religion, as well as the notion that it can be perceived as a grass roots phenomenon. Alternatively, it looks into the different factors which bring elites of terrorist organizations to turn to suicide terrorism or, inversely, to cease from using it. Specific emphasis is given to the relations between the terrorist organization and its constituency. I then present an overview of the circumstances leading young people to join terrorist groups and to sacrifice themselves. Finally, I investigate the training process of the suicide potential in the terrorist organisation, beginning from the moment he/she has been selected and recruited and concluding with the dispatch to the suicide mission. 26 The rest of the book’s chapters will follow this model. In chapters 3-5, I focus on the factors which led terrorist organizations in different corners of the world to start and end campaigns of suicide terrorism. Chapter 3 will be devoted to a comparative analysis of the Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian organizations. Chapter 4 focuses on the Tamil LTTE and the Kurdish PKK. In the first part of chapter 5 I look at Al-Qaeda, as well as other Islamic fundamentalist organizations, while in its second part I discuss the Chechen and Iraqi cases. In chapter 6 I turn to an in-depth discussion of the individual motivations for suicide terrorism with a special focus on the concepts of commitment and crisis. Following a description of life stories of suicide terrorists from different countries I test my hypotheses by employing a quantitative analysis of a dataset, which includes rich data on the whole population of the Palestinian suicide bombers. Then, in Chapter 7, I focus on the analysis of the recruitment, training and dispatching for suicide missions. In this chapter I emphasise the important role of the surrounding community in facilitating the process. The first part of the concluding chapter is devoted to a discussion of the effects of suicide terrorism. In the second part I offer a new model for coping with this threat. 27 Chapter 2 – How Can Suicide Terrorism Be Explained? The advent of suicide terrorism in the early 1980s caught security services and citizens offguard in many countries all over the world. For more than two decades scholars from the fields of humanities and social sciences have devoted much time, effort and considerable resources to finding an answer to the riddle of what makes human beings kill so many people and simultaneously sacrifice their own lives, sometimes, apparently, for political ends? Why has suicide terrorism spread around the globe, and so rapidly? And doesn’t this act in effect go against one of the most fundamental instincts of most human beings, that is, the preservation of one’s own life at almost any price? It therefore does not come as too much of a surprise that the scholars who first began to study this phenomenon placed the individual committing the suicide at the focal centre, and subsequently pursued the psychological, economic and social factors that allegedly compelled the person to commit this act.35 This orientation was also espoused by intelligence services seeking to compile the psychological and social “profile” of the suicide terrorist, thereby facilitating efforts to apprehend potential suicide attackers. However, in-depth studies investigating the background of suicide terrorists did not lead to unambiguous conclusions regarding this enigmatic “profile”. In effect, many cases show that suicide terrorists do not differ in their psychological characteristics (and often also in their sociological features) from their peers; heated discussion continues among scholars on this matter.36 The only partial success in explaining the persistent expansion of suicide terrorism by focusing on the isolated suicide bomber led social scientists to redirect the spotlight onto the society and culture that produced these terrorists. This approach gained further appeal immediately in the wake of the events of September 11th, 2001, and 28 was considerably fuelled by the fact that the origin of all organisations dispatching suicide terrorists so far was in Asia and the Middle East. Before long, Samuel Huntington’s idea of the clash of civilisations was adapted to account for suicide terrorism and an emphasis was particularly put on the struggle of Moslem culture with Western culture.37 However, academic scepticism calls for redoubled caution. To be sure, the majority of groups activating suicide terrorists are organisations with Islamic origins yet, having said that, one should not jump to the conclusion that all believers in the Moslem faith necessarily support this phenomenon, or that it can be exclusively associated with one culture.38 There are many cases underscoring the problematic aspects of trying to form an exclusive affinity between radical Islam and suicide terrorism. For example, a short time after the appearance of Shiite suicide terrorism in Lebanon in the first half of the 1980s, organisations consisting of members who were Moslem yet secular — occasionally, even communist — in their ideology, began to cast their lot in with the lethal cadres of suicide bombers. Most of them operated under the auspices of the Syrian regime and out of nationalist motives. Another example is the PKK, a separatist group that began to send suicide bombers on missions against Turkish targets in the mid 1990s. Members of the PKK are also of Moslem faith, but this is only of marginal importance; essentially, the PKK is a secular organisation with a left-wing worldview and anti-colonialist ideas that justified the use of suicide terrorism. In the Palestinian arena, which became one of the principal loci of suicide terrorism, a similar tendency can also be detected. Organisations that brought suicide terrorism to this area during the 1990s were the Palestinian Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic 29 Jihad, both of them Sunnite organisations holding a fundamentalist religious worldview. However, several years later, use of this tactic also spread to organisations with no outstanding religious element in their ideology. One of the latter groups was the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), a Palestinian organisation with many Christian members and which over the years was marked by a fusion of Marxist and nationalist ideologies. Another organisation is Fatah—the central faction in the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation), which not only adopted this modus operandi but, during the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, also became the group to send the greatest number of militants on suicide missions against Israeli targets, after the Hamas.39 However, the primary setback in establishing a direct connection between radical Islam and suicide terrorism is the case of the Black Tigers suicide squad of the LTTE, which sought to achieve independence for the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. In this case, as well, the prominence of a nationalist-ethnic element is much more evident than the religious element as a motive for mounting suicide operations. Furthermore, attacks by the Tigers, similar to many other organisations, were not directed at Western objectives but rather at governments in Asia and the Middle East that were of, or related to, the same culture as the terrorist organisations. This point detracts from the inference that this is a struggle between cultures or civilizations and indicates quite the opposite, i.e., that this is an intra-cultural struggle. After the group of culture-based researchers did not provide a sufficient explanation for the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, two novel approaches emerged, shedding light on aspects that, up to this point, had not attracted much attention. The advantage of these approaches is that they dispense with both the micro level, that is, the 30 individual suicide attacker, and the macro level, that is, society and culture, and, instead, they focus on the intermediate level, namely, the organisation. Whereas one approach underscores the rational processes in the decision-making of the organisational elite, ultimately leading the terrorist organisation executive body to choose suicide bombers as the preferred alternative,40 the second approach puts the emphasis on the various stages that take place in the frame of the organisational process. The latter refers to the recruitment of the individual into the organisation and the socialisation process he/she undergoes which transforms him/her into a “live bomb” and eventually leads to his/her departure on the mission.41 In this chapter I shall review recent studies which tackle the phenomenon of suicide terrorism from different view points. Despite my inclination to place special emphasis on the approaches which emphasize the organisational nature of the phenomenon, I will not neglect other approaches that have tried to explain it. The goal is to offer the following tri-stage model which has both the capacity to describe and explain the process that begins with strategic decision-making and concludes in the explosion of the suicide terrorist. In the first stage, there is the rational process where heads of the terrorist organisation, in view of considerations related to the struggle with a stronger enemy but also in view of internal political considerations, arrive at the conclusion that suicide terrorism is the most effective way of furthering their goals at a certain point in time. Nevertheless, the decision to mobilise suicide bombers cannot be implemented without a social environment that approves of this method of operation, for a terrorist organisation acts on behalf of a social category and strives to advance its interests. If this same social group concurs with the organisation’s decision to deploy suicide 31 bombers, then this support will most likely maximise the benefits of this strategy. To the extent that this social group, on the other hand, will have reservations regarding the use of suicide militants, the organisation will be left with limited options. One option is to attempt to gain the community's support by portraying the idea of suicide terrorism as a noble act or, alternatively, to engage in completely different methods of action. The second stage, after the organisational elite has decided on this mode of action, calls for the recruitment of suicide potentials. In contrast to research that focuses on the psychological problems of the individual which could lead him/her to commit such an act, I shall claim that the person who chooses this act is motivated by reasons anchored by his/her commitment to an ideology, a leader or a group of people. Alternative motivation could be a personal crisis he/she had suffered or feelings evoked by events undergone by the group to which they belong, and with whom they feel a deep sense of identification. This aspect, as well, cannot be analysed in isolation from the broader context, namely, the social endorsement of the commitment of such an act. The social environment to which the individual belongs, whether it is a community or a more restricted organisational framework that insists on the idea of suicide, will significantly facilitate his or her enlistment to the mission. The third stage consists of the process that takes place within the framework of the organisation: it starts off with the definition of the individual as a potential suicide and concludes at the point when he is considered a “live bomb”. After the candidate is recruited for the suicide action, he/she undergoes a process of training. Along with the necessity of operative training, the organisation takes on the no less important challenge of training him/her mentally for the task. Despite the fact that, in many 32 instances, this part involves only a short period of training, it still must be long enough in order to assess the personality of the candidate and his/her degree of willingness to perform the mission. There must also be time to remove any doubts that might be evolving in the candidate’s mind. The objective is to bring him/her to a mental state which enables him/her to set out upon the operation fully reconciled with the purpose and thus reduce the chances that he/she will change his/her mind at the last minute. The preparation process is critical as far as the organisation is concerned and the organisations do not spare their efforts to persuade the candidate and strengthen his/her spirit. In later parts of the chapter, I will elaborate upon each of the stages leading to the suicide action and, at the same time, present and sometimes raise questions with regard to different studies which aimed at explaining the root causes of suicide terrorism. Strategic-Rational Decision-Making My basic assumption, therefore, is that suicide terrorism, like other types of terrorism, is a product of an organisation’s political strategy after it has defined its goals, clarified the options it has in order to realise these goals, and checked the price label attached to each operational method.42 The issue now is what happened in the last two decades that has led so many terrorist organisations at such diverse and faraway places on the globe to learn and adopt this dramatic and brutal mode of operation and to favour it over more traditional methods of terrorism? It seems that the answer to this question should be divided into two dimensions: external and internal. Suicide terrorism has made its appearance primarily in conflicts where the balance of power has been asymmetrical, meaning a relatively weak organisation up against a 33 strong state.43 This method of action has succeeded, in many cases, in minimising the advantages of the military superiority of the stronger side in the conflict. The explanation for this is straightforward. The great damage achieved by the suicide action, especially in terms of the number of victims, carries with it considerable psychological impact both on the citizens of the country under attack as well as on its policymakers. The anxiety that spreads through society in cases of a protracted campaign of suicide terrorism has the potential to reduce the faith citizens have in the government’s ability to protect them, and the latter becomes subject to persistent pressures to concede to terrorists’ demands.44 Indeed, in the initial years following the deployment of suicide terrorists, this method already earned itself a name as a “winning strategy”.45 By means of this strategy, terrorist organisations in different places in the world felt they were successful in advancing their goals in a very effective manner and with relatively low expenditure in comparison to strategies used in the past.46 However, the decision to adopt the method of dispatching suicide combatants is not only made on the basis of the benefits gained in the course of the organisation’s struggle against the opponent country. Political considerations related to the organisation’s internal situation and especially the affinity towards the supporting population, may also have considerable role in the decision on the choice of this strategy.47 On several occasions, political scientists have in fact suggested that it is possible to detect similarities between terrorist organisations, particularly those operating within the borders of a certain country, and other political organisations, particularly political parties.48 Akin to political parties, terrorist organisations are also dependent, to a great degree, upon the economic, organisational and moral backing of 34 their potential public supporters and they perceive the gratification of the public’s demands as an important objective. Furthermore, in national struggles, such as the Palestinian one, sometimes more than one terrorist organisation will operate to further the interests of a single national group. Although these organisations are fighting against a common enemy, they are in effect also competing with each other. By adopting the suicide bomber tactic and fostering the culture of “self-sacrifice”, these organisations are endeavouring to show their total commitment to the community’s struggle, while gaining that community’s endorsement of their methods. In a situation where there is no strong socio-cultural resistance to the idea of self-sacrifice and where there is a feeling in the community that all other attempts to attain goals have not borne fruit, the organisation featuring this tactic may grant it extra points over rival organisations.49 The more the organisation is successful in adapting the fostered “culture of death” to the cultural elements of the society and sentiments of the public, the political influence of the organisation in the local political arena will increase and its standing vis-à-vis the enemy will be reinforced.50 The association that is successful in preserving the grassroots support of its actions, and at the same time is able to make gains in the struggle against the enemy, is thus able to translate this type of struggle into a future political resource. The Social-Cultural Aspect If the decision of the organisation executive body to dispatch suicide bombers can be analysed in rational terms then, in order to understand the widespread support for the phenomenon in various places in the world, explanations from the other social sciences are necessary. As I maintained previously, in order to sustain suicide 35 terrorism over a length of time, the organisation requires the legitimacy of the group or groups in whose name it operates. In light of the fact that all organizations dispatching suicide bombers until now have originated in the Middle East and Asia, the inevitable question, already addressed above in part, is: Are cultural factors responsible for the widespread legitimacy accorded to suicide terrorists? Or, alternatively, under certain political, economic and social conditions, will certain societies reveal more of a predisposition towards supporting this type of action? I contend that while the answer to the first question is negative, the second question may be answered in the positive. In order to substantiate my contention I will rely, at least partially, on the thesis of the clash of civilisations, but not quite in the way it has been previously used to provide explanations for suicide terrorism. It stands to reason that Huntington defined the various civilisations on the basis of historical, lingual, religious and cultural features that evolved over hundreds of years. At the same time, he did not consider these distinctions a sole immediate cause for confrontation, all the more so, violent confrontation among the various civilisations. So, what does in fact lead to violent clashes among civilisations? These conflicts, for the most part, result from the attempt to gain control of a certain territory or from the effort to add to the economic and military might of one force over another.51 A review of the conflicts where suicide attacks have been employed demonstrates — as shown above — that in most circumstances, there is a struggle over territory and an aspiration for self- determination of certain groups in a given territory. In other cases, especially that of Al-Qaeda, there is an effort to replace secular Arab regimes and to remove Western military, economic and political elements from Islamic areas, while the use of the rhetoric of a struggle between religions or cultures is in effect a veil for struggles of a 36 more material nature.52 Having said that, it is hard to ignore the fact that suicide terrorism, originally from Iran and Lebanon, rapidly dispersed towards the east and south whereas, in the West, this phenomenon did not catch on. It is thus possible to assume that there apparently are societies and cultures that, under certain circumstances, will support suicide terrorism, whereas other societies will reject it out of hand. Durkheim’s comparative research on suicide raised the first signs of this possibility. According to his view, the phenomenon of individualistic suicide was found to be prevalent in higher rates in Western culture compared to Eastern cultures. Social scientists who investigated the history of suicide in traditional societies backed up this claim. However, alongside relatively low rates of individualistic suicide in many Asian societies, they also found high rates of altruistic and fatalistic suicide types.53 The most prominent example of a surge of altruistic suicide in the 20th century was that of Japanese kamikaze pilots near the end of WWII.54 However, if the following contention is accurate, namely, that culture is the immediate factor responsible for altruistic suicide, then it is reasonable to assume that the kamikaze phenomenon would have accompanied the war from its first days and would not have made its appearance only towards the end, when Japanese military inferiority became clear. Another example of the transience of support for suicide operations among Eastern cultures is found in the idea of sacrifice which spread among Islamic insurgents in the Philippines hundreds of years earlier. The march to a sure-fire death received widespread social support and in fact became a pivotal cultural element expressed in songs, recitations and texts, only when it was evident to insurgents that their other methods of action had failed.55 Indeed, in much the same way that the kamikaze 37 course of action disappeared at the end of WWII, the sacrifice phenomenon in the Philippines also reached its end when a new political reality emerged, providing hope for a better future for the Islamic community.56 Therefore, it appears that in a certain context, particularly in a state of real or perceived inferiority against an enemy that is hostile and also regarded as cruel, and following repeated failures in their attempts to fight it, certain societies will tend to support terrorist organisations that send recruits off to meet their death against this enemy.57 The reason for this is rooted in, among other things, the attitude towards death in some cultures. If, in Western cultures, the threatening shadow of death hovers over the individual from the day of his birth and signifies termination and desolation, in other cultures death is accompanied by additional, different symbols, including honour and even sanctity. In the relative deprivation approach, originally meant to explain group political violence, there are fundamentals that can also be instructive in regard to the conditions in which violence, no matter how brutal, can earn widespread social legitimacy. The source of violence, according to this orientation, is in the protracted sense of injustice which marks a certain group. As the disparity between the expectations and the practicable abilities of a group grows, the sense of deprivation also increases and with it a predisposition towards violence. One of the main pillars of this approach is how long the social group is subjected to feelings of deprivation and the extent to which it believes things might change. The longer that deprivation persists, combined with the subjective feeling that chances of change are small, the inclination to violence will grow.58 Although this approach was originally intended for explaining episodes of political 38 violence within the context of the state, it is also possible to make use of it in different frameworks. The majority of organisations adopting suicide terrorism represent ethnic, national or religious groups. These groups feel that they are being, so to speak, trampled under the boots of other groups, thus barring them from the liberties and rights they deserve. In every one of these cases, one is speaking of feelings of deprivation and injustice that have developed over many years and occasionally even worsened in the event of a deterioration in the group’s situation. The galvanisation of social support for activating suicide bombers is contingent upon a three-phase process. In the first phase, feelings of discrimination and despair spread to large parts of the society. These feelings are also accompanied by a fierce hostility towards the oppressive factor and sometimes even lead to a dehumanisation of it.59 In the next phase, the terrorist organisation will attempt to provide a comeback to these feelings. It will supply the group with heroes and symbols that give meaning to an existence in a hopeless reality.60 The organisation will also offer a strategy that will cause the enemy much pain and sometimes even force it to change its policy and thus provide the group in whose name it acts with a feeling of accomplishment. The third phase depends on the reactions from the side subjected to the suicide attacks. If the enemy reacts with great force to the suicides and harms innocent civilians, there is a possibility that public legitimacy for suicide actions will only increase. A change for the better in group conditions is liable to bring with it a decrease in the support for this type of action. Another possibility is that the enemy will respond in a more sophisticated manner, e.g. it will effect changes in policy for the benefit of the community in whose name the organisation acts, without rewarding the organisation itself. This kind of situation will lead to a breach between the organisation and its 39 supporters and sometimes even to sanctions applied by the community against the organisation, if the community feels that any gains achieved are being jeopardised. In sum, a supportive social environment has a decisive influence, both on the organisation’s decision to adopt suicide terrorism and to continue to pursue this strategy, as well as on the individual who decides to join the organisation in order to take part in the suicide mission. Recruitment of the Potential Suicide Bomber The appropriate question at this point, other than the supportive environment discussed above and the organisational process to be discussed later on, is whether it is possible to compile a list of the distinctive features of those same individuals who join the ranks of suicide legions? A short while after the events of September 11th, 2001, the President of the United States, George Bush, called the plane hijackers, “evil cowards”. Senator John Warner went even further and stated that those who performed suicide aggressions are not rational people and therefore there is no possibility of deterring them with equally rational countermeasures.61 These statements well reflect the tendency that was popular among many social scientists following the contemporary flare-up of suicide terrorism. These same scholars, for the most part Western, found it hard to understand what compelled a person to carry out a suicide attack and assumed that the cause must stem from some type of mental pathology. At the same time, they disregarded the fact that most suicides were on a mission, groomed and dispatched by active terrorist organisations and were not individuals often termed, in the jargon of students of terrorism, “lone 40 wolves”. Therefore, it was easier for them to claim that embarking on a suicide action was an expression of an individual’s mental disturbance rather than a rational tactical strategy.62 The great interest sparked by suicide terrorists in the imagination of researchers led to the emergence of two principal psychological approaches which sought to assess the factors leading a person to engage in such an action. The first approach, deriving from the psychology of personality, put an emphasis on the personality traits that could indicate suicide potentials, while the second approach, based on a more social psychological orientation, attempted to detect the specific circumstances that drive someone to embark on a suicide action. I must admit that both schools left me with many unanswered questions. This may be due to the fact that these approaches make it very difficult to offer convincing explanations that can be put to empirical testing. Nevertheless, I believe that the different psychological schools should be discussed and I will devote the following paragraphs to that purpose. One of the conclusions drawn from the attempts to fathom the personality of the suicide terrorist was that not one single personality trait common (as demonstrated by the literature) among suicides, including affective disorder, alcohol or drug addiction or severe childhood disturbances, was found to be prevalent among suicide terrorists.63 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that attempts to use conventional psychoanalytical theories to explain suicides in the realm of suicidal terrorism have produced only partial results. For example, Shneidman’s theory, perceiving suicide to be consequent to feelings of hopelessness and helplessness deriving from ungratified psychological needs, may in fact shed light on certain aspects related to suicide terrorists. Suicides, according to this approach, choose the path of taking their own 41 lives when they perceive this option as the only possible way to put an end to the pain they are enduring.64 Having said that, the main problem in trying to put this theory into practice when explaining suicide terrorism is that it was primarily intended to account for suicide on an individualistic basis and in the case of suicide terrorists, while many of them have been found to suffer from despair on a community or nationalist level, very few of them were in fact subject to despondency due to purely individualistic causes. Furthermore, in contrast to individualistic suicides, suicide terrorists do not have a history of attempts to harm themselves. And the act of suicide was not committed following a harsh quarrel with members of their families or friends and they did not report in their videotaped or written last testaments a sense of exasperation with their lives as often found in the letters of those who take their own lives. Nonetheless, researchers in the field of psychology have not yet thrown in the towel. Recent years have seen the surfacing of an assumption—not yet empirically confirmed—whereby many suicides suffer from a borderline personality disorder. According to this point of view, these people suffer from defective bonding and dependency needs, fear of abandonment and existential anxiety. They are plagued by feelings of shame and use defence mechanisms that enable them to cast blame on others. Due to their disturbed sense of judgement, they are apt to distort reality, perceive it in a defective manner and act impulsively under the influence of this sentiment.65 The origins of this disorder, according to researchers, are rooted in childhood experiences. In many traditional societies, the father fills the role of the central figure in the education of his sons. However, these fathers are often removed from their 42 children so that the greater part of the burden of educating children falls on the mother who is an oppressed figure in patriarchal and conservative societies. In many cases, the mothers transfer a great deal of the pain they feel onto their sons and create much frustration in them. These childhood experiences cause these young boys to become introverted and shy in comparison to their peers and foster in them the tendency to be attracted to charismatic figures.66 These are the type of youths that recruiters from terrorist organisations are looking for, according to some researchers. After spotting a youth who fills these characteristics, they present him with the most exalted myths and fantasies of the society in which he lives and offer him the ultimate way of channelling the aggressions and frustration he carries with him. The act of suicide, his handlers assiduously maintain, will transform him into a mythological hero and secure him a place in the fantasies of his people. This argument is corroborated by the videotaped last testaments of many of the suicide attackers, who refer to the suicide as a heroic act performed for the sake of the collective. In these same recordings, there also seem to be no signs of feelings of hopelessness or helplessness.67 Another group of scholars, who investigated the personality features of suicide attackers, put forward the concept of the authoritarian personality. Similar to their colleagues who focussed on the borderline personality disorder, these researchers also detected the seeds of the suicidal act in the socialisation process of a conservative society. In their view, education in conservative and — in most cases, Islamic — societies is founded on an imperative towards obedience and an indoctrination of perceptions and beliefs. This is in contrast to the strong emphasis on providing skills for rational assessment among alternatives in educational systems in other societies. Furthermore, traditional societies impart the youth with political and religious 43 authorities which absolve him from internal reservations and clearly define for him who is friend and who is foe and in this way reinforce the internal cohesion of the society. The family institution in these societies does not serve as a counterbalance to the messages the youth picks up in the education system, because familial relations are also rooted in clear-cut definitions of roles and dictates of obedience. Consequently, in his childhood and youth, the individual is subject to harsh discipline, which demands from him submission and also precludes the option of acquiring critical tools to deal with reality. The result is an authoritarian personality structure, where a deep hatred of the other and a willingness to harm him in order to defend his own society, are basic constituents of one’s personality.68 The conclusion from the above is that theories trying to explain suicide terrorism by means of personality factors do not indicate an organic flaw and neither do they attribute the suicidal tendency to an innate cause. Conversely, they call attention to the socialisation process of the individual and point to the society where he grew up as a decidedly primary factor in shaping the personality into a potential suicide terrorist. One of the significant stumbling blocks associated with these approaches pertains, as already noted, to the fact that they have not undergone empirical testing and it appears doubtful that they will in the near future. The numerous problems inherent to the approaches which sought to indicate the personality features of the individual or the long-term social processes he undergoes as central principles for explaining suicide terrorism, led a different group of scholars, many of them social psychologists, to focus their attention on more immediate factors. In this case, too, the task of discovering the causes which transform a human being into a suicide terrorist was no mean feat. Already, as in earlier cases, a simple perusal 44 of their articles leaves the reader with the impression that it is not possible to identify a dominant single factor responsible for the individual becoming a perpetrator. Apparently, it takes a number of factors at the same time in order to reach the critical juncture that compels the individual to develop into a potential suicide terrorist. Three studies that adopted this approach as their premise indicated the individual’s rational deliberation within a certain social context as a factor that has influence on the choice of the suicide option. In the first place, a review of Moslem suicide terrorists shows that several elected to participate in the mission as a means of purification or self-cleansing from sins committed in this world and with the aim of guaranteeing for themselves life in a next-world paradise.69 A direct parallel can be drawn with the Moslem martyrs who operated in the Philippines, where also many of them were branded sinners.70 In this particular context, it is important again to elaborate on the dominance of the afterlife concept for the religious person. In many religions, the present life is defined as a narrow corridor ultimately leading to eternal life. Subsequently, the fear that due to his sins in this world, the person will be forced to spend his/her next life in hell may in fact bring the believer to seek out every possible means of atoning for his sins, including self-sacrifice.71 Second, in some episodes of suicidal martyrdom, the suicide bomber and his family are rewarded with a change in social status. A person who ended up in the margins of society and subsequently might have caused much shame to him/her and his/her family, will become, after his/her death, a hero and will entitle his/her close ones to much honour.72 In the third place, the change in the social status of the suicide bomber’s family members is often complemented with a change in their material status. Testimonies, particularly from the Palestinian arena, provide evidence that many 45 families of suicide bombers received monetary compensation from the organisation that dispatched their son or daughter to the suicide mission and occasionally from other sources, foremost among them Saddam Hussein. Material compensation that might amount to a few thousand dollars can indeed be a genuine incentive for people who have been living for many years in the squalour of a refugee camp and may ensure a significant change in the quality of life of their remaining kin.73 Then again, social psychologists claim that it is not always possible to consider an act of suicide as a culmination of rational deliberations. This argument is based on the many episodes where cause for the suicidal act turned out to be the individual’s desire to take revenge on an enemy considered, in his view, to be responsible for a historical injustice, as well as for the oppression and humiliation of the social group to which he belongs.74 In other cases, the wish to avenge comes from the experience of losing a family member or close friend that was harmed by the enemy, and sometimes the source of the vengeance is the physical harm or humiliation the ‘suicide’ person was subjected to.75 Due to the complexities cited above, it is possible to conclude that the discussion of the factors leading the individual to commit the suicidal act is still in its early stages and will apparently also serve as a basis for additional academic discussion, mostly among psychologists, in the future. In chapter 6, I will elaborate on my own observations on the individual causes for suicide terrorism. The fact that my perspective is not psychological led me to look into macro and micro social experiences and dynamics that may lead a person to make such a decision. As mentioned earlier, I will specifically focus on the concept of crisis that is associated with personal and communal experiences to which the individual was exposed in the 46 period prior to the attack and the concept of commitment to ideas, leaders and above all to comrades, as key terms in exploring individual motivation for the perpetration of suicide attacks. The Organisational Procedure The organisational procedure of devising the suicide operation and training the suicide potential is performed in a number of parallel and distinct steps. Planning the operation is vested in the hands of the higher echelons of the organisation. They design the strategic guidelines and engage in a continuous process of raising economic, organisational and tactical resources, thus enabling the organisation to maintain an unbroken succession of suicide actions over time. Concurrently, the tactical levels are at work gathering intelligence, scouting for targets, and on the lookout for ways to enhance the impact of the attack. Additionally, there are trainers or handlers, part of a group of organisation activists responsible for the recruitment of potential suicides, training and then dispatching them to their final operation.76 The discussion below will focus on this process. The first step in the process is the recruitment of the potential suicide bomber. Whether it is someone who approached the organisation on his/her own accord or someone who was contacted by organisation activists, the degree of suitability for the task must be assessed. Despite the tactical advantages in dispatching older men or women to suicide operations, organisations generally prefer to recruit young adults and youths who are not attached to family or have other commitments.77 On some occasions, work will be more set out for recruiters. These are the cases where the potential suicide bomber makes first contact with them. The reasons that lead someone to offer himself as a candidate for a suicide operation, as we have already 47 seen, are diverse and may range from a hunger for revenge to commitment to a group or a community. Nonetheless, the more he/she is determined in carrying out the action, the shorter the training phase, which may decrease from a number of days and even weeks to a matter of hours. The reason for the great importance ascribed to the training period of the suicide is associated with the need to bring a human being, within a short period of time, to engage in a mission whose psychological intricacy is significantly greater than its tactical and technical challenges. In the past, it was customary to believe that suicide bombers were veteran members of the organisation and their decision to undertake the suicide operation had crystallised over a long period so that over the years they were gradually able to assume the mental fortitude and operative abilities necessary to engage in the operation.78 In recent years, the reality has altered. The majority of suicide bombers are recruited to the various organisations or are approached for only one purpose, that is, the suicide act, and this demands prompt and efficient training.79 The most important phase of the training process is the indoctrination, or in its more popular repute, “brainwashing”.80 This alludes to the process that aims to bring about change in a whole set of attitudes, opinions and beliefs of a person by means of mental and occasionally even physical persuasion. In most of the cases of suicide terrorists, the process is somewhat different because operatives are “preaching to the converted”, in that recruits are already well aware of the purpose for which they were enlisted in the first place and the goal of indoctrination is not to change their behaviour but rather to reinforce an existing inclination within a short time period.81 The indoctrination process is two-pronged: presenting the recruit with persuasive thematic material and exploiting charismatic images to help internalise these 48 materials. When the combination of the two is successful, a special dynamic is created, during which the feeling of a calling wells up in the prospective suicide followed by a decreased fear of death.82 Matters reach such a point that in the last phase of training, where the suicide prospect is asked to write a farewell letter and leave behind him/her a videotaped testament to his/her loved ones, he/she is already in a mental state where all his/her hopes are pinned on the suicide action. These same recorded testimonies reveal that some of the living martyrs in fact express an eagerness for performing the action and a great joy for this occasion.83 From this point on, the chances that the suicide will go back on his decision are relatively small because such a step would give rise to condemnation on behalf of his friends in the organisation and sometimes even on behalf of the community at large, as well as grave harm to his or her self-esteem. In many cases, the indoctrination process is complemented by the organisation’s efforts to create a strong sense of commitment among the suicide candidates themselves, if such a commitment has not already been established within their social network prior to their recruitment for the suicide mission. By the nature of things, this process does not take place in all organisations and is completely absent on occasions where the individual approaches organisation representatives on his own initiative and is sent on the operation shortly thereafter. However, research that tracked religious Palestinian groups and also the Tamil Tigers for a period of years discovered a similar process of preparation of suicide potentials in group forms called martyrdom cells (haliya istishhadiya) in the case of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and in units called Black Tigers for men and Birds of Freedom for women in the case of the LTTE. The purpose of this group cohesion is essentially to create a sense of unity 49 where members of each cell reinforce each other and establish a sort of contractual framework binding them to the mission.84 This technique which is utilised by the leaders of the terrorist organisation relies on past experience and on an understanding of the group dynamic that occurs in army units as well as other organisations.85 Time and again, the question has been raised, what compels soldiers in armies all over the world to meet smoking barrels head-on in the battlefield?86 The answer is found in the profound sense of commitment the soldier feels towards the fellow members of his unit.87 Evidence of this commitment can already be found in the mass suicide carried out by the besieged group of Jews in Massada (Jewish fortress from Roman times) who, rather than surrender to their enemies, took each other’s lives from within a strong sense of common destiny and mutual assurance.88 Another example from more contemporary history is the consecutive suicides of Irish prisoners, who starved themselves and died one after the other. This sequence of suicides was explained by a group pact that not one of the members of the group was willing to break. The fervour of their commitment to the contract only increased from the moment the first hunger striker died.89 Summary From all of the above, it is possible to conclude that the bulk of studies that have attempted to explain suicide terrorism have focussed on specific aspects of the phenomenon. This could be, for example, either the decisions taken by an organisational elite or the personal and environmental circumstances that led the individual to take part in this action or the training process that the suicide recruit undergoes in the organisational framework. Every one of these approaches has revealed an important piece of the mosaic of the complex of suicide terrorism, but 50 until now, an integrated explanation of the phenomenon has yet to be presented. In the following chapters, I will try to clarify the picture. 51 Chapter 3 – Turning to Suicide Terrorism: Hezbollah and the Palestinian Organisations I have chosen to present in three separate parts a discussion of the factors which led the various organisations to adopt and occasionally discard the use of suicide terrorism. In practical terms, this will facilitate the reading of this subject, but this is not the only or most important reason for breaking up the discussion into smaller segments. While investigating the respective cases, I discovered that a single comprehensive study of all the organisations could perhaps shed light on a number of key factors responsible for compelling organisation elites to either adopt or abandon suicide terrorism. However, this type of discussion would also obscure features that are no less important and which become particularly prominent when the comparison focuses on a smaller number of organisations similar to one another in their nature and operating under similar circumstances. Therefore, in this chapter, I will focus on the Hezbollah and the Palestinian organisations. The following chapter will be devoted to a comparison of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey and, finally, the third chapter will concentrate on Al-Qaeda and local groups related to Al-Qaeda which have also deployed suicide terrorists as well as to the cases of the Chechen and Iraqi insurgents. The basic assumption of this chapter and, to a large extent, the following chapters as well, is that the preference for suicide terrorism by terrorist organisations is a consequence of advance planning and informed assessment of other alternatives, as each one of the organisations calculates how it can further its goals vis-à-vis a number of targeted publics. These three publics are, as follows: the stronger opponent,90 the 52 public the organisation seeks to represent, and the local political rivals.91 To elaborate, in this chapter I will demonstrate that the principal factor explaining the decision to adopt and apply suicide terrorism over a period of time—as well as its ultimate suspension—is associated with the benefits for the organisation in its struggle with a stronger state and the costs of using this method. Suicide terrorism was adopted by Lebanese and Palestinian organisations as a psychological and strategic device. In psychological terms, the reason why organisations use suicide terrorists is to signal to the countries where they are fighting, and to their own citizens their great determination to engage in an uncompromising battle in the name of their people and a certain ideology. On a strategic level, most suicide campaigns are meant to bring about political and military changes. However, both the Lebanese and Palestinian cases show that despite the fact that the principal factor for activating suicide terrorists is linked to the conflict with an external and powerful force, additional considerations related to the internal political situation in which organisations operate cannot be treated lightly, in particular competition among rival organisations battling each other for the public’s support.92 But why should terrorist organisations compete among themselves when they are in effect fighting for a common cause? The answer is quite simple, especially if we rely on the assumption that the majority of organisations act in the name of a certain nationality and are committed to establishing an autonomous political entity. History shows that a significant number of terrorist organisations using violence in their efforts to achieve national liberation indeed later strove to become political parties in the national sovereign entity that emerged at the end of the struggle. Political parties, by their very definition, are organised groups, holding a common worldview, which 53 seek to rule the government. This rule depends on the degree of public legitimacy the party enjoys and the political support it is able to muster.93 The discretion displayed by the leadership of terrorist organisations in internal politics is analogous to the rationality they show towards their enemy. If they sense that the public whose support they are seeking perceives activation of suicide bombers in a positive light, and this public also shows support for other organisations in the same arena that make use of suicide attackers, the chances are they will also adopt this tactic and invest in the “marketing” and glorification of their actions.94 Decisions about whether to increase or reduce the number and magnitude of operations, or whether to change the targets of suicide attacks will also, to a great extent, be a direct consequence of the support that organisation steersmen sense they are receiving from their “constituency”. In this chapter, I will also try to confirm the contention that the use of suicide bombers will be suspended under the following three conditions. First, if the goals of the organisation have been attained. Second, if the side that is being attacked finds effective ways of containing this phenomenon and the organisation leadership becomes aware that this strategy is no longer beneficial. Third, if the public which the organisation seeks to represent makes it apparent that it no longer sanctions the use of this method. Founding Fathers of Modern-Day Suicide Terrorism – The Hezbollah in Lebanon During the course of the 1980s, the term, suicide terrorism, was virtually synonymous with the Hezbollah organisation in Lebanon. With more than twenty years hindsight, it is still not easy to believe that the organisation which today controls vast areas of 54 southern Lebanon—both in military and civilian terms—and is represented in the Lebanese Parliament, is that same fledgling movement that was founded by a group of Shiite Muslims who adopted the Koran as their programme and announced the founding of the Party of Allah (the meaning of Hezbollah in English) in 1982. Hezbollah was established at the time that civil war was raging in Lebanon and foreign countries were increasing their involvement and direct influence on events in the country. The primary goal of the organisation was to bring an end to the presence of foreign military forces in Lebanon and the principal target was Israel. Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in June 1982 with the aim of deterring Palestinian terrorist organisations. Despite committing to a withdrawal of its forces within a short time period, Israel’s stay in Lebanon persisted and its hold on large areas of the country became entrenched. This presence provoked much agitation among the citizens of the country in general and also among the broader Shiite population, the supportive base of the Hezbollah organisation. The position which opposed the Israeli presence in the country gained the endorsement of Syria, Lebanon’s neighbour to the east, and also Iran, the patron and main benefactor of the organisation.95 However, the first suicide attack to be associated with the Hezbollah was carried out against a non-Israeli target. On the 18th of April, 1983, a stolen commercial vehicle laden with about 400 kg of dynamite drove up to the American Embassy in Beirut and exploded in its vicinity. From the impact of the blast, an entire wing of the seven-story building collapsed; 63 people were killed and another 120 were wounded. Many of the dead and the wounded were employees of the American Embassy and CIA representatives in the Lebanese capital. Subsequently, it turned out the car had been driven by a suicide bomber. 55 Suicide Terrorism – A Winning Strategy A reasonable question at this point is why does a small and juvenile organisation such as the Hezbollah inaugurate its operations, of all ways, in such a fashion? The Iranian influence on the organisation evidently played a central part in the attempt to find an answer. The Hezbollah grew up in the lap of a theocratic leadership headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, which became well-established in Iran in the early 1980s. The Iranian influence on the Lebanese movement was not limited solely to religious and cultural facets. To a great degree, the Hezbollah organisation served as an Iranian offshoot in the Middle East and confirmation of this can be found in the fact that delegates from Teheran were involved up to the very last detail in determining organisational goals. They were also responsible for developing methods of operation.96 Tangible evidence is also the fact that more than a thousand troops of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (the Pasdaran) were sent by Khomeini to Lebanon with the aim of erecting an additional base for the Islamic revolution.97 In the period prior to the establishment of the Hezbollah, relations between Iran and the United States reached an unprecedented low point and actions taken against American objectives, especially by indirect means, were perceived as extremely important by authorities in Teheran.98 Moreover, an impressive assault on an American target by means of a terrorist tactic rarely seen before in Lebanon bore the potential of placing the Hezbollah in the first class of resistance organisations in Lebanon.99 Figure 3.1 around here The immediate American response to the attack on the Embassy in Beirut was its relocation to a new site in Aukar, north of the capital.100 For the Hezbollah, this was a 56 highly significant accomplishment. Not only had the operation been successful in tactical terms, that is, a direct hit on a well-protected installation, it also had considerable symbolic implications. In the first suicide operation to be executed, the organisation had already brought the strongest power in the region to its knees, causing it to react in a defensive way and withdraw its embassy from the capital to a distant town. Borne along on the wave of a feeling of success, Hezbollah steersmen proceeded to plan their next attacks. Early in the morning of the 23rd of October, 1983, a Mercedes truck filled with more than 100 kg of TNT infiltrated the American Marines barracks and exploded in the yard there. As a result of the impact of the explosion, the four- story building collapsed. Out of more than 300 casualties, 241 people were killed and 80 were injured, mostly Marines that served on the Multinational Force sent to keep order in Lebanon. Two minutes later, another truck blew up, this time in the compound of the French forces which was about three kilometres distant from the American Marine quarters. Fifty-eight people, most of them French troops that were part of the same force, were killed.101 Less than two weeks later, a booby-trapped truck exploded adjacent to the Israeli forces headquarters in the city of Tyre. Twenty- eight Israeli soldiers and thirty Lebanese citizens were killed in the blast. These attacks by Hezbollah suicide bombers were carried out at close time intervals, directed at strategic targets associated with foreign armed forces stationed in Lebanon, and were carried out in such a way that produced many casualties. This strategy proved to be highly effective as far as the organisation was concerned. As a result of the high number of military casualties and the inability of the Lebanese army to regain control over parts of Beirut, and contrary to the original plans of President Reagan, 57 the United States government decided to immediately withdraw all its troops from the Lebanese capital. And, in fact, on February 26th, 1984, the last of the American Marines left the country.102 Spurred on by its successes, the Hezbollah intensified its use of suicide attacks against the remaining Israeli forces in Lebanon. The tactic used against the Americans was now tailored to the properties of the new enemy. Trucks that were rigged with dynamite in order to pierce the well-shielded barracks of the Multinational Force were replaced by lighter vehicles, mostly cars that were set off in close proximity to Israeli army posts and those of the South Lebanese Army (SLA). In other cases, explosive- laden cars driven by suicide operatives were detonated near convoys of vehicles that moved along the roads in the southern parts of the country. These attacks led to many casualties among Israeli soldiers. On the 14th of January, 1985, the Israeli Minister of Defence, Yitzhak Rabin, announced Israel’s intention to withdraw its forces from the more central part of the country and redeploy them in the security zone in the south. This signified substantial realignment of Israeli forces in Lebanon and, in practice, partial capitulation in face of the pressure applied by Hezbollah suicide bombers. Israel, which had sustained heavy losses in these suicide actions, elected to reposition its forces in close proximity to the international border while maintaining control of certain regions in southern Lebanon with the intention of safeguarding settlements inside northern Israel from the range of Katyusha rockets. The Israeli decision only reinforced the Hezbollah’s resolve. Their leadership felt that the winning strategy they had adopted could not fail them. Evidence of this was seen in the sharp rise in the number of suicide attacks perpetrated against Israeli forces in 58 the period of time between the declaration of the intention to retreat and the actual completion of the withdrawal.103 However, directly following Israel’s redeployment in southern Lebanon, suicide attacks against IDF soldiers almost completely ceased. Concomitantly, suicide assaults on the South Lebanese Army, which acted in collaboration with Israel, actually increased.104 However, the intense suicide offensive against SLA soldiers apparently was meant to serve additional purposes other than an assault on the Israeli army. By means of attacking SLA troops, the Hezbollah was ascertaining its position which corresponded to the Lebanese populace who perceived members of the SLA as traitors. At the same time, it indicated to the soldiers themselves that they should reconsider their alliance with Israel because if they refused, they would have to pay a heavy price.105 All the same, a short while after the retreat of the Israeli forces to the security zone, suicide attacks against SLA troops did in fact cease. The reason for the change in the Hezbollah’s position toward a strategy which had fared so well for them is apparently related to the reduced rate of benefit they stood to gain from suicide attacks in light of the new emergent reality.106 IDF troops, backed up by SLA troops, were deployed at forty-five well-protected military outposts that were situated at strategic locations.107 Moreover, the distances IDF supply convoys had to cover were reduced and vehicles were better armour reinforced. Under these conditions, it seemed that dispatching suicide bombers utilising conventional Hezbollah operational methods lost some of its effectiveness.108 In actual fact, over the course of the fourteen years in which the IDF controlled the security zone in southern Lebanon, the Hezbollah organisation altered its modus operandi significantly. Its members, who in the past belonged to groups of suicide attackers, were reassigned to sophisticated guerrilla training that included, among 59 other techniques, launching missiles and mortars against outposts and discharging concealed roadside bombs at passing armoured Israeli convoys. The organisation’s strategic versatility, manifested in the adaptation of its operational methods to changing conditions, proved to be quite effectual. A multitude of guerrilla attacks that took the lives of many IDF soldiers radically changed the Israeli public’s position towards continued deployment in the security zone in south Lebanon. In effect, Ehud Barak’s victory at the Israeli polls in May, 1999 owed more than just a small part to his pledge to the Israeli public that during the first year of his incumbency, he would withdraw the Israeli military forces from Lebanon. Suicide Terrorism as a Tool for Gaining Power in Political Arenas in Lebanon and the Middle East Despite the fact that, above all, suicide bombers have been used by the Hezbollah as a tool in its struggle against Israel, as indicated above, they have also functioned in Lebanese internal politics and the Middle East arena as well. Lebanon is a country that is deeply fissured, ethnically and religiously. Although the Shiite ethnicity is the largest in the country and comprises 41% of the population, members do not necessarily all have the same political leanings. For a long time, the Amal Movement, headed by Nabih Berri, united many of the Shiite factions and became the dominant voice of the Shiite population in Lebanon. Since its establishment, the Hezbollah has tried to proposition a completely different political agenda to this population. The strong will of the Shiite elites in ridding Lebanon of foreign forces in the early 1980s is a result, to a great extent, of the Shiite leaders’ supposition that Western forces supported the Maronite Christian minority and have always acted in tandem with Israel. The different Shiite factions had a collective interest at that time in 60 preventing both the increase of Israeli influence and the upset of the political balance among ethnic and religious groups in favour of the Christians.109 Hezbollah’s suicide attacks signalled to the Shiite population that the organisation was a very determined actor in this struggle. They also used the self-sacrifice notion which has remained prominent in the mythology of Shiite Islam since the death of Ali, the prophet’s son- in-law.110 The heroic image ascribed to the Hezbollah led to a surprising swell of support also far beyond the limits of the Shiite population in the country.111 The leaders of the organisation’s elite were shrewd enough to exploit the popularity it had gained. From the early days of Hezbollah, they did not settle for military actions alone. As both part of their religious worldview and an appreciation of the political benefits thereof, they invested great effort in constructing an education, welfare and religious network that provided services to the Shiite population in the country.112 In the late 1980s, they realised it was time to cash in and convert the organisation’s military and social status into political currency. They announced the founding of a political party and, beginning in the 1990s, made sure to compete in the elections for Parliament in Beirut as well as local elections. Evidence of their success is the high rate of support Hezbollah receives on a consistent basis in Shiite regions. An additional indication is how the Lebanese Shiites’ concern over the possible dispersion of their votes among the Hezbollah, Amal and other Shiite bodies, led to the establishment of joint lists consisting of a number of organisations in which the Hezbollah played a dominant role.113 So, in effect, the use of suicide bombers in the 1980s and the strong-willed determination exhibited by the organisation in its struggle against Israel in the following years, had a considerable influence on its transition into a dominant political institution among the Shiite populace in Lebanon, in particular, 61 and into a central actor on the Lebanon political scene in general.114 However, the Hezbollah were not satisfied with only a significant standing in Lebanon politics. Despite the fact that it had ceased its suicide attacks some time previously, it continued to flaunt its status as the founding father of this method and encouraged terrorist organisations all over the world to take the path it had carved out. As elaborated later on, a great number of terrorist organisations that decided to deploy suicide bombers relied on the Hezbollah’s experience and learned from it. Still, the region where the Hezbollah longed to gain a foothold and genuine leverage was in the Middle East and, in particular, the scene of the Palestinian struggle. During the course of the 1990s, and especially after the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Hezbollah was significantly involved in providing both spiritual inspiration and operative support to Palestinian organisations in their struggle against the Israeli enemy. This was a factor that transformed it, over the years, into an actor with genuine clout in Palestinian politics. A significant part of the speech delivered by the secretary general of the Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, on the 14th of December, 2001, was dedicated to bolstering the spirit of the various Palestinian factions and encouraging them to increase the use of suicide terrorists in their assault on the Israeli “home front”. After opening his oration with a religious justification for committing suicide, Nasrallah proceeded to a tactical line of reasoning: “…sacrificing life in the holy name of Allah is the weapon entrusted by Allah into the hands of this nation and which no person can take away from us. They can take away [our] cannons or tanks or planes but they cannot take away our spirit that yearns for Allah and our resolve to surrender life in the sanctification of the name of Allah”.115 Clearly evident in these 62 words is the profound identification of the Hezbollah organisation with the Palestinian struggle. Nasrallah would like the Palestinian public to understand that by means of suicide bombers, they could achieve results similar to those of the Hezbollah in its struggle against its enemies. As previously noted, Hezbollah support for Palestinian suicide terrorism was not only restricted to a declamatory nature.116 Despite the theological gap between the Shiite Hezbollah and the Palestinian organisations—the latter belonging to Moslems of the Sunnite faith—Nasrallah and his people took steps in order to increase their involvement in the Al-Aqsa Intifada and, in particular, to promote suicide actions. To this end, they transferred technological know-how and even military weaponry to the Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and other Palestinian organisations.117 Due to the crisis it suffered in the beginning of the year 2004, the Hamas improved its ties with the Hezbollah, which provided money and infrastructure for operations. The affinity between the two organisations grew to such a point that following the Israeli attack on the Hamas leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, his replacement, Abd el-Aziz Rantisi approached the Hezbollah for assistance in launching an operation in revenge for the liquidation of the Sheikh. In summary, it appears that the mobilisation of suicide attackers proved itself quite beneficial in serving all of Hezbollah’s major goals. With this method of terrorism, strategically, the organisation was successful in forcing countries with greater military capabilities to accept its conditions and change its policy accordingly. In internal and regional political terms, the Hezbollah’s determination, reflected in its willingness to make frequent use of suicide attacks, turned it into a leading force among the Shiite populace in particular and Lebanon politics in general. Furthermore, many terrorist 63 organisations in the world saw in the Hezbollah’s tactics a winning model for their own campaigns. While organisations such as the LTTE, the PKK and Al-Qaeda imitated the organisation’s modus operandi, Palestinian factions in recent years have became genuinely dependent on it and consequently have transformed the Hezbollah into a powerful actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Middle Eastern theatre in general. External or Internal Struggle? Suicide Terrorism in the Palestinian Arena Despite the Hezbollah’s considerable contribution to the initiation of many suicide attacks on the Palestinian scene since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifida, in the first years of Palestinian suicide operations, the Hezbollah was an important inspiration but did not yet take a significant part in their campaigns. The first suicide mission performed by a Palestinian organisation took place on the 16th of April, 1993. In the late Friday afternoon hours, a car driven by Tamam Nabulsi, a Hamas operative slowly rolled into the parking lot of a restaurant run by members of the nearby Mekhola settlement in the Jordan Valley. This restaurant was known as a meeting place for soldiers who regularly dined there when going home on leave or returning to base. Nabulsi parked the car loaded with explosives between two buses and then detonated the explosive device. The number of casualties caused by the explosion was relatively reduced owing to the fact that most of the soldiers destined to travel on these buses were in the restaurant at the time. Still, this operation carried the seeds of a dramatic change that was about to take over the scene of the Palestinian struggle. Among policymakers in Israel, the first Palestinian incident was received with great astonishment. This was because until that same day, the phenomenon of suicide 64 terrorism was mostly limited to the Lebanon region. However, the basis for their reaction was not entirely founded. The Hamas had adopted “in principal” the idea of using self-immolating terrorists already four years previously. In leaflet number 68 of the organisation, distributed in the wake of a wave of arrests of its top-ranking officials in 1989, there was a summons to the movement’s loyalists to begin engaging in suicide missions against Israeli targets.118 Suicide Terrorism – A Strategy for Advancing the Peace Process? The question is why did the Hamas wait four years from the day of their appeal for suicide operations until the actual implementation? The answer can be found in the same rational approach that in general guides the organisation’s leadership. In their view, violence is a means and not an end and the decision whether to use violence or not and, if so, which tactic should be chosen, is an outcome of the anticipated benefits inherent to each method of operation.119 Therefore, what specifically did lead the Hamas executive body to begin dispatching suicide bombers to the cities of Israel in 1993? Despite the fact that the research of suicide terrorism in general, and the study of the Palestinian case in particular, is still in its early stages, the question of the objectives Hamas had in mind by initiating suicide attacks piqued the interest of many scholars and has led to the emergence of two academic polarised views. Despite the disagreement between the approaches, they equally rely on a common basic assumption, i.e., they both accept the doctrine of controlled violence. In other words, this is an assumption according to which the decision to initiate suicide missions is a rational choice among a number of several options.120 Figure 3.2 around here The first approach holds the view that the aim of Hamas suicide attacks was to coerce 65 Israel into fulfilling its part of the Oslo Accords, which they signed with the Palestinian Authority in September, 1993. This view is based on the complications that evolved in the implementation of the Accords a short while after Israel and the Palestinians signed them. For example, according to the Accords, Israel was required to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho between the December 13, 1993, and April 13, 1994, but it did not comply with this timetable. Furthermore, Israel and the Palestinian Authority became involved in disputes regarding the size of the Palestinian police force to be stationed in evacuated cities and also regarding the question about Israel’s right to “hot pursuit” after terrorist suspects in these territories. When talks on these issues reached an impasse, the Hamas executed two suicide attacks; the first on April 6, and the second on April 13, 1994. Several days later, on the April 18, the Knesset approved the decision to draw back its forces and, according to this approach, in this fashion, gave in to force applied by Hamas suicide terrorism; withdrawal itself began on May 4, 1994.121 Confirmation of this approach, according to which suicide attacks were used as leverage against Israel with the intention of imposing implementation of the agreements, was evident in the next wave of suicide attacks near the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995. This time, the actions were putatively in response to the delays in the implementation of the second stage of the agreements, that is, the withdrawal of Israel from highly populated areas in the West Bank. Between October 1994 and April 1995, the Hamas launched, together with the Islamic Jihad organisation, seven suicide strikes. The attacks ceased only after the Palestinian Authority explicitly requested the Hamas and Islamic Jihad to discontinue their operations and, in the wake of these events, Israel reached a target date for withdrawal, i.e., July 1, 1995. 66 Unexpected delays on behalf of Israel linked to the need to pave secure bypass roads for Israeli vehicles in order to avoid evacuated territories, led to the renewal of suicide attacks by these two organisations. On July 24 and August 21, 1995, two suicide attacks occurred which took the lives of 11 Israelis. Less than two months later, Israel agreed to pull back from West Bank cities and this was before the construction of bypass roads, a demand that it had previously and forcefully insisted upon. The withdrawal itself began on December 12, 1995.122 On the face of it, the explanation provided by the first approach seems to have merit. It is in fact supported by statements made by the Israeli prime minister at the time, Yitzhak Rabin who, as early as April 18, 1994, maintained that the only way to cope with the great losses inflicted by suicide terror was to pull back from Palestinian territories.123 However, the basic assumption of this first approach appears to be somewhat flawed. According to this assumption, the goals of the heads of the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were identical to those of the leaders of the Palestinian Authority, who sought to expedite the implementation of the Oslo Accords. The problem with this reasoning is that it does not account for the vehement rivalry between these two organisations on one hand and the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority on the other, and therefore the idea of some type of cooperation at that time is not entirely persuasive. The second approach analysing the Palestinian organisation’s use of suicide terrorism accounts for this rivalry and also does not overlook the influence of internal Palestinian political considerations on the espousal of the suicide terrorist strategy. 67 Suicide Terrorism as a Strategy in the Contemporaneous Struggle against both Israel and the Palestinian Authority If the argument of the first approach was that the aim of the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in dispatching suicide bombers was to speed up implementation of the Oslo Accords then, according to the second approach, their aim was to sabotage implementation of the Accords and undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. From the moment they were signed, the Oslo Accords were problematic for the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, for two reasons. First, the Accords would bring an end to their lofty vision of the establishment of an Islamic state on all Palestinian-Israeli territory. Second, and no less important, the Accords granted Fatah a dominant status in the institutions of the Palestinian Authority and excluded Islamic organisations—which enjoyed widespread popular support—from the process of making and executing policy in the Authority. The tension among religious and national political currents in the Palestinian arena therefore is not surprising. With the establishment of the Hamas movement in the last months of the year 1987, it was already clear that there were more differences than common ground between it and the Fatah. Both movements in fact agreed upon the importance of the “armed struggle doctrine” forged by the Fatah in the 1960s, putting forward the notion that fulfilment of Palestinian aspirations would become possible only by means of violent struggle. However, while the Fatah aimed mainly at national aspirations, Hamas ideology integrated both national and religious elements. The Hamas position was that establishing a Palestinian state on the lands of Judea, Samaria and Gaza was not enough. Their claim was that all of Palestine as well as the 68 territories of the State of Israel comprised the holy land (wakf) of the entire Islamic world and hence must be liberated from the possession of infidels.124 Moreover, opposing ideological worldviews was not the only source of strain among the movements. The heads of the Hamas felt that the gradually increasing legitimacy accorded to Fatah, coupled with the considerable power amassed by the United National Headquarters of the Intifada, jeopardised the political viability of Islamic movements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.125 This new reality was not at all welcomed by the movement and its leadership decided to fight against it. The Hamas at that time had an advantage over Fatah in two primary respects. First, before the signing of the Oslo Accords, the preponderance of the veteran Fatah leadership had been in exile in Tunisia and other Arab countries, whereas the Hamas leadership operated from its central base in Gaza. Second, together with the vehement rhetoric voiced against Israel in order to drum up the Palestinian masses, the organisation was wise enough to rely on the traditions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hezbollah and founded a network of charitable and welfare institutions that granted aid to the needy Palestinian populace.126 Yasser Arafat, leader of the Fatah, shortly after the institution of the Hamas, already understood the ominous potential of the organisation and began to work against it. The Hamas responded by intensifying its military actions against Israeli targets. These actions earned the organisation growing public support.127 Although the first suicide attack mounted by the Hamas took place a short while prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords, the beginning of organised Hamas suicide campaigns was highly evident in the months following the signing of the Accords. Among both the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, there was full concurrence 69 regarding the policy that multi-casualty suicide attacks would ultimately dash the hopes of Israelis who thought the Accords would put an end to terrorism and would gain security for the Israeli “home front”.128 Erosion in the support of the Israeli public for the agreements was henceforth meant to cause serious hindrance in their implementation, accompanied by the undermining of Fatah’s status as both the Israeli leadership and Palestinian public perceived it. Three concentrated campaigns of suicide attacks launched against Israeli targets did not further the goals of these organisations and also did not lead to the collapse of the Oslo process. However, the campaign that began in the February of 1996 did have significant results.129 The four attacks carried out by the Hamas in the cities of Jerusalem, Ashkelon and Tel Aviv in the months of February and March, 1996, were labelled by the organisation as acts avenging the assassination of Yehiya Ayyash— “the Engineer”—the man who developed and enhanced the organisation’s method of suicide attack and who had been eliminated by Israel not long before. However, the leaderships of terrorist organisations generally do not engage in retribution. Reprisals for actions perpetrated against them are first and foremost prescribed by their goals. In the case of this campaign, the Hamas sought to realise two goals. First, they wanted to signal to Israel that the elimination of the person most responsible for dispatching suicide attackers would not put an end to the phenomenon, and, second, the suicide campaign was also an attempt to halt the progress of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. To further these goals, they actively hoped for the election of Binyamin Netanyahu, then leader of the Likud right-wing party, to win in the elections scheduled for the month of May, 1996. In contrast to the incumbent prime minister at the time, Shimon 70 Peres, who was committed to the Oslo process, Netanyahu made no secret of his hawkish orientation and expressed reservations regarding his willingness to implement the agreements in the future. It seems that the Hamas was able to accomplish these two missions it set out for itself. Even after the death of Ayyash, the organisation was able to accomplish extremely lethal suicide actions that claimed a very high price and in this fashion made it obvious to Israel that its capabilities were intact. More important, Binyamin Netanyahu won the elections, albeit with just a slight majority, but it must be remembered that he managed to defeat his opponent in Labour (Peres) only a little more than a half-year after the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, leader of the Labour Party. The murder that stunned Israeli society was supposed to have been converted into sweeping support for Rabin’s party, as surveys at that time in fact indicated.130 However, the suicide attacks led to an erosion of support for the Labour Party and the gap between Labour and the right-wing Likud Party gradually diminished until it completely vanished on election day. The Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad racked up a victory in another sense. Suicide actions perpetrated in those years conformed to the general feelings of the Palestinian people at the time. A survey conducted in February, 1995, a short while after the double suicide attack by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad at a roadside bus stop for soldiers at Beit-Lid, demonstrated the support of 46% of Palestinians for persisting in attacks against Israeli targets, whereas only 34% were opposed.131 Hence, in terms of internal Palestinian policy, the execution of suicide attacks proved to be an important political tool. It allowed Islamic organisations to appear more determined and daring than the Fatah and led to higher rates of support for the former. 71 Suicide Terrorism as a Tool in Rivalry among Organisations – The Case of the Al- Aqsa Intifada Toward the end of the 1990s, following a short period of decline in Palestinian support for carrying out suicides, there was a discernible change in public opinion. A survey conducted in 1998 showed that, for the first time, the number of supporters for attacks against Israeli targets had risen to 50%.132 The operative manifestation of this shift became apparent only two years later, when the Al-Aqsa Intifida erupted in late September, 2000. At the outbreak of the Intifada, the number of suicide terrorist actions increased by hundreds of percent and at the vanguard of the actions stood the Hamas movement. Khaled Mishal, chief of the movement’s political bureau claimed that, in contrast to the first intifada, which had assumed a more popular nature and was marked by demonstrations and acts of sporadic violence, it was now time to resort to an organised mobilisation of military hardware and suicide bombers and that the standard of reference was now the Lebanese model of armed resistance.133 The strategic directive that guided Hezbollah action over the years was highly prominent in Mishal’s oration. According to him, the present balance of powers between Israel and the Palestinians would preclude the Hamas from being victorious over Israel. Acts of resistance (and especially suicides) performed by the movement were to grant it cumulative advantages by virtue of its endurance and the determination of the public it represented.134 Mishal’s words certainly did not fall upon deaf ears. At that time, more than 60% of the Palestinian people supported the continuation of violent attacks on Israel and 63% maintained that Palestinian resistance organisations should adopt Hezbollah methods.135 72 Indeed, the Hamas suicide campaign that began shortly after the onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada had far-reaching implications on the fate of the agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.136 Sending suicide bombers into the streets of Israel at that time wore away the little hope that still remained among the Israeli public regarding the peace process. The fact that suicide attacks were a Hamas initiative did not have much importance for the majority of Israelis, who had lost faith in the Palestinian leadership and its will and capacity to cope with terrorism. The results of this crisis of faith were not slow in finding expression. In February 2001, the head of the Likud, Ariel Sharon, one of the leading voices in the opposition to the peace process with the Palestinians, was elected prime minister of Israel in a sweeping majority unprecedented in Israeli politics. Once again, the Palestinian organisations’ accomplishments were twofold. Not only were they able to bring about the ultimate downfall of the Oslo Accords and create a strategic balance of terror with Israel although its power was far greater than theirs, for the first time in their brief history, these organisations were also able to hold sway over the political agenda of the Palestinian street. The broad support for suicide attacks among Palestinian public opinion as well as the increase in support for the Hamas did not fail to make a strong impression on the other organisations. A fear of an erosion of their own public standing created a sobering sense of pressure which led to a change in their line of action. Soon enough, organisations that in the past may have condemned the idea of suicide bombers—including factions from the leftist front such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—also joined the vicious cycle of suicide-dispatchers.137 However, the crown of these developments was the Fatah’s decision to adopt suicide 73 terrorism. For the Fatah organisation, this was indeed a real revolution.138 Prior to the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, members of Fatah, many of whom had served in the security forces of the Palestinian Authority, had refrained from any direct involvement in terrorist activities, let alone suicide actions. In fact, many of them had been put in charge of preventing these exact types of action. Even in the first weeks of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, it seemed that the heads of the Fatah could not decide what steps they should take. Confusion among the organisation ranks was demonstrated in the first period of these events, when veteran activists restricted themselves to shooting incidents aimed at Israeli civilian and military targets and the younger members took part in heavy riots and lynches of Israeli citizens. However, these “small noises” of the Fatah actions got lost in the mayhem of the multitude of suicide attacks perpetrated by the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. A survey conducted in July 2001 revealed that the degree of Palestinian approval for attacks against civilians inside Israel had increased to 58%. Seventy percent of respondents in fact felt that attacks on Israel rather than a pursuit of the political process were more likely to further Palestinian goals. This same survey shows an additional important finding which explains why Fatah also chose the path of suicide violence. While Arafat and Fatah’s popularity had plummeted between July 2000 and July 2001, at the same time, support for Islamic organisations rose in almost identical numbers.139 The Fatah leadership could not remain indifferent to these developments. As events of the Intifada escalated, Fatah set up the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades which relied on the Tanzim infrastructure—a network of local organisations uniting the younger members of Fatah among them.140 The goal of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades was to serve as a 74 counterweight to the suicide arms of the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the brigades of Iz a-Din al-Kassam and the Al-Quds Brigades. The new Fatah suicide squads, endorsed by the highest echelons of the Fatah and Palestinian Authority,141 performed their duty to the full. On the 18th of February, 2002, Fatah’s first suicide attack was carried out and in the following months, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades became the most active arm in the initiation of suicide actions. The number of actions perpetrated by the Fatah at the time exceeded the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and almost reached the number of attacks for which Hamas was responsible.142 About halfway through the year 2002, Israel defined suicide terrorism as a first degree strategic threat and began to take great pains in dealing with it. Among other things, it increased its “targeted assassinations” policies, regained control of the majority of Palestinian territories and hastened the erection of the fence separating the territories of the Palestinian Authority from its own lands. These steps made it very difficult for organisations to initiate suicide actions aimed at the Israeli “home front”. At this point, the Hezbollah’s involvement in the Palestinian arena was deep-seated and the logic that directed the Hezbollah leadership to abandon suicide terrorism when Israel withdrew to the security zone in southern Lebanon in 1985 was also somewhat noticeable in the actions of Palestinian factions affiliated with the organisation. Although it was evident that they had not given up in their efforts to dispatch suicide bombers, the organisations vigorously engaged in operating other types of methods of warfare. One way was by launching more Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip to Israeli settlements in the area. Another measure, and no less important, was to adopt tactics of guerrilla warfare inside the Palestinian territories themselves. The first indication of this was the remote-controlled explosion of two IDF armoured personnel 75 carriers in Gaza on the 11th and 12th of May, 2004, by means of highly powerful roadside bombs and anti-tank missiles. The transition to warfare of this type was indicative of the considerable strategic logic underlying actions of the Hamas and other Palestinian organisations and their capability to adjust the logistics of their struggle to a changing reality. In conclusion, the crucial question is, to what extent did suicide actions help Palestinian organisations further their goals? It is hard not to agree with the contention above, according to which Hamas-instigated suicide campaigns contributed to the acceleration of the Israeli withdrawal from cities in the West Bank at the time of the implementation of the Oslo Accords, something that perhaps indirectly served the interests of the Palestinian Authority.143 However, the major significance of suicide missions is in fact rooted in their cumulative influence. Although I do not have at my disposal the tools necessary to prove a causal relationship between the two, it nonetheless appears that since the intense suicide campaigns of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, there has been a genuine change among the attitudes of the Israeli public and elites regarding the question of whether or not to maintain control of the Palestinian territories. If the architects of the Oslo Accords hoped that the Israeli public would approve the relinquishing of Israeli control over Judea, Samaria and Gaza on the basis of a belief in a vision of peace and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians, well then, these particular hopes were now scattered to the winds. Throughout the whole period during which Israelis and Palestinians pressed ahead on their way to a peace agreement, the Jewish population in Israel remained divided in regard to the question of the withdrawal from the territories and the evacuation of settlements. This change in public opinion happened in fact during the years of the 76 Intifada. Israelis gradually reconciled themselves to the notion that in order to live a normal life in this country, there was no alternative but to disengage from the Palestinians. In plain words, suicide attacks had succeeded where a vision of peace had failed. These attacks had brought about a substantial increase in Israeli public support for withdrawal from the territories—but this was out of a sense of resignation and not from a feeling that it was possible for Israelis and Palestinians to peaceably coexist, at least not in the near future. Therefore, it can be inferred that both the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad—groups that from the very beginning objected to the Oslo Accords—had realised their goals. The Israeli public was fed up with the Accords and, at the same time, was willing to accept the idea of secession from the territories without a Palestinian commitment to peace or even an end to terror. The change in the Israeli public attitude was so dramatic that even Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, chief architect of the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, is now struggling in his efforts to promote a political plan based on an Israeli unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and evacuation of settlements in northern Samaria. At this juncture, it is necessary to verify if indeed there has been genuine progress for the Palestinian struggle in general. The answer is not so obvious for a number of reasons. First, in the short term, the erection of the separation fence and Israel’s renewed takeover of extensive territories belonging to the Palestinian Authority has made the lives of many Palestinians quite unbearable and also led to the point where there are serious doubts regarding the accomplishments of the armed struggle. Second, with respect to long-term consequences, in exchange for the disengagement from Gaza, Ariel Sharon has sought to shore up settlements deep in the territories of 77 Judea and Samaria, a fact that will significantly reduce the size of a Palestinian state and will create a situation where there are Palestinian enclaves surrounded by territories under Israeli control. The persistence of an Israeli military presence in Palestinian territories will make it difficult to improve the quality of life of the population in the area and will perpetuate the sources of conflict. The third point addresses the effect of the use of suicide bombers on the internal Palestinian state of affairs. During the course of the last years, there has gradually been growth in the popularity of the Islamic bloc. Representing about one-quarter of the Palestinian public, it has become a political power to reckon with. Concurrently, the Fatah’s status as a dominant force has steadily eroded. Once again, it will be hard to prove a causal effect of a violent struggle in general and the use of suicide bombers in particular on the change in the constellation of political power in the Palestinian theatre. However, an in-depth review of surveys conducted among Palestinians in the last decade indicates an affinity between the struggle of Islamic currents against Israel and the surge in public support for them. Conceivably, it would seem that, much like other political bodies, Islamic terrorist organisations, too, will seek to convert public support into political influence and will become a central actor in the institutional politics of the Palestinian state. Summary A comparison of the Hezbollah and Palestinian organisations in their use of suicide terrorism indicates that this strategy has had a considerable influence on political processes in the Middle East. An attempt to try and assess which one of the various organisations has benefited the most from the application of this method will place the Hezbollah at the top of the list. Not only has the organisation been able to realise its 78 strategic goals and bring about the withdrawal of various foreign forces from Lebanon, activating suicide terrorists has earned it great popularity and substantial influence on the Lebanon political scene and, at a later stage, on more extensive areas in the Middle East conflict. Despite no longer utilising suicide bombers after the strategy had more or less exhausted itself in southern Lebanon, the Hezbollah continues to “spread the news” on this subject throughout the world. Among the Palestinian organisations, the great winner from the use of this method was Hamas and the loser was the Fatah. Nonetheless, the Palestinian case is more complex than the Lebanon one. The Hamas was successful in significantly damaging the Oslo Accords process and tipping over the scales of Israeli public opinion in favour of support for the withdrawal from the lands of Judea, Samaria and Gaza during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. It forced Israel to be inclined to pull out of Palestinian territories that were not part of the peace agreements and without the Palestinians requiring to yield to any of its original demands. Moreover, the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have become significant political forces in the Palestinian political arena and they will have to be accounted for in any future situation that will include a division of political goods. At the same time, Israeli determination to wage war on suicide terrorism has landed a strong blow on the Hamas leadership, which had become a major objective of the policy of “targeted assassinations”. This has left the Hamas in the position of a strong popular movement seeking institutionalisation and aspiring to receive a slice of the authority over lands to be evacuated by Israel yet, at the same time, the backbone of its senior leadership has been eliminated. Grooming a new generation of leaders could take a long time. Furthermore, it was Israel’s effective foiling policy that forced the Hamas and Islamic Jihad to downgrade its 79 suicide bombing campaigns, rather than any other factor. A concluding word about Fatah; it is more apparent now that this organisation was drawn into the use of suicide bombing rather than actually being a spearheading model of it. In the case of Fatah, this tactic was not a vehicle used to promote strategic or political interests but rather a necessary means of political survival. In effect, the Fatah’s use of suicide terrorism during the time of the Al-Aqsa Intifada was the last nail in the coffin of the Oslo Accords—the same Accords the organisation had signed approximately one decade earlier. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of the accomplishments brought about by Palestinian suicide terrorism will be attributed in the future to the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad whereas the Fatah’s role in this context will probably be made light of. As for internal Palestinian politics, it is hard to suppose that the Fatah’s perpetration of suicide bombings was or will be the magic bullet that could help the organisational elite protect or revive their older, higher standing. Over the years, the image of the Palestinian Authority has gradually worn away in the Palestinian public eye due to leadership failures and corruption. If the public remains loyal to the movement, it will apparently be due more to the long-lasting commitment to this institution as the flag-bearer of Palestinian liberation rather than by dint of its activation of suicide bombers. 80 Chapter 4 – Turning to Suicide Terrorism – The LTTE and the PKK The decision to present the cases of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK – Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) immediately on the heels of the analyses of the Hezbollah and Palestinian organisations is not just a matter of coincidence. A study of the factors that led these organisations to launch and in some cases eventually terminate campaigns of suicide terrorism will be helpful in understanding whether the aspects relevant to explaining the phenomenon are universal or, on the other hand, particularistic and location-dependent. Moreover, the decision to make the LTTE from Sri Lanka and the PKK of Turkey the focus of this chapter is also not unintentional. The LTTE and the PKK are two organisations operating in countries quite remote from each other yet despite the geographical distance between them, they share many common features. Both of them became active in the 1970s and were raised on the tenets of a radical left-wing ideology. Both of them represented or aspired to represent large ethnic groups struggling to achieve independence and sovereignty in a given territory. Furthermore, both the PKK and the LTTE have consistently endeavoured to recruit support from the Diasporas of the ethnic group they sought to represent, principally from western Europe, but at the same time, they also applied mechanisms of control and oppression against that same ethnic group in the territory where they operated. These two organisations were also determined to gain international legitimacy for their causes but, at the same time, financed a great deal of their actions by criminal means, including smuggling drugs into different countries around the world. However, the most striking similarity between the LTTE and the PKK was the fact that both were headed by charismatic leaders who were responsible for the sect-like 81 features of their organisations. Above and beyond the commitment made by organisation members to a certain ideology or interest, their primary duty was to their leader. The leadership style of the commanders of the LTTE and the PKK, Vellupillai Prabhakaran and Abdullah Ocalan, respectively, was almost identical. Both did not tolerate resistance or disagreement and reacted very aggressively to any signs of challenge. They also were not lenient, to say the least, toward political personages outside the ranks of the organisation who did not fully agree with their policies. Finally, in both cases, these organisation leaders were the ones responsible for adopting the idea of suicide attacks, devising strategic guidelines for activating bombers, and they also served as the principal source of inspiration for the suicides themselves. Overall Strategy or a Specific Tactic? – Suicide Terrorism of the LTTE in Sri Lanka Before elaborating upon the factors that led the LTTE to resort to suicide terrorism, it seems appropriate to address the group’s instrumental-tactical orientation towards this method of operation. In regard to organisations discussed in the preceding chapter and those that will be presented later on, the decision to adopt suicide terrorism was in effect a quantum leap and once choosing this method, they placed it at the very forefront of their operations. In the case of the LTTE, on the other hand, it was evident that the use of suicide attackers was not a radical change in the organisation’s central strategy and it was perceived first and foremost as a highly useful tactic in situations where other methods seemed less effective. Many terrorist organisations in the world are known for their limited organisational and military capabilities. In such cases, suicide attacks may serve as a strategic tool 82 enabling them to upgrade their operational capacities, thus creating a “balance of terror” when up against powerful states (also known as asymmetrical warfare). In comparison to these groups, the LTTE is an exception. It is an example of a highly efficient guerrilla organisation, suggestive in its structure of a small army, principally specialising in sophisticated small-scale operations. In fact, its achievements using this mode of warfare did not fall far behind those of many armies.144 Even before adopting the suicide bombing method, LTTE commanders were not afraid of engaging in major confrontations with the Sri Lankan army in their efforts to gain control over areas considered to be of strategic significance. The decision to set up suicide squads was made by Prabhakaran after he carefully studied the many benefits of this method on the basis of the Hezbollah experience in Lebanon.145 However, he was also aware that it was necessary to adapt this mode of action to the particular requirements of his organisation. In contrast to Palestinian organisations, which regarded suicide terrorism as a means for attaining an effect of mass casualty terrorism with the intention of shocking Israeli society, Prabhakaran saw the potential benefits of this method specifically in carrying out targeted assassinations in situations where it was difficult or impossible to attack a certain public figure or group of people using other methods.146 The assassinations themselves, and not the element of suicide, were the strategic objective for the organisation; they could possibly be used as a vehicle for changing political reality in the country. A review of a chronology of the actions of the LTTE reveals that nearly one-quarter of the suicide attacks attributed to the organisation were assassinations of political figures. In other cases, suicide attacks were employed by the LTTE as an effective battering ram in order to pierce well-defended army installations otherwise 83 virtually impenetrable for the organisation’s guerrilla squads. In addition to the LTTE’s tactical use of suicide squads, the picture would be incomplete if the other advantages of this method were not mentioned. These benefits are particularly evident when the organisation was in a tight spot. In these cases, suicide attacks provided the LTTE with the ability to signal to the government in Colombo, as well as the Tamil population, that the organisation was not to be easily defeated. Even under heavy pressure, it was still very determined and in fact capable of inflicting considerable damage on the enemy.147 Suicide Terrorism as a Tool in the Tamil Minority’s Struggle for Independence The LTTE’s first suicide action took place on May 5, 1987. Captain Millar, who eventually was to become one of the most revered persons in the organisation, blew himself up inside a vehicle loaded with explosives in the centre of a Tamil university taken over by the army. The Hezbollah’s influences on Prabhakaran were highly manifest in this operation, which culminated in the deaths of 75 people. The trademark features of this operation were almost completely identical to those of the Hezbollah attack on the US Marine headquarters in Beirut.148 The assault on the university was the opening chord in a long line of suicide attacks perpetrated by the LTTE throughout most of the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium. Indeed, this was the only organisation where suicide attacks almost reached the numbers of those committed by Palestinian organisations Figure 4.1 around here Despite the many differences between the Palestinian and Tamil situations, there are still a number of similarities that may help shed light on the factors responsible for the extreme violence of these two conflicts. A comparison may also help explain why 84 both the Palestinian as well as the Tamil communities were so understanding and receptive towards the organisation’s deployment of suicides. In both cases, suicide terrorism emerged after years of the oppression of aspirations towards sovereignty in a given, contentious territory and a violent and protracted struggle that did not further the goals of these groups in the way they hoped it would. One of the key aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, like the Tamil-Sinhalese struggle, was the end of British rule over these divisive territories in 1948. A short while after the British began to cede control over Ceylon, the Sinhalese majority, which comprises about 74% of the country’s population, embarked on a process of ethnocratisation that gradually wore away the civil rights of the Tamil people.149 The exclusion process of the Tamils from political and public life in Ceylon persisted for several decades and reached its peak after the British cut off the last remaining strands of its control over the island in 1971.150 During the course of the 1970s, the political scene in the country continued to bubble and simmer and the tension between the two communities increased until it reached a violent boiling point in 1983. In July of that year, the LTTE carried out its first large- scale guerrilla operation. In a well-planned ambush, thirteen soldiers of the Sri Lankan army were killed in the Jaffna region, where there are large concentrations of Tamils.151 The reaction of the Sinhalese community was fierce and swift in coming. For the next seventy-two hours, Tamil-owned houses and businesses were pillaged, burned and destroyed. Tamil women were raped and 360 Tamil citizens were killed. Although the extent of the active part of the defence forces in these events is not exactly clear, testimonies from on-the-spot witnesses indicate that many army officers chose to turn a blind eye and did not prevent harm to innocent citizens. In the 85 following days, the riots continued to spread as bands of Tamils began to confront the rioters. In response, the government authorised the army to attack Tamil concentrations in Jaffna and quash the resistance. Ultimately, the Tamil United Liberation Front was banned and ousted from Parliament in Colombo. This step closed off the little political recourse left to the battered Tamil minority, which consequently had no means of promoting its interests by means of legitimate political action.152 Between the years 1983 and 1986, members of the LTTE intensified their attacks in the streets of Sri Lanka with the use of sophisticated guerrilla tactics. Prabhakaran’s goal was to keep the Tamil problem on the country’s political agenda and apply constant pressure in order to further the organisation’s demands for independence. In the beginning of 1986, while under continuous attack by the LTTE, the government yielded and began to engage in negotiations with the hope of reaching some kind of agreement. However, talks were not conducted with Tamil representatives but rather with Indian authorities. The aim of negotiations was to try and find a resolution that would provide a partial autonomy to the Tamils while receiving support and Indian guarantees for the agreements.153 Unfortunately, things took a turn for the worse. The explosion at a busy bus station in Colombo caused 113 fatalities, which prompted the government to mount a wide-scale military operation in the Jaffna area. Once again, Tamil residents of this region were hit very hard. The Indian government stepped up its efforts to put an end to this violent standoff and following a concentrated effort, an agreement (the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord) was signed between Sri Lanka and India in July, 1987. The Accord guaranteed partial rights to the Tamils while India pledged that it would provide assurances to the government in Colombo. At the same time, 86 there were also clauses protecting the interests of both countries.154 However, instead of advancing a compromise in this region, the Accord led to an escalation of tensions. Radical Sinhalese movements, which had reservations about the Indian role in Sri Lankan internal affairs, began to knuckle down and worked hard to torpedo the agreements, a fact that led once more to a worsening of relations between the two groups. Moreover, Prabhakaran and his people had doubts about the deployment of an Indian peacekeeping force in the Tamil areas of the country and so now, in addition to Sri Lankan soldiers, Indian soldiers also became a target for hostilities. At this stage, LTTE guerrilla attacks—always marked by great daring and sophistication—were complemented in the months after the signing of the agreements by a systematic use of suicide attacks. In many cases, suicide bombers functioned as force multipliers that compounded the destructive effect of the actions.155 Similar to the Lebanese case, the intense and protracted assaults on peacekeeping forces had a coercive effect on the Indian government. In March 1990, India withdrew its forces from the country and the president of Sri Lanka, Premadasa, announced his readiness to engage in negotiations with representatives of the Tamil factions. Three months later, the talks ran aground, which once again led to an escalation of the situation in the country. Members of the LTTE exploited the new conditions and took forcible control of the Jaffna region in what was termed Elam War II. The anticipated and severe response of the Sri Lankan army to the takeover of Jaffna, like the events of 1983, including the rape of women and the “disappearance” of many men, served well the interests of the LTTE. Support for the organisation swelled and with it the reserves of potential recruits.156 In the year 1991, there was once again an upsurge in LTTE actions. The organisation 87 mounted a wide-ranging campaign including a wave of suicide attacks that reached its climax in 1994. As noted before, one of the main features of LTTE violent operations was to use suicide bombers in the assassination of prominent political figures with the aim of changing the region’s political reality. In May, 1991, a woman suicide bomber from the organisation took the life of the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Ghandi, together with her own, as she blew herself up during one of his election rallies. About two years later, it was the president of Sri Lanka, Premadasa, who was killed by a suicide assassin. The assassin had become a member of the president’s house maintenance staff and detonated himself at the president’s side on the way to a press conference. Another elimination which took place in October, 1994, had a decisive influence on the country’s political system. This time, the target was Gamini Dissanayake, the presidential candidate on behalf of the Sinhalese United National Party. In addition to Dissanayake, fifty of the Party’s directorate were killed and, in effect, the entire leadership sector of the party was wiped out. In the wake of this mass killing, the People’s Alliance Party, headed by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, took over the government helm in Colombo. The new government adopted a mixed approach in relation to the Tamil issue. On one hand, there were attempts at making contact with representatives of moderate Tamil organisations and, on the other, the LTTE was politically excluded. Militarily, the pursuit of organisation operatives continued. In April, 1994, one of the first manifestations of this approach was the massive air force bombardment of LTTE bases located in the Atikaula region of the island. Not long after this, in July 1995, the government of Sri Lanka submitted a proposal that put forward a political compromise to Tamil representatives. The crux of the proposal was the idea of 88 establishing a federal republic consisting of eight autonomous districts, each with limited independence and all subordinate to the central government. The LTTE outright rejected the offer, compelling the entire Tamil population to decline it as well. The government’s response to the LTTE’s position was not long in coming. The army launched an extensive operation aimed at weakening the organisation’s muscle and ability to force its attitudes on the Tamil population. In an operation termed, “Riviresa”, which began on December 3, 1995, Sri Lankan military forces were able to restore control of Jaffna to the government. Encouraged by their success, the forces continued to apply considerable military pressure on the LTTE so that its fighters retreated into the jungle regions. The second Riviresa operation got underway only a brief time later with the aim of overpowering the organisation and bringing about its collapse. For a short while, it appeared that the government was about to accomplish its goals. However, the LTTE was able to recoup forces and wage battle yet again. This turn of events led the army in 1997 to set out on operation Riviresa number three. The outcome of this operation was already less promising for the government of Sri Lanka. Members of the LTTE had taken advantage of the interim period between operations to rebuild the organisation’s military infrastructures and subsequently retaliated against the third operation with the most severe campaign of suicide attacks since the commencement of operations.157 In this particular case, suicide operatives were exploited by the organisation as a balancing factor in view of the other advantages held by the Sri Lankan army at that time and were able to inflict great harm to the larger opponent. In the beginning of 1999, following another period of reorganisation, LTTE forces 89 launched their own extensive military campaign which included the incorporation of suicide attacks. Their goal was the attrition of Sri Lankan military gains in the past four years with the ultimate objective being the reconquest of Jaffna. The fighting continued for three months and Prabhakaran’s people made substantial gains. The most crucial was the takeover of Elephant Path, a road of major strategic significance because it connects Jaffna with the rest of Sri Lanka. The LTTE sought to make the most of this advancement in order to build up momentum for continuing their attack, however, their progress towards the takeover of Jaffna was slower than they anticipated. Disillusioned with their inability to realise the goal they had set for themselves, the LTTE submitted, at the beginning of May, an official ceasefire proposal to the Sri Lankan government. In exchange for a cessation of hostilities in the region, Prabhakaran and his people called for the withdrawal of army forces from Jaffna. The government, which sensed the organisation’s distress, rejected the proposal and violence in the region resumed. The conflict reached one of its low points in December 1999 when, during an election rally, a suicide terrorist blew herself up right next to President Kumaratunga and injured her in the eye. As before, the goal of the LTTE was to alter the political status quo by means of a campaign of assassinations in the attempt to bring about a replacement of the country’s leadership. The depiction above supports the assumption that the LTTE’s use of suicide attackers was highly sophisticated. The organisation marked off goals whose aim was to further the interests of the Tamil population as perceived by the organisation leadership. For a great part of the operations, suicide actions were a tactical device designed to bring about strategic changes. In other words, they made it feasible for the LTTE to cause 90 serious damage to the country’s political leadership and in this fashion reshuffle the political deck of cards in the hope that this change would serve the organisation’s goals. In other cases, suicide missions were an effective tool for attacking security forces when other organisational methods proved to be less effective. From the events described above, it appears that the importance of suicide attacks for the LTTE leadership progressively increased in circumstances where the organisation suffered from military inferiority and was in need of military gains in order to renew a balance of deterrence. At this point, it seems appropriate to ask the question that was relevant to the Hezbollah and Palestinian campaigns: Did suicide assaults have a role in the organisation’s attempt to muster the support of the population it sought to represent as well as in its competition with other Tamil groups? Suicide Terrorism and the Tamil Political Arena A study of developments in the Tamil theatre during the years when the LTTE made use of suicide terrorism confirms that deploying suicide bombers for this organisation had less significance than in the Palestinian and Lebanese cases. This reinforces the assumption presented before. Initiating suicide attacks was regarded by Prabhakaran as a case-specific tactic more than an overall strategy; he did not seem to be making a consistent attempt to utilise suicide terrorism as a vehicle for achieving political gains in the internal affairs of the country. The reason for avoiding the use of suicide terrorism as domestic political propaganda is not because the LTTE lacked rivals in the Tamil political arena. In fact, the opposite is true. Over the course of time, dozens of organisations emerged on the scene, some of them violent while others elected to keep their actions within the limits of the law. All these organisations sought to gain the confidence of the Tamil minority and 91 represent its interests. However, the reason why the LTTE did not require suicide terrorism in order to glorify its reputation was much simpler. Over the years, the organisation systematically and violently eliminated the majority of competing organisations until it was left almost completely on its own. To elaborate, in the 1970s, the Tamil National Tigers—the group which eventually was to become the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam—was only one in a long list of political organisations in the volatile Tamil political arena. Even during its beginnings, this group turned out to be much more militant in comparison to the others. It started out as part of the Tamil United Front, but withdrew in the year 1978 due to ideological disputes. The source of these disputes was related to the Tigers’ call for more forcible measures in the struggle for Tamil independence and its marked dissatisfaction with the actions of veteran organisations.158 The hostility displayed towards other Tamil organisations by the LTTE did not just amount to a lack of cooperation. Unlike Palestinian organisations which, despite considerable differences among them, attempted to maintain over the years—at least on the face of it—a certain degree of cooperation and worked together to prevent the breakout of civil war, the Tigers opted to deal with rival Tamil organisations in aggressive ways. Signs of this were already evident in the organisation’s early years. In contrast to what would be expected from a guerrilla or a terrorist organisation whose goals were national liberation, the first violent actions initiated by the Tigers were not aimed at army forces or Sinhalese politicians but rather at moderate politicians and Tamil civilians in Jaffna suspected of collaborating with the government.159 Throughout the 1980s, this tendency grew. In those years, many organisations, both 92 nationalist and local, continued to operate in the Tamil arena. The Tigers, who had maintained their status as the most extreme Tamil organisation and increased their numbers in the wake of the 1983 events, mounted a campaign about two years later to remove these organisations. Following Prabhakaran’s orders and applying brutal force, his people systematically liquidated leaders and sometimes activists of other organisations. On several occasions, the targets of these eliminations included LTTE ex-allies who were regarded as a threatening factor.160 Things reached such a point that in May 1986, the Tigers carried out a full-scale massacre of members of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation and their leader Sri Sabaratnam.161 The elimination campaign at the time was so aggressive that associations such as the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam, which had already lost most of its combat potential and was quite subservient in any case, continued to be a target for Prabhakaran devotees, who sought to bring about the complete immobilisation of some of these groups.162 In the years subsequent to the Tigers’ systematic campaign of terror against rival groups, they remained the single most dominant organisation in the Tamil arena. Therefore, the idea that as a political organisation, the Tigers employed the suicide method in order to gain public sympathy in its contest with rival groups—a factor which, in the Palestinian case, was highly germane—is basically of no consequence in this case. The LTTE simply did not allow any other organisation to be of relevance, let alone be in direct competition with them. It is also difficult to prove that suicide terrorism was committed in order to gain Tamil public approval. It is hard to make an unequivocal connection between suicide terrorism and increases in organisation public approval ratings in the beginning of the 93 1980s. As mentioned earlier, in contrast to other cases, where the introduction of suicide tactics often indicated a new stage in the battle waged by the particular organisation, for the Tigers this method was just one link in a chain of an assortment of warfare tactics employed by the organisation over the years. Therefore, it would be a very difficult task to isolate the effects of suicides from other conflict-related events, especially the aggressive actions of the army and Sinhalese groups which often were enough to propel the Tamil population into the arms of the LTTE. In general, two principal types of affinities evolved between the LTTE and the Tamil community: voluntary mobilisation and coercion. The mobilisation of public support was often facilitated by the harsh attitude of the government in Colombo towards the Tamil minority. For example, while the number of LTTE members in 1983 was around six hundred, a short while after the large-scale operation against the Tamils, these numbers increased into the tens of thousands.163 Persistence of the government’s iron-fisted policy toward the Tamils played into the hands of the LTTE in another aspect. During the 1970s and especially during the 1980s, support for the organisation spread to the Tamil populace all over Sri Lanka as well as to Tamils abroad. Support from the diaspora was important for the Tigers because it formed a strong base for recruiting a significant part of the organisation’s resources.164 Another opportunity for marshalling Tamil support took place in September 1990 when the LTTE took over the Jaffna region. When the government retaliated with severe military measures, rioting broke out among the Tamil population. These events not only led to a broadening of support for the Tigers, they also inspired scores of men, women and even youths of both sexes, to want to join organisation ranks and engage in combat against army forces.165 The Tigers knew how to take advantage of 94 these circumstances and enlisted many of these volunteers for military action including, not surprisingly, suicide missions. Many recruits to the Tigers organisation at that time were young, below the age of eighteen. Frequently, elements of coercion and intimidation were applied by the LTTE when picking potentials from among the Tamil population. Taking on children for military operations would often elicit the dismay of parents who expressed their reservations to organisation representatives regarding the use of children in the battlefield. But as far as the LTTE were concerned, acknowledging these attitudes or even negotiating with local representatives on the question of the children was not up for debate. Organisation operatives simply demanded from each family that at least one of their children join the ranks of the warriors. If refused, children were snatched from the streets or even taken from schools. The Tamil population’s reverence for—as well as fear of—the Tigers was demonstrated in Mia Bloom’s attempt to conduct a public survey among the Tamil population. Already before the survey was attempted, many of the potential subjects expressed their reluctance to participate, fearing for their well-being. They agreed to answer survey questions only after receiving explicit permission from LTTE operatives. Survey findings well reflected the feelings of admiration accompanied by trepidation. In the first place, approval for the LTTE was very high. Respondents even expressed reservations about the founding of other Tamil organisations that might turn out to be competition for the LTTE. In the second place, all of the LTTE’s methods of operation, including activation of suicides, garnered high rates of support. Survey participants did not find any ethical problem in the commitment of suicide attacks against military targets. In fact, the opposite was true. They saw this as a fully 95 legitimate method of operation with the potential of forcing authorities into solving the Tamil problem on the negotiations table.166 At the same time, using suicide attackers against civilian targets received significantly lower rates of support. This fact corresponded with the LTTE’s official position, which consistently expressed reservations regarding the use of this method against civilians and denied any responsibility for actions that were aimed at civilian targets.167 Factors Leading to the LTTE’s Suspension of Suicide Attacks The question, at this juncture, is what brought about the dramatic decrease in LTTE- instigated suicide attacks subsequent to the year 2000? The question is especially relevant in view of the fact that this operational method rendered the organisation such good service over the years. The answer can be found in changes that took place in three frameworks that were of critical importance for the LTTE. These were the struggle with the government, the international context and the internal Tamil arena. With respect to the struggle against the government in Colombo, it appeared that discontinuing the use of suicides was, to a great degree, in direct consequence to a conclusion reached by the organisation leadership; specifically, that the benefits of this tactic had been exploited to the full, at least for the time being. Furthermore, it seemed that both the authorities in Colombo as well as the LTTE had reached a state of sobering fatigue due to protracted and mutual attrition. As a result, following years of violent confrontation, both sides exhibited considerable flexibility at the negotiation tables. The LTTE shelved their demands for independence in exchange for a Tamil autonomy in a federal system. The government, on the other side, was forthcoming in its very willingness to negotiate with LTTE representatives and by regarding them as formal representatives of the Tamil minority.168 96 Another explanation, and one no less important, for suspending the use of suicides, is related to the changes that occurred in the international arena. According to Puleedevan, one of the organisation’s spokespeople, the events of September 11, 2001, transformed suicide attacks into a method of operation that was subject to widespread condemnation by the international community. The LTTE, which throughout the years was fairly concerned about its image in the international arena, was not interested in being put in the same category as organisations such as Al- Qaeda.169 In terms of Tamil internal politics, the ongoing violence that characterised the LTTE’s struggle, including the use of suicide actions, made it increasingly difficult for the population and not only because of pressure applied by the army. At a certain stage, in the late 1990s, when insurmountable obstacles began to appear in recruiting funds for the organisation’s activities from the Tamil diaspora in North America, Australia and Africa, the LTTE shifted the focus of its money-raising efforts to Sri Lanka. The consequence of this step was the considerable financial exhaustion of the Tamil population whose economic situation was unsatisfactory even prior to the LTTE’s fresh appeals. As a result, the organisation began to be concerned that if it was to increase pressure on the local population, support for the organisation and its operational methods would gradually decrease and, by the same token, there would be a greater disposition to a resolution of the Tamil problem on the negotiation tables.170 In conclusion, while the factors that led the LTTE to engage in violent struggle have a resemblance to the Palestinian case, the reasons for incorporating the suicide method were considerably different. In respect to the battle with the government and army, suicide terrorism for the LTTE was just one tactical weapon among several others that 97 were employed during the course of the conflict. The effectiveness of the suicide method was foremost apparent in assassination operations aimed at undermining the political system and in penetrating fortified military installations in order to create a balance of terror and prove to the army the organisation’s imposing capabilities. Using suicide bombers as a vehicle designed to influence public opinion and in this way put pressure on policymakers did not seem of central importance for the organisation. Also, in regard to the country’s internal political affairs, the use of the suicide method by the LTTE differs, to a certain extent, from the circumstances of organisations described earlier. It would indeed be hard to argue with the fact that the determination associated with the organisation’s readiness to send its members on certain-death missions helped it win the sympathy of certain parts of the population. Nevertheless, there seemed to be no intentional use of suicide terrorism as a tool for mobilising political support, let alone as a factor in the competition with other Tamil organisations. Suicide Terrorism as a Means of Organisational Survival – The PKK in Turkey It is hard not to be struck by the many similarities between the LTTE and the PKK. All the same, these are not identical organisations. In fact, the differences between them seem to be the main reason why the LTTE was successful in advancing a significant number of its goals and was able to survive while the PKK failed to last and eventually folded. The Kurdistan Worker’s Party was established on November 27, 1978, and was one out of a number of radical left-wing organisations that emerged in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s. However, in contrast to other organisations which sought at the time to promote different strains of a communist worldview, Abdullah Ocalan, the organisation’s founder, regarded the integration of a Marxist revolution 98 with the Kurds’ struggle for independence as a central objective. The PKK’s involvement in violent action against Turkey began only six years after the organisation’s formal institution. Ocalan, who received substantial assistance from the Syrian authorities, took advantage of this interim period to create an organisational infrastructure for guerrilla actions and to train groups of fighters.171 Similar to all the organisations discussed in the cases above, the PKK’s decision to opt for suicide terrorism was eventually made only after long years of involvement in a wide diversity of guerrilla operations and other types of terrorism. Before going into the factors that led the PKK to adopt suicide terrorism, a certain critical question, long associated with the organisation, should be asked. Researchers who have followed the PKK during the course of its operation are divided in their opinion regarding the question of the organisation’s objectives. Was the Kurdish ethno-national interest in fact so close to Ocalan’s heart as it appeared in his messages, or were most of his gestures made with the aim of promoting a Marxist revolutionary ideology?172 Halfway through the 1980s, a short while after deciding to take the path of violence, the PKK formed two military organisations. The first one was ERNK (Kurdistan National Liberation Front) and was established in 1984.173 As already evident in the group’s sporadic acts of terrorism, it is possible to provide a partial answer for this question and at the same time learn about one of the PKK’s most crucial problems over the years—the organisation’s only partial ability to convince the Kurdish population about the sincerity of its intentions in respect to the promotion of its interests and, in consequence, the difficulties it has always had in drumming up support for its cause.174 The minor effectiveness of the ERNK’s activities in terms of 99 the struggle against Turkey and the indifference with which the organisation was received among Kurds mainly in the urban centres led Ocalan to institute the ARGK (Kurdish Popular Liberation Army) in 1986. Somewhat wiser from his bitter experience, this time Ocalan sought to assemble Kurds into guerrilla units that would form a people’s army and in this fashion gain the support of the Kurdish population.175 However, the organisation’s actions to a large extent gave lie to its goals. Over the years, the ARGK was responsible for the deaths of more than ten thousand people, most of them Kurds. The systematic and grave injury sustained by precisely the same population which the organisation claimed to represent was justified by the organisation as efforts to demonstrate to the Kurdish public its ominous power and deter it from collaborating with the Turkish authorities. In general, it appeared that despite its declared intention to represent the Kurds, the PKK did not pass over any opportunity to threaten and alienate them from the organisation. Even when it was necessary to recruit new fighters to their ranks, the PKK preferred in many cases to either abduct young Kurds from their houses or depend on the recruiting abilities of the organisation’s envoys in Kurdish centres in western Europe—where the PKK had more success—rather than directly approach Kurds in southeast Turkey in the effort to gain their confidence.176 The sporadic attempts to nevertheless muster support among the Kurds were quite crude. For example, in the mid-1990s, Ocalan who, throughout the years championed a Marxist worldview tried, ironically, to link up with the Islamic Welfare Party. His purpose was to capture the hearts of those Kurds known for their tendency to exhibit sympathy for Islam-affiliated organisations.177 100 Popular Support, Member Morale or Strategic Interest? The PKK’s Opting for Suicide Terrorism The PKK launched its campaign of suicide terrorism in June, 1996, and suspended it in August, 1999. Unlike other organisations where the decision to dispatch suicides was reached by the higher ranks of leadership, in the case of the PKK, the subject was, at least formally, debated and eventually authorised by representatives who participated in the organisation’s congress.178 And yet, in comparison to the LTTE, the number of suicide operations was quite trifling. While the LTTE conducted more than 170 suicide actions during the course of its five campaigns between the years 1983 and 2003, the number of PKK-activated suicides between the years 1996 and 1999 added up to no more than fifteen operations that reached their target and seven that failed. All these attacks were part of one major campaign, which peaked in 1999 following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya. The key question that I will try to answer in the following paragraphs is what were the factors that led the organisation to opt for suicide terrorism at the time? Figure 4.2 around here As noted above, prior to the first suicide attack, it was possible to describe the PKK as an organisation whose direction was ambiguous. On one hand, it wished to be an authentic representative of Kurdish national aspirations and, on the other, the tough attitude displayed towards this population over the years and the considerable ideological gap between the organisation leadership and majority of Kurds did not exactly help the former to win the latter’s confidence. The very decision to use suicide terrorism—until then, identified in the Middle East with religious Islamic organisations—can be interpreted as an attempt by Ocalan and his people to signal to 101 the Kurdish population that their organisation was not significantly different from those same religious organisations that had gained the support of the Kurdish population. Another possible explanation why the PKK chose the path of suicide terrorism is related to the low morale of the organisation rank and file due to the tough obstacles encountered in its attempts to advance its goals.179 Dispatching suicides injected new blood into the organisation’s veins and raised, if only for a short time, the morale among its members. Yet, the pivotal factor which led the organisation to set out on a campaign of suicide terrorism was strategic. From 1992 on, the Turkish army launched a salvo of hard and consecutive blows at the PKK.180 In March, 1995, large army forces set out on “Operation Steel”. About thirty-five thousand soldiers accompanied by air and artillery support crossed the Iraqi border and began to operate in the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq with the aim of halting PKK operations and establishing stability along the border.181 After seven weeks of intensive military action, the authorities in Ankara announced that they had attained their goals and had decided to draw back most of their forces to Turkey. Army sources claimed that they had killed 555 PKK fighters and had seriously damaged the organisations’ assorted infrastructures.182 The first suicide operation initiated by the PKK took place not long after these attacks on the organisations’ strongholds. A female suicide terrorist, who was hiding the explosive device under her clothes, killed nine soldiers who were marching in a military parade in the city of Tunceli.183 This incident signalled to Ankara that despite the widespread army operations that had seriously damaged the organisation’s military capabilities, they still possessed ways of inflicting severe damage on the Turkish “home front”. 102 In May, 1997, the Turkish army crossed its border into Iraq once again. This time, the extent of the military operation was downgraded. About ten thousand troops, accompanied by tanks, artillery and air support, penetrated Kurdish enclaves with the intention of striking at PKK bases. Despite the smaller forces, reports from news agencies stated that 1300 PKK fighters were killed and two hundred more were captured. The pressure on the PKK was so intense that Ocalan was forced to approach the Turkish authorities in an appeal for ceasefire. His petition was emphatically rejected.184 In the period following the operation, the organisation’s activities were almost completely neutralised aside from one aspect, that is, the dispatching of suicides.185 It is possible to assume that the PKK’s ensuing and obvious strategic inferiority was a significant factor in Ocalan’s decision to appreciably increase the number of suicide operations. In the absence of other effective devices and in view of Ankara’s refusal to arrive at some compromise with the organisation, Ocalan was trying to show authorities that even in a state of battlefield inferiority, the organisation still had the capability of striking back at strategic targets in the heart of Turkey. Ocalan’s message was clearly understood by Ankara. The Turkish government at the time was acutely aware of the fact that PKK suicide operations in the country’s tourist centres could lead to serious economic losses.186 Still, the PKK was not successful in its attempt to force the government to concede to its demands and not to let up in its iron-fisted efforts to stamp out the organisation’s suicide terrorism campaign. The Role of Turkish Policy in Thwarting Further PKK Suicide Actions For countries that are struggling with similar types of terrorism warfare, many lessons can be learnt from Turkey’s battle against the PKK. Unlike the cases reviewed above and those which will be discussed below, Turkey was able to suppress the PKK 103 suicide campaign and overpower the organisation before it could benefit from the advantages inherent to this method of operation. Nevertheless, Turkish policy also demonstrates that success in such a struggle is often accompanied by heavy losses and it is questionable whether many democratic countries—particularly those where human rights are an essential foundation—could afford to pay this price. One of the main elements responsible for thrusting Turkey into an uncompromising struggle with the PKK was the Turkish army, which traditionally had served as a significant force in the country’s political system. While political echelons found it difficult to assess the degree of the organisation’s threat to the Turkish polity and therefore were also hesitant in their selection of tools to fight against it, as far as the army was concerned, there were no doubts. The PKK was considered a genuine threat and higher-ranking army officers applied heavy pressure on the political system to persuade them to invest greater resources in the fight against the organisation. In effect, the army assumed the role of spearhead and leading light in this battle. Its forces tenaciously laboured against PKK contingents in southeast Turkey and did not hesitate to invade Kurdish enclaves in northern Iraq when the higher echelons found this necessary.187 It would be erroneous to maintain that army leaders purposely endeavoured to harm those sectors of the Kurdish population uninvolved in organisation activities. Their principal goal was, for the most part, to harm the PKK in such a critical way that its military operational capabilities would be neutralised. However, in situations where Ocalan’s fighters operated from within Kurdish villages, army units did not think twice about entering these villages and engaging in actions that were in serious violation of human rights.188 In principle, political factors in Ankara accepted the army’s position, according to 104 which it was necessary to put a stop to the organisation’s activities. At the same time, they tried to prevent a situation in which the general Kurdish public would be severely harmed because this was also liable to drive the latter straight into the arms of the PKK. Therefore, they adopted a policy of “divide and rule” with the aim of driving a wedge between the organisation and its potential “constituency”. One of the first steps taken by Ankara was to acknowledge the Kurdish minority’s cultural uniqueness. Although an initial and small step, it should be emphasised that this was a significant change in the policy of Turkey, which for many long years had obstinately refused to recognise Kurdish claims and made it particularly difficult for them to engage in political action.189 The divide and rule policy lasted throughout the years of armed conflict between Turkey and the PKK. It relied on a number of measures and among them there was an attempt to shore up Kurdish groups that opposed the PKK. In addition, governmental financial assistance was awarded to Kurdish regions in southeast Turkey suffering from serious economic destitution. At the same time, Kurdish political elements considered to be militant were excluded both from the political system and public life. Finally, the army received political cover for persisting in its struggle against the PKK. The army’s actions were also distinguished by features of this same two-pronged policy. On one hand, aggressive operations were mounted against PKK strongholds which led to serious casualties among residents in that area. On the other hand, the army’s generals indicated to residents that they had no intention of harming them and that one of their main goals was actually to protect them from the organisation itself. In light of the difficult history of relations between the PKK and many of the Kurds in 105 the area, it comes as no surprise that many residents chose to cluster in villages that the army constructed for them. The military and financial support provided to residents of these villages allowed them to cope with PKK attacks in a better way. As for the army, in return, it used these villages as frontline outposts in Kurdish regions. In this fashion, it was able to increase its intelligence-gathering abilities and also could be ready to attack at much shorter notice when urgent operations against the organisation were necessary. The uncompromising military pressure on the PKK and the state’s success in winning over a considerable part of Kurdish public opinion ultimately led to Ocalan’s flight, together with some of his associates, to Syria and Lebanon. However, the Turkish authorities did not relent at this stage. Ankara applied considerable diplomatic pressure on Syria and this eventually led to the deportation of the PKK followers from the region.190 Ocalan was now continuously on the run, unable to find a place where the long arm of the Turkish security authorities could not reach him. During the course of his flight, he even made his way to Kenya where, due primarily to the newly enhanced intelligence capabilities of the Turkish security services, he was finally caught. The ramifications of Ocalan’s capture and his prosecution are very interesting, especially when compared to Israel’s policy of assassinating Palestinian organisation leaders responsible for dispatching suicide attackers. It seems that the Israeli policy of targeting leaders leads to a short-term confusion among organisations and some degree of erosion in their operational capabilities but ultimately does not unsettle their motivation to continue to dispatch suicides. In Ocalan’s case, on the other hand, his apprehension brought to an intensification of the suicide attacks in the short run, yet 106 the events that followed brought to a halt of the attacks and later to the virtual dissolution of the PKK.191 During the course of Ocalan’s trial, and perhaps due to the intense pressure he was under, he denied responsibility for the suicide attacks and expressed reservations regarding fundamental premises of the PKK’s ideology. The death sentence served to Ocalan on June 26 1999, more or less put the last nail in the coffin with respect to the activities of the PKK.192 It is difficult to speculate what exactly were the reasons that led Ocalan to implore his people to cease their aggressions and focus only on defensive actions,193 but it is reasonable to assume that a major reason was the condition that, in exchange for the cessation of PKK’s violent actions, his death sentence would be commuted to imprisonment. Ocalan’s dominant status in the organisation led to the almost unreserved compliance of his people. The threat of dispatching suicide bombers was removed and other planned violent actions were also discontinued. However, this was not the last of his capitulations. Ocalan’s call also obliged the PKK leadership to abolish the Free Women’s Union of Kurdistan (Yekitiya Azadiya Jinen Kurdistan – YAJK), which had served as the principal military arm of the organisation for mounting suicide actions. This act essentially wrapped up the last chapter in the organisation’s history.194 Furthermore, in the PKK congress that was held in the year 2000, the organisation revised its ideology and announced that it was relinquishing its ambition of establishing a socialist Kurdish state. In conclusion, from the early years of its founding, the PKK could be identified as an organisation whose goals were not entirely unambiguous, a fact that at times encumbered its operations. The fact of Ocalan’s leadership might have been 107 indisputable among the organisation’s rank and file, but not among different segments of the Kurdish people, who were ideologically more remote from the organisation and were more likely to suffer from its strong-arm tactics. Under these circumstances, the PKK was left with a relatively narrow backbone of support, especially in the rural areas. This fact also made it easier for the government of Turkey to prise open the existing fissure between Ocalan and his followers on one hand and the Kurdish people on the other, and then isolate the organisation and strike at it. The group’s decision to incorporate suicide attacks as a feature of its terrorist tactics was evidently an attempt to preserve some kind of element of deterrence in view of the unrelenting pressure from the Turkish army. However, Ocalan failed to read correctly the Turkish determination to clamp down categorically on his group’s activities and therefore it is difficult to point out any genuine achievements that this sole suicide campaign actually brought him. The most important lesson to be drawn from the case study of the PKK is the fact that, under certain conditions, a resolute counter policy applied by a government contending with suicide terrorism may actually bring an end to the phenomenon. Summary Despite the many similarities between the LTTE and the PKK, it is in fact the distinctions between the two that shed light on the circumstances leading these organisations to commence and eventually cease in carrying out suicide attacks. As shown above, the LTTE regarded this method as more a specific tactic than an overall strategy. Having said that, in a number of episodes, both organisations committed suicide attacks in situations where they felt powerless or were pushed into a corner, most often as a result of protracted military pressure. Dispatching suicide bombers 108 under these conditions was meant to demonstrate to the state and army that these insurgent groups were not to be suppressed. These organisations were in fact signalling that they still had the capacity to cause substantial harm to sensitive targets on the “home front” of the other, dominant side, while also trying to dissuade authorities from bringing the standoff to a critical, decisive point. The very fact that the LTTE was able to survive and even accomplish several goals (to a great extent, on account of suicide terrorist campaigns) whereas the PKK failed in its endeavours and was eventually overpowered, is largely rooted in the circumstances where, despite the intricate relations between the LTTE and the Tamil public, the LTTE was able to create for itself significant bases of support among a population that believed the organisation was completely committed to its interests. Therefore, the hard-hitting attacks of the Sri Lankan army only fuelled support for the organisation among major segments of the Tamil people and enabled it, time and time again, to recover and recommence its operations. In the case of the PKK, the reality was exactly the opposite. The organisation was ideologically remote from the large segments of the public it sought to represent. It had abused the Kurds in one way or another over the years so that, ultimately, it became hard for it to mobilise vast popular support. For that reason, being subject to formidable offensives on behalf of the Turkish army did not endear the organisation to the locals nor help it draw support from them in order to recoup for counterattack. Unlike Prabhakaran, Ocalan was forced to flee for his life to another country. Even after he was captured and prosecuted, his organisation did not have the strength to force the Turkish authorities to release him nor commute his sentence and therefore Ocalan was obliged to instruct his people to end all hostilities and, in effect, cease from any and all activities. 109 Chapter 5 – The Transition to Suicide Terrorism: Al-Qaeda and the Network of the Islamic Fundamentalist Groups One of the main reasons for the recent growth of academic interest in suicide terrorism has been the actions of Al-Qaeda and in particular the September 11th, 2001, suicide attack on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington. Before investigating the reasons which led Al-Qaeda to launch their campaign of suicide terrorism, two important matters should be clarified about this organisation. First, despite the ostentatious nature of Al-Qaeda suicide operations, in comparison to organisations discussed previously, Bin Laden and his group have in effect made little use of suicide terrorists. Second, many acts of terrorism, including suicide attacks which have taken place in the last few years all over the world, have been credited to Al-Qaeda. Although there may be a fair degree of truth in some of these allegations, there is probably at the same time an equal amount of fallacy. The meaning of the word Al-Qaeda in Arabic is “the base” and this name is already indication of its nature. Al-Qaeda is an umbrella organisation which involves, with various degrees of affinity, affiliated terrorist groups in more than forty-five countries in the world, including Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Indonesia as well as many other countries in the Middle East, Asia and Europe. Many of these groups consider Bin Laden and his organisation a prime example and model for simulation and in fact tend to gather under the banner of a jihad rhetoric against the West. At the same time, it should not be presumed that the reasons for dispatching suicide bombers by one organisation will necessarily be relevant to the others. In fact, Al-Qaeda is not a “unitary actor” and to approach it in this fashion would hamper our efforts in elucidating the factors that led its numerous affiliates to undertake suicide 110 campaigns throughout the world. The critical questions at this point are what are the goals of the Al-Qaeda organisation? Why has Bin Laden adopted the method of suicide terrorism? And what are the reasons that led organisations associated with Al-Qaeda to initiate suicide attacks following the events of September 11th and the American invasion of Afghanistan? The task of finding answers to these questions is not an easy one so that, understandably, it is often a source of impassioned dispute among scholars involved in the study of this organisation.195 The Strategy of Ostentatious Suicide Terrorism – The Al-Qaeda Organisation The stated goal of Bin Laden and his adherents, according to a religious ruling (“fatwa”) made public by the organisation in August, 1996, and February, 1998, was the Muslim duty to engage in a worldwide, violent and uncompromising struggle in defence of the holy places and sanctity of Islam. In this ruling, Bin Laden determined that Moslems must avow that Allah will be the only god of their worship and, given the above, a violent “war to the end” must be fought against all infidels. He also lamented over the heretic takeover of Arabic wealth in the Arab peninsula and regarded this as part of a sweeping global assault on all of Islam. In conclusion, Bin Laden stressed in this ruling the necessity of joining in battle, especially against the Americans and their allies, and further declared that they must be killed without discriminating between civilians and soldiers.196 These goals are not surprising, given the fact that Al-Qaeda’s ideology is based on the Salafi interpretation of Wahhabsism.197 This is a Revivalist school which promotes violent rebellion against secular regimes in the Muslim world, and the establishment of States which follow the laws of Islam.198 As maintained in a more elaborate version of Bin Laden’s ruling, Al- 111 Qaeda aspires to transform the Western world into a part of the Islamic caliphate. In the view put forward by organisation ideologues, the world can be divided into two: Dar al-Islam (the house or domain of Islam)—the lands where Islamic reign already exists, and Dar al-Harb—the domain or lands controlled by infidels which must be liberated by “virtue of the sword”. Terrorism is the modern-day sword brandished by members of the organisation.199 Nevertheless, a quick glance at Bin Laden’s personal history will suffice in order to cast doubt on the assumption that the central motive for the organisation’s terrorism is the decision to set out on a holy war meant to overthrow the West. In essence, Al- Qaeda’s ideological roots are embedded in the radical Sunni (Wahhabi) Islamic perspective, according to which the worship of any god other than Allah is blasphemous and anyone who believes in a god other than Allah deserves to die.200 It is therefore imperative upon Moslems to engage in armed struggle (Jihad) against the enemies of Islam and anyone who is not a believer in Allah’s singularity.201 However, Bin Laden fought for goals that were far more concrete. In the late 1970s, the nationalist-territorial conflict between the Soviet Empire and Afghan fighters was a breeding ground for recruiting many Islamic fighters. It also formed a fertile basis for creating a connection between the struggle for liberation from the yoke of the foreign conqueror and the radical approach of the Islamic jihad.202 By the 1990s, Bin Laden had already set his sights on a different enemy in order to fire up his warriors for battle. In the beginning of 1998, Bin Laden announced the formation of “The International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders”. During that same year, the first two suicide actions were carried out by the organisation. On the morning of the August 7th that year, United States embassies in 112 Kenya and Tanzania were attacked within a five minute interval of each other. Similar to the early operations of the Hezbollah and the LTTE, in these cases as well, operatives driving trucks loaded with explosives hurtled into embassy complexes. In attacks that post factum turned out to have been meticulously planned for many years, 224 people were killed and more than 5000 were wounded. The organisation’s second offensive took place October 12th, 2000, targeting the American destroyer, the USS Cole, which was anchored for fuelling and taking on provisions in the Port of Aden in Yemen. This attack was also based on the experience of other organisations, in this case, the LTTE, which had instituted a marine division in order to carry out actions at sea or underwater (divers, etc.).203 This operation was directed by two suicide bombers who rammed a boat full of explosives into the destroyer, blasting a hole in its hull.204 This time, too, Bin Laden’s goals in founding the Front and in launching attacks were much more concrete than the abstract idea of a religious war. Inter alia, worth mentioning are the organisation’s aspirations to depose secular Arab regimes Bin Laden considered to be corrupt, the desire to remove foreign army forces that had ensconced themselves in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf during the first war in Iraq, concern for Palestinian interests in the conflict with Israel, and the ambition to protect the economic interests of Arab nations with an eye on the price of oil exported by their countries.205 All these objectives had one common denominator—the American connection. The United States was the one with its forces dispersed throughout the Middle East; it was a major supporter of secular Arab regimes as well as Israel, and it also had a vested interest in bringing down oil prices. Hence, as far as Al-Qaeda was concerned, the road to the achievement of organisation goals was 113 paved with detrimental intentions towards the United States.206 From the above, it is also clear why Bin Laden chose to engineer his struggle in the United States by adopting a strategy of suicide terrorism, specifically, grandiose suicide attacks. Al-Qaeda is a small organisation that had embarked on a war against a hegemonic power in a unipolar world. The asymmetry in the balance of power is remarkably prominent in this case. The Hezbollah’s earlier experience made it evident to Bin Laden that in order to strike the United States in such a way that would lead to policy revision, it would be necessary to perpetrate attacks at a high level of sophistication with the potential of producing the greatest number of casualties and most severe damage. Subsequently, the effect would have to be enough to truly shock the American people and change public opinion in a way that would ultimately sway the government to instigate new policies or courses of action. The attacks on the US embassies in Africa and the Cole destroyer apparently did not bring about the anticipated results in terms of organisational goals and so the Al-Qaeda leader selected more drastic measures. The attacks on September 11th, 2001, consisted of hijacking four passenger planes and crashing them into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, the Pentagon building in Washington, DC, and a third target in the Washington, DC, area. The third attempt failed and the plane crashed in an open field in Pennsylvania. On the whole, this coordinated terrorist attack was unprecedented in the history of global terrorism. The terrorists demonstrated very high levels of daring and planning that enabled them almost to completely realise their goals. They inflicted massive damage to life and property and, furthermore, assaulted the very heart and core of the targeted country and struck a blow to its economic symbols and security establishment. 114 The principal aim of these attacks, as noted earlier, was to disrupt the American political system and make it clear to public and political elites in the United States that they were up against an enemy that was perhaps strategically not as strong but with enough audacity and determination to compensate for this inferiority. It is reasonable to assume that Bin Laden did not believe the United States would in fact capitulate in the wake of this attack and subsequently revise its policy in the Middle East. It is more likely that he anticipated an escalation in American military involvement in the Middle East and Asia. This would increase the alienation many Moslems felt towards the United States and help the Al-Qaeda leader galvanise a united Islamic Arab front against the conqueror.207 At the same time, other, more internal factors must be accounted for when specifying the motives responsible for the mega-terrorist attacks in the United States. Bin Laden was interested in positioning his organisation at the forefront of Islamic terrorist groups. His advantage over other organisations was rooted in the fact that Al-Qaeda was a supra-national movement that included members from different countries, all ready to fight for the cause even in places that were far away from their country of origin. The organisation’s international character and the willingness of its members to fight for Islamic interests wherever necessary provided Bin Laden with a very convenient base for mobilising support among radical political groups throughout the Moslem world. A direct assault on the economic, military and political symbols of the United States served as an ideal catalyst for recruiting this kind of support.208 An additional and somewhat surprising explanation for the mega-attacks was found in the computers left behind by high-level Al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan following the American operation. According to Alan Cullison’s analysis of these documents, the 115 aim of the attack, inter alia, was to close ranks of the organisation and reduce tensions that had evolved between the leadership in Kabul and Al-Qaeda cells dispersed at different locations all over the world.209 The results of the September 11th attack were mixed from the perspective of Bin Laden and his people. The organisation was indeed successful in striking at the very heart of the United States, especially a blow to the morale of the American people; however, its strategic objectives were only partially realised. As expected, the response of the American government to the attack was in fact the intensification of its military involvement in the Middle East. Yet, Arab and Moslem mobilisation for the war against the United States was late in coming. On the contrary, until the beginning of the war in Iraq, the strengthening of ties between the American government and friendly Arab regimes and of course Israel, indeed led to an increase in the region’s stability. Furthermore, the direct attack on the Al-Qaeda organisation and its benefactor, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, caused great damage to the organisation’s infrastructure and severely impaired its military capabilities. On the face of it, this was a major defeat for the organisation. In a number of months, it was transformed from an institution that held bases in Afghanistan—where it had enjoyed total freedom of movement—into a relatively small group that found itself in a defensive stance against a superior power. In practice, however, the picture was not so clear-cut. Al-Qaeda had achieved two major accomplishments. The first was the preservation, to a certain degree, of the operational capacities of local groups that identified with Al-Qaeda and whose goals were partially shared by the Bin Laden organisation. The second, within relatively few years and mostly following the American invasion of Iraq and efforts to supplant the Saddam Hussein regime, was 116 how organisation ideology became a magnet for Arabs and Moslems who began to identify with Bin Laden’s notions regarding the “nature of American imperialism” and the “evilness” of the United States.210 While its leadership did not directly enjoy the fruit of its efforts, Al-Qaeda-affiliated organisations in various places all over the world certainly did. Suicide Terrorism of the Islamic Fundamentalist Groups Before going into the factors that prompted groups associated with the idea of Jihad to embark upon campaigns of suicide terrorism, it is necessary to explain and set the record straight regarding a number of facts. First, suicide operations linked to some of the jihad organisations had been underway and in certain cases already suspended a long time before Al-Qaeda dispatched its first suicide bombers. Second, aside from the Iraqi and Chechen cases, which were both marked by a succession of suicide actions, in most other situations, suicide episodes were either sporadic or consisted of several incidents at the most. Third, both in the Iraqi and Chechen cases—to be discussed in more detail later on—it has been very hard to verify the identity of the perpetrators of each incident, thus making it difficult to analyse the factors responsible for attacks. The reasons for this had to do with both the restrictions on the media coverage of many of these events, as well as the difficulties involved in deciphering with certainty the organisational structure underlying attacks in these two cases. Figure 5.1 around here One of the first Jihad organisations to make use of suicide missions was the Egyptian Al-Gama’a al-Islamiya. This organisation dispatched one of its operatives to the city of Rijeka in Croatia already in October, 1995. The operative detonated a car bomb at the entrance to the city’s police station. The purpose of this action apparently was to 117 deter Croatian authorities from cooperating with Egyptian officials in the pursuit of organisation members in Croatia. About a month later, another Egyptian organisation—the Egyptian Jihad—executed a suicide action at the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan. In an attack that, in certain ways, was reminiscent of Hezbollah methods, a suicide bomber blew himself up in the centre of the Embassy compound. Once again, the aim of the operation was to discourage local authorities from pooling resources with Egyptian security forces in their efforts to apprehend organisation activists.211 Another association that began to utilise the suicide tactic even prior to the commencement of Al-Qaeda operations was the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria (GIA). Most of the hundreds of GIA members were Afghanistan war veterans and some of them even trained at Mujahidin camps in the early 1980s. The Group was the most prominent from among a number of armed movements founded under the patronage of the Islamic Salvation Front following the annulment of the latter’s victory in the Algerian 1991 elections. Initially, the organisation mounted attacks against the Algerian regime but later it also included civilian targets in its use of the suicide tactic.212 Among the more significant attacks initiated by this group was the explosion of a car bomb driven by three suicide operatives in January, 1995, in the town of Boufarik. Seven months later, a suicide-driven explosive-laden truck was detonated amidst a crowd of civilians in the capital city of Algiers. In these two attacks, more than fifty people were killed and more than a hundred were injured.213 It also should be noted that above and beyond the organisation’s pivotal role in the devastating civil war that transpired in Algeria in the early 1990s, it also initiated terrorist attacks in the mid-1990s directed at French targets in general and French 118 Jews in particular. However, the principal inspiration for suicide actions by radical Islamic movements sprung from the events of September 11, 2001. For many years, and before its involvement in its own terrorist operations, Bin Laden began disseminating his ideas among Islamic organisations in different locations in the world and helping them construct the infrastructure for terrorist activities. His success was helped in no little measure by the fact that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many of these organisations lost the sponsorship they had received in the past from various other sources. Al-Qaeda’s penetration into countries in southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines was made possible principally due to the cessation of economic support from Libya in the early 1990s.214 But first contacts were made even before in Afghanistan, when Moslems from different countries geared themselves up for the Mujahidin and underwent military training.215 In western European countries as well, Bin Laden’s operatives were successful in forming networks of cells that were based on first and second generation immigrants who lived in these countries, but who also displayed tendencies towards fundamentalist Islam. Although many of these cells underwent a spontaneous process of radicalisation where members would progressively and mutually influence each other, in order to adopt a more violent course of action, they were in need of the direction and infrastructures that Al-Qaeda could provide.216 The events of September 11th were a sort of catharsis for many jihad cells. On one hand, they were an inspiration and encouraged members to join Bin Laden’s battle and, on the other, they created a sense of urgency as the siege on Bin Laden closed in 119 on him and the operational capacities of cells linked to the leadership in Afghanistan gradually dwindled. Still, the immediate factors for terrorist actions perpetrated by most of these cells remained local. The first major terrorist operation that took place after September 11th occurred on October 12th, 2002, in the nightlife hub of the tourist island Bali in Indonesia. This incident was an example of the complex connections between Al-Qaeda and organisations in southeast Asia as well as the considerable importance of local interests in the motivation for terror. The group responsible for the calamity in which 187 people were killed and 300 more were wounded was the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which was not an Al-Qaeda cell and was not directly controlled by Bin Laden and his people. This was a relatively experienced organisation already established in 1993 and whose aim was entirely local, i.e., supplanting the regime in Indonesia with a theocratic one. The affiliation of JI members to Al-Qaeda initially stemmed from a common worldview. Over the years, relations gradually grew closer between the two organisations as well as their elites, and JI fighters began to frequent training camps in Afghanistan and receive information from Bin Laden activists.217 As time passed, the influence of Al-Qaeda on the JI increased all the more. This was particularly evident when the organisation adopted the global Jihad agenda as its own and established cells in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia. Each one of these cells functions in a self-contained manner, that is, according to the conditions and range of operation in that specific country. However, it seems that in exchange for the dissemination of Al-Qaeda ideas in their own countries and the erection of local infrastructures for recruiting new members and launching attacks, these organisations 120 receive intelligence and military know-how, as well as equipment and economic resources, in order to promote their local interests. The same can be said for Indonesia and the Philippines. The MILF (Philippines Moro Islamic Liberation Front), a local Islamic organisation dedicated to an ethnic-religious struggle in the Philippines, had already sent off members in the early 1990s to train in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The reason for this was the cutback in financial support it had previously received from Libya and its need for a steady flow of funding in order to sustain its activities. The only suicide attack perpetrated by the MILF was in fact aimed at a Philippine military installation and was carried out by two local activists. However, closer investigation of the incident reveals that the suicide attackers had been assisted by two foreign trainers—the Egyptian Mohammed Gharib Ibrahimi and Al Maki Ragab from Saudi Arabia.218 Another Philippine organisation likewise drawn into collaboration with Al-Qaeda was the Abu Sayyaf Group. A relatively veteran organisation, it was founded in 1991 and its main goal was the establishment of an Islamic theocracy in the Mindanao islands region in the southern Philippine islands.219 Bin Laden had estimated already in the 1990s that the Group — whose worldview was not that far from his own — could serve as a convenient base for operations in the Philippines. For that reason, he approached their leader and offered him economic and logistic aid. This offer was readily welcomed by the organisation. The support he received from Bin Laden enabled Abu Sayyaf to start a campaign of formidable terrorism against the government in Manila. In exchange for Al-Qaeda sponsorship, organisation members granted refuge to Bin Laden’s cohorts. In the first half of the 1990s, they were even partners in devising a number of ostentatious operations orchestrated by Bin Laden, 121 however, these were ultimately not carried out.220 The suicide bombings that took place in May, 2003, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and Casablanca in Morocco once again proved Al-Qaeda’s capacity to grant support and inspiration to Islamic organisations striving to promote local objectives. On May 12th, nine operatives blew themselves up adjacent to residential buildings inhabited by foreign citizens in Riyadh. This attack, masterminded by Ali Abd al-Rahman al- Faqasi al-Ghamdi, who had fought in the service of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and was among the highest-ranking officials of the organisation,221 led to the deaths of 25 people. Four days later, in an even more sophisticated operation, twelve suicide bombers belonging to the Salafist Jihad organisation located in Casablanca, Morocco, detonated themselves at various locations. Five separate details from the organisation, which sought to remove Americans and Jews from the kingdom,222 attacked the Belgian Embassy, a Spanish culture club and restaurant and a Jewish recreation club and cemetery. In these attacks, forty-three people were killed and more than one hundred were wounded.223 The organisation engaged in armed resistance against local regimes that approved of the Western presence and sought to eliminate this presence in their countries by targeting these sites. A communiqué issued by Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, and taped recordings that the suicide bombers left behind, provided evidence of the close affinity between the interests of local cells and the Al- Qaeda global jihad.224 The double suicide attacks in Istanbul in late 2003 carried the earmarks of a campaign sponsored by Al-Qaeda, which seemed to be absent in this region until this incident.225 Three of the attackers came from the city of Bingol in eastern Turkey and were members of the Turkish Hezbollah.226 The same organisation that in the past had 122 received support from the Turkish government as part of its battle against the PKK, was deprived of this backing in 1999 and therefore in need of alternative financial sources to sustain its activities. Furthermore, its members required military instruction in the perpetration of guerrilla and terrorist acts.227 In line with his principles, Bin Laden was willing to grant the necessary assistance to the organisation. An investigation of the events in Istanbul revealed that at least two of the suicide bombers took part in military training programs in Al-Qaeda camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan and after completing their training, they returned to their home city. After reaching a decision to conduct the operation in protest of the collaboration among the United States, England and Turkey,228 Al-Qaeda activists arrived in the region to provide aid in constructing explosive devices and in the tactical planning of the mission. In addition, they taught local operatives how to exchange enciphered information and instructions on the Internet after Al-Qaeda advisors left the country. Indeed, in the period preceding the operation, the suicide attackers communicated with Al-Qaeda operatives in an Internet café owned by one of them.229 From the above, we can conclude that, for the most part, suicide actions performed under the flag of the jihad and attributed to Al-Qaeda were, in effect, local initiatives stemming from Islamic organisational interests operating within the borders of a given country and whose aspirations principally amounted to a change of rule in that same country. In order to advance these goals, they availed themselves of Al-Qaeda’s assistance. From the organisations’ perspective, Al-Qaeda services were a convenient platform from which they were able to operate. From an Al-Qaeda standpoint, these local offensives were a powerful propaganda tool that sent a message both to the organisation’s constituency and the countries it was up against. The gist of this 123 message was that the long arm of Al-Qaeda could reach numerous and sundry points all over the globe. The routing of the Taliban reign in Afghanistan had many assuming that the organisation had suffered a fatal blow and that its operational capabilities were severely impaired. Therefore, the message conveyed by these renewed offensives was of particular importance. However, as mentioned above, in respect to the two principal foci of suicide terrorism in recent years, Chechnya and Iraq, it has been in fact difficult to find the telltale marks of Al-Qaeda sponsorship. Although information from these regions regarding actions and perpetrators is inconsistent as well as incomplete, and despite the fact that in both cases, the organisational base or bases responsible for dispatching suicide bombers have not been clearly identified, it is still possible to venture that, as in the cases discussed above, the principal reasons for sending off suicide attackers into the streets of Russia and Iraq stem from local conflicts. In the Chechen case, activists seek independence from Russia and their struggle is nationalist-ethnic in nature whereas, in Iraq, the struggle is conducted directly against the American occupation of the country. In Iraq, suicide dispatchers attempt to create chaotic conditions that will enable them to gain more influence and reap political benefits once the occupation is over. Figure 5.2 around here Chechnya is an autonomous republic in the Russian Federation and the majority of its residents are Muslim. Despite relatively loose ties with Moscow, the Chechen Republic has been and is subject to the control and occasionally even military containment of the central government. After the break-up of the USSR, many separatist groups appeared in the country, inspired by the mythology of the Chechen 124 struggles for independence. Like their predecessors, the new separatist groups also wished Chechnya to secede from Russia and declare independence. While the majority of the members of these groups were Sunnite Moslems, at least at the beginning of their campaign, their fight was painted in strong ethnic colours and religion had only a marginal role. However, during the course of the 1990s, ties were forged between Al-Qaeda and several of these groups, and they all began to steep their struggles in Jihad rhetoric. Similarly to the other cases, in Chechnya, as well, suicide terrorism was first introduced at a relatively late stage of the conflict. Suicide operations commenced only after two episodes of intense battles in the years 1994 and 1996 and a terrorist campaign in the streets of Moscow in 1999 followed by a harsh Russian response.230 Eventually, the first Chechen suicide offensives were carried out in July, 2000. Again, attacks were suggestive of Hezbollah methods of operation. Two suicide operatives, a woman and a man, drove a booby-trapped truck and blew it up near the barracks of a Russian army base at Alkhan Yurt. A week later, another Chechen suicide bomber detonated a car bomb at a Russian checkpoint near Khanakala. In the ensuing months, this operational pattern gradually spread to the streets of Chechnya while suicides from rebel ranks repeatedly attacked military and civilian Russian targets.231 As time passed, it became evident that, like the Palestinian organisations, the Chechen use of suicide bombers became increasingly sophisticated and also began to focus more on civilian targets. A prominent example of this tendency took place in July, 2003, when two female suicide bombers, who belonged to the Riyadus Salikhin organisation headed by Shamil Basayev, detonated themselves near a stadium in the suburbs of Moscow where the “Krilya” rock festival took place. Both suicides 125 activated their explosives within a quarter-hour interval, one next to the ticket office and the other at a nearby market. In this incident, sixteen persons were killed.232 Another example is the explosion of a Chechen woman suicide bomber in the underground train in Moscow on February 6th, 2004, during the morning rush hours. In consequence to that operation, originally committed in order to avenge the massacre perpetrated by the Russian army in Chechen villages in February, 2000, thirty-nine civilians were killed and more than 130 were injured.233 Additional examples are the takeover of a theatre in Moscow in October, 2002, the exploding of a passenger train in Russia by a single woman suicide terrorist in January, 2004, the explosion of two passenger planes in September, 2004, and the ambush and takeover of the school in Beslan, also in September, 2004, that concluded in a very tragic and large-scale bloodbath. In addition to the incident at the stadium, Besayev’s Riyadus Salikhin faction took responsibility for the two latter incidents as well. It would be no mean feat to assess what were the goals of each one of the factions in initiating these actions. However, it is possible to assume that the unifying goal of the majority was the desire to liberate themselves from Russian control and to achieve independence whether as a Chechen state or Islamic theocracy. The force of the rebels’ struggle had been fuelled to a large extent by the severe reaction of authorities in Moscow to events and the widespread harm caused to the civilian population during efforts to crack down on rebel pockets of resistance. In the same context, it is important to clarify that the Chechen political arena was marked by a number of rival factions. This raises the supposition that the use of suicide terrorism, at least as employed by the Basayev group, was intended to signal to the population its fervent adherence to the struggle. 126 Iraqi suicide terrorism in fact appeared a short while prior to the American invasion in early 2003. The first suicide incidents in this country were somewhat characteristic of the difficulty in isolating factors responsible for suicide actions, including motives. The first Iraqi suicide happened to be of Kurdish origin. The attacker exploded a car bomb near a structure inhabited by Kurdish forces about one month before the outbreak of fighting. The second attack occurred immediately with the beginning of American army activities in the country and before the invasion of Baghdad. An Iraqi army officer behind the wheel of a car full of explosives detonated it at an American army road barrier. Four soldiers were killed. Four days later, two Iraqi women blew themselves up — one of them was pregnant — in front of an American road barrier in the northern part of Baghdad. The video left behind showed both of them wearing explosive belts in the style of Palestinian suicide bombers. At about the same time, the Iraqi Information Minister, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, announced that the Saddam Hussein regime had at its disposal four thousand suicide bombers ready to act at any given moment. Saddam Hussein’s intention of using suicide attackers was later corroborated as hundreds of sophisticated explosive belts were found in various ammunition caches of the Baath regime. However, suicide operations were suspended a short time after the concluding stages of the American invasion and were not renewed until August, 2003.234 When operations recommenced, they were already of a completely different nature and apparently Saddam Hussein’s regime had no connection to them whatsoever. The suicide operations that took place were similar in style to the Hezbollah method and included the use of massive explosive charges planted or concealed in cars, ambulances and trucks. One of the more prominent terrorist operations during this 127 wave of attacks took place on October 27th, and greatly resembled the coordinated offensive in Riyadh, which occurred three months earlier. Five suicide bombers drove vehicles laden with explosives in the vicinity of Iraqi police stations and detonated all of them almost simultaneously. Unlike most incidents where it was not possible to identify suicides after the explosions, in this case, one of them was caught and identified as a Syrian volunteer who had crossed the border in order to fight in Iraq, a fact that indicated a possible connection with Al-Qaeda.235 This series of attacks escalated in the following months. Targets of suicide attacks were mostly coalition forces as well as Iraqi security forces with an emphasis on recruitment centres. The principal names mentioned in the context of these operations were those of the organisations Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Suna and Al-Qaeda while, in the background, the name of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—known for his connections with Al-Qaeda but also Saddam Hussein’s regime and even Iranian authorities—repeatedly appeared.236 Bombers in this campaign would commonly make sure to conceal their identity and were even capable of shaving themselves and wearing a mask before setting out on their mission. This made the detection of perpetrators a tough job. It was equally hard to reveal who the dispatchers were so that, ultimately, the assessment of the precise nature of their goals also became involved. However, one can cautiously postulate that, despite the abundance of factions fighting in Iraq, Sunnite groups have a higher profile in the initiation of suicide attacks. It is easier to assume that the objective of local Sunnite factions in Iraq was to prevent the establishment of a new government under American patronage which would also be detrimental to the preferred status enjoyed by Sunnites during the years of Saddam 128 Hussein’s reign. But, then what are Zarqawi’s goals, if he is in fact the one responsible for suicide operations and if the estimation (often subject to doubts) is correct that he worked in close affinity with Al-Qaeda people? For those Islamic organisations coming from outside Iraq, direct battle with American forces and countries under their sponsorship in the Middle East was an opportunity to try and replicate the accomplishments of the Hezbollah in Lebanon about two decades earlier. Or, in other words, to cause the greatest power in the world to withdraw its forces from the country. Unlike the Hezbollah, a local organisation which, following its success in the campaigns against the Multinational Force and Israel, converted its new status into political clout, it is plausible to assume that the immediate goal of Islamic organisations operating in Iraq was actually to mobilise the endorsement of Arabs and Moslems from other countries. The assault on American forces therefore served as a highly effective tool in the recruitment of such support. In the future, this backing could be converted into the destabilisation of US-friendly Arab regimes and an attempt to try and institute theocratic republics in their place. Summary Osama Bin Laden launched the ostentatious Al-Qaeda suicide attack campaign out of both political and organisational motives. Borne along on the wave of a Wahhabist credo, Bin Laden saw himself as a supranational leader. He believed in the liberation of the Middle East and Moslem world from the control or influence of the West and its allies. Notwithstanding, it is difficult to accept the assumption that his solitary goal was to try and spread the control of Islam to other regions in the world. Therefore, the depiction of Al-Qaeda actions in general and the organisation’s suicide operations in particular in terms of a clash of religions or civilisations goes a bit too far. Bin 129 Laden’s decision to mount grand-scale suicide offensives principally against American targets was meant to signal to the United States that they were dealing with a highly determined organisation that was not deterred by the necessity of engaging in brutal warfare even if it suffered from strategic inferiority. Moreover, Bin Laden wanted to provoke the Americans into an aggressive response against himself, and paradoxically also to intensify its military involvement in the Middle East. His aim was to demonstrate to Arabs and Moslems the predatory nature and cruelty of the United States on one hand, and his devotion to their interests on the other. As noted, organisational concerns were also included in his designs. He sought to close ranks around his leadership and to motion to the various Al-Qaeda cells that he was the leader and mainstay of a struggle that was not possible without him. Although the central leadership backbone of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was severely weakened due to the American invasion, it would still be difficult to disagree with the inference that the organisation’s grandiose operations had strengthened Bin Laden’s status and even transformed him into a major symbol of the global Jihad. The factors that led Islamic cells with only loose connections to Al-Qaeda to initiate suicide attacks were, for the most part, local ones. Prior to the events of September 11, these were sporadic episodes. Suicide attackers were a convenient and effective weapon in the hands of organisations that generally did not possess large-scale military options in their fight against the regimes pursuing them. Even after the attacks in New York and Washington, the motives for dispatching suicide bombers remained largely local. However, the increase in suicide operations also stemmed, to a large degree, from the fact that cells in assorted places drew their inspiration from September 11th. An additional reason for the rise in the number of suicide attacks was 130 the desire of the Al-Qaeda leadership to prove to the world that the organisation still existed in full force. Islamic cells, scattered in different countries that identified with the organisation’s ideology and were indebted to its leadership on account of the material support they received over the years, served as an ideal vehicle for showing that the organisation was still very active. Finally, two principal foci where campaigns of suicide terrorism still persist must be addressed: Chechnya and Iraq. In both these cases, it is hard to gauge precisely to what degree local motives or external interests are involved. Nevertheless, it still seems evident that in Chechnya, the principal emphasis is local, so that revisions of Russian policy towards this region are liable to substantially reduce the incentive to send suicides off into the streets of Moscow. In the Iraqi case, on the other hand, it seems that the use of suicide tactics is conducted both by local insurgents and non- local factors, thus transforming the country into a battleground in their struggle with the United States. After a short period of rivalry between the local and foreign insurgent groups, it seems that the level of cooperation among them has increased.237 The American withdrawal from the country will be perceived by these organisations, as well as other Islamic radical elements, as a significant accomplishment directly in line with Bin Laden’s vision and therefore it seems that the end of suicide terrorism in Iraq has still a way to go. 131 Chapter 6 – Who Becomes a Suicide Terrorist? One of the remarkable facts that come to mind when reading the life stories of suicide bombers is how commonplace they are. For example, Ahmad Qasir, who drove a vehicle loaded with explosives into the Israeli military compound in the city of Tyre on November 11th, 1982,238 was no different from many other fifteen-year-old boys who lived in countries subjected to protracted violent conflicts. He was not a very happy individual, but at the same time he was definitely not miserable. Qasir had a loving and supporting family and was described as a kind young man. He was forced to drop out of school when he was only eleven years old due to financial difficulties in the family. He joined his father and helped him sell fruits and vegetables. Later, Qasir left Lebanon to work as a janitor in a Saudi-Arabian hospital; his purpose was to save some money and send it to his family.239 Upon his return to Lebanon, Qasir, like many of his peers, began to perform minor errands for the Hezbollah. He found it very exciting and was proud to be assigned on logistic missions such as smuggling equipment for the organisation’s fighters and spying on Israeli convoys for gathering intelligence. Yet, despite his involvement in these underground operations, he also found time to spend with his friends. They were mostly interested in Qasir’s two favourite activities, camping and hunting. One morning, Qasir took his father’s passport, transferred ownership of the family truck, and disappeared. His concerned family had no idea what had happened to him. Two-and-a-half years later, when the Hezbollah exhibited Qasir’s pictures as a heroic figure in the fight against Israel, his stunned family members received the devastating news that he had been sent on a suicide mission. They had never even considered this possibility and were left with many unanswered questions. In fact, until this day, no 132 one really knows what led Qasir to sacrifice his life.240 Exactly 21 years later, on November 15th, 2003, Gokhan Elaltuntas, a young man from the Turkish city of Bingol, was one of two suicide bombers who exploded their trucks in front of the “Neveh Shalom” and “Beth Israel” synagogues in Istanbul.241 Again, as far as could be seen, nothing in Elaltuntas’ childhood and youth suggested that by the age of 22 he would become a suicide terrorist.242 Elaltuntas was the second of six children.243 His parents were involved in real estate and electricity projects and were considered rather affluent in the impoverished city of Bingol.244 Like many members of his community, Elaltuntas was raised as a religious Muslim but he was never closely involved in radical Islamism, neither did he join a radical Moslem movement.245 Actually, his real passions in life were soccer and videogames.246 After failing university admission exams,247 Elaltuntas began to work at his father’s Internet café where he met a group of new friends, some of whom were later described as radical Muslims.248 Their influence on Elaltuntas became evident when he began to express radical political views and started praying five times a day.249 The real turning point occurred after an earthquake caused enough damage to destroy the family store. In the wake of this blow, his parents sent Elaltuntas to Istanbul. They wanted him to have the opportunity of starting his own business somewhere else and were hoping that the move to the big city would loosen the ties with his new friends.250 They were especially concerned about one figure, i.e. Azad Ekinci, a charismatic 27-year-old who was educated in the madrasahs of Pakistan and who had even took part in the wars of Chechnya and Bosnia.251 Ekinci appeared to be the group’s leader and was admired by its members. However, Elaltuntas’ move to Istanbul did not help much in this respect. Ekinci 133 decided to move together with him and the bonds between them only grew closer.252 Still, despite Ekinci’s sway on him, nothing in Elaltuntas’ plans or deeds indicated the intention of sacrificing his life. On the contrary, he opened a new shop for cellular phones, redecorated his house in a Western style and even told his uncle that he was seriously thinking of marrying his fiancée.253 Yet, four months after moving to Istanbul, Elaltuntas blew himself up inside a truck along with his victims in the Neveh Shalom synagogue. As in Qasir’s case, Elaltuntas’ family refused to believe he was involved in the attack and was left with many perplexing questions regarding his motivation.254 Four months prior to the attack in Istanbul, on July 9th, Zarema Muzhkhoeva, a 23- year-old Chechen woman, carried a bomb to Mon Café in the heart of Moscow. Minutes before she was supposed to detonate the bomb, she handed herself over to police officers who were on the premises. Like Qasir and Elaltuntas, Muzhakhoeva was also Muslim. However, she never really practiced Islam and, furthermore, the Chechen nationalistic cause was not really important to her. She was much more preoccupied with her own personal problems.255 Four years earlier, her husband had been killed during the course of a business dispute. Shortly afterwards, the dead husband’s family took away Muzhkhoeva’s newborn baby girl and she was prevented from seeing her child. All she could think of was how much she wanted her daughter back. Driven by her distress, Muzhkhoeva stole her grandmother’s jewels, sold them for $600, and made her way to her mother- in-law’s house. She asked for permission to spend some time with her daughter, yet her real plan was to run away with the baby to Moscow. Members of her late husband’s family kept a close watch on her the whole time and when Muzhkhoeva 134 tried boarding an aircraft, they took her child away and left her beaten and humiliated at the airport. Muzhkhoeva was absolutely heartbroken; not only had she stolen her grandmother’s jewels, she had also lost her daughter.256 It took her a few days to recover a little from these blows, and then she joined the Shamil Basayev faction of the Chechen rebel movement. Her only incentive in doing so was financial. She heard that the family of a suicide bomber received $1000 for carrying out a mission for this faction. Muzhkhoeva, who did not see much point in continuing life without her daughter, thought that if she died for this faction, at least her grandmother would be compensated for the stolen jewels. When she met Basayev at the rebel camp, he was not very enthusiastic with regard to her motivation. He told her that a person should not set out on a suicide mission just on the basis of financial distress. He even offered her to stay and marry one of the rebels but Muzhkhoeva refused to even discuss this possibility. Her only thought was to put an end to her problems. However, a little while before the day of the planned attack, she started having second thoughts. She concluded that her problems did not justify sacrificing her life for a cause which was still quite alien to her and she looked for a way out of this mission, but at this stage it was far too late. She was locked in an apartment with other women who were assigned to suicide missions and all of them were under constant observation by Basayev’s men. Therefore, she decided to embark upon the mission and surrender herself once her handlers could no longer watch her. Tragically, the explosive belt which she carried was ready to be activated and when one of the police officers tried to defuse it, the bomb exploded and killed him.257 Muzhkhoeva remained unscathed and was arrested. 135 The descriptions above reinforce the conclusions of many studies that have investigated the characteristics and motivations of suicide terrorists. The majority of suicide bombers are not crazy.258 Furthermore, they generally are not forced into perpetrating the suicide act.259 In effect, most suicide terrorists can be described as ordinary people. Studies have shown that they exhibited no suicidal tendencies prior to the act and lived normal lives, although many of them came from conflict-ridden areas where a “normal life” is a relative concept. Most of them were not leading figures in their communities or organisations but they also did not come from the fringes of society. Suicide attackers were generally not highly educated, but also not illiterate. They were not very successful, but, at the same time, not complete failures. Attackers were both men and women; some were very religious while others were completely secular. Some were politically active for many years and others became active only in the perpetration of their suicide mission. So who, indeed, are the suicide terrorists? And what drives them to take their lives and the lives of so many others? In this chapter, I will attempt to portray the characteristics of a sample of suicide bombers from different parts of the world and I will study the motivations which led them to turn themselves into live bombs. Yet it is not my intention to offer a psychological or any other type of profile. Looking into the personal motivations of suicide terrorists is a highly complicated task, mainly due to the fact that perpetrators are no longer alive and their stories are therefore derived from secondary sources. However, other factors may also raise difficulties in the undertaking of such a study.260 First, many organisations are not interested in exposing the identities of individuals they have sent on suicide missions. In some cases, even the governments of countries that have been victimised by suicide 136 bombers have refrained from exposing the identities of perpetrators, mostly in order not to jeopardise their counterterrorism efforts. Hence, we know a great deal about Lebanese and Palestinian suicide terrorists whose acts were publicised and praised by their respective organisations. We have also heard a lot about the hijackers responsible for the events of September 11, 2000, in the United States. The magnitude of these events drew the attention of many reporters and scholars who made extensive efforts to get their stories across and track down the motivations of terrorists. However, our knowledge about the characteristics and motivations of suicide bombers from the LTTE, the PKK, and Chechnya is far more limited. With regard to perpetrators of suicide attacks in Iraq, information is almost impossible to obtain because of the meticulous attempts by the terrorists to remove all signs which may lead to their identity. Second, even if we were able to uncover the identity of perpetrators, how can we learn about their motivations? Some scholars chose to interview family members and the friends of suicide bombers.261 Such an approach is very useful in obtaining background information about the particular person. However, many suicide bombers, such as the three described at the beginning of this chapter, left their families a long while before they committed the act. In other cases, families may have their own agenda when describing their loved ones who were responsible for the attacks. For example, they may embrace their son or daughter and portray them as heroes in order to gain respect from their community or even financial support. In other instances, family members may do anything possible to dissociate themselves from the suicide bomber, mainly, in order to signal to authorities that they had nothing to do with the act. 137 Another group of scholars have chosen to focus on the diaries and videotapes left behind by perpetrators.262 Again, such information is highly valuable. Yet, there is also a good chance that a lot of the information obtained from these sources was meant to serve the propaganda purposes of the organisation and thus the question whether this data actually reflects the thoughts and feeling of terrorists still remains unresolved. A third group of researchers decided to interview those who had failed in their attempts at suicide bombing.263 Admittedly, these scholars got hold of information which could not have been obtained in any other way. Yet, they profiled the “losers”, i.e., those who did not complete their missions. The question whether these profiles are identical to the ones of the “successful” suicide bombers remains unresolved. It is important to address these methodological problems since they have the potential of biasing research. Yet I strongly believe that this bias is marginal. Despite the various problems involved in the study of suicide terrorists, most scholars have been able to offer valuable analyses of the characteristics of individual bombers. As mentioned earlier, many have come to similar conclusions. Personality and psychological traits play only a secondary role in the makeup of a suicide terrorist. In order to find the reasons for an individual’s decision to turn him or herself into a live bomb, there is a need for a broader approach which will focus on the different experiences this person has undergone during the years and months preceding the event. To examine this approach, I rely on two main sources. The first is the life stories of suicide terrorists from different corners of the world as documented by the media. These reports do not cover the whole population of suicide terrorists and sometimes 138 offer only limited information about them. Thus, as mentioned earlier, I will not engage in ambitious attempts to outline the profiles of terrorists and instead I will limit my efforts to a search of the common motivations of these perpetrators. The second source of research is a dataset of the whole population of Palestinian suicide bombers. In the Palestinian case, organisations had an interest in revealing the identities of shahids and advertising their stories for the purpose of portraying them as heroes. In this fashion, legitimacy was gained from the community, which in turn influenced many others to volunteer for such missions. The process of collecting data took more than three years. In order to be as accurate as possible, we studied and crosschecked facts obtained from both Israeli and Palestinian publicly-accessible sources, most prominently, newspaper reports and websites devoted to shahids.264 In the first part of this chapter, the dataset is drawn on for the purpose of telling the stories of some suicide bombers while, in the second part, it provides the numerical basis for the changing features of Palestinian suicide bombers. Preconditions for the Emergence of Suicide Terrorism Suicide terrorism is a political phenomenon orchestrated by an organisation; this has been a major guiding assumption throughout this book. Any attempt to look into the personal motivations behind the decision to become a suicide bomber without taking this fact into consideration would generate only partial results. Suicidal behaviour is a common phenomenon in almost every society. Usually, people decide to take their own lives when suffering from one or a variety of problems. There is nothing unique or novel about this aspect. However, people who kill themselves as a mean of killing others are a different story. Are there specific conditions which may serve as a breeding ground for this phenomenon? 139 A careful scrutiny of the data on suicide attackers in different parts of the world led to the following conclusion. Suicide bombers can be roughly classified into two main groups: (1) members of an organisation or social network, and (2) individuals who were recruited—or volunteered—specifically for the suicide mission. The precipitating factors compelling individuals to embark on such missions in the two groups are different, yet they are not mutually exclusive. For the first group, the key word would be commitment. This could be commitment to a cause, an ideology, to one’s comrades or leader, or to all of these combined. Like soldiers, members of such organisations or networks become increasingly dedicated to the framework to which they belong, to what it stands for and especially to their comrades, sometimes even to the degree that they are willing to sacrifice their lives on the basis of this commitment. The precipitating factors motivating individuals who belong to the second category are different. Here the key word should be crisis. This can be a real or perceived crisis situation and it is liable to be on either the personal or community level or both. In some cases, the decision to embark on a suicide mission is a direct result of a specific crisis and takes place shortly after the crisis has occurred. In other cases, the potential suicide bomber might be predisposed towards the mission as a result of an accumulation of crises that has eventually overwhelmed him or her.265 On the personal level, both financial and individual-emotional crises seem to be fair predictors of the willingness to become a suicide bomber. Yet, while financial motivations appear to be relatively weak in predicting the successful completion of suicide missions, crises that involve the loss of a loved one seem to be a much stronger predicting factor. In the majority of cases, an individual crisis might be a 140 direct consequence of painful acts inflicted by an oppressor, and the person’s main motivation in perpetrating the act would be revenge. On the community level, the decision would most likely be a result of a sense of hopelessness and frustration with a static or even deteriorating situation.266 In the following sections, I will demonstrate these different motivating factors. Commitment as a Motivation for Suicide Attacks Not many leaders of terrorist organisations will elect to send well-trained warriors and long-time members of its organisation on suicide missions. Except for the LTTE, Al- Qaeda and religious Palestinian organisations (e.g., Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad) in their early years, all other organisations have preferred to dispatch individuals recruited specifically for these assignments. In other cases, suicide bombers were individuals who were recruited to the organizations for more general purposes, but during the initial training phase displayed no qualities which could have been useful for the organizations and hence were perceived as ‘expendable’ by the leaders. So, in effect, leaders of organisations utilising the suicide tactic acted quite rationally. They did not want to send valuable operatives, who could have served them in many different ways, on a deadly mission which in actual fact required very little sophistication and combative skills. Yet, in some cases, strongly integrated members of an organisation who felt a deep commitment to the group or cause persuaded their leaders to send them on suicide operations. The story of Salah Mohammed Ali Ghandour is highly illustrative of this phenomenon. On April 25th, 1995, Ghandour, (also known as the “Angel” - Malak), a veteran member of the Hezbollah, rammed a car loaded with explosives into an Israeli military convoy near Bint Jbeil when he was 26 years old. Ghandour’s attack took 141 place long after the Hezbollah leadership decided to stop deploying suicide bombers. Actually, his commanders did everything they could to prevent him from embarking on this mission. One of them later spoke of the long discussions with Ghandour when they tried to convince him it would be wrong to sacrifice himself and leave behind a young wife and three babies. Even Hassan Nassrallah, secretary general of the Hezbollah, took part in the efforts to prevent Ghandour from setting out on this irrevocable operation. The source reported that Ghandour tried to persuade his commanders to dispatch him on a suicide mission for over three years and they always managed to stop him. Yet, his belief in the organisation’s ideology was so profound that ultimately his only aspiration was to die as a shahid. At a certain stage, Ghandour’s commanders understood he was utterly determined and that there was no way to talk him out of his resolve. Hence, they gave him the explosives and their blessing. In the videotape that he left behind, Ghandour seemed happy and confident. He stated that he was leaving to fight the oppressors in the most honourable way.267 Ghandour’s story exemplifies the power of the organisation in reinforcing commitment. People who spend long periods of time within organisational frameworks, especially those that offer a compelling ideology accompanied by symbolism and ritualism, identify more and more with the group and its goals. In most cases, this ideology serves the organisational needs. However, in Ghandour’s case, it became dysfunctional. While his commanders valued his skills and wanted to keep him in the ranks of the Hezbollah, he became so devoted to the cause that he could not think of any other way of expressing his commitment. The LTTE is another example of a movement where a strong commitment gradually developed. Over the course of years, the association of members with each other, as 142 well as with their leaders, had a strong influence on their organisational allegiance. Prem, for example, was the first suicide bomber who managed successfully to take the life of a political figure in the government of Sri Lanka. A long-time member of the LTTE, he blew up his car on March 2nd, 1991, when the convoy of the Sri Lankan Minister of Defence, Ranjan Wijeratne, passed close by.268 For many years, Prem had served as the personal driver of one of the organisation’s leaders. His strong commitment to this specific leader and the LTTE’s cause in general led him to volunteer for the suicide mission. Previous attempts to assassinate Wijeratne, including remote control bombs with radio connections, were unsuccessful. Due to the complicated nature of the operation, in which Prem himself had to activate the bomb, and as a result of several previous and unsuccessful attempts on Wijeratne’s life, Prem had to go through a long training period. In the attack, nineteen people were killed, including the Minister of Defence and his bodyguards.269 Maybe the most striking example of the role of commitment as an incentive to become a suicide bomber was that of Yogarajah Koneswaran from the village of Valvettithurai. He became an orphan at a very early age and joined the LTTE in 1987. While serving as a guard at the LTTE camp at Thondamannaru, the site came under the attack of Sri Lankan army forces and he swallowed a cyanide capsule in order to avoid capture. He survived the poisoning but remained physically weak. Because of his bravery, he was adopted by the revered leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran. After several years, he felt that he was strong enough to set out on his own and volunteered for a suicide mission. On June 7th, 1990, he operated a boat full of explosives and crashed it into the “Edithara”, a military ship of the Sri Lankan navy.270 143 In the case of the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, commitment to the organisation, its ideology and it members was forged in many instances during the long periods members of these groups spent incarcerated together. Israeli prisons in effect replaced the institution of the army boot camp where rites of passage into group members and identification with the cause are more commonly formed. The reason for this is that unlike other organisations which turned out suicide terrorists, the Palestinian factions operating in the territories of Judea, Samaria and Gaza never had camps where they could isolate members from the rest of the community and train them. Israel monitored these organisations very closely and prevented the establishment of such camps, however, Israeli authorities failed to see that, in the meantime, this same solidarity process was taking place directly under their very noses.271 The story of Yusef Ali Mohammed Zughayar and Suleiman Musa Dahayneh illustrates the power of this commitment. Zughayar was an activist of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and an inhabitant of Anata, a village near Jerusalem. The 23-year-old Dahayneh came from Silat al-Harithiya, close to Jenin, and also was a member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These two villages are quite remote from one another and since these two young men were not related, the prospects of their getting acquainted were quite slim. However, both were prosecuted and sentenced for lengthy periods in prison on charges of being active members of the local chapters of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Like many other Palestinian prisoners, Zughayar and Dahayneh became very close while in prison and reinforced each other’s ideological commitment. Suleiman even became familiar with Zughayar’s sister and married her after he was released.272 Once 144 they were both out of prison, they became inseparable.273 They were staunchly dedicated to one thing: expressing their devotion to the cause through the act of self- sacrifice. On November 6th, 1998, the two friends embarked upon a double suicide attack at the Mahaneh Yehuda market in Jerusalem.274 They approached the neighbourhood in a red Fiat and drove onto the sidewalk near the entrance into the market. They had planned on taking two suitcases packed with explosives to the market that was then full of shoppers. However, before they could get out of the car, evidently because of a technical problem, the suitcases prematurely exploded, killing them both and injuring 21 citizens.275 Not only prison experience formed a catalyst for commitment among members of Palestinian organisations. Yossef Suiat and Nidal Jibali, who were also activists of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and belonged to the Jenin group, worked together as police officers. During the hours spent together, their friendship grew closer. In their long talks, they were very happy to find out that they shared joint commitment to the Palestinian cause and to the ideology of the organisation. Eventually, they offered themselves to a local handler who dispatched them on a double suicide operation which took place in the city of Hadera on May 25th, 2001.276 They detonated the bomb inside the car they were driving next to a bus loaded with passengers and 36 people were injured. Individuals may seek friends or community before they become dedicated to a specific organisation or cause. In some cases, comradeship seems to be a force almost stronger than anything. In his study of Al-Qaeda networks, Marc Sageman emphasised the role of social networks in generating radicalism and terrorism.277 He indicated the importance of pre-existing social bonds with other people committed to 145 the same cause and to one another. A typical case is the homesick, drifting young man who is drawn to familiar settings, especially mosques, to find friends who share common traits and interests. Small clusters of friends that form in these mosques often move in together and live in the same lodgings. These groups go through a long process of intense social interaction and peer socialisation together in these apartments and develop a strong mutual confidence. As they become more intimate, the moderate members of these groups adopt the beliefs of the most extreme ones. They sever previous ties and become increasingly involved in the group. At the end of this process, they are ready to join the Jihad. 278 An example of such a network is the Istanbul cell that carried out the November 2003 attacks. Mesut Cabuk, the operative who blew himself up in the Beth-Israel Synagogue, was a member of this cell. Cabuk had lost his father at a very young age and this experience had a dramatic effect on his life. He began to look for comfort in religious books and was constantly looking for a community that would embrace him. In his teenage years, Cabuk finally found what he was looking for when a group of young religious militants offered him their friendship. A prominent figure in this group was the suicide bomber who was later to perpetrate the attack on the HSBC Bank on November 20th in Istanbul. This was Azad Ekinci, the same person who recruited Gokhan Elaltuntas, whose case was described earlier. Cabuk and Ekinci became virtually joined at the hip. They travelled together to Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, where they were introduced to the mujahidin.279 Even following their return, nothing could interfere with their close ties.280 Despite the fact that he was married and had two children, Cabuk remained highly committed to his friend who served as a major source of encouragement for many years. Hence, when Ekinci 146 approached him with the plan to attack the synagogues, Cabuk did not hesitate. He told his wife that he was leaving for a trip to Dubai and left the house with a few of his belongings.281 Several days later, his young spouse read in the paper that Cabuk and his friends were the ones responsible for the attacks.282 Similar collaborations among friends are also evident on the Palestinian scene. These networks are usually formed outside the framework of any organisation. In these small coteries of friends, the radicalisation process occurs subsequent to intense social interaction and the aspiration of each member to prove to his friends how committed he is to the group and/or the cause they believe in. One of the most significant examples of this process involved five childhood companions from the village of Assira al-Shamaliya (north of Nablus). Moawiya Jarara (23), Bashar Sawalha (24), Tawfiq Yassin (25), Youssef Shouli (22)283 and Asadi tul (24) grew up together and became close friends. At first, they all joined the Fatah, but then they met Mahmoud Abu Hanude, a well-known Hamas activist, who recruited them to this Islamic organisation. He was responsible for indoctrinating them with the belief that they should sacrifice their lives in the struggle against Israel. The special dynamic among the members of the group led them all to take part in suicide attacks. Two of them detonated themselves at the Mahaneh Yehuda market in July, 1997, and the other three in September that same year in the midrahov (pedestrian mall) in Jerusalem, killing seven and injuring more than 200.284 Another powerful illustration of such a network is the incident involving members of the Hebron football club. Altogether, seven players from this team took part in several suicide attacks over a relatively short period of time. Fuad Al-Qawasme was one of them. On May 18th, 2003, he carried out a suicide attack in his hometown, Hebron, in 147 which two Jewish settlers were killed.285 In Al-Qawasme’s case, the influence of social networking, whether it be kin or peer pressure, is even more prominent. Not only did his football team produce a considerable number of suicide bombers, his family did as well. In all, eight members of the extended Al-Qawasme hamula (extended family),286 who in fact interacted on a regular basis, committed suicide attacks during the first few months of 2003. Some of them were also members of the football team.287 Networks based on families and friends became increasingly important during the years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This was a result of the fact that some of the more established organisations underwent different degrees of dissolution due to the heavy military pressure imposed by Israel. Muhamad Hasnin and Ashraf Asmar from Jenin were close friends. Neither one of them belonged to any of the known terrorist organisations yet they gradually became committed to the Palestinian struggle through their friendly interaction. When they felt ready to act, and after making contact with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an activist supplied them with a truck loaded with explosives and instructed them to crash it into a bus. They carried out their mission on October 21st, 2002. They drove a car loaded with 70kg of explosive in the vicinity of the IDF military camp, “Mahaneh 80”, and exploded the car near bus line 841, killing 14 people and injuring 48.288 A comparable example is the case of Muhammad Bastami, a 21-year-old from Nablus, who appeared to have no ties to any known terrorist cell nor a specific motivation for volunteering for the suicide squads. Ultimately, he carried out an attack against citizens and soldiers at a petrol station located near the entrance to the settlement of Ariel. The only thing that seems to be relevant in explaining his decision 148 to choose this path was his close relationship with his cousin, Hamed Sader, a well known Hamas activist. It seems that Hamed introduced him to the ideology of the Hamas and indoctrinated him with the virtues embedded in perpetrating the act of martyrdom.289 Yet, one of the most significant examples of the powerful influence of a social network can be found in the case of Asif Muhammad Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif, both British citizens in their 20s. Hanif and Sharif, both of Pakistani origin,290 grew up in Britain.291 Hanif grew up in London and was an enthusiastic fan of football and cricket. After commencing studies in Cranford College, he began to get closer to Islam. He tried for a graduate degree in Kingston College, but after four months, decided to go to Morocco and learn Islamic Law. His travels also took him to Syria and Saudi Arabia. During this period, he became increasingly religious and after returning to Britain, he began studying Islamic lessons in Derby, delivered by the Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed. In those lessons, he met Sharif and they become close friends. After six lessons292 Hanif and Sharif offered their services to the Hamas unlike many other Europeans of Muslim or Arab origin who put their small radical cells at the disposal of Al-Qaeda. They travelled to Syria where they met Imad Al Alami, a Hamas leader in Syria who equipped and prepared them for their mission.293 They entered Israel by way of Jordan as activists of the “Alternative Tourism Group” (a peace-promoting solidarity movement), and in Gaza they encountered local Hamas activists who outfitted them with explosives. Hanif detonated his explosive belt at the entrance to a bar called “Mike’s Place” in Tel Aviv. Sharif’s body was found a few weeks later, swept ashore a Tel Aviv beach.294 To conclude, commitment is a strong motivating force for suicide missions. This 149 should not come as a surprise. As mentioned in chapter 2, studies indicate that soldiers who storm enemy fire head on are not crazy or suicidal. They are simply committed to their country, often to an accompanying ideology and, above all, to their unit, commanders and comrades. This allegiance or “kinship” factor significantly applies to many suicide terrorists who belong to an organisation or even an independent cell. They do not exhibit mental pathologies or personal problems; they are simply strongly integrated into the social unit. A successful integration makes the unit and its members the most important factor in their lives, and they are willing to do anything for their friends and the common cause. Personal Motivation for Suicide Attacks However, not all suicide bombers are members of organisations or integrated into a social network. Many of them chose to become suicide bombers out of personal motivations, the majority of which are related to some type of crisis. Most of these latter perpetrators had never been members of an organisation and were recruited, or in other cases specifically volunteered, for the purpose of carrying out the suicide mission. Financial Crisis as Motivation The first years in which suicide attacks became a prominent feature of the conflict in Lebanon may help demonstrate the importance of a favourable social environment when recruiting individuals for such missions. Before the Hezbollah, as well as other organisations, understood the importance of a supportive environment and started planting the roots of the martyrdom idea in Shiite subculture, they had difficulties in mobilising individuals for such actions. 150 Mohammed Mahmoud Berro is a good example of this kind of problem. He was captured by Israeli forces while trying to detonate a car bomb at the Israeli military headquarters in Nabatiya on February 23rd, 1985. Berro was not religious, did not believe in heaven, nor did he show any signs of hatred towards Israelis.295 He was inclined to set out on a suicide mission simply because his family needed the money and he was manipulated “to volunteer” to become a live bomb.296 A few months earlier, Berro’s father, who served as a police officer, was involved in a car accident. He ran over a young woman and was required to pay her medical expenses. Later, her family asked for further financial compensation and so the Berro family was under enormous pressure until the Shiite Amal Movement entered the picture.297 The organisation’s representatives offered the family assistance which should have taken care of their financial obligations. As members of the Shiite community, the Berro family was not surprised when they received this kind offer. The organisation had a very good reputation for helping Shiite families in crisis.298 However, this time the Amal people had a different plan in mind. Shortly after transferring the money to the debtors, they approached Berro’s father and asked him to pay back what he owed. Pushed into a corner, the father tried anything to avoid the people who were looking for him. Hence, they decided to invite the young son to a meeting with an organisation representative by the name of Abu-Hassan. In the course of the meeting, the younger Berro was asked to join the Amal military wing and fight the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon.299 In return, Abu-Hassan promised that the organisation would take care of the family’s financial problems. Berro was promised that he would not be put at any risk.300 Berro did not refuse the offer outright, as he was willing to hear more. Abu Hassan 151 then sent him to a religious cleric named Haj Ali. The cleric used a different rhetoric and talked to Berro about heaven and about the fact that people who die as shahids did not actually expire but just moved on to a much better place. However, Berro was sceptical; the religious rhetoric did not appeal to him.301 Abu-Hassan, for his part, was not ready to give up. When he saw that the religious inducement was not effective, he appealed to Berro’s commitment to his family. Berro was told that his father was at a high risk of losing his job and that the whole family would be deprived of everything they had. However, if he chose to become a suicide bomber for Amal, the organisation would offer the family a lifetime of financial stability. In his testimony, Berro said he felt trapped. He could not watch his father suffer anymore and thus, quite unwillingly, he agreed to go out on the mission.302 This was also the reason he was not eager to set off the explosives and ultimately he let the soldiers capture him.303 The stories of Zarema Muzhkhoeva and Mohammed Berro indicate that a financial crisis does not provide a very strong incentive to become a suicide bomber. In both cases, these individuals had no belief in the cause or felt no commitment to the organisation. As a result, they were reluctant to fulfil their mission. This pattern repeated itself in the case of Mayilla Soufangi who also failed to detonate her explosive device. In November, 1985, the seventeen-year-old Sunni woman was sent to blow up a donkey she was leading towards a joint Israeli-SLA post.304 Soufangi was a member of the Lebanese United Front, a small pro-Syrian faction which was actually operated by the Syrian intelligence services.305 Soufangi joined the organisation shortly after she ran away from home following her mother’s death.306 She was desperate for money and the Syrian intelligence services were generous 152 enough to offer her many of the things she needed.307 In return, Soufangi was sent to basic military training in Rayak, a small town in the Lebanon valley and the site of a Lebanese Army and Air Force base.308 After a short training period, she was told that her duty was to carry out a suicide attack.309 According to her testimony, she in fact wanted to kill Israelis, however she also stressed that she felt no hatred towards them. Hence, it seems that the main reason she set out on the mission was a sense of obligation to the people who helped her financially. As in the aforementioned cases, Soufangi, too, was not eager to accomplish her mission and later regretted that she was persuaded to attempt it.310 Hence, we may cautiously conclude that financial crisis on its own cannot be regarded as a strong motivating factor for carrying out suicide missions, especially in the absence of a supporting environment. This conclusion raises the question: are there other types of personal crises which are better or more reliable predictors of the engenderment of such a motivation? Personal Crisis as Motivation The answer to the question is positive. Individuals who experienced a significant crisis in their personal life with strong emotional consequences, as well as individuals who never found their place in the community and thus suffered from social sanctions and low self-esteem, have always been easy targets for the “enlistment officers” of terrorist groups. These “enlistment officers” knew exactly how to push the right buttons. In other words, they became experts in exploiting the pain and weaknesses of people for their own political objectives. Such recruitments were mostly successful in cases where the community supported the martyrdom idea and the individual was convinced that his act would be lauded. Bilal Fahs, a member of the Lebanese Amal, was born to a poor family. His father left 153 his mother soon after Bilal’s birth, remarried and had a new family. Young Bilal grew up with his grandmother; however, this was not his sole predicament. His father’s marriage with his mother were never properly registered and, according to Lebanese law, Bilal was accordingly not recognised by the authorities and prevented from enjoying basic civilian rights such as education.311 Consequently, he spent most of his days wandering the streets of Beirut until he was recruited by the Amal people. Finally, for the first time in his life, he had some sense of belonging. When he turned seventeen, he met a young girl – they got engaged and the future seemed even brighter. However, Bilal’s past, once again, came back to haunt him. Preparations for the wedding were frustrated by the fact that Bilal had no civilian status and was not eligible to register for marriage. He was extremely discouraged by this indelible mark and bane on his life. Religious clerics who saw how devastated he was tried to talk to the authorities on his behalf but nothing helped. Bilal went through a dramatic change. His fiancée told reporters that he became obsessed with the fight against Israel in southern Lebanon and began to carry religious books and pictures of men who had perpetrated suicide acts against the Israeli forces. All his energy was transferred from his plans of marriage and starting a family to a full commitment to the jihad against the Israeli occupation. On June 16th, 1984, he smashed a car full of explosives into an Israeli military convoy. Fahs was Amal’s first suicide bomber.312 In many conservative societies, women who go through a personal crisis such as a divorce or an unintentional pregnancy suffer strong social condemnation and sanctions. In most cases, both these women and their families suffer from a dramatic decline in their social status. “Enlistment officers” of the different Palestinian groups identified this category of women as an ideal target of recruitment to suicide 154 missions.313 One of the most famous female suicide bombers to become elevated into the Palestinian pantheon of exalted champions was Wafa Idris. She was 31 years old when she detonated an explosive charge on Jaffa Street in the heart of Jerusalem on January 28th, 2002. In the years prior to her suicide attack, Idris worked as a nurse in the Palestinian city of Ramallah. People who knew her reported that she had exhibited a strong empathy for the pain of Palestinians injured in clashes with Israeli forces and expressed much frustration with regard to the situation in the city. However, this cannot be regarded as the sole motivation for her to become a suicide bomber. Idris was very different from most Palestinian women of her age. She was born to a poor family and lost her father when she was very young. When she turned sixteen she married her cousin, Ahmad. Soon afterwards it became apparent that she could not have children and her husband asked for a divorce. Deeply shamed, Idris returned to her mother’s house and put all her energy into voluntary activities. Her aunt, who was interviewed shortly after Idris’ death, said that her former husband’s insensitivity drove Idris to her death. From her bedroom window, Idris saw her ex-husband remarry and she even took part in the party he threw on the day he became a father. She was deeply humiliated but wanted to show the community that she still had her pride. Her friend, Raffa Abu Hamid, added that after the divorce, the conservative Palestinian society labelled her as a divorcee who could not have children. Feelings of emptiness and loss deprived her of all joy in life. The “enlistment officers” of the Al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigades who heard about her situation took advantage of it and appealed to her strong identification with the suffering of the people whom she treated. Indeed, following her death, Idris, the former outcast, became a popular 155 Palestinian hero.314 A careful scrutiny of the life stories of Palestinian women who became suicide bombers reveals that the story of Wafa Idris repeated itself, time and again, in different versions. Darine Abu Aisha, an English literature student from Al-Najah University in Nablus, who discharged an explosive belt at the Maccabim-Re’ut Junction on February 27th, 2002,315 was also a marginalized person.316 She resented her parent’s pressure to get married and rejected all the young men who asked for her hand. Her behaviour led the community to raise questions about her character and thus pose more pressure on the family.317 The videotape that she left and was broadcast on the Arab satellite channel, ANN, did not reveal the personal motivation for her act. She said she, “wanted to be the second woman—after Wafa Idris—to carry out a martyr operation and take revenge for the blood of the martyrs and the desecration of the sanctity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque”. Darine called attention to the crucial role of Palestinian women in the resistance: “Let Sharon the coward know that every Palestinian woman will give birth to an army of martyrs, and her role will not only be confined to weeping over a son, brother or husband; instead, she will become a martyr herself.”318 The story of Shifa Adnan Al-Qudsi, a 26-year-old from Tul-Karem who was arrested before she was able to complete her mission, is rather similar.319 Her status as a divorcee pushed her to the margins of the community.320 At the same time, her sympathy for the pain which her people experienced grew stronger.321 The fact that her brother had planned to perpetrate a suicide mission and instead was shot and captured by Israeli soldiers was the final trigger that prompted her to offer herself for a suicide mission to the representatives of the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades. 156 Ayat Al-Akhras was somewhat different. She was a brilliant eighteen-year-old high school student who on March 29th, 2002, for no apparent reason, blew herself up at the entrance to a supermarket in the Kiryat Yovel neighbourhood of Jerusalem, killing two and injuring 30.322 Like her predecessors, in the videotape that Al-Akhras left, she said that she chose this path in order to protect the Palestinian people and to show the Arab leaders who neglected the Palestinian cause what one young woman was capable of doing.323 Or in her own words: “I am going to fight instead of the sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fighting alone…It is an Intifada until victory”.324 However, shortly after her death, rumours started spreading around that Al-Akhras had been sexually active with her fiancé and became pregnant.325 Afraid of the social sanctions she would be subject to by her family and community, she probably preferred to end her life for a noble cause. An almost identical incident is the case of the twenty-year-old student, Andalib Takatka, from Beit Fajar who committed a suicide act two weeks after Al-Akhras in the Mahaneh Yehuda market in Jerusalem. In an interview previous to her suicide mission, Andalib Takatka said, “When you want to carry out such an attack, whether you are a man or a woman, you don’t think about the explosive vest or about your body being ripped into pieces. We are suffering. We are dying while we are still alive”.326 Following the attack, rumours started spreading to the effect that she had been romantically involved with a Fatah activist and got pregnant from him.327 Although evidence with respect to the romantic relations in the last two accounts of the female suicide terrorists is partial, it remains apparent that in conservative societies, setting out on a suicide mission can sometimes be a more appealing alternative than living a life of condemnation on the margins of society. A case clearly 157 illustrating this point is that of Rim Salah al-Riashi, the 22-year-old mother of two from Gaza, who detonated an explosive belt at the Erez Crossing in the northern part of the Gaza Strip in January 2004. Al-Riashi, the first Hamas female suicide bomber, was known to have problems in her marriage and according to some sources, was sent on the mission by both her husband and lover in order to help her avoid the social sanctions which are imposed on an unfaithful woman in a highly conservative society.328 Not only women chose to volunteer for suicide missions in order to avoid social sanctions. A reporter of the Qatar-based TV station, Al-Jazeera, presented the story of a sixteen-year-old boy from Nablus who detonated an explosive belt when he was approached by Israeli police officers on June 16th, 2002. According to the story, the boy whose name was not disclosed was infected with the HIV virus when he received a blood transfusion during an operation a few months earlier. Unable to live with the stigma of a person with AIDS, he preferred to die in a way which would bring some of his dignity back.329 Shadi Nasser from the village of Madama near Nablus suffered from a disability for many years. When he was four years old, he fell off a building and sustained a severe head trauma. Ever since that ill-fated day, he suffered from recurrent epileptic episodes and was rejected by his peers who thought he was insane. When he turned fifteen, Nasser could not take the mocking and humiliation anymore and decided to quit school. He felt lonely and depressed and moved from one job to another. On March 3rd, 2002, he executed a suicide attack in the city of Ariel on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Shortly after his death, posters with Nasser’s image adorned every corner of his small village and, for the first time, he 158 gained the respect he had so desperately yearned for when he was alive.330 His family members had no idea when and how he had been recruited for the mission and they did not approve of the act. His brother Rami said that a short time before the attack, Shadi started expressing views against the occupation but there were no indications that he was planning to do something. According to Rami’s assumption, organisation recruiters took advantage of Shadi’s physical and mental condition and manipulated him into this act. The fact that a few months prior to the attack he had been beaten by Israeli soldiers could also have been a trigger which made him more predisposed to engage in the act.331 This precipitating factor leads us to the motivation which seems to be the strongest indicator in the perpetration of a suicide act— revenge. Revenge as Motivation The basic urge to inflict pain on those perceived as responsible for the anguish of the aggrieved party appears in many biographies of suicide bombers throughout the world. It should be noted, however, that revenge is not limited only to cases where an individual suffers a direct loss, such as an injury or losing a loved person in an action committed by the perceived aggressor. Revenge can also be in consequence to the continuous suffering of the community to which the perpetrator belongs. Many suicide bombers stated that they wanted to hurt the enemy in the same way that the people had been hurt by it, and they wanted to make this enemy feel and pay for what it had done to the community. The story of Sana Mheidleh, who was the first female suicide bomber in Lebanon, may serve as a good example of this kind of revenge. Mheidleh was only sixteen years old when she drove a car bomb into an Israeli checkpoint on April 9th, 1985.332 159 Despite her Shiite origin, Mheidleh was not a member of the Hezbollah but of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.333 Before embarking on her mission, she spoke to her comrades and left a letter.334 When discussing her motives for perpetrating the attack, she clearly stated that religion had nothing to do with it. All she wanted was revenge. She stated that her act should be some of the consequences that the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon would have to suffer for the way it had treated the Lebanese people.335 Almost sixteen years later, on March 4th, 2001, Ahmad Alian, a 22-year-old Palestinian from the Nur A-Shams refugee camp, detonated an explosive belt, killing three and injuring 60 in the Israeli city of Netanya.336 Alian was a very religious person who worked in the local mosque as a muezzin. He was not a known member of any terrorist organisation and it appears that he made the decision to become a shahid more or less on his own.337 In a letter he left behind, Alian wrote: “Israel is slaughtering the Palestinians and Jerusalem is still under occupation. Therefore, we Palestinians must sacrifice ourselves in any possible way for the Lord and for Jerusalem”.338 Despite the strong religious rhetoric in Alian’s statement, it seems that the main motivation for his act was the urge to protest against the Israeli occupation and to avenge the death of his fellow Palestinians.339 The desire to take vengeance for the community’s suffering became a recurrent motif among Palestinian suicide bombers during the years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Jamal Nasser, a 23-year-old electrical engineering student from Nablus who detonated an explosive device near a school bus in Shavei Shomron on April 29th, 2001, left a letter and a videotape. In the letter, he wrote that he made the decision to become a suicide bomber because “He wanted to revenge the death of all the Palestinian shahids”.340 In 160 the videotape, he elaborated: “I was driven to this act by my love for the lord and the Al-Aqsa Mosque and by my desire to revenge the blood of the shahids…While Arab leaders and kings neglect their duty in protecting Palestine, I tell them: we do not want your money, your food or your medicine. We want your soldiers for the liberation of Palestine”.341 Nasser was one of many Palestinian suicide bombers who made such statements prior to their deaths. Less than a month later, on May 18th, 2001, Mahmood Ahmad Marmash, a twenty- year-old carpenter from Tul-Karem, activated his explosive belt at the entrance to the Sharon (“Hadarim”) shopping mall in Netanya, killing six and injuring more than a hundred.342 This time the only indication of a motive was found on a videotape distributed by the Hamas. In the tape, Marmash said: “I will turn my body into a bomb which will explode the bodies of the Zionists who are ancestors of pigs and monkeys. I will revenge every drop of blood that was spilled on the soil of Jerusalem”. Later in the tape, he said that the death of a Palestinian baby, Iman Hiju, one week earlier in Gaza, had shocked his very being and triggered him to act at that point in time.343 Following Marmash’s death, his sister, Wahiba, made a comment that was not very different from the one made by Jamal Nasser. She said, “My brother did what he had to do and it should be a good lesson to the (Palestinian) leaders who are doing nothing…I am very proud of him”.344 Therefore, along with the urge to avenge the pain and humiliation of Palestinians by means of killing Israeli civilians, these suicide bombers also expressed their frustration at the incompetence of the Palestinian Authority, as they perceived it. Over the coming months, the idea of committing a suicide attack in an act of vengeance against the Israelis, while at the same time protesting the inadequacy of the 161 Palestinian authority, became a pattern. Ismail Al-Maswabi, a 27-year-old student at the University of Gaza, exploded himself and a group of Israeli soldiers near the Dugit settlement in the Gaza Strip on June 22nd, 2001. He left no explanation for his act, but his father, Bashir, who celebrated his son’s death much in the manner of a wedding party, said: “This is not an ordinary wedding, which anyone can have. This is a wedding that only very special people are entitled to—a wedding with heaven…My son resisted the occupation and the wrong way of some of our leaders…he did it out of our desire for freedom…he did not kill himself…he sacrificed himself for the Lord and for our homeland”.345 Similar statements were made by the family members of Mohammed Saeed al- Hotary, a 22-year-old Palestinian from Qalqilya who had resided in Jordan for many years346 and was responsible for the attack on the beachside club, Dolphi disco, in Tel Aviv on June 2nd, 2001.347 This attack claimed the lives of 21 people, most of them young immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were waiting to enter the popular nightclub on a Friday night. Hotary’s family put the blame on Israel for his act.348 His father said: “The Palestinian people believe in peace, but the Israelis left us with no other alternative but this one…I am very happy that my son did it; I wish that I had many more sons who could have committed such actions. I would have loved to do it myself”.349 This type of revenge seems to occur in communities that have experienced long periods of repression that are felt, in one way or another, by almost every member of the community. Such acts of revenge are sparked off in cases where there is a collective sense that the situation must be changed but there is no one who is ready to do anything about it. Under such circumstances, individual members of the 162 community feel it is their duty to make the oppressor pay while at the same time they are also signalling to their leaders and allies that the community is frustrated and disappointed by their incompetence. In many cases, these perpetrators are regarded as heroes and their families garner a lot of support from the community. Suicidal acts of revenge provoked by personal reasons are a different matter. These generally take place a short while after the perpetrator has suffered a significant loss and the action is a relatively individual one. This kind of attack was prevalent both among Chechen suicide bombers—mostly the women—and the Palestinian community during the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Kaira was a 22-year-old student when she took part in the tragic siege of the Moscow theatre. Despite the fact that she grew up in a religious Muslim family, she had always felt an affiliation with the West. She particularly loved European and American history, literature and music.350 During the long years of the war in Chechnya, Kaira fell in love and got married. Shortly after the wedding, her husband joined the ranks of the rebels and six months later he was killed in action. For Kaira, this was just the beginning. The Russian army found out that she had been married to a rebel. A patrol stormed her family’s house and took away her sixteen-year-old brother. Not long afterwards, the family recovered his mutilated body. It was clear to them that the boy had been severely tortured before he was executed. Over the next few months, Kaira also lost her cousin and, to make matters even worse, the family’s house was destroyed in a Russian artillery attack.351 Kaira was crushed. She felt guilty for marrying a rebel and bringing so many calamities on her family,352 as well as anger against the Russians who were pitiless towards young children, women and older people.353 According to an American friend of hers, these circumstances led her to 163 join the group which attacked the theatre.354 Many more Chechen women turned to suicide bombing, spurred on by the urge to avenge the death of a loved one. Following are just a few illustrations: on May 14th, 2003, Larisa Musalayeva detonated an explosive belt during a religious festival in Belorechie. Her story begins a half-year earlier, when her brother, Imran, a well- known Chechen rebel, committed suicide355 when the bodyguards of Akhmad Kadyrov (a Chechen leader loyal to President Putin) tried to catch and arrest him.356 Subsequently, Larisa accused Kadyrov and his bodyguards in the death of her brother and resolved to take revenge. When she heard Kadyrov was going to be present at the religious festival in Belorechie, she tried to assassinate him in a suicide attack.357 She perished in the blast and so did Kadyrov’s bodyguards and many others but Kadyrov himself was left unharmed. Luiza Gazuyeva, whose husband and two brothers were brutally killed by Russian troops, blew herself up near a group of soldiers. Shahida Baymuradova, a 46-year-old woman, who was responsible for the May, 2003, attack in Ilishkhan-Yurt,358 lost her husband during the 1999 fights.359 One of the most illuminating cases in regard to this phenomenon is the account of a woman known as Kawa. She agreed to give a media interview before departing on her ultimate mission.360 Kawa’s husband was tortured to death by Russian soldiers and, as a result, she became a member of the “Black Widows” of Chechnya, determined to avenge his death. The first thing she did was to join a group of rebels sent to locate her husband’s killers. When they identified one of them, they tortured him to death in front of Kawa’s eyes.361 Then, Kawa decided it was time to leave on her own mission. Despite her strong ties to the Wahabist current of Islam, when asked about her motivation to become a suicide bomber, she never mentioned a religious cause. She 164 said: “Now I am left with one dream, to blow myself up in Russia and take with me as many Russians as possible. I want to be sent on such a mission. I want revenge. This is the only way to stop the Russians from killing Chechens. Maybe now they will understand the message and leave us alone”.362 Later in the interview, Kawa discussed the roots of her hatred towards Russians in more detail. In 1995, when she was only fourteen years old, her father was killed during a raid of a Russian force on the family house. Later, she fell in love with Salman, who was two years older than her. He joined a small group of radical Muslim Chechens who aspired to free Chechnya and turn it into a Muslim theocracy. Shortly before he was killed, the Russians identified Salman as a prominent figure among the rebels and planned on ambushing him. He was caught by surprise, tortured and then shot dead. The immediate trigger for Kawa’s decision to leave her young daughter with Salman’s mother and join the rebels was the fact that after his death, Salman’s face was brutally mutilated in order to prevent identification. This act of cruelty horrified Kawa. When she heard the details, she made a commitment to take revenge.363 This type of individual retaliation is also present among men and women in other parts of the world, most prominently among Palestinians. A review of the records and accounts of over 180 Palestinian suicide bombers confirmed that close to half of them—and a larger number during the years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada—embarked on their suicide missions shortly after they had lost a very close person. This person could have been a friend, family member or lover. On July 16th, 2001, Mustafa Abu-Shaduf,364 a twenty-year-old from the city of Jenin, detonated an explosive device at the Binyamina train station. Two Israelis were killed and ten others were injured.365 Despite the fact that the organisation which sent 165 Mustafa, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, announced that this was in response to the continuation of crimes committed by Israel against the Palestinians;366 other sources indicate that Abu-Shaduf was driven to the act by the loss of his brother seven months earlier in a clash with Israeli soldiers. Later, a friend of his who was a member of the local chapter of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was assassinated by a missile launched from an Israeli helicopter. To add to this, a few weeks prior to his departure on the suicide attack, Abu-Shaduf’s best friend, Mahmud Juma Hamdan, disappeared.367 On August 12th, 2001, three weeks after Abu-Shaduf’s attack in Binyamina, Muhammad Nasser, a 28-year-old bachelor who was also a member of the northern group of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, detonated his suicide bomb at the Wall Street Café in Kiryat Motzkin (a suburb of Haifa), injuring 20 people.368 His father, Mahmud, told reporters that Nasser had served in the police intelligence unit in Jenin but had decided to quit his job following the IDF assassination of his friend, Iyad Hardan, one of the prominent Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaders in Samaria. Nasser became obsessed with the wish to avenge Hardan’s death. Prior to his departure on the suicide mission, he told his friends that all that was left for him was the desire to meet Iyad in heaven.369 Jihad Titi was motivated by a very similar reason. This eighteen-year-old from the refugee camp of Balata near Nablus activated his explosive belt on May 27th, 2002, in Petah Tikva a week after three Fatah activists from Nablus were killed by Israeli soldiers. Among them was Mahmud Titi, Jihad’s cousin.370 This event drove the young man straight into the hands of the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades who were looking for a candidate to carry out a suicide mission in response to an attack on their people.371 166 A well-known and illustrative case of this phenomenon is the story of Hanadi Jaradat, which has already been discussed in the first chapter. Jaradat, who perpetrated one of the most deadly attacks against Israeli civilians at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, was a 29-year-old lawyer from Jenin. Both Salah, her cousin and fiancé, and her brother, Fadi, were killed by Israeli soldiers. Fadi was shot near the house of her family372 and the soldiers did not let her approach her dying brother and offer him help. Fadi was a role figure for Jaradat. He supported her during her student years in Jordan and took care of their father who suffered from cancer. After Fadi’s death, Jaradat assumed all his duties in the household, including taking care of her ailing father. This was another frustrating experience. Her father was being treated at the Rambam hospital in the city of Haifa and, in many instances, as result of closures in Jenin, he missed his treatments and his health deteriorated. Family members described Jaradat as a volcano waiting to erupt. All she could think of was avenging the death of her loved ones and to make the Israelis pay for the pain they had inflicted on her family.373 According to family members, four months previous to the attack, she went to visit her brother’s grave and swore to take vengeance. She said: “Your blood will not have been shed in vain. The murderer will pay the price and we will not be the only ones crying”.374 Iyad Al-Masri was much younger than Jaradat when he activated his explosive belt; he was only seventeen years old. However, the circumstances which led him to carry out the attack were very similar. On January 11th, 2004, Iyad left his parents’ home and never came back. Later that afternoon, his mother was watching the broadcasts of the Hezbollah TV station, Al-Manar and, at first, she did not make the connection between the story of a young Palestinian who detonated an explosive charge next to a 167 group of Israeli soldiers and the disappearance of her son. Only later that night, she received the news. What drove the quiet adolescent into the arms of the “enlistment officers” of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad? This saga began a week earlier on January 3rd. Amjad, Iyad’s younger brother, who was only fifteen years of age, woke up one morning and went to school as usual to take a civic studies exam. When he arrived at the school gate, he saw that it was surrounded by soldiers. They refused to let him in and sent him back home. Frustrated, he left and waited with his friends on the roof of a neighbour’s house. Up there, they kept track of the school premises, waiting for the soldiers to leave when, suddenly, Amjad fell down. He had been shot. According to his mother, all he did was observe the schoolyard. According to military sources, Amjad was throwing blocks at the soldiers. Amjad’s mother, Abir, and his brother, Iyad, rushed to him and found him unconscious. They called an ambulance but on the way to the hospital, they were stopped several times at military checkpoints. By the time they reached the emergency room, there was nothing to be done. Amjad was brought to burial that same day, but that was not the end of the story. During the funeral, a group of youngsters started protesting against the presence of soldiers in the area. Military sources reported that Molotov cocktails and blocks were thrown at the soldiers. Muhammad, Amjad’s cousin who, in the family’s version, was carrying his body and, according to the military, took part in the riots, was shot dead. A day later, he was buried next to Amjad. In the following weeks, there were no prominent changes in Iyad’s behavior. He did not even mention revenge; however, there were a few almost insignificant signs. For example, he never left the house and he began to smoke, something he had never done before. Most importantly, he asked his mother to extend the mourning period a little longer. A few days later, Iyad himself was dead in 168 the suicide attack he carried out against the Israeli army.375 Among the different crisis situations which may lead a person to commit a suicide attack, personal crises (except for financial ones) would be at the top of the list. It seems that a personal experience, whether it is the loss of a loved person and the urge to take revenge, or an event which has a strong impact on the person’s life, such as an unplanned pregnancy in a conservative society, would be the best predictor. Having said that, it should be stressed that the community has to view suicide terrorism as a positive phenomenon, and the person who perpetrates the act must be rewarded. In most cases, this reward will be the “resurrection” of the person following his/her death and an elevation of the social status of this person’s family. Without support from the community, the prospects of perpetrating a suicide attack, even for purposes of revenge, will diminish. As for a community crisis, embarking on a suicide mission solely on the basis of the community’s distress, is far less common. This type of behaviour will mostly characterise members of the community who are strongly integrated into it and are highly influenced by the collective feeling of hopelessness. Conditions reinforcing such behaviour will develop after a long period of repression and when the situation seems more hopeless than ever. An Analysis of the Motivations of Palestinian Suicide Bombers As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the attempt to construct a profile of suicide bombers based on psychological and socio-economic characteristics has for many years absorbed scholars and those engaged in military intelligence. While academics believe that a solid profile would enable them to figure out (estimate) what kind of people sacrifice themselves in suicide missions, and what motivates them, intelligence officers are highly interested in such profiles for the purpose of 169 identifying and stopping suicide terrorists before they are dispatched. The first wave of suicide attackers launched by the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad against Israeli targets consisted of 33 suicide bombers over a period of seven years until the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (April 1993-September 2000). In many aspects, this group fitted the profile of the Islamic mujahidin.376 They were single (89.35%) males (100%) and their average age was 23.21. Most had a religious background (53.6%)377 and they were also highly educated. Only a small minority of this group had no more than an elementary education (10.75%), while 39.3% had a high school education and 50% were either in academies or university students. Most of these suicide bombers (69.6%) were full- or part-time employed. Another common and important denominator was organisational affiliation. Over 71.4% were long-time members of one of the organisations and had a record of involvement in terrorist activities. Many of them also spent time in Israeli prisons. The group of Al-Aqsa Intifada suicide perpetrators numbered 150 in only 4 years (October 2000-September 2004) and its composition was already quite a different matter. Men still constituted the vast majority of this group but women became increasingly involved in the suicide type of terrorism over the years of this Intifada (5.4%). The number of unmarried perpetrators also increased during the course of the Intifada and stood at 92.3% (of whom 0.7% were divorced). The increase in the number of single individuals could be attributed, at least partially, to the fact that the average age dropped to 21.71. Yet, the most important differences between the two groups lie in other distinctions. Among Al-Aqsa Intifada perpetrators, only a minority of 46.9% had a religious background. Moreover, the level of education in this group was dramatically lower 170 than that of their predecessors. Twelve percent of Al-Aqsa Intifada perpetrators had an elementary education, 55.6% had a high school diploma and only 32.4% were either in academies or students in academic institutions. The levels of unemployed terrorists also increased and stood at 41.9%. More strikingly, only 24.2% of this group were members of a terrorist organisation or had spent time in an Israeli prison. Making solid inferences about the personal motivations of suicide terrorists on the basis of their changing characteristics as a group can be problematic. Yet, some ideas can be cautiously proffered. Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, suicide terrorism was no longer a unique trait of fundamentalist organisations which dispatched veteran activists who were mostly religious and educated men. Suicide terrorism became widespread among young Palestinians from very different backgrounds. Many of them were not highly ideological or religious and, furthermore, most of them were never active members of a terrorist organisation. The differences between the two groups lend some support to the commitment versus crisis dichotomy. The first generation of Palestinian suicide bombers was composed of a relatively small and homogenous group of members from the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, two religious fundamentalist organisations which objected to the peace process, once led by Arafat. The main motivation of these suicide bombers was to fulfil their duty as devout members of their organisations. During this period, both the role of socialisation as well as ideological indoctrination — discussed in the next chapter — in becoming a member of the organisation were of great import. Most suicide bombers from the much larger, second group had no organisational affiliation. Many of them offered themselves for suicide missions and did not really care under which organisational designation they would be carried out. The fact that 171 the second group was much bigger and more heterogeneous may indicate that this later wave of suicide terrorism was caused by the intensification of both personal and community crisis situations. In the months prior to the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and especially after its outbreak, the entire Palestinian community plummeted from a state of high hopes for a better future into a bitter and painful war. Many members of this community suffered directly from this change in circumstances. The next chapter will illustrate how the different Palestinian organisations transformed the idea of martyrdom into a virtue and essentially planted the culture of death within Palestinian society. By doing so, they offered members of the community undergoing a crisis a channel for articulating their frustration, deprivation and, above all, their urge for revenge. Summary At the beginning of this chapter, two key questions were posed: Who are suicide bombers and what motivates them? At this point, some conclusions can be offered. A suicide bomber can be almost anyone. Resorting to suicide terrorism, however, requires supporting preconditions as well as a triggering factor. Preconditions in most cases are related to the underlying values of the community and a situation of protracted conflict from which it has suffered. A combination of a culture which regards death as less threatening than the perception of death held by more Western cultures, and a violent conflict which takes a high toll on the community, can serve as a breeding ground for suicide terrorism. Yet, in order for this potential to materialise, there is a need for a strong organisational endorsement of the phenomenon, a subject which will be discussed in the next chapter, and a reserve of motivated candidates who will carry out suicide missions. The first precipitating motivational factor for 172 such a mission would be a total commitment of the individual to an organisation which endorses suicide terrorism or to a social network which regards the act of martyrdom as a virtue. The second triggering factor would be a crisis situation. This mostly applies to individuals who are members of the community but have no organisational affiliation. Under conditions of personal crisis, such as the loss of a loved person in a conflict, a divorce or unplanned pregnancy in a conservative society and, in fewer cases, even a financial problem, a person may volunteer or become more susceptible to the recruitment to a suicide assignment. Such a mission may be perceived by this individual as an ultimate vehicle for revenge, a way to gain personal rehabilitation, and even a channel for securing the financial future of his or her family. A second type of crisis is related to cases where the individual’s integration into the community is so profound that, overwhelmed by the pain inflicted on the community, this person regards the suicide attack as a reasonable action to help the group he or she identifies with. 173 Chapter 7 – The Recruitment and Socialisation of the Suicide Terrorist Murad Tawalbi was no different from most of his friends. He was born in the Palestinian city of Jenin in 1983. A boy with considerable political awareness, he was very much absorbed in the Palestinian struggle for independence. However, except for throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli soldiers like many of his peers, he had never been involved in more serious terrorist activities. In fact, when he turned 18, he even joined the Palestinian police forces. Yet, Murad was different in one crucial aspect. His older brother Mohammad was the charismatic leader of the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Jenin.378 Following a routine confrontation with IDF soldiers, in which one of Murad’s best friends, Amjad Hasnia, was shot dead, Mohammad noticed that his brother had changed. He was constantly upset and kept repeating that he wanted to avenge the death of his friend. Mohammad’s response was not long in coming. He asked one of his comrades, Tabet Mardawi, to approach his younger brother and recruit him to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Murad responded enthusiastically to the offer. At first, he was told that he would be sent on a mission to Haifa, which is only a thirty-minute drive from Jenin, and that he would be expected to open fire on passers-by in a crowded street. He had even undergone a short training period for this mission with another young member of the organisation. However, in the end, the plan did not materialise.379 In May 2002, a few months later, Murad was approached directly by his older brother. This time the offer was more concrete. The target again was downtown Haifa and this time Murad understood that he was expected to stab civilians with a knife in a final 174 act of sacrifice. In other words, much like the 11th century assassins, he was supposed to run down the street and stab people until he was either killed or stopped. Two months later, the plan was slightly modified. Mohammad and Mardawi invited Murad to Mohammad’s apartment in the Jenin refugee camp where they described to him the virtues of becoming a shahid. They specifically emphasised the shahid’s role as the advocate of his parents and other family members in heaven on judgment day. He was also reminded of the fact that once he reached the gates of heaven, as a shahid, he would be welcomed by 72 beautiful virgins. Murad was very impressed. In the following days, he went through a brief training procedure. Besides hearing stories about the importance of the act of istishad, stories which were meant to strengthen his spirit, Murad also went through some tactical training. Only then, the true nature of the planned attack was revealed to him. Instead of stabbing Israelis, he was instructed to detonate an explosive belt in a crowded street. At this point, he showed no objection. 380 The final stage in the training process took place in the house of Haj Ali Sphoori, one of the prominent leaders of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Jenin. When Murad entered the room, he saw his brother waiting for him. He was instructed to write a will and then read it in front of a video camera. In his will, Murad asked his mother and brothers to be strong and patient until they would all be reunited one day in heaven. When the short ritual ended, he was sent back home with instructions to return to the same place the next day at 4 am. The following day, he arrived at the house before dawn and was welcomed by his brother and Sphoori. The slim boy was wrapped in a 6 kg explosive belt and then covered with three shirts to make him look a little overweight. Before he was sent to 175 pray for the last time, Murad was informed that he had two options regarding the destination of the attack. He could either go to the city of Afula or the original target, downtown Haifa. Murad chose Haifa. Following another short ritual, he boarded a taxi waiting for him outside Sphoori’s house. The taxi dropped him off at the village of Anin, very close to Israeli territory. Another Jihad activist smuggled him into Um- al-Fahem, which is an Arab city inside Israel. For the first time since his recruitment Murad was alone. He decided to join a group of Arab workers and boarded a taxi to Haifa. Thirty minutes later, he left the taxi near a mosque in the Arab quarter of the city. Not far from the mosque, he noticed a group of about 150 people who were shop owners and customers at the local flea market. Murad knew that this was an ideal opportunity. He approached the crowd and moved his hand to the activation button of the explosive belt when suddenly, he froze. In a statement which he later gave, he said that he suddenly was overcome with fear. “I was afraid. I was flooded with thoughts of my mother and brothers. I decided not to blow myself up with all these people, I felt sorry for them. They did nothing wrong”. Later, he added that he saw some Arab faces in the crowd and was afraid that he would harm them as well. Scared and confused, Murad fled the scene. A few minutes later, he tried to summon up his courage, and returned to the market. However, once again, he just could not do it. Finally, he ran to a deserted building where he took off the belt. Then he called his brother from a payphone and told him that he had failed to accomplish the mission due to an electrical failure which prevented the detonation. Later on, when he tried to flee the scene, he was detained by a police patrol and revealed the whole story. Ultimately, he was prosecuted and is now serving a 7-year sentence in an Israeli prison.381 176 Despite his failed mission, the story of Murad’s recruitment, training and dispatching sheds light on the process of how a young person, who is sometimes bitter, upset and eager for revenge, is transformed into a live bomb. In the following sections of this chapter, I will investigate the training process of suicide bombers and dispute the contention that suicide terrorism is a trait of a certain culture or religion. Alternatively, I will argue that this phenomenon is to a large extent a result of favourable environmental conditions and a well-orchestrated organisational process. However, prior to this, I will discuss the role of the surrounding environment in supporting the recruitment processes of potential suicide terrorists in different parts of the world. Then, I will conduct a comparative analysis of the organisational process, i.e., the recruitment, training and dispatching of suicide bombers by different groups, and finally, I will highlight similarities and differences. The Environmental Setting of Suicide Terrorism As mentioned in previous chapters, many academic voices have recently been heard linking Muslim religion and Arab culture to suicide terrorism.382 Yet, as I have shown, suicide terrorism generally runs its course in short-term campaigns, mostly lasting up to three years. This indicates that there is a person or organisation who decides when to start and end it. Moreover, suicide terrorism rarely appears in a non- organised form. Therefore, it should not be treated as a spontaneous phenomenon but more as well-designed and planned. People do not just take to the streets and begin to set off explosive devices. They are trained for this mission by an organisation which has a set of goals. Hence, I believe that the arguments which stress that suicide terrorism is a product of a certain culture or religion should be carefully examined. I do, however, believe that 177 culture and religion are utilised for the purpose of training the suicide bomber and that some societies are more vulnerable to this phenomenon than others. The chances of finding suicide terrorists in affluent and prosperous societies are not very high. The same is true for societies in which life is a dominant value and the aspiration to preserve life is superior to all other goals and dreams. Yet, suicide terrorism is also not present in most poor societies or societies where life is considered as no more than a path that must be taken before the individual reaches his/her eternal destination. So what are the conditions which allow some societies to show understanding and support for this phenomenon? As presented in chapter 2, a survey of areas in the world where suicide terrorism has emerged and is perceived as a virtue by large parts of the population underscores the factor of a long-lasting conflict with a powerful enemy that has inflicted much pain on that society. This predicament generates frustration and results in the dehumanisation of the other side.383 As strange as it may sound, in certain societies that perceive themselves as weak and who feel hopeless and oppressed by such a powerful enemy, suicide terrorism, which has the potential to cause considerable pain, damage and confusion to the aggressor, can empower that society. It may even offer hope that things will eventually change or it may at least ensure that the aggressor suffers. In some cases, perception of the enemy as evil and dehumanised makes it easier for people to support acts in which not only soldiers and politicians but also innocent civilians and children are killed. One interesting fact should be emphasized. Social support for suicide terrorism, or the “culture of death”, as it is described in other places,384 is very rarely a grassroots phenomenon. Actually, it is a highly calculated top-down phenomenon. 178 The organisation which adopts this strategy is greatly concerned with its public image and the level of support it receives from its potential constituency. Hence, the organisation’s leadership is engaged in trying to mobilise support and one of the prominent ways of doing this — among societies which are oppressed and feel weak and hopeless — is by supplying heroes and hope. The Hezbollah was the first organisation to launch waves of suicide attacks. Early suicide campaigns carried out by this organisation were marked by high levels of secrecy. Organisation leaders wanted to leave no traces of their involvement in order to prevent counterattacks against the organisation. Moreover, as Sheikh Subhi al- Tufeili explained, the organisation was reluctant to take responsibility for the attacks so that not a specific person or organisation, but Islam in general, would be glorified. However, a few years later this picture began to change as Hezbollah leaders realised the political power of martyrdom.385 The first sign of an attempt to create a supporting culture with respect to suicide bombers was the case of Ahmad Qasir, which was discussed in the previous chapter.386 It took the organisation over two years to reveal the identity and picture of the fifteen-year-old suicide bomber,387 but soon after the release of his photo, Qasir became a mega-celebrity both in Lebanon and Iran. This was a result of a concentrated effort by Iran and the Hezbollah to market him as a hero. Huge posters of Qasir’s image rising from the ruins of the Israeli barracks were positioned along roadsides and inside the Shiite villages of southern Lebanon. The Iranian leadership erected a memorial site in the name of Qasir, the Islamic hero, in Teheran. The anniversary of his lethal act has been commemorated by the Hezbollah every year since then. Dozens of potential shahids declaring they are ready to walk in Qasir’s 179 footsteps march along the streets and the number of supporters attending these annual events continues to grow every year.388 This approach has proven to be highly effective. Almost ten years after the Hezbollah stopped sending its members on suicide missions, Sheikh Naim Kassem, one of its leaders, claimed that the organisation’s reserve of potential suicide bombers has expanded. Swayed by the “culture of death” created and nurtured by the organisation, many people responded to the huge recruitment posters in the streets of southern Lebanon, offering themselves for suicide missions. The organisation has been so persuasive that it did not have to deploy special operatives for the recruitment of new members for suicide missions. All its leaders had to do was pick out the best people for the job from the many applicants.389 The question is, what has made Hezbollah’s efforts to establish this “culture of death” so successful? There are arguments that Islamic religion looks favourably upon acts of martyrdom, yet the case is not so simple; Islam in fact has many faces. Hezbollah started launching suicide attacks under fairly auspicious conditions. Lebanon was torn apart by a long-drawn-out civil war, during which the Shiite population, and the Hezbollah’s constituency, suffered greatly. The organisation’s leadership, backed by Iran, learned quickly how to turn a blind eye to those authoritative voices in the Muslim world which objected to the idea of suicide (“intihar”, in Arabic). The Hezbollah eventually adopted the Iranian stance on the issue which was developed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, according to which such attacks are not considered suicide acts. During the war with Iraq in the 1980s, the Iranian army, suffering from military inferiority, recruited young boys whose function was to walk into Iraqi minefields. 180 Sometimes they even carried explosive devices on their bodies and were required to run towards Iraqi tanks. These children proved to be an effective tactical tool and Khomeini did not want to lose this advantage. However, he needed popular support for sending young children to die in battlefield and so he used his religious authority to make the distinction between a condemnable suicide act and a praiseworthy act of self-sacrifice (“istishad”, in Arabic). This religious justification was important for the children’s families and for Iranian society, yet, it was not appealing enough for the children themselves. In order to attract them, Khomeini cultivated an ethos of self- sacrifice.390 The army officers who recruited these children promised them the keys to the gates of heaven and fitted them out with headbands flaunting the slogan, “Long Live Khomeini”. Steadily, the idea of joining the army and becoming a hero or even a martyr spread among boys in Iran. This cultural phenomenon, created by the top- down approach of the regime, was translated into peer pressure and even became a trend among Iranian youths. A great number of these children felt the pressure of their friends, and bearing in mind the social rewards they would receive once they became heroes, went off and enlisted in the army, often without the approval of their parents, many of whom remained sceptical about the idea of “istishad” or “martyrdom”.391 The Hezbollah was not the only organisation to successfully adopt this approach. Years after it stopped dispatching suicide bombers, this strategy was passed over to Palestinian organisations, using the same “marketing” approach. As mentioned in previous chapters, Palestinian organisations did not need much encouragement to turn to suicide terrorism. They were fighting the same Israeli enemy as the Hezbollah, and were inspired by the fact that suicide bombing proved to be effective in the Hezbollah’s struggle against Israeli forces. They also realised it was not enough to 181 prove to the Palestinian people the strategic advantages of this phenomenon; it would have to become something prestigious and desirable. Therefore, both the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad adopted the Hezbollah’s approach of glorying self- sacrifice and creating a “culture of death”. However, during the 1990s, when both organisations started sending suicide terrorists off to Israeli cities, Palestinian society was not really eager to embrace this type of culture. Many Palestinians saw the Oslo Accords as the prospect of a better future. However, before long, the hope for a bright future was once more replaced by despair. Disappointment with the Israeli lack of will to implement the Accords coupled with anger towards the Palestinian National Authority — which did not show a real commitment to improving the living standards of the average Palestinian — served the efforts of terrorist organisations in disseminating a “culture of death” in Palestinian society. At first, this consisted of turning out posters of shahids with the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the background which were circulated and posted in the streets. Later, and especially following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the streets were covered with graffiti in praise of the shahids. Songs in their honour were written and broadcast on the radio. Mass rallies were devoted to the presentation of dramatic pieces which depicted suicide attacks and Internet sites were created in memory of perpetrators. This time, the organisations were highly successful in cultivating this convention. The idea of istishad became a virtue and was associated with symbolic capital. Young children started playing the “shahid game” in which they imitated suicide attacks. Public support for suicide terrorism increased and the number of volunteers for such operations reached new peaks.392 The Palestinian shahid became a cultural icon and 182 society regarded this model as a powerful act of hope rather than one of despair.393 There is evidence of the creation of death or martyrdom cultures in other places as well. For example, in the case of the PKK, women who volunteered for, or were even forced into suicide missions, received the support of parts of the Kurdish community in southeast Turkey for these activities and enjoyed an elevation in their social status.394 Even Tamil communities in Sri Lanka felt empowered by the LTTE’s decisive struggle and in some cases supported the martyrdom acts of their children for the greater cause of national liberation.395 Another interesting example of the emergence of a “culture of death” can be found in Chechnya. Since the advent of suicide terrorism in this part of the world in the early years of this decade, mostly perpetrated by the unit of “Black Widows”, the surrounding environment has shown growing support for these women and their acts. These women have become the heroes of the rebels. Admirers have glorified their acts, written songs of praise and used the Internet to encourage wider support for the phenomenon.396 Hence, culturally, suicide terrorism can be described as a result of a spiralling, feedback process between an organisation and its constituency. In order to sustain a suicide campaign, every terrorist organisation needs the support of the community. Raising such support depends upon the organisation’s success in instilling ideas among members of the society about the importance of martyrdom and glorifying these notions by religious, nationalistic or other means. Under certain conditions, such as ongoing repression, desperation and hopelessness, certain societies will be willing to embrace these cultural elements and close the circle by providing the organisation with support for instigating suicide acts. This chain of events can be broken under two conditions. If the organisation’s 183 leadership decides that suicide terrorism is no longer effective, it will stop fostering this type of culture. Alternatively, if there is a change in external circumstances and the community becomes hopeful and sees prospects of a better future, the appeal of martyrdom will diminish. This analysis helps break the myth of the connection between Islam and suicide terrorism. First, as mentioned earlier, a “culture of death” can be created by non- religious organisations who justify martyrdom with nationalistic or ethnic rhetoric. Second, all cases of Islamic suicide terrorism have been initiated by organisations that have also cultivated the surrounding culture. Hence, culture or religion is not the source of the phenomenon for, suicide terrorism did not just spring unaided from this type of society. As described in previous chapters, the first phase of a suicide campaign begins with a decision made by the organisation elite. In order to maintain campaign momentum, the organisation needs support from its constituency; religious rhetoric or any other strong rhetoric can be useful for this purpose. These means are also highly important in the recruitment and training segments of prospective suicide bombers. At this stage, I will proceed to analyse the organisational process which starts out with the identification of a potential suicide bomber; it then continues with his or her training, and is completed when the individual is sent on his/her last mission. As in the case of collecting data of the perpetrators, obtaining comparative data on the organisational process was not a simple task; many organisations maintain high levels of secrecy and prevent any disclosure of information. The following analysis is based on data which has been collected over a long period of time from publications and studies on organisations as well as from the testimonies of members and ex-members. 184 Recruitment In cases where organisations succeeded in fostering strong communal support for suicide terrorism, the recruitment stage is far easier than when such support is absent. Nonetheless, finding the right person for the mission, recruiting him or her to the organisation and coaxing this person into sacrificing his or her life for the organisation is not an easy task. The recruitment mechanism of potential suicide bombers varies among the different organisations. However, recruitment methods can generally be classified into three main types. The first is when a person approaches the organisation and offers him or herself for a suicide mission. The second is the grassroots mobilisation of a group of people who are committed to a certain cause and who are willing to die for it. These people sometimes approach the organisation for specific guidelines regarding the suicide mission. The third method, which is the most common, is active recruitment. This is when the organisation’s “enlistment officers” are sent to recruit new members. In the majority of cases, new members are first offered to become fighters and only after the training process some are singled out for suicide acts. Individuals seeking to become suicide bombers and who approach organisational operatives on their own accord are most common in societies which adhere to a “culture of death”. Once the idea of martyrdom becomes deeply rooted in society and receives strong popular support, members of this society will alter their views on the act of sacrifice. Culture shapes the way we perceive reality. A culture which perceives martyrdom as a virtue has the potential to incite people in certain situations to do almost anything in order to attain this goal. It would not be true, however, to claim that anyone can be persuaded to perform such 185 deeds. Otherwise, we would see thousands of candidates waiting in line to become suicide bombers. A more accurate description would be that when the suicide method is bestowed with a positive image, people who are highly committed to a cause or in certain crisis situations, as described in the previous chapter, may be more likely to volunteer for this mission. The second method of recruitment for suicide missions should be approached from a network perspective. This recruitment method is particularly relevant in the case of Al-Qaeda but lately became highly visible in other instances as well, most prominently the Palestinian. For many years, Al-Qaeda was markedly interested in recruiting Muslim and Arab youngsters residing in Arab and Western countries, with the aim of conscripting these youths to fight under the flag of Islam.397 The liaison operative sent by the organisation for the recruitment mission was mostly a former member of the organisation who had gone through military and primarily ideological training in one of the mujahidin’s camps. Many of these liaison officers, after a period of training, were sent back to the countries of their origin and if they were posted to Western countries, they received very specific instructions on how to assimilate, mostly by marrying a local woman. Many of them found positions in mosques which allowed them to get to know the local Muslim community, identify potential candidates for recruitment and initiate their training process.398 Following a period of preliminary training and evaluation, novices were invited to become members of Al- Qaeda.399 As mentioned earlier, the American invasion of Afghanistan has hurt the core of Al- Qaeda in a dramatic way. The organisation in effect has lost its stronghold in Afghanistan, a fact highly visible in the reduction of the extent of its terrorist 186 operations as well as in its reduced geographical dispersion. Following this invasion, the importance of these overseas social clusters has increased and they have become the major source of terrorism under the umbrella of the global jihad. Since 2002, it has become evident that many of the cells operating under the name of Al-Qaeda were actually local cells with very loose ties to the organisational core.400 However, the most common recruitment method is still by way of “enlistment officers”. One of the most explicit manifestations of this recruitment method is evident in the case of the LTTE. For many years, representatives of the organisation were sent to Tamil communities, especially in Jaffna, for the purpose of recruiting children aged 12 to 16 who dropped out of school, mainly due to family economic difficulties. These recruiters were instructed to go from one house to another in pursuit of potential candidates. However, not only school dropouts were conscripted. In some Tamil areas, the LTTE gained control over many aspects of civilian life, including the education system. This privileged status allowed organisation operatives access to schools. In the first stage, teachers were instructed to indoctrinate their students about the importance of the Tamil struggle and the leading role of the LTTE in this struggle. Then, during school hours, members of the organisation would enter classrooms and talk to the children about the LTTE and its goals. One specific way to attract the young children was by showing them movies featuring earlier successful operations. Many of the children who became highly enthusiastic were immediately signed up; in other cases, children who were not eager to join the organisation were forced to enlist.401 The recruitment process to the PKK was rather similar. Many PKK fighters who were recruited from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe were approached by organisation 187 “enlistment officers” in Kurdish cultural centres where many youths spent their time. There is evidence that, at these centres, young men went through a process of indoctrination whose aim was to build up their Kurdish identity and introduce them to the PKK.402 A similar process took place in Kurdish summer camps. Children were approached in their schools by representatives of the PKK and were invited to cultural camps all over Europe where they learned about the Kurdish struggle. Some of these children never returned home but rather were sent directly to the battle zone in southeast Turkey.403 The PKK’s method of recruiting specifically for suicide missions was slightly different. Most suicide attacks mounted by the organisation were carried out by women and organisation activists usually approached younger, undereducated potentials from large, poor families residing in Turkey.404 Some of these women were reported to have lost their close family in combat with the Turkish forces. It is hard to find evidence indicating that financial incentives were offered to the women during the recruitment phase and religious rhetoric was also not visible. The most prominent incentives evidently were the urge for vengeance, commitment to the Kurdish cause and devotion to the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan.405 A similar recruitment technique was also employed by leaders of the Chechen rebels. Some Arab and Muslim fighters perceived the Chechen fight against the Russians as another chapter in the mujahidin struggle which began in Afghanistan and voluntarily joined the Chechen forces; but the rebels also relied on local manpower. Once again, unemployed young persons were the most vulnerable group for recruitment. One of the main incentives for joining the rebel forces was the salary offered by recruiters. Other reasons, as discussed in the previous chapter, were hatred of the Russian forces 188 and the desire to avenge the death of a friend or relative killed by the Russians.406 It appears that, similarly to the PKK, Islamic rhetoric, often regarded as having a crucial effect, was not as relevant as one may expect in the recruitment stage.407 Recruitment of male suicide bombers for the Chechen campaign of terrorism was equivalent to the mobilisation for other units. Here, again, potential members joined the unit as a result of a combination of financial and personal incentives. Prospective female bombers were recruited in a slightly different manner. The “Black Widows” unit identified women who were at a vulnerable phase in their lives. Like the Kurds, some of them had lost a husband or a loved one during the fighting. Others may have suffered from financial difficulties or some other personal crisis. These women were then approached by a woman called Black Fatima, whose real name was Lyuba.408 Fatima was known as a legendary figure in the “Black Widows” unit; each time she recruited a woman for a mission, she used a different approach to suit the specific candidate. In some cases she offered revenge; in many other cases she offered money and, even more important, financial support for family members to be left behind by the suicide bomber.409 At first, the recruitment procedure to Palestinian groups was quite similar to the aforementioned organisations. The Hamas would find potential suicide bombers among members of its university chapters as well as in schools, mosques, social clubs formed by the organisation, and in Israeli jails. The “enlistment officers” sent by the organisation looked for youngsters who showed interest in religious studies and were drawn to the organisation’s doctrine.410 Prior to the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the organisation was very cautious. It generally refrained from accepting unfamiliar volunteers for suicide missions and carefully examined the background of each potential candidate 189 or group of candidates. One thing which was of particular importance to the organisation was to ensure that the recruit’s motivation for the mission was rooted in ideological reasons and not in the person’s desire to improve his or her family’s financial status. It was also important to make sure that this person did not suffer from mental problems. The organisation did not want to be portrayed as taking advantage of sick people or individuals who were not responsible for their actions.411 The recruitment process for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was almost identical although, due to the smaller size of this organisation, it was hard to find cases of mass mobilisation for suicide missions. For the most part, “enlistment officers” operated in the well-known Jihad strongholds in the cities of Jenin, Beit-Lehem, Nablus and Hebron.412 The Al-Aqsa Intifada altered the whole recruitment process. As mentioned earlier, Palestinian organisations employed suicide terrorism as a leading strategy and hence began to need a growing number of bombers. Competition among organisations also intensified the use of such perpetrators and the relatively long and selective process of recruitment became irrelevant. Similar to its predecessors, the Fatah, which joined the scene of suicide terrorism only in late 2001, sent “enlistment officers” to universities, schools and mosques. They were looking mostly for young people who had a history of confrontation with the Israelis or who had lost family or friends in incidents with the Israeli army.413 However, unlike the Hamas, the Fatah was less hesitant in recruiting volunteers who were not known the organization prior to it.414 In fact, with the dramatic increase in the number of suicide attacks in the year 2002, the recruitment methods of all organisations began to collapse.415 The leaderships of 190 these organisations had sustained targeted attacks by the Israeli army and this had loosened their control over recruitment and training processes. As a result, many of the attacks that were launched against Israeli targets after the beginning of 2002 were local initiatives rather than top-down organisational decisions. Hence, it came as no surprise that many attacks were credited to more than one organisation. Local activists from different groups were cooperating in order to launch the attacks and, in many cases, the whole process of recruitment and training took no more than a few hours. Unlike other organisations which adhered to one recruitment method, Palestinian organisations adopted all three. Changing patterns of recruitment and especially the transition from a careful culling of candidates by trained recruiters to a mass mobilisation of volunteers emphasises the success of the organisation in planting the roots of a “culture of death” in a society which in return provided endless numbers of prospective bombers in times of need. Training A comparative appraisal of the training processes among the different organisations reveals an interesting picture. As noted above, the majority of terrorist organisations do not recruit candidates specifically for suicide missions, and consequently preliminary training processes involve a combination of an introduction to basic military techniques and ideological — in many cases, religious — indoctrination. Preparation courses for suicide attacks take place at a later stage and are delegated to only a select group of people. At this point, the most important instruction course is the mental one. The organisations’ main concern now is to make sure that the potential bombers do not back down, a move that would not only jeopardise the specific mission but could also disclose organisation members and tactics. 191 In tactical terms, the course of preparation is rather short. Suicide bombers often have some kind of background in guerrilla and terrorist tactics, yet this is not always necessary. Organisations handle the perpetrator as if he or she was a weapon and this weapon is not responsible for the selection of a target, gathering intelligence or tactical preparations. Moreover, in most cases, the suicide potential is escorted by organisation operatives until nearly reaching the target and he or she receives instructions up to the very last stage. This reinforces the importance of mental preparation. In order to complete the mission, the suicide bomber must reach the target calm, confident and focused. Hezbollah, the organisation which launched the first suicide bomber, was also the first to develop a two-stage training programme for such missions. At first, knowledge on how to prepare for and execute a suicide attack was acquired from representatives of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who were closely involved in the activities of the Hezbollah in its early days. These connections were so close that not only were Hezbollah suicide bombers trained by Iranians in the early 1980s, the actual training procedure took place in camps in Iran.416 Later, with the help of Iranian officers, the Hezbollah established its own training camps in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon. The selection of this location was not random. The Beqaa Valley is mostly Shiite and the Syrian Army has a strong influence there. Hence, these camps were relatively secure from Israeli attack. One of the camps, Ein Kawkab, resembled the type of basic training camp that could be found in any army. New recruits lived in tents while their trainers resided in separate quarters. On the camp’s premises, there was a mosque and an auditorium. The first phase of the training process included the introduction of guerrilla tactics, 192 which consisted of, among other assignments, laying landmines, infiltration of enemy camps, how to use automatic weapons and rockets, and learning techniques of self- defence. Yet, religion and political courses were of no less importance in grooming the Hezbollah militant for action. Only the trainees who exhibited the strongest commitment to the cause and a willingness to die for Islam, were selected for the more advanced training stages. This phase, during which religious indoctrination was intensified, also included preparation for highly sophisticated guerrilla attacks as well as suicide missions.417 Once the Hezbollah abandoned the suicide strategy in the mid 1980s, traditional guerrilla tactics received a much bigger role in the training process. This reached a point where, by the mid 1990s, Hezbollah no longer had a specific programme for suicide bombers.418 The LTTE, known to have connections with Hezbollah, has imitated and improved Hezbollah suicide techniques and also adopted their training methods. Every new recruit to the LTTE, most of whom were children, had to go through a basic training period of four months. Basic training included an introduction to military tactics and of course indoctrination to the organisation’s ideology. Much emphasis has been given to glorifying and idolising the organisation’s leader, Prabhakaran. A typical daily routine at LTTE camps began with an early wakeup call at 5 am. The children then underwent two hours of physical training in the jungle followed by lessons in the martial arts. In the afternoon, they attended classes, where they were introduced to the history of the organisation and the Tamil people. In order to toughen them up and take the edge off their doubts about killing, instructors showed them war movies and later sent them to attack designated targets, applying the knowledge 193 acquired from the movies. Evenings were mostly devoted to classes in intelligence gathering and the handling of explosive devices. Throughout the training period, children were isolated from their families and subject to the draconian rules of the camp. For example, there are testimonies about trainees who were caught drinking alcohol and consequently punished by death. At the same time, in order to keep families happy while their children were going through the training period, the organisation provided them with financial support.419 Only after the basic training period, selection process for the suicide squad, The Black Tigers, began. Prospective suicide bombers were selected according to their achievements in the initial training period.420 Specific training for suicide missions lasted for a few more weeks during which trainees learned the suicide tactic in great detail. However, in the vein of the Hezbollah, mental preparation was even more important. The instructors’ objective was to get the recruit to fully commit to the mission and make sure he or she would not have second thoughts.421 One of the mechanisms used by the organisation to ensure the commitment of the Black Tigers to their mission was by dubbing them the most important warriors of the organisation. As a result of this classification, all other LTTE members looked up to them and this helped the organisation accomplish two important goals. First, the potential suicide bomber felt uplifted, “a chosen one”, for this elite status was very appealing.422 Second, he was at the same time hard-pressed; this admiration created very strong social pressure which made it virtually impossible for the potential suicide bomber to leave the unit. However, in cases where the social pressure was not effective enough and a person decided to back down at the last moment, the LTTE could apply formal sanctions in order to make the novice reconsider. 194 Not surprisingly, the training process of the PKK was not much different. One striking resemblance to the LTTE was the nature of the programme which the suicide bomber underwent during the training process. Again, the organisation did everything possible to prevent the person from having second thoughts. Much like the LTTE, both social and formal sanctions were applied in cases where a prospective suicide bomber showed hesitation. In some cases, unsure candidates were even threatened with execution if they refused to fulfil their mission.423 However, there are also other similarities in the training processes of these two organisations, both of which were first to introduce women on to the suicide terrorism scene. Most PKK training camps were located in Syria, Lebanon and the northern Kurdish part of Iraq. Training went on for a period of three months and included the instruction of an assortment of guerrilla tactics, primarily, the operation of light weapons and explosives, collecting intelligence and, of course, mental education — again, similar to the LTTE’s methods. However, rather than committing to a religious or ideological doctrine, allegiance to the charismatic leader of the organisation, Abdullah Ocalan, and the Kurdish national cause stood at the centre of this indoctrination. Another parallel to the LTTE and even the Hezbollah is the fact that the basic training of all these organisations resembled standard army training. Once they arrived at “boot camp”, trainees were required to turn over their identity cards and were prohibited from leaving camp or making contact with their families.424 A far less structured training process is evident in the Chechen groups’ case. During the first stages of the Chechen struggle against the Russians, the rebels relied mostly on traditional tactics and training processes. However, the growing number of Al- Qaeda-affiliated Arab militants who joined them in the 1990s made them change their 195 tactics and affected the training process. Yet, while it is quite apparent that the method of suicide terrorism is a part of the Arab influence on Chechen rebels, the training process for suicide missions remained separate from standard guerrilla training. According to Russian intelligence sources, many Chechen rebels made use of the infrastructure of Mujahidin training camps in Pakistan and sometimes in Georgia. Chechen as well as Arab trainees, all of them men, arrived at camps and went through a three-month training programme, which included guerrilla and terrorist tactics, such as mountain combat techniques, convoy attacks, and kidnapping. This was accompanied by Islamic religious indoctrination.425 Following this initial training period, just a select few were chosen for suicide missions. These prospective suicide bombers were subject to further training in intelligence methods. The purpose of this specific training was to assist them in getting through Russian roadblocks and penetrating Russian territory without being revealed.426 However, many of the Chechen suicide bombers were women who went through a different training process. The period of grooming female potentials for suicide missions was in fact minimal and lasted around two weeks during which they became acquainted with basic terrorist tactics.427 Descriptions of the training of female suicide bombers in Chechnya are rare and often biased. However, there are several testimonies of women who claimed that they had been drugged during the mental preparation process. Others maintain that they had been whipped up into an ecstatic frenzy. They describe how they were taken into large rooms where they were ordered to repeat a sentence over and over again and move their bodies in monotonous motions until they lost control.428 It seems that the introduction of drugs in the training process of Chechen women has made an impression on other organisations. 196 There are indications that since the American invasion of Iraq, the use of drugs as part of the preparation of suicide bombers has increased. Suicide bombers under the patronage of Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi were reported to have taken antipsychotic pills during the training process and before setting out on their mission.429 Brief inculcation programmes for suicide operations have also been highly significant for Palestinian organisations where both women and men did not undergo an official training period. There are two basic explanations for the absence of a more comprehensive training programme. First, the Palestinian territories are closely monitored by the Israeli army. Hence, it is almost impossible to operate a semi- military camp without giving away its location. Second, as mentioned earlier, in the late 1990s, and especially during the years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the surrounding culture became highly supportive for suicide missions and helped provide potential perpetrators with strong incentives to go out on missions. Thus, the need for long psychological preparation—usually meant to reduce the objections of potential perpetrators—was eliminated and all that remained was to provide the person with instructions on activating the explosive device and infiltrating Israeli territories. Nonetheless, during the pre-Intifada period, some similarities to other terrorist organisations employing the suicide technique were evident. For example, many suicide bombers sent by the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have been long- time members of these organisations and were active in other forms of terrorism in the past.430 Moreover, the training process in the Hamas included psychological elements and religious indoctrination. The prospective perpetrator went through long sessions with his recruiters who talked to him about the religious importance of his act and also tried to remove the fear of dying. This would include taking the recruit to a cemetery 197 and placing him inside a grave.431 After the outbreak of the Intifada, even this short training process was discarded. Since the leaders of the organisations became targets for the Israeli army, much of the responsibility for suicide missions fell on the shoulders of the lower-ranking local activists. The selection process became irrelevant and almost anyone who volunteered for a suicide mission was immediately accepted and put through a short training course. Sometimes this lasted no longer than a few hours in which the candidate was praised for choosing this path and given basic technical instructions regarding the activation of the device.432 In order to compensate for the lack of real preparation, the suicide bomber was accompanied by his/her operators from the start of recruitment until he/she entered Israeli territory. In some cases, perpetrators were allowed to spend the last night before their mission with their families. Since this act became so prestigious in Palestinian society, there was almost no concern that the family of the prospective suicide bomber would try to prevent him or her from going out on the mission even if he/she was to tell them about the plans.433 Al-Qaeda features the most interesting example in the training process of suicide terrorists. The fact that this is a multinational organisation requires high levels of coordination. Prior to 9/11, for the most part, recruitment took place in Muslim and Western countries while training camps were based in Afghanistan. Hence, following the recruitment of a candidate or a group of candidates, it was necessary to send them off to these camps. Candidates approved by the Al-Qaeda leadership received flight tickets, money and the necessary documents for the journey. Most of the new recruits were trained and indoctrinated at these camps and then sent back to their countries of origin in order to help establish new cells. The more capable candidates went through 198 intensive military training and remained in Afghanistan; only a select few were singled out for suicide missions.434 As indicated in chapter 5, the number of suicide attacks initiated by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates prior to 9/11 was relatively small. Hence, suicide terrorists were trained in similar fashion to other members of the organisation. The most important part of their training was the psychological phase. The organisation put most of the emphasis on bringing the recruits to a mental state in which they were fully committed to the organisation and its goals and were willing to sacrifice everything, including their own lives, for its sake. The key procedure was by means of a constant indoctrination of the organisation’s perception of Islam and the importance of maintaining the superiority of Islam against challenges posed by infidels. In some cases, psychological training led all the way up to the very attack itself. On a few occasions, such as the Hamburg group which participated in the 9/11 episode, suicide terrorists were instructed to live together and help each other prepare for the mission. In general, it seems that the actual tactical preparation for the mission was relatively brief.435 A comparative review of the occurrences in which Al-Qaeda initiated suicide attacks indicates that the organisation leadership felt the success of the operation mostly depended on the mental resilience of the perpetrators rather than their tactical skills.436 In the post 9/11 era, this mind-set changed. The fact that training camps in Afghanistan were destroyed in the wake of the American invasion forced Al-Qaeda to adapt. Hence, the core of the training process shifted from sites in Afghanistan to countries where candidates were recruited.437 This increased the organisation’s reliance on modern technology and, most prominently, the Internet. This tool has served many organisational objectives, including, the dissemination of ideological 199 propaganda, mobilisation of support, transference of strategic and tactical manuals to active cells, and providing intelligence information and operational commands prior to an attack.438 Dispatching The most critical juncture in the process of executing a suicide mission is the minutes and sometimes hours from the moment the suicide bomber leaves his/her operators until the perpetration of the attack. This could be a very risky point in time for the dispatchers, as well as for the success of the operation, since the prospective perpetrator is already on his/her way to his destination and the chances that he/she might be caught are much higher. Yet, there is another risk for the organisation at this stage. As the time of the attack draws closer, the greater are the chances that the prospective terrorist might start having second thoughts or might even become paralysed with fear. His/her colleagues are no longer on hand to raise his/her spirits or take away his/her doubts. Therefore, it is crucial to get the suicide candidate to deeply commit beforehand to his/her mission and to bolster his/her confidence before finally setting out. The Hezbollah found an effective mechanism to solve this problem which was later adopted by almost every organisation to deploy suicide bombers. Since the mid 1980s, the organisation has prepared and released a short video of the suicide candidate prior to his/her departure on his/her mission. This tactic has two objectives. The more important and psychological purpose of this ritual is to get the individual to totally commit to the operation. After shooting a video in which the prospective bomber justifies his/her act, prays and says his/her last goodbyes to his or her loved ones, there is almost no way back. In some organisations, such as Hamas and the 200 Palestinian Islamic Jihad, from the minute the tape is shot until the actual bombing, the perpetrator is referred to by his/her comrades as al-shahid al-hai (the living martyr). The psychological pressure at this point is so great that even if the person still has doubts — a situation which occurs from time to time — it is impossible for him or her to back out without suffering considerable injury to his/her social status. This means being condemned by his/her close circle of comrades inside as well as outside the organisation, which may even include his/her own family members.439 These tapes have another, secondary, purpose. They enhance the celebrity status of suicide bombers and further reinforce the “culture of death”. In most cases, these tapes are brief, yet very powerful. Suicide aspirants wear military uniforms and headbands and may proudly brandish their weapons. Often, there are flags of the organisation and religious symbols in the background. The Islamic religious organisations also make sure that the “living shahid” is holding the Koran. The fact that most suicide bombers appear calm and resolute and ask their parents not to cry for them, helps their families cope with the act and increases the community’s admiration. Despite the fact that the ritual of videotaping has become an integral part of the training process of suicide bombers in most organisations, there are different versions of these “last rites”. Chechen women, for example, are videotaped wearing the black clothes of a widow whereas, unlike their Palestinian and Lebanese counterparts, their tapes are characterised by less emphasis on Islamic rhetoric.440 The LTTE has also adopted a slightly different version of the videotape ritual. In the night prior to his or her departure for the suicide mission, the prospective perpetrator is invited to sup at the table of Prabhakaran, the mythical leader of the organisation. During the course of 201 dinner, the prospective bomber receives the highest honours and his/her picture is taken standing next to the leader. Soon afterwards, and before the dinner ends, the picture is developed and hung on the wall next to the pictures of all former suicide bombers of the organisation. This has a very similar effect to the videotape procedure; the prospective bomber sees his or her picture on the wall next to a long succession of the association’s past heroes. As in the videotaped ritual in other organisations, at this point the person becomes a living martyr and after this “last dinner”, the chances of turning back decline dramatically.441 Following the completion of the videotape, suicide bombers in religious organisations, such as, Al-Qaeda, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, undergo a ritual of religious purification which prepares them for entering the gates of heaven. Recent testimonies collected mainly from Israelis who survived a suicide attack and witnessed the last moments of the suicide bomber before the explosion, underscore the power of this psychological training process. Most bombers were reported to be calm, quiet, and even smiling.442 It is very uncommon to find an occasion where the suicide bomber was detected due to his/her nervous behaviour and apprehended before detonating the explosive device. Summary In this chapter, I described the preparation process of suicide bombers for their mission based on evidence from various testimonies and narratives from different organisations. I argued that a specific culture or religion cannot be held as solely responsible for suicide terrorism. As demonstrated, it seems that the evolution of a “culture of death” depends on a combination of a long period of feeling hopeless in a certain community together with the presence of an organisation which offers a way 202 out of this predicament through the ultimate sacrifice. A supportive culture is very important for an organisation which chooses the suicide strategy. It offers a considerable reserve of potential perpetrators and makes the recruitment phase much easier. Furthermore, as mentioned in previous chapters, terrorist organisations are like political parties, both of which are highly interested in the endorsement of their constituencies. If a “culture of death” is deeply rooted in society, the organisation will gain approval and be acclaimed rather than condemned for employing the suicide strategy. An understanding of the training and dispatching processes of suicide terrorists also helps detract from the argument that this phenomenon is linked to a certain culture or religion. All organisations put a strong emphasis on psychological preparation. Indoctrination can be religious, nationalistic or any other type as long as it hits a sensitive point in the prospective perpetrator. The fact that most organisations train their people in closed off and remote camps increases this effect even more. Isolation, a strong, dominant organisational culture, and peer pressure are highly important in the process of getting the prospective suicide bomber to fully commit to the mission. In other cases, most prominently the Palestinian ones, the training process takes place inside the community, which is highly supportive of the act and provides cultural support to the training process. 203 Chapter 8 - The Consequences of Suicide Terrorism In the last seven chapters, I have portrayed the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and offered explanations for its emergence and expansion. In this concluding chapter, I will look into the various effects of suicide terrorism on the victimised societies and offer a response model, which is aimed both at its symptoms and root causes. The Effects of Suicide Terrorism The idea that the main goals of any terrorist organisation in causing harm to a civilian population is actually to draw attention to the group’s demands, create an atmosphere of fear in the victimised society and, as a result, bring about policy changes, has been known in the literature for many years.443 The devastating nature of suicide terrorism has multiplied the effect of terrorism on individuals, societies and political systems, and thus created a grave, new and immediate challenge for many societies.444 Due to the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks, the ramifications of these particular events have gained a lot of scholarly attention.445 However, similar effects are present also among other societies that are victims of suicide attacks. The first three sentiments reported by individuals in many of these societies are anxiety, confusion and especially the fear of recurrence of such an attack, which could harm them and their loved ones.446 In many cases, these feelings are transformed into a form of attenuated behaviour.447 In the period following the 9/11 attacks, the citizens of New York and other metropolitan areas, were extremely unwilling to leave their homes to visit places of entertainment, shopping malls, public or civic centres, or even to go to their workplaces. Clearly, this behaviour had a direct effect on the slowdown of the economy.448 204 A similar pattern has taken place in Israel. Following the first few waves of suicide attacks on shopping centres and buses, the number of individuals prepared to go out to restaurants and shopping malls decreased and many small businesses had to close down.449 I remember driving the streets of Tel Aviv on the day after the Purim suicide attack on March 4th, 1996. Typically, on the Purim holiday, the streets of all major Israeli cities, and especially Tel Aviv, are crowded with children in costumes who gather to watch or join the city’s carnival parade. This time, the streets were deserted, the buses were almost empty and even the Gan Ha’ir shopping mall in the heart of Tel Aviv was almost completely abandoned. Indeed, when suicide attacks happen on a recurrent basis and assume the pattern of a campaign, a process of “habituation” takes place in many societies. People seem to get used to the situation; sometimes they repress it and try to maintain a façade that everything is normal.450 However, this can be misleading. Terrorism has profound psychological effects which are not always immediately visible. The most prominent among them is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which manifests itself in various forms, most notably in repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts, or images of the terror attacks and aftermath of events. Included in the indications of PTSD is often avoiding activities or situations that remind the individual of traumatic events and feelings, while thoughts about the attacks may interfere with routine functioning at home or elsewhere.451 PTSD symptoms were found to be prevalent among many United States citizens after 9/11 and also among Israelis following waves of Palestinian suicide attacks,452 as well as Russians who were exposed to ongoing suicide campaigns of Chechen factions,453 205 and Sri Lankan citizens. The results of a Sri Lankan study which explored the effects of terrorism on refugees who fled conflict-ridden areas are of particular interest. This study revealed that the effects of terrorism were not limited merely to the psychological realm. Individuals who took part in this survey reported severe medical conditions, many of which were found to be closely connected to the constant exposure to terrorism and ongoing emotional stress.454 One of the major problems associated with high levels of fear due to exposure to suicide terrorism is that this fear has a substantial influence on sentiments and behaviours in the social realm as well. An immediate response of almost any society that becomes a victim of a mass casualty attack is the “rally around the flag” syndrome.455 American society, in the wake of the 9/11 events, is a good example of this pattern. In the days following the attacks, people expressed strong patriotic sentiments. American flags were hanging from almost every window, firemen and police officers were treated like heroes, and even the media coincided with positions held by the administration.456 Furthermore, over 60 percent of Americans attended memorial services in order to express their identification with community and country. More than 30 percent donated money or blood for victims of the attacks.457 However, this is only one side of the coin. Alongside patriotic sentiments and community-oriented activities, which seem to be harmless and even constructive, other sentiments take root in societies exposed to suicide attacks as well as other forms of mass casualty terrorism. These include mistrust of other people, disillusionment with the government’s ability to protect them, sceptical attitudes towards prospects of reconciliation and peace and, above all, militant and hostile 206 attitudes towards the terrorists and communities they claim to represent.458 Pursuant to the 9/11 attacks, American politicians expressed concern over a probable wave of Islamophobia and the appearance of exclusionary sentiments towards minority groups from the Middle East and Asia. Indeed, many Americans supported the restriction of civil liberties and displayed anti-Arab sentiments. They also exhibited hawkish positions with regard to the war on terror.459 In two other countries, Russia and Israel, which suffer from suicide terrorism on a continuous basis, fear of terrorism was found to be correlated with both higher levels of animosity towards minority communities and a desire for harsh governmental reprisal aimed at terrorists and their “constituencies”. Moreover, exposure to terrorism predisposed all of these societies to be more willing to give up some democratic freedoms in order to enable their governments to effectively protect them from terrorism.460 A survey conducted in Russia after Chechen terrorism attacks showed that 25% were willing to establish an emergency regime in order to fight terrorism. While another 21% approved giving the security forces more power in the war against terrorism, 10% advocated tougher anti-terrorism legislation.461 From a survey conducted in Israel in April 2002, 72% of the Israeli population declared that any military operation against terrorism was justified.462 In democracies and semi-democracies, such public sentiment incites elites who are eager to satisfy their constituencies—and who sometimes experience the same sentiments themselves—to take fierce action. The fact that the terrorised public is impatient to see a quick solution to the threat and thus exhibits militant positions, can help or even convince the leadership to reach a decision to declare a state of war (as is true in the United States, Russia, Israel) or to launch wide-scale military operations 207 (such as in Sri Lanka and Turkey). In most of these countries, elites also relied on the public’s willingness to impose limitations on civil rights during the course of the war on terrorism. Such limitations were manifested in the American Patriot Act as well as in a long string of counter-terrorism laws adopted after the events of 9/11.463 It was also manifested in Israeli and Sri Lankan policies of closures and pre-emptive detentions. In Sri Lanka, for example, the 1979 law against acts of terrorism authorised the government to arrest a person for 18 months without trial.464 In Israel, the law for the detention of illegal combatants granted the Israeli government the mandate to arrest a suspect for up to six months and possibly more without trial.465 However, above all, there are President Putin’s reforms in Russia. The federal law for the protection of constitutional rights, civil liberties and the security of the Russian Federation, which was adopted on June 30th, 2002, was one important step in the major political reform that took place in Russia. In essence, it limited many democratic freedoms in the country, reduced the level of autonomy given to the different components of the federation, and accorded the ruling elite in Moscow with much more power.466 In other cases, the urgency in trying to solve the problem may lead democratic governments in completely opposite directions. The Spanish change of government which took place shortly after the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11th, 2004, and the decision of the new government to pull out Spanish forces from Iraq reflected, to a large degree, the Spanish public’s desire not to be exposed to similar attacks in the future. These events were an important triumph for terrorists all over the world. The message from Spain was that terrorism is a low-cost, winning strategy. Hence, mass casualty terrorism can have problematic consequences for democratic 208 administrations in two opposing ways. On one hand, it can sway such governments to wage war on terrorism. In most cases, this will not put an end to the phenomenon but, at the same time, it can easily undermine the moral democratic foundations of the ruling administration and may deepen political cleavages. On the other hand, it can encourage governments to acquiesce to terrorists’ demands and subsequently send an encouraging message to terrorists all over the world. The question of how to respond to mass casualty terrorism, given the possibility that each of the abovementioned modes of response may end up with an unfavourable outcome, is a major dilemma facing democracies under attack. Unfortunately, this is not the only dilemma that may arise in the efforts to formulate an effective response to this challenge. The Response to Suicide Terrorism Suicide attacks manifest themselves in various forms. Many (36.9%)467 of these attacks take place in the battlefield or are aimed at inflicting damage to military compounds. In such cases, the question of how to respond seems to be less complicated than in other ones. As demonstrated in the case of Hezbollah, when Israel restructured and reinforced its military compounds and shortened the routes of its military convoys, suicide attacks became less effective and subsequently less appealing to the organisation. Therefore, when suicide attacks are used as part of guerrilla warfare in the battlefield, the challenge of responding to them remains confined to tactical and strategic considerations and they should not be treated differently from any other kind of guerrilla tactic. However, in many (39.6%) instances, organisations dispatch their perpetrators to highly populated urban areas.468 As discussed earlier, the implications of this tactic go far beyond its immediate damage and eventually put a lot of pressure on political 209 elites. Contrary to other types of terrorism, even a short-term, effective response to suicide terrorism is hard to accomplish. Suicide terrorism requires very little means and preparation. All the organisation needs in order to carry out a successful attack is a perpetrator and an explosive belt. In democratic societies which keep their borders relatively open and do not place military checkpoints on their highways, such a perpetrator can quite easily cruise through the country and reach the heart of its urban centres. Therefore, measures must be taken to prevent suicide bombers from arriving at their designated target and ways must be found to minimise the damage in case the explosion takes place, in spite of the many precautions. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, responding to terrorism always takes a high toll on democratic societies. A lot has been written on the methods of response to terrorism and most scholars are in agreement that using military rather than police enforcement in response to a terrorist threat in a democratic state is unacceptable.469 However, can police officers, whose actions generally are more in conformity with democratic values than those of the military, respond effectively to the challenge of suicide terrorism? This form of terrorism requires first-rate counterintelligence capabilities that would enable agencies to monitor the organisation and prevent the recruitment and launching of a potential suicide bomber. In circumstances where the perpetrators have already been dispatched on a suicide mission, substantial tactical capabilities are necessary in order to stop them from reaching their destination. Finally, if the attack was not thwarted, there is a need for a highly organised force to coordinate rescue efforts. In most Western countries, expecting the police to assume responsibility for all these 210 tasks seems almost unreasonable. Thus, many countries choose to put much of the burden of responding to suicide terrorism on the shoulders of military or semi-military forces even while knowing the democratic price of such decisions. This type of policy is based on the policy makers’ belief that the overall risks are justified, in order to protect the civilian population from this deadly type of terrorism. Such belief can be a result of the high level of influence that the armed forces enjoy over policy making processes in democratic regimes undergoing a crisis situation. In many cases, army generals and heads of security services will advocate forceful military responses, either because they were trained to believe that these are the best solutions for countering terrorism effectively, or for the reason that such a response will serve the interests of the organizations they lead. Yet, over the years it has become evident that this belief is somewhat unfounded. Despite the military’s capacity to reduce the number of suicide attacks in the very short run, such a response exacts a high price in the long run. Military operations inflict a great deal of suffering on the wider society rather than just on the terrorist organisations themselves. Hence the anger, and with it the incentive to perpetrate more attacks, will only increase, even among people who until that time had no intention of becoming terrorists. Thus, the cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism will only escalate and the military option becomes highly counterproductive in the long run.470 So what can be done to protect civilians from suicide bombers in the short run and deal with the causes of this phenomenon in the long run? In the following paragraphs, I will offer an integrative approach for responding to suicide terrorism. This approach shifts much of the weight from short-term offensive measures aimed at the symptoms 211 of the problem to longer term and defensive measures, which have the potential to offer a better answer to both the roots of the problem and its manifestations. Having said that, there is a need to be very cautious before dismissing more aggressive modes of response altogether; the use of these approaches may become inevitable under certain circumstances. However, any resort to them should be made only under extreme circumstances and only for a short while. Figure 8.1 around here As seen in the figure, the model is divided between short-term responses whose aim is to protect the population from suicide attacks in the midst of a campaign, and long- term responses, which are meant to address the root causes of the problem. Another distinction is between offensive and defensive measures. While the first is relevant to the response to terrorist organisations and the perpetrators themselves, the second is relevant to the victims of suicide terrorism as well as the constituencies that support these organisations. Short-Term Offensive Responses Short-term offensive measures in this model are confined to small-scale operations aimed directly at the leaders and members of the organisation who are responsible for planning and launching perpetrators. The objective of this kind of policy is to prevent an attack which is already underway. Such counter-operations should not necessarily end in the death of the perpetrator or his/her dispatchers—if possible, they should be disarmed and arrested. It should be re-emphasised that such operations will not solve the problem of terrorism but only offer “first aid” for its symptoms. It is also important to avoid using mass military force when resorting to this kind of response and try to keep the operation as limited as possible. Large-scale strikes will miss the 212 very purpose of this type of response, since they may inflict extensive damage on civilians who have nothing to do with terrorism; in this way, they just generate more hatred, hopelessness and the urge for revenge.471 Hence, whenever a government carries out an offensive strike aimed at preventing a suicide attack, all possible consequences should be brought into consideration and, in some cases, if the price of such a strike is too high, it should be avoided all together, even at the cost of tolerating the suicide attack. Short-Term Defensive Responses This leads me to the second and, in my view, more important short-term response— the defensive one. I would like to take up Robert Pape’s analysis, which puts an emphasis on the importance of defensive mechanisms in coping with suicide terrorism, and to elaborate on this mode of response.472 As mentioned earlier, even in cases when military strikes against terrorists are highly effective, the probability that a certain number of suicide attacks will be carried out regardless is relatively high due to the nature of this type of terrorism. Moreover, one suicide attack can cause vast damage. It will most likely kill and injure many people and terrify many more. Based on the understanding that such attacks cannot be completely prevented, we should think of ways to minimise their consequences. Three important stages are involved in this process: prevention, crisis management and reconstruction.473 The first stage is aimed at preventing the terrorist from detonating the device in an environment possibly abounding with targets. One possible way to do this is by building physical barriers between the terrorists and their potential targets. Provided that such a barrier is impossible to build due to the geopolitical nature of a given territory, or if a perpetrator succeeds in crossing the barrier, there is need for a second 213 line of defence. Soft targets which include infrastructure facilities, shopping centres, hospitals, schools, public transportation as well as many other sites which may be appealing in the eyes of the terrorists should be heavily guarded by police or other agencies that are designated for such missions. True, being checked at the entrance to a government building, shopping mall and even restaurant is unpleasant. However, ever since the wave of terrorist hijackings in the 1970s, we have all become accustomed to airport security. If we calculate the effects of security checks in the prevention of suicide terrorism vis-à-vis the brief unpleasantness, I believe that the price is worthwhile. At any rate, governments should reassess the prospects for potential suicide terrorist attacks every few months. If the chances for such attacks drop dramatically, there is no need to continue to disturb the everyday lives of civilians as well as allocate considerable funds for such security inspections. The second stage is crisis management. This becomes highly important in cases where the suicide bomber has succeeded in overcoming all barriers and was able to detonate the explosive device. Examples from different parts of the world show that, time and again, rescue agencies failed to respond effectively to such incidents. There are numerous problems that should be dealt with in the minutes after the occurrence of a suicide attack. The vicinity must be secured in order to make sure that a second suicide bomber is not waiting for rescue forces to arrive and then detonate his/her and possibly an external explosive device in order to inflict more damage. Victims should receive first aid and then be rushed to medical centres. This means that roads should be clear so that ambulances will be able to arrive on and leave the scene with maximum speed. It is also necessary to administer first aid to indirect victims of the 214 attack. These include individuals who were exposed to the event and developed symptoms of anxiety. The key words in such a situation are coordination and planning. There should be one agency responsible for the management of such a crisis situation and all other agencies involved must follow its directions.474 In order to assure the effectiveness of the response, the agency in charge should develop guidelines for coping with suicide attacks. Moreover, all agencies involved must train together on a regular basis and thus improve their coordinated response to different scenarios of suicide attacks as well as other types of mass casualty terrorism. The last stage, reconstruction, is aimed at bringing life back to normal as soon as possible and thus minimise the long-term effects of the attack. This stage involves continuous medical, psychological, social and even economic support for all direct victims of the attack and their family members as well as psychological treatment of indirect victims. This stage also includes the physical reconstruction of the stricken area and allocation of budgets for compensating business owners and other individuals who sustained financial damage in the attack. Another important aspect is the reconstruction of interpersonal trust as well as trust in the government following an attack.475 An effective response should include programmes for both children and adults whose aim is to reduce the psychological and social outcomes of the exposure to terrorism. Such programmes can be communicated through schools and the media. To sum up, defensive measures have an added value beyond the enhanced coping capabilities of urban centres. An effective defensive response will limit the number of fatalities and casualties of suicide terrorism. It will also minimise secondary 215 psychological, social and economic damage. If we believe that most terrorist organisations act in a rational fashion, we may assume that once suicide attacks lose a certain degree of their effect, this tactic will lose some of its appeal for terrorists. This does not mean, however, that terrorist organisations will necessarily revert to more traditional tactics. If defensive measures are not comprehensive enough nor accompanied by policies addressing the causes of the phenomenon, it is highly likely that organisations will look for soft spots which would allow them to initiate other types of mass casualty attacks. Long-Term Offensive Responses As mentioned earlier, short-term responses are aimed at the symptoms of suicide terrorism. However, they will not have an effect on its causes. One of the clearest conclusions of this study as well as other inquiries is that suicide terrorism is a product of an organisational process.476 Hence, one method of coping with the phenomenon would be to reduce the organisation’s interest in initiating such attacks. Many countries affected by suicide terrorism, including the United States, Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka and Turkey, have opted for the military response. Their decision was based on the supposition that they were capable of overpowering these organisations. Yet, many contemporary terrorist groups do not correspond with the old hierarchical structure but rather with a network-based one.477 Hence, a clampdown on one of the organisation’s branches will have very little impact on the operational capabilities of other chapters of the same group (both internationally, e.g., Al-Qaeda, and domestically, e.g., Hamas). Thus, on the organisational level, it is necessary to make a concerted effort where the goal is to identify the main figures and cells of the organisation, put them under constant 216 surveillance, and undermine their activities in almost any possible way, starting with ongoing arrests and ending with freezing assets and bank accounts. This will not diminish the organisation’s capabilities in carrying out suicide missions but it will shift the focus of the elite’s energy from initiating attacks to saving its own skin. The same logic applies for leaders of organisations and cells. The continuous killing of these leaders without trial cannot become an acceptable policy. Democratic countries cannot afford to lapse into this kind of response. Morally, it will undermine the very foundations of the governing system and, tactically, such actions have the potential of turning dead leaders into martyrs in the eyes of their constituencies and increasing the motivation for revenge. These leaders should be captured and brought to trial as the Turks did with Abdullah Ocalan. In this case, not only did Turkey maintain some level of democratic standards, it was also highly successful in dissolving the organisation.478 Yet, targeting the organisation and its leadership are not enough. As noted above, it is imperative to take one step further and tackle the deepest roots of the phenomenon. This essentially means addressing the key grievances of the constituencies which support the organisations. Long-Term Defensive Responses Suicide terrorism does not appear out of thin air. In most cases, it surfaces after long periods of conflict and following the exhaustion of many other warfare tactics. Furthermore, in most cases, organisations considering the option of suicide terrorism will seek the support of their constituency when adopting this tactic. Hence, in order to confront the roots of suicide terrorism, there is no alternative but to explore the needs of these constituencies and undertake to meet some of their demands in order to 217 reduce their support for such actions. In the majority of the cases (Lebanon, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Chechnya), the basic demand of these populations was to be free in their homelands.479 To be sure, in many instants, this demand was shrouded in clerical rhetoric but religious motivation should be considered only secondary to the main grievances. Hence, it could be assumed that once some of the aggrieved population’s demands are met or, at least, a point is reached where the injured party believes its adversaries are upfront and ready to compromise, its incentive to support the organisation dispatching suicide terrorists will diminish. The case of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates is a little more complicated in this respect. Osama Bin-Laden and his allies have placed the religious conflict rhetoric at the forefront of their agenda. However, I am not convinced that both Bin-Laden and his adherents are interested in waging war on the Western world and, most prominently, the United States. They are far more realistic. Many Muslim and Arab communities in the world who support Bin-Laden are not anti-American. Actually, in some respects, America is perceived in a mixed way by the Middle East and Asia. On one hand, these communities admire the power of the American economy and even find some cultural elements very appealing. On the other hand, they fear the power of the United States and are suspicious of the American leadership’s real intentions. They do not really understand why the United States has a military presence in the Middle East, or why it has always favoured Israel and especially why it supports Arab regimes often considered corrupt and far from being democratic. Beefing up American military forces in the region following the invasion of Iraq has only increased the perception of threat among many people in the region who are now sure that the United States is trying to establish a permanent presence in the Middle East. 218 Having said that, I am not implying that the United States or other countries should completely alter their foreign policies or accept the demands of terrorist organisations. On the contrary, there is a need to sidestep these organisations and eliminate their role as brokers. The countries under the attack of suicide bombers should approach both moderate leaders and people on the other side in an honest way and leave out the militant rhetoric (which sometimes equally applies to its domestic politics). The key factor in addressing these populations is trust. In order to undercut support for terrorist organisations, there is a need to reduce the levels of perceived threat among these communities and create basic levels of trust in the intentions of the other side. This is not a simple task but if intentions to confront the root causes of suicide terrorism are sincere and elites are ready to pay a price for this resolution, it is also not unworkable. There are various methods of implementation. In terms of leadership, it is necessary to engage in serious negotiations with moderate leaders who have the respect and legitimacy of their people. If negotiations are honest and fruitful, the constituency will most probably shift its support from the radical to the more moderate organisations. However, if talks fail and no trust is created between the two parties, prospects for further radicalisation will only increase. In terms of the community, it is necessary to let members know that their opponents do not perceive them as the evil enemy and, by the same token, they respect their needs and aspirations. Military strikes are not helpful in this respect nor is propaganda and psychological warfare. The community needs to know that the other side is trustworthy. The ways to start the process is by making life easier for the population and imposing as few restrictions as possible. In cases where there is a need for 219 humanitarian aid, it should be provided but not in a paternalistic way. Rather, food and medication can be transferred to the population through the moderate leadership or international humanitarian organisations. Above all, it is highly important to leave the population out of the cycle of violence. Even if a military strike is inevitable, civilian populations should not be involved. In cases where such an operation would harm innocent civilians, it should be reconsidered even at the price of letting terrorists off the hook. Inflicting pain on a civilian population will eliminate trust and simply drive more people into the unremitting cycle of violence and revenge. 220 1 Ariel, Merrari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press. 193-194. 2 For Durkheim’s typology of the different types of suicide, see: Durkheim, Emile. 1952. Suicide. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD. 3 Under the broad category of altruistic suicide, Durkheim distinguished among three subcategories: obligatory, optional and acute altruistic suicide. While Ariel Merrari maintains that the type most applicable to the suicide terror phenomenon is in fact optional altruistic suicide, my view is that the acute altruistic suicide subcategory is the most relevant to the description of the phenomenon. For a discussion of this matter, see: Ariel, Merrari. 2003. “Social, Organisational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism”. In Tore, Bjorgo (ed.) The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root Causes of Terrorism, June 9-11, 2003. Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; As well as: Emile, Durkheim. 1952. Suicide. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD: 217-240; Young, Lung-Chang. 1972. “Altruistic Suicide: A Subjective Approach”. Sociological Bulletin, 21(2): 103–121. 4 Kathryn, Johnson. 1979. “Durkheim Revisited: Why Do Women Kill Themselves?”. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behaviour, 9: 145–53; Steven, Stack. 1979. “Durkheim’s Theory of Fatalistic Suicide: A Cross-National Approach.” The Journal of Social Psychology, 107:161–168; Steven, Taylor. 1982. Durkheim and the Study of Suicide. London: Hutchinson. 5 See: Rex, Brynen. 1995. “The Dynamic of Palestinian Elite Formation”. Journal of Palestinian Studies, 24 (3): 31–43; Hussein, Sirriyeh. 2000. “Democratisation and the Palestinian National Authority: From State in the Making to Statehood”. Israel Affairs, 7(1): 49-62. 6 Young, Lung-Chang. 1972. “Altruistic Suicide: A Subjective Approach”. Sociological Bulletin, 21(2): 106. 7 Ami, Pedahzur, Arie, Perliger and Leonard, Weinberg. 2003. “Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists”. Deviant Behaviour, 24 (4): 405-423. 8 For a discussion of the two approaches on the definition of suicide terrorists, see: Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 345 (note 1). 9 For a discussion of the features of martyr terror, see: Ariel, Merrari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press. 194. 10 For a more in-depth analysis of martyr terror, see: Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: Interdisciplinary Centre Press. 26-27 (Hebrew). 11 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 12 Ehud, Sprinzak. 2000. “Rational Fanatics”. Foreign Policy, 120: 69. 13 Karin, Andriolo. 2002. “Murder by Suicide: Episodes from Muslim History”. American Anthropologist, 104 (3): 738-739. 14 Karin, Andriolo. 2002. “Murder by Suicide: Episodes from Muslim History”. American Anthropologist, 104 (3): 739. 15 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: Interdisciplinary Centre Press. 51-55 (Hebrew). 16 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 345; Boaz, Ganor. 2000. “Suicide Terrorism: An Overview”. Countering Suicide Terrorism, Herzliya: ICT. 134–145. 17 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding”. Political Science Quarterly, 119 (1): 61-88. 18 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 19 Scott, Atran. 2003. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”. Science, 299 (5619): 1534. 20 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: Interdisciplinary Centre Press. 24-25 (Hebrew). 21 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 346-347. 221 22 For further elaboration on the advantages which terrorist organizations gain from of using suicide terrorists please refer to: Bruce, Hoffman and Gordon H., McCormick. 2004. “Terrorism, Signaling and Suicide Attack”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (4): 243-281. 23 This study relied on a database consisting of a list of terror incidents perpetrated by suicide terrorists worldwide. It covers a period of time beginning on the 19th of March, 1977, the day of the assassination of the Congo president, Marien Ngouabi, and concludes on the 22nd of February, 2004, in the explosion of a suicide terrorist on a Jerusalem bus in Israel. In all, the catalogue includes 418 suicide assaults which took place in 29 different countries and were carried out by 25 different organisations. The database was compiled in several stages and is the property of the National Security Studies Centre in the University of Haifa. First, data was collected from various academic sources (articles and books) in order to identify the countries, organisations and periods which have proved to be a part of the realm of suicide terror. In the second stage, each region and group of organisations was assigned to a researcher, whose function was to search for information on suicide attacks that were relevant to their assigned domain. The sources of information on which the database was established are numerous and diverse: articles and academic texts (Encyclopaedia of World Terrorism, 1997; Almanac of Modern Terrorism, 1991; Pape, 2003), databanks found on the internet (Cdiss Terrorism Programme, ICT Database), internet sites dealing in various terror organisations or terror in the world, as well as a broad use of Israeli and international media sources. In the final stage, the amassed information was encoded in an SPSS file according to the specific variables chosen. At the same time, a qualitative database was constructed which included descriptions of the incidents and their features as well as indication of the organisations which perpetrated them. Variables included in the quantitative database on which the analysis was based are: 1. date of incident; 2. place of incident (country); 3. features of the incident; 4. the organisation responsible; 5. ideology of the perpetrating organisation; 6. suicide tactic; 7. the assaulted target (for example: restaurant, military force); 8. a profile of the target of attack (e.g., citizens, soldiers); 9. number of fatalities and wounded; 10. number of terrorists participating in attack; 11. gender of terrorists participating in attack; 12. religious affiliation of terrorists. 24 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 347. 25 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 347. 26 Except for the Palestinian incidents related to the Al-Aqsa Intifada as well as incidents in Chechnya and Iraq. 27 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 346-350. 28 Shimon, Shapira. 2000. Hezbollah: Between Iran and Lebanon. Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad. 164-169 (Hebrew). 29 Rohan, Gunaranta. 2002. Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press. 74. 30 Shaul, Mishal and Avraham, Sela. 1999. The Hamas Wind: Violence and Coexistence. Tel-Aviv: Miskal – Yediot Ahronot Books and Chemed Books. 126. (Hebrew). 31 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 345 32 Scott, Atran. 2003. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”. Science, 299 (5619): 1535. 33 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming); Martha, Crenshaw. 1990. “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice”. In Walter, Reich (Ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York Cambridge University Press. 7-24. 34 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 35 See, for example: Harvey W., Kushner. 1996. "Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual ". Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19 (4): 349-367. 36 See, for example: Emad, Salib. 2003. "Suicide Terrorism: A Case of Folie à Plusieurs?". British Journal of Psychiatry, 182 (6): 475-476; John, Rosenberger. 2003. “Discerning the Behaviour of the Suicide Bomber: The Role of Vengeance ”. Journal of Religion and Health, 42 (1): 13-20; Harvey, Gordon. 2002. “The ‘Suicide’ Bomber: Is it a Psychiatric Phenomenon? ”. Psychiatric Bulletin, 26 (8): 285-287. 222 37 Kim, Taewoo. 2002. “Islamic Terrorism and the Clash of Civilisations”. Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, 14 (1): 97-117; Raphael Israeli focuses specifically on Islamic culture and calls the phenomenon, “Islamikaze”. Raphael, Israeli. 1997. “Islamikaze and their Significance”. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9 (3): 96-121; For more information please refer to: Scott, Atran. 2004. “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism”. The Washington Quarterly, 27 (3): 75. 38 Scott, Atran, 2004. “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism”. The Washington Quarterly, 27 (3): 67-90. 39 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding”. Political Science Quarterly, 119 (1): 61-88. 40 Radio interview with Iyad, Saraj and Ariel, Merrari. 2002. “Today’s Suicide Bombers are the Children of the Previous Intifada”. Studio, 134: 27 (Hebrew); Bruce, Hoffman. 2003. “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The Atlantic Monthly, 291 (5): 40-47. 41 Scott, Atran. 2003. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”. Science, 299 (5619): 1534. 42 Martha, Crenshaw. 1990. “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press: 8; For a discussion of the different modes of decision making process among elites of terrorist organizations please refer to: Gordon H., McCormick. 2003. “Terrorist Decision Making”. Annual Review of Political Science, 6: 473-507. 43 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 343-361. Pape’s assumption that suicide terrorism targets democratic countries has been the object of much criticism. Apart from certain countries where this type of terrorism has surfaced, such as, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, which don’t even fill the minimum requirements of a democratic polity, there is considerable doubt also in regard to the types of rule in terror-stricken Sri Lanka, Turkey and Israel and whether they possess the features of a democratic polity. For a discussion of this issue, see: Mia M., Bloom. 2004. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding”. Political Science Quarterly, 119 (1): 61-88; Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 44 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 346. 45 In Pape’s study, he in fact presents an assumption, according to which more than half of the organised campaigns of suicide terrorism in different places in the world between the years 1980 and 2001 wound up with various degrees of success for the organisation that led the campaign: Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 351. 46 Bruce, Hoffman and Gordon H., McCormick. 2004. "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack". Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (4): 243-281; Ehud, Sprinzak. 2000. “Rational Fanatics”. Foreign Policy, 120: 68. 47 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding”. Political Science Quarterly, 119 (1): 61-88; Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 48 Leonard, Weinberg. 1991. “Turning to Terror: The Conditions Under which Political-Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities”. Comparative Politics, 23 (4): 423-438; Leonard, Weinberg and Ami, Pedahzur. 2003. Political Parties and Terrorist Groups. London: Routledge. 49 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 50 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 346-347. 51 Samuel, Huntington. 1993. “The Clash of Civilisations?”. Foreign Affairs, 72 (3): 22-49. For discussion of Huntington’s contentions in this context please refer to: Oneal, John R. and Russett, Bruce M. 2000. “A Response to Huntington”, Journal of Peace Research 37 (5): 611-612; Senghaas, Dieter. 1998. “A Clash of Civilizations – An Idee Fixe?”, Journal of Peace Research 35 (1): 127-132; Fox, Jonathan (July 2001). “Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West”, Journal of Peace Research 38 (4): 459-472. Henderson, Errol A. October 1997. “Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (5): 649-668; Chiozza, Giacomo. November 2002. “Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946-97”, Journal of Peace Research 39 (6): 711-734; 223 Russett, Bruce M., Oneal, John R. and Cox, Michaelene. September 2000. “Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà vu? Some Evidence”, Journal of Peace Research 37 (5): 583-608; Fox, Jonathan. January 2004. “Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious conflict from 1950 to 1996”, International Political Science Review 25 (1): 55-76. 52 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 349. 53 Mamoru, Iga. 1981. “Suicide of Japanese Youth”. Suicide and Life Threatening Behaviour, 11 (1): 17-30; Mamoru, Iga. 1986. The Thorn in the Chrysanthemum: Suicide and Economic Success in Modern Japan. Berkeley: The University of California Press; Charles R., Chandler and Yung-Mei, Tsai. 1993. “Suicide in Japan and the West: Evidence for Durkheim’s Theory”. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 34 (3-4): 244-259. 54 Dennis, Warner and Peggy, Warner with Sadao, Seno. 1982. The Sacred Warriors: Japan’s Suicide Legions. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 55 Stephan F., Dale. 1988. “Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia: Anti-Colonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia and the Philippines”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32 (1): 52-53. 56 Ibid. 57 Ariel, Merrari. 2003. “Social, Organisational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism”. In Tore, Bjorgo (ed.) The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root Causes of Terrorism, June 9-11, 2003. Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 58 For further discussion of the Relative Deprivation Theory and suicide terrorism please refer to: Scott, Atran. 2004. “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism”. The Washington Quarterly, 27 (3): 77-79. 59 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 60 Ghassan, Hage. 2003. “Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm: Understanding Palestinian Suicide Bombers in Times of Exighophobia”. Public Culture, 15 (1): 79-80. 61 Scott, Atran. 2003. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”. Science, 299 (5619): 1535. 62 They had in mind terrorists who operated on their own and without the backing of an organisation and who, many times, were in fact found to be suffering from mental pathologies. 63 Ariel, Merrari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press. 203; Scott, Atran. 2003. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”. Science, 299 (5619): 1537; Ariel, Merrari. 2004. “Suicide Terrorism”. In R., Yufit and D., Lester (eds.) Assessment, Treatment and Prevention of Suicide. New York: John Wiley. 64 Edwin S., Shneidman. 1985. Definition of Suicide. New York: Wiley. 65 John, Lackhar. 2002. “The Psychological Make-Up of the Suicide Bomber”. Journal of Psychohistory, 20: 349-367; Lloyd, DeMause. 2002. “The Childhood Origins of Terrorism”. Journal of Psychohistory, 29 (4): 340-348. 66 John, Lackhar. 2002. “The Psychological Make-Up of the Suicide Bomber”. Journal of Psychohistory, 20: 349-367; Lloyd, DeMause. 2002. “The Childhood Origins of Terrorism”. Journal of Psychohistory, 29 (4): 340-348. 67 Ariel, Merrari. 2003. “Social, Organisational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism”. In Tore, Bjorgo (ed.) The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root Causes of Terrorism, June 9-11, 2003. Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 68 David, Lester, Bijou, Yang and Mark, Lindsay. 2004. “Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (4): 283-295. 69 Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (2): 72. 70 Karin, Andriolo. 2002. “Murder by Suicide: Episodes from Muslim History”. American Anthropologist, 104 (3): 736-738; Stephan F., Dale. 1988. “Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia: Anti Colonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia and the Philippines”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32 (1): 52. 71 Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (2): 72. 72 Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (2): 72; Ghassan, Hage. 2003. “Comes 224 a Time We Are All Enthusiasm: Understanding Palestinian Suicide Bombers in Times of Exighophobia”. Public Culture, 15 (1): 76. 73 Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (2): 72. 74 Scott, Atran. 2003. "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism". Science, 299 (5619): 1536. 75 Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (2): 72-73; Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 76 Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (2): 76. 77 Jessica, Stern. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. 48-50; Anat, Berko. 2001. The Moral Infrastructure of Chief Perpetrators of Suicidal Terrorism: Cognitive and Functionalist Perspectives, PhD Thesis. Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University. 5 (Hebrew). 78 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 79 Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (2): 68. 80 Edgar H., Shein. 1956. “The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War: A Study of Attempted ‘Brainwashing’”. Psychiatry, 19 (2): 149-172; Robert J., Lifton. 1961. Thought Reform and Psychology of Totalism. New York: W. W. Norton. 81 Ariel, Merrari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press. 199-200. 82 From an interview with Ariel Merrari conducted by CBS network on May 26, 2003. "Mind of the Suicide Bomber". CBS News, May 26, 2003. The interview can be found at: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/23/60minutes/main555344.shtml. 83 Ibid. 84 Scott, Atran. 2003. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”. Science, 299 (5619): 1537. 85 For further discussion of the role of commitment in terrorist groups please refer to: Marc, Sageman. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 86 Joseph A., Blake. 1978. “Death by Hand Grenade: Altruistic Suicide in Combat”. Suicide and Life- Threatening Behaviour, 8 (1): 46-59; Jeffrey W., Riemer. 1998. “Durkeheim’s ‘Heroic Suicide’ in Military Combat”. Armed Forces and Society, 25 (1): 103-120; Ariel, Merrari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press. 201-202. 87 Ariel, Merrari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press. 201-202. 88 Ariel, Merrari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press. 198-199. 89 Ariel, Merrari. 2003. “Social, Organisational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism”. In Tore, Bjorgo (ed.) The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root Causes of Terrorism, June 9-11, 2003. Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 90 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 343-361; Bruce, Hoffman and Gordon H., McCormick. 2004. “Terrorism, Signalling, and Suicide Attack”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (4): 243-281. 91 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding”. Political Science Quarterly, 119 (1). 92 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. NY: Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 93 Leonard, Weinberg and Ami, Pedahzur. 2003. Political Parties and Terrorist Groups. London: Routledge. 1-35. 225 94 Cristoph, Reuter. 2004. My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 95 Cristoph, Reuter. 2004. My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 62. 96 Shimon, Shapira. 2000. Hezbollah: Between Iran and Lebanon. Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad. 164-169 (Hebrew). 97 Cristoph, Reuter. 2004. My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 57. 98 Shimon, Shapira. 2000. Hezbollah: Between Iran and Lebanon. Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad. 123 (Hebrew). 99 Yoram, Schweitzer. “Suicide Terrorism: Developments and Characteristics”. ICT, Apr. 21, 2000. http://www.ict.org.il. 100 About a year-and-a-half after the strike on the Embassy in Beirut, it was again bombed at its new location. A booby-trapped truck carrying dynamite driven by a suicide bomber was detonated close to the Embassy building, causing the deaths of 11 people and the injury of 58. Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 65-66 (Hebrew). 101 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 64-66 (Hebrew) 102 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 348. 103 The organisations responsible for this increase were: The Syrian National Party, The PAS, The Lebanese Communist Party, and the Socialist Nasserist Party. Shaul, Shay. 2001. “Suicide Terrorism in Lebanon”. Countering Suicide Terrorism. Herzliya: ICT. 131. 104 All the suicide attacks, 15 in total, that took place in Lebanon between July 1985 and November 1986 targeted soldiers of the South Lebanese Army. 105 Three suicide attacks occurred between the time of the retreat of the Israeli army to the security zone and the complete withdrawal from Lebanon. The first incident took place on the 19th of October, 1988, when a truck bomb carrying 200 kg of dynamite driven by a suicide operative blew up next to an IDF convoy in the vicinity of the Fatma Gate on the Israel-Lebanon border. In this episode, eight Israeli troops were killed and seven more were injured. In the second attack, in which a Hezbollah suicide militant detonated an explosive device amidst an IDF convoy on the 20th of March, 1996, an Israeli officer was killed, whereas, in the third incident, on the 29th of December, 1999, one soldier was killed and twelve others were wounded when a suicide operative driving a car bomb crashed into a convoy of military vehicles. 106 Shaul, Shay. 2001. “Suicide Terrorism in Lebanon”. Countering Suicide Terrorism. Herzliya: ICT. 133. 107 Gal, Luft. 2000. “Israel’s Security Zone in Lebanon – A "Tragedy"?”. Middle East Quarterly, 7 (3). http://www.meforum.org/artice/70. 108 Cristoph, Reuter. 2004. My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 67. 109 For further details, see: Martin, Kramer. 1990. “The Moral Logic of Hezbollah”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. 142. 110 For elaboration on the notion of sacrifice in the Shiite tradition, please refer to: Norton, Augustus Richard. 1988. “The Shi’is Muslims of the Arab World”, American for Middle East Understanding 21 (5) http://www.ameu.org/printer.asp?iid=154&aid=198#content 111 Martin, Kramer. 1990. “The Moral Logic of Hezbollah”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. 142. 112 Magnus, Ranstorp. 1998. “The Strategy and Tactics of Hezbollah’s Current ‘Lebanonization Process’”. Mediterranean Politics, 3 (1): 95-126. 113 During the elections that took place in the year 2000, the list allying Hezbollah, Amal and other Shiite organisations won all 23 of the seats apportioned to southern Lebanon. This was Hezbollah’s greatest achievement since setting foot in the political arena of Lebanon. Ten out of 23 parliamentary seats were reserved for Hezbollah representatives. All told, Hezbollah chalked up 12 parliamentary seats and Amal secured 9 seats. 226 114 For elaboration of the Hizballah’s shift to party politics please refer to: Norton, A.R. 1998. “Walking Between Raindrops: Hizballah in Lebanon”, Mediterranean Politics 3 (1): 81-102; Jones, Clive. 1997. “Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and the War in South Lebanon”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 8 (3): 82-108. 115 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 78 (Hebrew) 116 Norton, Augustus Richard. 2000-01. “Lebanon’s Malaise”, Survival 42 (4): 38. 117 Yoram, Schweitzer. “Hezbollah: A Transnational Terrorist Organisation”. ICT, Sep. 1, 2002. http://www.ict.org.il. 118 Anat, Kurz, Maskit, Burgin and David, Tal. 1993. Islamic Terrorism and Israel: Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Tel-Aviv: Papyrus – Tel-Aviv University: 174 (Hebrew). 119 Shaul, Mishal and Avraham, Sela. 1999. The Hamas Wind: Violence and Coexistence. Tel-Aviv: Miskal Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Hemed Books. 101-105 (Hebrew). 120 Shaul, Mishal and Avraham, Sela. 1999. The Hamas Wind: Violence and Coexistence. Tel-Aviv: Miskal Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Hemed Books. 109-118 (Hebrew). 121 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 353. 122 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 354. 123 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 353. 124 Shaul, Mishal and Avraham, Sela. 1999. The Hamas Wind: Violence and Coexistence. Tel-Aviv: Miskal Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Hemed Books. 78-80 (Hebrew). 125 Ibid. 126 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "HAMAS - The Islamic Resistance Movement – Jan 93", MFA Liberary. Jan. 1, 1993. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/1990_1999/1993/1/hamas++the+islamic+resistance+movement +-+jan-93.htm. 127 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding”. Political Science Quarterly, 119 (1). 128 Andrew, Kydd and Barbara F., Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence”. International Organization, 56 (2): 263-264. 129 The three campaigns that failed to cause significant disruptions took place in October-November 1993, April 1994 and October 1994. For details, see: Andrew, Kydd and Barbara F., Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence”. International Organization, 56 (2): 279- 284. 130 See, for example: "The Peace Index 1996", The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC). (Hebrew). http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace/peaceindex/1996/files/Jan96.pdf. 131 "Armed Attacks, Negotiations, "Separation", Elections, Unemployement, and Palestinian-Jordanian Relations", CPRS Polls, Public Opinion Poll #15. Feb. 2-4, 1995. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/95/poll15a.html. 132 "The American Initiative, Armed Attackes, Palestinian State, Cabinet Reshuffle, Corruption, Democracy, Election of the President and vice President, Ownership of Satellite Dishes and Computers, and Subscription in the Internet Service", CPRS Polls, Public Opinion Poll #34. Jun. 25-27, 1998. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/98/poll34a.html. 133 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 355. 134 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding”. Political Science Quarterly, 119 (1). 135 "Camp David Summit, Chances for Reconciliation and Lasting Peace, Violence and Confrontations, Hierarchies of Priorities, and Domestic Politics", CPRS Polls, Public Opinion Poll #1. Jul. 27-29, 2000. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2000/p1a.html#violence. 136 In between the two campaigns that succeeded, there was an additional suicide campaign during the months of July-October, 1998, at the time of the signing of the Wye Agreements between Netanyahu and Arafat; however, the Hamas did not achieve its goals by means of this campaign. Andrew, Kydd 227 and Barbara F., Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence”. International Organization, 56 (2): 286-287. 137 Results were not long in coming. In a survey conducted a short while after the commencement of suicide attacks by the PFLP, rates of support for the organisation had returned to their original levels. Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 138 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding". Political Science Quarterly, 119 (1): 61-88. 139 While Arafat’s popularity dropped from 46% to 33% and the Fatah from 37% to 29%, support for Islamic organisations increased from 17% to 27%. These figures are taken from: "The Mitchell Report, Cease Fire, and Return to Negotiations; Intifada and Armed Confrontations; Chances for Reconciliation; and, Internal Palestinian Conditions", CPRS Polls, Public Opinion Poll #2. Jul. 5-9, 2001. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2001/p2a.html. 140 Ronen, Bergman. 2002. Authority Given. Tel-Aviv: Miskal – Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books. 25-28 (Hebrew). 141 IDF Spokesperson. “Documents: The Palestinian Authority Employs Fatah Activists Involved in Terrorism and Suicide Attacks”, Kokhaviv Publications. Apr. 23, 2002. http://www.kokhavivpublications.com/2002/israel/04/0204231229.html. 142 Ronen, Bergman. 2002. Authority Given. Tel-Aviv: Miskal – Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books (Hebrew); Mia M., Bloom. 2004. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding”. Political Science Quarterly, 119 (1). 143 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 348. 144 “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ”, organization profile in the Terrorist organizations Database, ICT. http://www.ict.org.il. 145 Bruce, Hoffman and Gordon H., McCormick. 2004. “Terrorism, Signalling and Suicide Attack”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (4): 243-281. 146 Mia, Bloom. "Tamil Attitudes Toward Terrorism", Tamil Eelam. Nov. 5, 2004. http://www.tamilcanadian.com/pageview.php?ID=1687&SID=52; Mia, Bloom. "Sri Lanka: In the Tigers' Belly", World Press Review. April 22, 2003. http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/1015.cfm 147 Bruce, Hoffman and Gordon H., McCormick. 2004. “Terrorism, Signalling and Suicide Attack”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (4): 259. 148 Bruce, Hoffman and Gordon H., McCormick. 2004. “Terrorism, Signalling and Suicide Attack”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (4): 260. 149 Oren, Yiftachel and As'ad, Ghanem. 2004. "Understanding ‘Ethnocratic’ Regimes: The Politics of Seizing Contested Territories". Political Geography, 23 (6): 647-676. 150 Christoph, Reuter. 2004. My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 158. 151 Ibid. 152 Mia M., Bloom. 2003. “Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka”. Civil Wars, 6 (1): 64. 153 Otis, Pauletta and Christopher D., Carr. 1988. “Sri Lanka and the Ethnic Conflict”. Conflict, 8: 212- 213. 154 Ralph R., Premdas and S.W.R. de A., Samarasinghe. 1988. “Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: The Indo- Lanka Peace Accord”. Asian Survey, 28 (6): 676-690. 155 Manoj, Joshi. 1996. “On the Razor’s Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19 (1): 21-22. 156 Manoj, Joshi. 1996. “On the Razor’s Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19 (1): 23. 157 Tom, Cooper. “Sri Lanka Since 1971”, ACIG Journal. Oct. 29, 2003. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_337.shtml 158 Mia M., Bloom. 2003. “Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka”. Civil Wars, 6 (1): 61. 159 Mia M., Bloom. 2003. “Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka”. Civil Wars, 6 (1): 64. 228 160 Manoj, Joshi. 1996. “On the Razor's Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19 (1): 24. 161 Kingsley M., De Silva (ed.). 2000. Conflict and Violence in South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Kandy: International Centre for Ethnic Studies. 407-408. 162 Mia M., Bloom. 2003. “Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka”. Civil Wars, 6 (1): 72. 163 Mia M., Bloom. 2003. “Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka”. Civil Wars, 6 (1): 64. 164 Sarah, Wayland, 2004. "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora". Review of International Studies, 30 (3): 405-426 165 Mia M., Bloom. 2003. “Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka”. Civil Wars, 6 (1): 69. 166 Mia, Bloom. "Tamil Attitudes Toward Terrorism", Tamil Eelam. Nov. 5, 2004. http://www.tamilcanadian.com/pageview.php?ID=1687&SID=52 167 Richard, Gorman. “Tracking the World’s Suicide Bombers”, Rutgers Focus. Nov. 18, 2003. http://ur.rutgers.edu/focus/index.phtml?Article_ID=1214. 168 Christoph, Reuter. 2004. My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 162. 169 Mia, Bloom. "Tamil Attitudes Toward Terrorism", Tamil Eelam. Nov. 5, 2004. http://www.tamilcanadian.com/pageview.php?ID=1687&SID=52 170 Mia M., Bloom. 2003. “Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka”. Civil Wars, 6 (1): 54-55. 171 “Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)”, organization profile in the Terrorist organizations Database, ICT. http://www.ict.org.il. 172 For a discussion of the PKK’s primary goals, please refer to: Criss, Nur Bilge. 1995. “The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 18 (1): 17-37; and Michael, Radu. 2001. “The Rise and Fall of the PKK”. Orbis, 45 (1): 47-63. 173 ERNK=Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan (National Liberation Front of Kurdistan). 174 According to Ergil, the PKK tried to create a myth of Turkish colonialism and convince the Kurdish population that it should fight against the Turks who took their land. Doğu, Ergil. 2000. “Suicide Terrorism in Turkey”. Civil Wars, 3 (1): 40-41. 175 ARGK=Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan (People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan). 176 Criss, Nur Bilge. 1995. “The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 18 (1): 20. 177 “Enter the PKK”: 25. http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/kur/chap02.pdf 178 Michael, Radu. 2001. “The Rise and Fall of the PKK”. Orbis, 45 (1): 52. 179 Doğu, Ergil. 2000. “Suicide Terrorism in Turkey”. Civil Wars, 3 (1): 46; Yoram, Schweitzer. “Suicide Terrorism: Development & Characteristics”, ICT. April 21, 2000. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=112. 180 Ely, Karmon. “The Showdown Between the PKK and Turkey: Syria's Setback”, ICT. Nov. 22, 1998. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=55. 181 Salah, Aziz. “Turkey’s Hard Choice”: http://www.kakarigi.net/salah-aziz/turkey.htm. 182 Ibid. 183 "Authorities Put on Brave Face after Fatal Suicide Attack", Turkish Daily News. October 27, 1996. http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/10_27_96/dom.htm; Yoram, Schweitzer. “Suicide Terrorism: Development & Characteristics”, ICT. April 21, 2000. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=112 184 “Turkey Defies Pleas to End Kurdish War”, CNN. May 20, 1997. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9705/20/turkey.iraq/index.html. 185 Ely, Karmon. “The Showdown Between the PKK and Turkey: Syria's Setback”, ICT. Nov. 22, 1998. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=55. 186 Ely, Karmon. “The Showdown Between the PKK and Turkey: Syria's Setback”, ICT. Nov. 22, 1998. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=55. 187 Doğu, Ergil. 2000. “Suicide Terrorism in Turkey”. Civil Wars, 3 (1): 45-47. 188 “Turkish Government Policies in the Southeast”: 133. 229 http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/kur/chap05.pdf 189 Criss, Nur Bilge. 1995. “The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 18 (1): 20. 190 Michael, Radu. 2001. “The Rise and Fall of the PKK”. Orbis, 45 (1): 57-58; “Enter the PKK”: 22. http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/kur/chap02.pdf 191 For a more detailed comparison please refer to: Mia, Bloom. "Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror", Submitted to the ISER Seminar of Contentious Politics. http://www.iserp.columbia.edu/downloads/bloom.pdf 192 Three last suicide attacks were carried out just after the sentencing but this small was ended by August 1999. 193 “World: Europe Revenge Bombings Halted”, BBC News. July 13, 1999. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/393611.stm. 194 Michael, Radu. 2001. “The Rise and Fall of the PKK”. Orbis, 45 (1): 50. 195 Please refer to: Daniel L., Byman. 2003. “Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?”. World Politics, 56: 139-163. 196 Magnus, Ranstorp. 1998. “Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin Laden’s ‘Fatwa’”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21: 321-330; “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”, fas.org. Feb. 23, 1998. http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm; “Bin Laden’s Fatwa”, Online News Hour. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html. 197 It should be mentioned though that there is still an ongoing debate regarding the question of Al- Qaeda’s connection to Wahhabism. Some scholars see a direct link to this tradition. See for example: Millard, Mike. 2004. Jihad in Paradise: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia. New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc. 35; Schwartz, Stephen. 2002. The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror. New York: Doubleday. 180. Other scholars do not find such a link. See for example: Azzam, Maha. 2003. "Al-Qaeda: The Misunderstood Wahhabi Connection and the Ideology of Violence", The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Briefing Paper 1. 198 The person mostly associated with the idea of Salfai Jihad is Sayyid Qutb. His book,which was published in 1964, became the manifesto of the Salfai Jihad. For analysis of the Salafi school and the writings of Qutb, please refer to: Marc, Sageman. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 7-17. 199 Yoram, Schweitzer and Shaul, Shay. 2002. An Expected Surprise: The September 11th Attack and its Ramifications. Herzliya: ICT. 17 (Hebrew). 200 Ted, Thornton. "The Wahhabi Movement, Eighteenth Century Arabia", History of the Middle East Database. Apr. 20, 2004. http://www.nmhschool.org/tthornton/wahhabi_movement.htm. 201 Jonathan, Fighel. "Sheikh Abdullah Azzam: Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor", ICT. Sep. 27, 2001. www.ict.org.il; H.A.R., Gibb and J.H. Kramers. 2001. Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam, Fourth Impression. Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, Inc. 618. 202 Yoram, Schweitzer and Shaul, Shay. 2002. An Expected Surprise: The September 11th Attack and its Ramifications. Herzliya: ICT. 36 (Hebrew). 203 Rohan, Gunaranta. 2002. Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press. 74. 204 Yoram, Schweitzer and Shaul, Shay. 2002. An Expected Surprise: The September 11th Attack and its Ramifications. Herzliya: ICT. 126 (Hebrew). 205 Please refer to: Daniel L., Byman. 2003. “Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?”. World Politics, 56: 145. 206 The question about the true goals of Al-Qaida is still debated by many scholars. For elaboration please refer to: Daniel L., Byman. 2003. “Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?”. World Politics, 56: 139-163; as well as to Anonymous. 2002. Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America..Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s. 207 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 153-154 (Hebrew). 208 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT: 154 (Hebrew). 209 Alan, Cullison. “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive”. The Atlantic Monthly, Sep. 2004. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200409/cullison 210 Bruce, Hoffman. 2003. “Al-Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (6): 434. 211 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 120-121 (Hebrew). 230 212 “Armed Islamic Group: Algeria, Islamists”, Council on Foreign Relations. In http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/gia.html; “In the Spotlight: Armed Islamic Group”, CDI. July 29, 2002. In http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/gia.cfm. 213 Based on data from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base: http://db.mipt.org/Faqs.jsp. 214 Briggs, Joe Bob. 2003-04. “The Q-Man”, National Interest 74: 115-120; Collins, Stephen D. 2004. “Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya)”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27: 1-18; Abuza, Zachary (Dec. 2002). “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 24 (3): 427. 215 Zachary, Abuza. 2002. “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24 (3): 427-466. 216 Marc, Sageman. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 217 Amy, Chew. “The Roots of Jemaah Islamiyah”, CNN. Feb. 26, 2004. http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/07/24/indo.JI.roots/. 218 Ibid. 219 “Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)”, organization profile in the Terrorist organizations Database, ICT. http://www.ict.org.il. 220 Zachary, Abuza. 2002. “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24 (3): 427-466. 221 “Suspect Mastermind Behind Saudi Bombing in Custody”, Chinadaily.com. June 27, 2003. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-06/27/content_241343.htm. 222 “Morocco Spells Death to 4 for Casablanca Bombing”, The Daily Star. Aug. 20, 2003. http://www.thedailystar.net/2003/08/20/d30820130184.htm. 223 Yossi, Melman. “Al-Qaeda is in Crisis, but the Spirit of the Global Jihad is More Alive than Ever”, Haaretz. Dec. 4, 2003. For examples of Bin Laden’s direct connections with large-scale attacks, see: Internet Desk. “Hand of Al-Qaeda at Casablanca”, Radio Netherlands. May 19, 2003. http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/mor030519.html; “Al-Qaeda Accused of Involvement in Riyadh Attacks”, CNN Student News. May 13, 2003. http://www.cnn.com/2003/fyi/news/05/13/saudi.bombings/index.html. 224 “Call for Suicide Attacks against Westerners”, The Star. May 22, 2003. In http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=132&fArticleId=150004; "The Wills of the Perpetrators of the Suicide Attacks in Riyadh", Memri: The Middle East Media Research Institute. (Hebrew). http://www.memri.org.il/Memri/LoadArticlePage.asp?entID=1339&entType=4&language=Hebrew. 225 On the 15th of November, 2003, two suicide bombers exploded two trucks full of dynamite at the entrances to the Beit Yisrael and Neve Shalom synagogues in Istanbul, and on the 20th of November, two suicide bombers detonated two car bombs at the entrances to the British Consul and the British Bank in Istanbul. Altogether, 57 people were killed in both attacks and hundreds were wounded. 226 Karl, Vick. “Turkish Suspects Tied to Guerrillas”, Washingtonpost.com. Nov. 24, 2003. 227 The ABC News Investigative Unit. “New Findings in Turkish Bomb Investigation”, ABCNEWS.com. Nov. 24, 2003. 228 Mike, Boettcher. "Tracing the Trail of Radical Turks", CNN.com. Dec. 26, 2003. http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/11/25/turkey.alqaeda/index.html; “‘The Cars of Death Will Not Stop...’”, Guardian Unlimited. Nov. 21, 2003. http://www.guardian.co.uk/turkey/story/0,12700,1090545,00.html; Ian, Mather. “‘The Cars of Death Will Not Stop...’”, Scotland on Sunday. Nov. 23, 2003. http://static.highbeam.com/s/scotlandonsundayedinburghscotland/november232003/thecarsofdeathwill notstop/ 229 Damien, McElroy and Philip, Sherwell. “Bomb Attacks Were Planned in Internet Café”, Telegraph. Nov. 23, 2003. 230 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 139-141 (Hebrew). 231 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 142 (Hebrew). 232 Andrei, Skrobot and Dmitry, Simakyn. “Black Holiday in Tushino”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta. July 7, 2003 233 “Vzriv v Metro Sovershila Jenchina Samoubiiza”, Izvestia. Feb. 6, 2004. 231 “FSB Rassmatryvaet dve Versii Terakta”, Izvestia. Feb. 8, 2004. 234 Rod, Nordland. “Is Zarqawi Really the Culprit?”, Newsweek. Mar. 6, 2004. 235 Deborah, Orin. “Bush Pledges US Staying Power in Iraq”, The New York Post. Oct. 29, 2003; Michael, Howard. “Baghdad Bombings: Foreign Fighters Blamed for Day of Carnage: Investigation Arrest of Would-Be Bomber with Syrian Passport Strengthens US Belief that Outside Insurgents are Behind Wave of Violence”, Guardian. Oct. 28, 2003. 236 Nordland, Rod. “Is Zarqawi Really the Culprit?”, Newsweek. Mar. 6, 2004. 237 Nordland, Rod. Masland Tom. Dickey, Christopher. “Unmasking the Insurgents”. Newsweek. Feb. 7, 2005 238 Martin, Kramer.1991. "Sacrifice and 'Self-Martyrdom' in Shi'ite Lebanon". Terrorism and Political Violence, 3 (3): 30-47. http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/Sacrifice.htm 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid. 241 “Eastern Turkish Town of Bingol in Shock After Suicide Attacks”, News-Star.com. Nov. 28, 2003. www.news-star.com/stories/112803/new_20.shtml. 242 Nicolas, Bourcier. “Turkish City that is a Cradle of Unrest”, Manchester Guardian Weekly. December 17, 2003. 243 Soraya Sarhaddi, Nelson. “Turkey’s Latest Terrorism Act Hatched in Internet Café”, Knight Ridder- Washington Bureau. November 21, 2003. http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/7321680.htm. 244 “Naive Bomber and the Avenger Who Lit his Fuse”, Times (London). November 29, 2003. 245 Nicholas, Birch. “Friends Seduced by Islamic Terror Suicide Bombings in Istanbul Have Put the Focus on a Sinister Terror Group, the Kurdish Hizbullah”, The Irish Times. November 22, 2003. 246 Soraya Sarhaddi, Nelson. “Turkey’s Latest Terrorism Act Hatched in Internet Café”, Knight Ridder- Washington Bureau. November 21, 2003. http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/7321680.htm. 247 “Naive Bomber and the Avenger Who Lit his Fuse”, Times (London). November 29, 2003. 248 Ibid. 249 “‘Parallels’ to Al-Qaeda Cited in Istanbul Synagogue Blasts: Investigators Identify Two Bombers from Same Eastern Province”, The Washington Post. November 20, 2003. 250 “Turkey’s Town of Terrorists”, The Times (London). December 8, 2003. 251 Nicholas, Birch. “Friends Seduced by Islamic Terror Suicide Bombings in Istanbul Have Put the Focus on a Sinister Terror Group, the Kurdish Hizbullah”, The Irish Times. November 22, 2003. 252 “Turkey’s Town of Terrorists”, The Times (London). December 8, 2003. 253 Soraya Sarhaddi, Nelson. “Remote Kurdish City Produced Terrorist Plot: Long Struggles among Factions May be to Blame”, San Jose Mercury News (California). November 23, 2003. http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/7331721.htm. 254 “Naive Bomber and the Avenger Who Lit his Fuse”, Times (London). November 29, 2003. 255 Lawrence, Uzzell. 2004. “Profile of Female Suicide Bomber”. Chechnya Weekly, 5 (6): 3-6. Feb. 11, 2004. http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/chw_005_006.pdf 256 Ibid. 257 Ibid. 258 Ariel, Merari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press. 203; Scott, Atran. 2003. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”. Science, 299 (5619): 1537; Ariel, Merari. 2004. “Suicide Terrorism”. In R., Yufit and D., Lester (eds.) Assessment, Treatment and Prevention of Suicide. New York: John Wiley. 259 In very few cases, evidence was found for some kind of mental condition or other illness, however, because this is such a small minority of the cases, it doesn’t say much about the larger phenomenon. There is evidence that some of the Sri Lankan, Kurdish and Chechen perpetrators, mostly women, were coerced to engage in suicide attacks; but, again, this phenomenon was only a small minority of the cases. 260 For a detailed description of the problems involved in the study of suicide terrorists, please refer to: Ariel, Merari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press. 232 261 Ergil, Doğu. 2000. Suicide Terrorism in Turkey: The Workers’ Party of Kurdistan, Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference. Herzliya, Israel: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 262 Ayla H., Schbley. 2000. “Torn Between God, Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon’s Religious Terrorists”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 23: 175-196. 263 Ariel, Merari. 1990. “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”. In Walter, Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind. New York: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press; Anat, Berko. 2004. The Path to the Garden of Eden. Tel-Aviv: Miskal Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books. (Hebrew). 264 We constructed a database specifically for this purpose. The database was created in two stages. First, we detected all terrorist events (suicide attacks) which had taken place in Israel over the last decade. This was done by conducting a careful scrutiny of the Israeli daily, “Ha’aretz”, with the help of a group of specially trained students. Each retrieved terrorist event was encoded according to a detailed codebook. Regarding incidents where it was difficult to obtain information, we made use of other resources, notably, Internet sites of the terrorist’s organization or other daily newspapers. In the second stage, we established a quantitative database which included characteristics relevant to terrorist profiles. The whole process of retrieving and encoding data was crosschecked in order to prevent any possibility of bias or loss of data. This methodology, which has become relevant over the years in the study of social protest as well as political violence, is termed “events data”. It allowed us to obtain longitudinal and reliable information with regard to the studied phenomenon as well as in terms of its characteristics and causes. 265 The commitment/crisis dichotomy has a lot of similarities to the altruistic and fatalistic types of suicide as proposed by Durkheim. For further elaboration on the relevance of Durkheim’s typology on the study of suicide terror, please refer to: Ami, Pedahzur, Arie, Perliger and Leonard, Weinberg. 2003. “Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists”. Deviant Behaviour, 24 (4): 405-423. 266 Bernard N., Grofman and Edward N., Muller. 1973. “The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis”. American Political Science Review, 67(2): 514-539; Ted R., Gurr. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Randy, Hodson, Dusko, Sekulic and Garth, Massey. 1994. “National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia”. American Journal of Sociology, 99(6): 1534-1558. 267 Dalal, Saoud. “Feature: Bombings – Suicide or Martyrdom?”, United Press International. May 3, 2001; Catherine, Taylor. “Jihad Widows Keep the Faith – Middle East Mayhem”, The Australian. Oct. 7, 2003; Red, Harrison. “Fundamental Rite”, The Weekend Australian. October 4, 1997. 268 “Nations aren't Innocent”, Sangam.org. http://www.tamil.net/list/2001-08/msg00211.html. 269 “Suspected Killer Identified by Sri Lankan Police”, The Xinhua General Overseas News Service. May 4, 1993; Rohan, Gunaratna. “The Employment of Suicide in Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: The Threat and Likely Trends”, atimes.com. In Vers une privatisation des conflits?, Recherches & Documents no. 22, Avril 2001. 43-60. 270 “Time’s Wasting Hours: Trends in the Tamil Struggle”. Report 13, Chapter 6. http://www.uthr.org/Reports/Report13/chapter6.htm. 271 In general, Israel allows Palestinian prisoners some degree of autonomy while they are serving their sentences. They elect their leadership, run their everyday life and give each other lessons on different subjects. Often, prisoners gather in groups based on their ideological affiliations. The closeness that life in prison imposes on them creates and reinforces their camaraderie and commitment to the organisation. Moreover, spending a length of time in an Israeli prison is often considered a commendable rite of passage when becoming a Palestinian fighter. 272 “Islamic Jihad Claims Responsibility for Bombing”, Morningsun.net. Nov. 8, 1998. http://www.morningsun.net/stories/110898/usw_1108980023.shtml; “Palestinians Boost Anti-terrorism Efforts After Attack”, CNN.com. Nov. 7, 1998. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9811/07/israel.bomb.02/. 273 Roni, Shaked, Doron, Meiri and Alex, Fishman. “The Terrorists Came from a Territory Under Israeli Control”, Yediot Aharonot. Nov. 8, 1998. 15. (Hebrew). 274 Ibid. 275 “Palestinians Arrest Jihad Activists after Bombing”, CNN.com. Nov. 7, 1998; 233 "Islamic Jihad Blamed for Jerusalem Car Bombing”, CNN.com. Nov. 6, 1998. 276 “The Perpetrators of the Attack”, Maariv Online. May 26, 2001. (Hebrew). 277 It is important to note that Sageman was not referring specifically to suicide terrorism. Marc, Sageman. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press. 278 "The Global Salafi Jihad", Statement of Marc Sageman to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 9, 2003. http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030709-sageman.htm. See also: Marc, Sageman. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press. 279 Nicholas, Birch. “Friends Seduced by Islamic Terror Suicide Bombings in Istanbul Have Put the Focus on a Sinister Terror Group, the Kurdish Hizbullah”, The Irish Times. November 22, 2003. 280 “Turkish Suspects Tied to Guerrillas; Government’s Backing of Islamic Group Arouses Scrutiny after Blasts”, The Washington Post. November 24, 2003. 281 Damien, McElroy, Olga, Craig, Philip, Sherwell, Colin, Brown and Yigal, Schleifer. “How the Message Was Brought Home. The State Visit by George W. Bush Was Running Like Clockwork, Then, 1,500 Miles Away, Two Massive Bombs Exploded”, Sunday Telegraph (London). November 23, 2003. 282 “Widow of Synagogue Bomber Says She Found Out He Died From Press”, Agence France-Presse. November 21, 2003. http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/bp/Qturkey-attacks- widow.Rq6O_DNL.html. 283 http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9709/24/israel/four.shot.jpg; "Israel Demands Arrest of Militants Linked to Bombings", CNN.com. Sep. 24, 1997. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9709/24/israel/index.html; "Israel Says 4 Suicide Bombers from West Bank", CNN.com. Sep. 23, 1997. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9709/23/israel.bombers/index.html. 284 Sami, Sokol, Eitan, Rabin and Amira, Hess. "The 4 Suicide Bombers Were Wanted by Israel Since September 96' When They Escaped the Palestinian Prison", Haaretz. Sep. 24, 1997 (Hebrew); Eitan, Rabin. "A D.N.A. Tests of the Family Members Confirmed the Suicide Bomber's Identity", Haaretz. Sep. 24, 1997 (Hebrew); Simone, Bitton. 1999. The Bombing. A film by Simone Bitton. About the film, see: http://www.frif.com/pdf/mideast2004.pdf. pg. 8; For a review of the film, see: Pamela, Nice. 2001. "Deconstruction of a Bombing". Al Jadid Magazine, 7 (35). http://www.aljadid.com/film/0735nice.html. 285 Itzik, Saban and Eitan, Glickman. “Bicycle of Death”, Yediot Aharonot. May 20, 2003: 7. (Hebrew). 286 For more on the involvement of the Qawasme family in terror incidents, please refer to: “The Qawasme Family is Responsible for the Murder of about 100 Israelis and to the Injury of Hundreds”, The News Room. Aug. 31, 2004 (Hebrew). http://newsroom.co.il/?id=30809. 287 Arnon, Regular. “The Six Suicides from Hebron: Friends in the Football Team”, Haaretz. May 29, 2003. (Hebrew) 288 Itzik, Saban, Roni, Shaked, Eran, Navon and Eitan, Glickman. “Suspect: Israeli Arabs Were Involved in Attack”, Yediot Aharanot. Oct. 23, 2002: 9 (Hebrew). 289 Roni, Shaked, Itzik, Saban, Haim, Broida. “Person Responsible for Attack in Ariel Eliminated”, Yediot Aharanot. Nov. 5, 2002: 9 (Hebrew). 290 Gal, Berger. “One Year Later: Hamas Assumes Responsibility for the Attack on Mike’s Place”, MSN.co.il. Mar. 8, 2004 (Hebrew). http://nfc.msn.co.il/archive/001-D-41827-00.html?tag=15-33-27. 291 “Suicide Bomber 'Had WTC Article'”, ic Newcastle. May 6, 2004. http://icnewcastle.icnetwork.co.uk/0100news/0200national/tm_objectid=14216982&method=full&sitei d=50081&headline=suicide-bomber--had-wtc-article--name_page.html. 292 “Cover Story: Passport to Terror - The Times, UK”, Islamic News Updates, Message 3035. May 8, 2003. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/IslamicNewsUpdates/message/3035. 293 Nick, Fielding. “Passport to Terror”, Sunday Times (London). May 4, 2003; Daniel, McGrory. “Israel Asks for Help to Trace ‘British Bombers’”, The Times (London). October 27, 2003. 294 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Details of April 30th, 2003, Tel Aviv Suicide Bombing”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Website: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2003/Details+of+April+30- +2003+Tel+Aviv+suicide+bombing.htm; 234 Sharon, Sadeh. “Britain: Indictments against Family of Terrorist on the Promenade”, Walla News. May 9, 2003 (Hebrew). http://news.walla.co.il/?w=//384918; Associated Press. “Suicide Bomber’s Brother and Sister Face Retrial”, News.jpost.com. Jul. 8, 2004. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1089257369089&p= 1078397702269. 295 Edward, Walsh. “Suicide Recruit to Captive of Israel: 16-Year-Old, Among Shiites Demanded by Hijackers, Describes Growing Up in Lebanon”, Washington Post. June 18, 1985. 296 Thomas L., Friedman. “Boys Says Lebanese Recruited Him as Car Bomber”, The New York Times. April 14, 1985. 297 Edward, Walsh. “Suicide Recruit to Captive of Israel: 16-Year-Old, Among Shiites Demanded by Hijackers, Describes Growing Up in Lebanon”, Washington Post. June 18, 1985. 298 Ibid. 299 Ibid. 300 Thomas L., Friedman. “Boys Says Lebanese Recruited Him as Car Bomber”, The New York Times. April 14, 1985. 301 Edward, Walsh. “Suicide Recruit to Captive of Israel: 16-Year-Old, Among Shiites Demanded by Hijackers, Describes Growing Up in Lebanon”, Washington Post. June 18, 1985. 302 Thomas L., Friedman. “Boys Says Lebanese Recruited Him as Car Bomber”, The New York Times. April 14, 1985. 303 Edward, Walsh. “Suicide Recruit to Captive of Israel: 16-Year-Old, Among Shiites Demanded by Hijackers, Describes Growing Up in Lebanon”, Washington Post. June 18, 1985. 304 “Captured Suicide Bomber Wanted to Ride Mule to Paradise”, The Associated Press. November 20, 1985. 305 “Syrians Paid ‘Suicide’ Girl”, Herald. November 20, 1985. 306 “Captured Suicide Bomber Wanted to Ride Mule to Paradise”, The Associated Press. November 20, 1985. 307 “Syrians Paid ‘Suicide’ Girl”, Herald. November 20, 1985. 308 “Captured Suicide Bomber Wanted to Ride Mule to Paradise”, The Associated Press. November 20, 1985. 309 Ibid. 310 For more information please refer to: http://www.iaf.org.il/Templates/Kills/FirstDown.IN.aspx?lang=HE&lobbyID=43&folderID=43&subfo lderID=293&docfolderID=293&docID=1268&docType=ARTICLE. 311 Martin, Kramer.1991. “Sacrifice and 'Self-Martyrdom' in Shi'ite Lebanon”. Terrorism and Political Violence, 3 (3): 30-47. http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/Sacrifice.htm. 312 Ibid. 313 For the full stories of the Palestinian suicide bombers, please refer to: Barbara, Victor. 2003. Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. USA: Rodale Books. 314 “Palestinian Women Martyrs against the Israeli Occupation – Wafa Idriss: January 27, 2002”. http://www.aztlan.net/women_martyrs.htm; Amit, Cohen and Sa’id, Baderan. “The [Female] Terrorist in Haifa: A Lawyer from Jenin”, Maariv Internet. October 5, 2003 (Hebrew); http://www.nrg.co.il/online/archive/ART/551/742.html. 315 Chen, Kotz-Bar. “I Dreamed of Killing More than a Hundred”, Maariv, Weekend Supplement. Jan. 23, 2004: 16 (Hebrew). 316 “Suicide Attacks Using Women”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the C.S.S. March 2004 (Hebrew). http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/4_04/women.htm. 317 Barbara, Victor. 2003. Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers. USA: Rodale Books. 100-101. 318 “Palestinian Women Martyrs against the Israeli Occupation – Dareen Abu Aysheh: February 27, 2002”. http://www.aztlan.net/women_martyrs.htm. 319 “‘She is Having a Fine Time with God’ Said the Terrorist about her Friend”, Haaretz. Apr. 14, 2002 (Hebrew). 320 Itamar, Eichner and Haim, Broida. “This is How [Female] Suicide Terrorists are Recruited”, Yediot Aharonot, 24 Hours. Jan. 12, 2003: 13 (Hebrew). 235 321 “‘She is Having a Fine Time with God’ Said the Terrorist about her Friend”, Haaretz. Apr. 14, 2002 (Hebrew). 322 “Suicide Attacks Using Women”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the C.S.S. March 2004 (Hebrew). http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/4_04/women.htm. 323 Chen, Kotz-Bar. “I Dreamed of Killing More than a Hundred”, Maariv, Weekend Supplement. Jan. 23, 2004: 16 (Hebrew). 324 Ibrahim, Hazboun. “The Palestinian Authority’s ‘Angels of Death’”, OPSICK. March 31, 2002. http://www.operationsick.com/articles/20020331_paangelsofdeath.asp. 325 “Suicide Attacks Using Women”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the C.S.S. March 2004 (Hebrew). http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/4_04/women.htm. 326 “Palestinian Women Martyrs against the Israeli Occupation – Andaleeb Takafka: April 12, 2002”. http://www.aztlan.net/women_martyrs.htm. 327 “Suicide Attacks Using Women”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the C.S.S. March 2004 (Hebrew). http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/4_04/women.htm. 328 “Suicide Attacks Using Women”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the C.S.S. March 2004 (Hebrew). http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/4_04/women.htm. 329 Harel, Amos and Jonathan, Lis. “Jerusalem Police on High Alert for Suicide Bomber”, Haaretz Daily. June 18, 2002. (Hebrew). http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=177250&contrassID=1&subContrassI D=0&sbSubContrassID=0. 330 Natasha, Muzgobiah. “Our Son is a Terrorist”, Yediot Aharonot, 24 Hours. Feb. 11, 2003: 7. (Hebrew). 331 Ibid. 332 Rima, Salameh. “Lebanon’s Militia Women Fight and Become Suicide Bomb ‘Martyrs’”, The Associated Press. April 7, 1986. 333 Scheherezadd, Faramarzi. “Girl Who Drove Car Bomb First Sent Mother Present”, The Associated Press. April 12, 1985. 334 Ibid. 335 Ibid. 336 “Israel Bomb Kills 4”, CNN.com. Mar. 4, 2001. 337 “The Executive of the Attack: We Must Sacrifice Ourselves”, Ynet. March 7, 2001 (Hebrew). http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~zultia/about%20me/shlomit/013.htm. 338 Ibid. 339 Ibid. 340 In this case, the term shahid was not used to describe fellow suicide bombers but people who died as a result of Israeli military assaults. 341 Ynet News Archive, April, 29, 2001: http://www.ynet.co.il/home/0,7340,L-8,FF.html(Hebrew). 342 “Six Dead in Mideast Resort Bomb”, CNN.com. May 18, 2001. http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/05/18/bomb.netanya.02/index.html; “Israel Launches Strikes after Suicide Bombing”, CNN.com. May 18, 2001. http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/05/18/bomb.netanya.03/index.html. 343 Ynet News Archive, May 19, 2001: http://www.ynet.co.il/home/0,7340,L-8,FF.html; Maariv Online Archive, May 19, 2001: http://www.nrg.co.il/online/HP_0.html. 344 Ibid. 345 Ynet News Archive, Jun. 23, 2001: http://www.ynet.co.il/home/0,7340,L-8,FF.html. 346 “Bomber Identified as 22-year-old Palestinian”, CNN.com. June 3, 2001. http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/06/03/tel.aviv.bomber/index.html. 347 “The Perpetrator of the Attack: A Qalqilya Resident who Served in the Jordanian Army”, Ynet news. Jun. 3, 2001. (Hebrew). http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-785548,00.html. 348 “Special”, A list of the twenty-one young persons who were killed in the attack, Ynet news. (Hebrew). http://www.ynet.co.il/home/0%2C7340%2CL-1258%2CFF.html. 349 “The Perpetrator of the Attack: A Qalqilya Resident who Served in the Jordanian Army”, Ynet news. Jun. 3, 2001. (Hebrew). http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-785548,00.html. 350 Chris, Kline and Mark, Franchetti. “The Woman Behind the Mask”, Sunday Times (London). November 3, 2002. 351 Ibid. 236 352 Ibid. 353 Ed, Bradley. “Terror in Moscow: New Documentary Features Hostage Drama in Moscow Theatre Last Year When Chechen Rebels Took 800 People Hostage”, 60 Minutes, (7:00 PM ET) – CBS. October 26, 2003. 354 Chris, Kline and Mark, Franchetti. “The Woman Behind the Mask”, Sunday Times (London). November 3, 2002. 355 Sharon, LaFraniere and Peter, Baker. “Moscow’s New Fear: Women with Bombs: Chechen Rebels Recruit War Widows”, The Washington Post. July 11, 2003. 356 Sergei, Dyupin. “Ripped Off Head Started Talking”, What the Papers Say (Russia). July 2, 2003. 357 Sharon, LaFraniere and Peter, Baker. “Moscow’s New Fear: Women with Bombs: Chechen Rebels Recruit War Widows”, The Washington Post. July 11, 2003; Viktor, Paukov, Aleksandr, Raskin and Vremya, Novostei. “Suicide Bombings Kill 75, Injure 400 in Chechnya, Terrorist Holiday: Akhmad Kadyrov Was Shielded by Bodyguards”, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. June 11, 2003. 358 “Chechen Interior Ministry Blames Blast on Rebel Commander”, BBC Monitoring International Reports. May 14, 2003. 359 Viktor, Paukov, Aleksandr, Raskin and Vremya, Novostei. “Suicide Bombings Kill 75, Injure 400 in Chechnya, Terrorist Holiday: Akhmad Kadyrov Was Shielded by Bodyguards”, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. June 11, 2003. 360 Mark, Franchetti. “‘Wish Me Luck’, Said the Suicide Widow Waiting to Kill Russians”, Sunday Times (London). August 17, 2003. 361 Ibid. 362 Ibid. 363 Ibid. 364 “Suicide Bomber Kills Two Israeli Soldiers”, CNN.com. July 16, 2001. 365 “The Jihad Takes Responsibility on Hezbollah Television”, Maariv Internet. July 17, 2001 (Hebrew). 366 Ibid. 367 Ibid. 368 “My Son Made His Family Proud”, Maariv Internet. Aug. 13, 2001 (Hebrew). 369 Ibid. 370 Amir, Rapaport and Itamar, Eichner. “The Target: Nablus”, Yediot Aharonot. May 28, 2002: 6 (Hebrew). 371 Ibid. 372 Yoav, Yitzhak and Yifat, Gadot. “A Woman Suicide Terrorist Blew Herself Up at Maxim Restaurant in Haifa”, News First Class. www.nfc.co.il (Hebrew); Amit, Cohen and Sa’id, Baderan. “The Woman Terrorist from Haifa: A Lawyer from Jenin”, Maariv Internet. October 5, 2003 (Hebrew). 373 John Ward, Anderson and Molly, Moore. “For Two Families in Haifa, Three Generations of Victims”, Washington Post. October 6, 2003; “Face of Suicide Bomber; She Kills 16 Adults 3 Kids and Wounds this Tiny Child”, Sunday Mail. October 5, 2003. 374 Vered, Levi-Barzilai. “Ticking Bomb”, Haaretz. Oct. 17, 2003 (Hebrew). 375 Gideon, Levy. “All the Sons are Dead”, Haaretz, Supplement. Jan. 30, 2004 (Hebrew). 376 Marc, Sageman. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University Press of Pennsylvania. There are, however, some interesting differences. While the majority of the subjects in Sageman’s analysis were married and had a background of secular education, among Palestinian suicide bombers of the first wave, the majority were single and had a background of religious education. 377 Religious background in this case has been determined according to the type of school that the perpetrator attended. 378 Arnon, Regular. “With his Hand on the Switch, the Terrorist Decided not to Explode”, Haaretz. May 23, 2004. (Hebrew); “Mind of the Suicide Bomber,” CBS News.com. May 25, 2003; http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/23/60minutes/main555344.shtml. 379 Ibid. 380 Ibid. 381 Ibid. 382 Michael, Radu. 2003. “Radical Islam and Suicide Bombers”. Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 21, 2003. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20031021.americawar.radu.islamsuicidebombers.html; 237 Raphael, Israeli. 2002. “A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 14 (4): 23-40. 383 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 384 Christoph, Reuter. 2004. My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princton: Princeton Univeristy Press. 385 Shimon, Shapira. 2000. Hezbollah: Between Iran and Lebanon. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing. 169 (Hebrew). 386 Martin, Kramer. 1991. “Sacrifice and ‘Self-Martyrdom’ in Shiite Lebanon”. Terrorism and Political Violence, 3 (3): 30-47. 387 “Shiites Posthumously Honour Teenager as Suicide Bomber”, The Associated Press. Dec. 19, 1985. 388 “Hezbollah Commemorates Suicide Bombers”, The Associated Press. Nov. 12, 1989. 389 Guy, Bechor. “Back on the Road to Sacrifice”, Haaretz. Dec. 6, 1995 (Hebrew). 390 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 60-61 (Hebrew). 391 Ibid. 392 Ariel, Merrari. 2003. “Social, Organisational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism”. In Tore, Bjorgo (ed.) The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root Causes of Terrorism, June 9-11, 2003. Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 393 Ghassan, Hage. 2003. “Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm: Understanding Palestinian Suicide Bombers in Times of Exighophobia”. Public Culture, 15 (1): 79-80. 394 Ehud, Sprinzak. 2000. “Rational Fanatics: Analysis of the Effects of Suicide Bombers”. Foreign Policy, 120: 66-73. 395 Rohan, Gunaratna. “Childhood: A continuous Casualty of the Conflict in Sri Lanka's Conflict”, Weekend Express. July 18-19, 1998. 396 James F., Dunnigan. 2004. “Suicide Terrorist Incorporated”, Strategy Page. May 31, 2004; Lawrence, Uzzell. 2004. “Profile of Female Suicide Bomber”. Chechnya Weekly, 5 (6): 3-6. Feb. 11, 2004. http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/chw_005_006.pdf. 397 Rohan, Gunaranta. 2002. Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press. 75. 398 “Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands, from Incident to Trend”, AIVD.NL. 11-14. http://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/2285/recruitmentbw.pdf 399 “Statement of Marc Sageman to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States”, July 9, 2003. http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030709-sageman.htm. 400 Bruce, Hoffman. 2003. "Al-Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: As Assessment". Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (6): 429-442. 401 Rohan, Gunaratna (ed.). 2003. Terrorism in the Asia Pacific: Threat and Response. Singapore: International Specialised Book Services. 402 Calabresi, Massimo. 1998. “A Hellenic Haven: The Flight of Kurdish Refugees to Greece Adds to a Cycle of Violence and Vengeance”. TIME, 151 (13): March 30, 1998. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/1998/int/980330/europe.a_hellenic_haven.19.html. 403 For further discussion, please refer to these websites: http://www.child-soldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsf; and http://www.mfa.gov.tr./grupa/ac/acf/FA.htm. 404 Radu, Michael. 2001. “The Rise and the Fall of the PKK”. Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 45 (1): 51. 405 Ehud, Sprinzak. 2000. “Rational Fanatics: Analysis of the Effects of Suicide Bombers”. Foreign Policy, 120: 66-73. 406 Audrey Kurth, Cronin. 2003. “Terrorists and Suicide Attack”. CRS Report for Congress. Aug. 28, 2003. http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32058.pdf 407 “Root Causes of Terrorism in the Caucasus”, Peace Mission in the North of Caucasus, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response. February, 2003. 408 There are reports that this woman does not exist. According to a terrorist named Zarema Muzhakhoeva who was caught by the Russian authorities she invented the whole story about this mystery woman. 238 409 Lawrence, Uzzell. 2004. “Profile of Female Suicide Bomber”. Chechnya Weekly, 5 (6): 3-6. Feb. 11, 2004. http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/chw_005_006.pdf; Kim, Murphy. “‘Black Widows’ Caught Up in Web of Chechen War”, Los Angeles Times. Feb. 7, 2004. http://www.rickross.com/reference/rs/rs43.html 410 Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivation and Organisation Aspects”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26: 83. 411 Jack, Kelly. “The Secret World of Suicide Bombers: Devotion, Desire Drive Youths to 'Martyrdom' Palestinians in Pursuit of Paradise Turn Their Own Bodies into Weapons”, USA TODAY. Jun. 26, 2001. http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/USATODAY/2001/06/26/404192?page=2 412 Amit, Navon. “How the Islamic Jihad Terror Machine Operates”, Maariv Internet. Jun. 14, 2002 (Hebrew). 413 Ilana, Dayan and Gal, Gabai, research reporters. Fact (TV program), Jun. 2, 2004 (Hebrew). 414 Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivation and Organisation Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26: 68. 415 Ami, Pedahzur, Arie, Perliger and Leonard, Weinberg. 2003. “Altruism and Fatalism in the Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists”. Deviant Behaviour, 24: 405-423. 416 “Iran’s Agents of Terror”, US News and World Report. Mar. 6, 1989. 417 “Raided Base is Breeding Place for Fanatics”, The Associated Press. Jun. 3, 1994. 418 Guy, Bechor. “Back on the Road to Sacrifice”, Haaretz. Dec. 6, 1995 (Hebrew). 419 Rohan, Gunaratna (ed.). 2003. Terrorism in the Asia Pacific: Threat and Response. Singapore: International Specialised Book Service. 420 Sanjay, Sonawani. 2001. On the Brink of Death. New-York: Pushpa Parakashan. 281. 421 Ibid. 422 It should be mentioned that the connection between the idea of suicide for the organization and the leader and high social status in the organization was not new to the LTTE. It started in the early 1980s when members of the organizations received cyanide capsules to hang on their necks for quick usage in case they were captured. The cyanide capsule wrapped in a leather thong, was considered as a badge of honour among the organization’s members. Bruce, Hoffman and Gordon D., McCormick. 2004. “Terrorism, Signaling and Suicide Attack”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (4): 259. 423 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 137 (Hebrew). 424 Fore more Information please refer to: www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/terror/greecebk/annex8.htm. 425 Audrey Kurth, Cronin. 2003. “Terrorism and Suicide Attack". CRS Report for Congress. Aug. 28, 2003. http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32058.pdf 426 James F., Dunnigan. “Suicide Terrorist, Incorporated”, Strategy Page. May 31, 2004. http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles2001/20010625.asp 427 Lawrence, Uzzell. 2004. “Profile of Female Suicide Bomber”. Chechnya Weekly, 5 (6): 3-6. Feb. 11, 2004. http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/chw_005_006.pdf 428 Kim, Murphy. “A Cult of Reluctant Killers: The 'black widows' of Chechnya suicide bombers who stalk Russia are driven by hatred, ideology, coercion and fear”, Los Angeles Times. Feb. 4, 2004. 429 “The Karbala Connection: Where Bombs, Heroin and Islam Meet”, AFP. March 23, 2004. http://www.keepmedia.com/ShowItemDetails.do?item_id=399522 430 Eitan, Rabin. “DNA Tests of Family Members Confirmed Identities of Suicide Attackers”, Haaretz. Sep. 24, 1997 (Hebrew); Sami, Sockol, Eitan, Rabin and Amira, Hass. “The Four Terrorists Were Wanted by Israel Already in September 1996 after Escaping from Palestinian Jail”, Haaretz. Sep. 5, 1997 (Hebrew). 431 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 43 (Hebrew); Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivation and Organisation Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26: 84. 432 Shaul, Shay. 2003. The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks. Herzliya: ICT. 44 (Hebrew). 433 Ibid. 434 Michael, Taarnby. 2003. “Profiling the Islamic Suicide Terrorist”, A Research Report for the Danish Ministry of Justice. November 27, 2003. 36, 29. http://www.jm.dk/image.asp?page=image&objno=71157. 435 Rohan, Gunaranta. 2002. Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press. 73. 239 436 Yoram, Schweitzer. “Suicide Terrorism and the September 11th Attacks”, ICT. October 20, 2002; “Translation of the Letter Left by Hijackers”, ICT. September 29, 2001. www.ict.org.il. See also the Al-Qaeda manual, lesson 2, on: www.usdoj.gov. 437 Zachary, Abuza. 2002. “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24 (3): 427-466. 438 Gabriel, Weimann. "www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet". www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html. 439 Ariel, Merrari. 2003. “Social, Organisational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism”. In Tore, Bjorgo (ed.) The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root Causes of Terrorism, June 9-11, 2003. Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 440 Lawrence, Uzzell. 2004. “Profile of Female Suicide Bomber”. Chechnya Weekly, 5 (6): 3-6. Feb. 11, 2004. http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/chw_005_006.pdf 441 Miranda, Kennedy and Matthew, Power. 2004. “The Buddha’s Teardrop”. The Old Town Review, March, 2004. http://www.fluxfactory.org/otr/kennedypowersrilanka.htm; Suba, Chandran. “Born to Die: The Black Tigers of the LTTE”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Oct. 7, 2001. http://www.ipcs.org/Terrorism_kashmirLevel2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=198&subCatID=1022 &mod=g 442 “Mind of the Suicide Bomber”, CBS News.com. May 25, 2003. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/23/60minutes/main555344.shtml. 443 Chris, Ryan. 1991. “Tourism, terrorism and violence: the risks of wider world travel”. Conflict Studies, 244, Sept. 1991: 1-30; Yoel, Mansfeld. 1994. “The Middel-East Conflict and Tourism to Israel, 1967-1990”. Middle Eastern Studies, 30 (3): 646-667; Grant, Wardlaw. 1989. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures. Cambridge, UK: CUP. 58 ; Brien, Jenkins. 1978. “Numbered Lives: Some statistical observations from 77 international hostage episodes”. Conflict, An International Journal for Conflict and Policy Studies, 1 (1/2): 71-111; Zagari, Mark. 1992. "Combating Terrorism: Report to the Committee of Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights of the European Parliament”. Terrorism and Political Violence, 4 (4): 288; Peter, Chalk. 1998. “The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy”. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44 (3): 377; Leslie, Macfarlane. 1992. “Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism in Northern Ireland”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 4 (1): 93. 444 While the average number of casualties worldwide from ordinary terrorism is 9.3, from suicide attacks, it is 70.3 .Figures from the National Security Studies Centre databases at Haifa University: http://nssc.haifa.ac.il/. 445 Galea, Sandro, Jennifer, Ahern, Heidi, Resnick, David, Kilpatrick, Michael, Bucuvalas, Joel, Gold and David, Vlahov. 2002. “Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City”. New England Journal of Medicine, 346 (13): 982-987; William E., Schlenger, Juesta M., Cadell, Lori, Ebert, Kathleen B., Jordan, Kathryn M., Rourke, David, Wilson et al. 2002. “Psychological Reactions to Terrorist Attacks: Findings from the National Study of Americans’ Reactions to September 11”. Journal of the American Medical Association, 288 (5): 581-588; Mark A., Schuster, Bradley D., Stein, Lisa H., Jaycox, Rebecca L., Collins, Grant N., Marshall and Marc N. Elliot. 2001. “A National Study of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks”. New England Journal of Medicine, 345 (20): 1507-1512. 446 Gary, Langer. “Prayers for Victims, Support for Reprisals”, ABCNEWS.com. Sep. 11, 2001. http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/wtc_abcpoll010911.html; After 9/11: Stress and Copying Across America. A paper presented before the United States Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labour and Pensions field hearing on “9/11 and NYC Children”, June 10, 2002. http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT198/CT198.pdf. 447 Gary, Langer. “Prayers for Victims, Support for Reprisals”, ABCNEWS.com. Sep. 11, 2001. http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/wtc_abcpoll010911.html 448 Mark, Gongloff. “When Will We Spend Again?”, CNNmoney. Oct. 26, 2001. http://money.cnn.com/2001/10/26/economy/economy_consumer/; Michael L., Dolfman and Solidelle F., Wasser. “9/11 and the New York City Economy: A Borough-by-Borough Analysis”, Monthly Labour Review. June 2004: 3-33. http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2004/06/art1full.pdf; David W., Moore. “Corporate Abuses, 9/11 Attacks Seen as Most Important Causes of Economic Downturn”, The Gallup Poll. August 5, 2002. http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/login.aspx?ci=6523; Frank, Newport and 240 Dennis, Jacobe. “Despite September 11 Attacks, Americans Optimistic about Economic Future”, The Gallup Poll. September 25, 2001. http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/login.aspx?ci=4930. 449 Tamar, Trabelsi-Hadad. “A Trip? Not in Our School”, Ynet. March 17, 2002 (Hbrew). http://www.ynet.co.il/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-1770370,00.html; Yediot Haharonot reporters. “Two Years to the Intifada: A War Report”, Ynet. Sep. 6, 2002 (Hebrew). http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-2102594,00.html#top. 450 Stevan E., Hobfoll, Daphna, Canetti-Nisim and Robert, Johnson. 2005. “Exposure to Terrorism, Stress-Related Mental Health Symptoms, and Defensive Coping among Jews and Arabs in Israel” (Forthcoming). 451 William E., Schlenger, Juesta M., Cadell, Lori, Ebert, Kathleen B., Jordan, Kathryn M., Rourke and David, Wilson. 2002. “Psychological Reactions to Terrorist Attacks: Findings from the National Study of Americans’ Reactions to September 11”. Journal of the American Medical Association, 288 (5): 581-588; Galea, Sandro, Jennifer, Ahern, Heidi, Resnick, David, Kilpatrick, Michael, Bucuvalas, Joel, Gold and David, Vlahov. 2002. “Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City”. New England Journal of Medicine, 346 (13): 982-987. 452 William E., Schlenger, Juesta M., Cadell, Lori, Ebert, Kathleen B., Jordan, Kathryn M., Rourke, David, Wilson et al. 2002. “Psychological Reactions to Terrorist Attacks: Findings from the National Study of Americans’ Reactions to September 11”. Journal of the American Medical Association, 288 (5): 581-588; Sandro, Galea, Jennifer, Ahern, Heidi, Resnick, Dean, Kilpatrick, Michael, Bucuvalas, Joel, Gold and David, Vlahov. 2002. “Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City”. New England Journal of Medicine, 346 (13): 982-987; Avraham, Bleich, Marc, Gelkopf, and Zahava, Solomon. 2003. “Exposure to Terrorism, Stress-Related Mental Health Symptoms, and Coping Behaviours among a Nationally Representative Sample in Israel”. Journal of the American Medical Association, 290 (5): 612-620. 453 Sanobar, Shermatova. “Caucasians Targeted in Wake of Moscow Blast”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Feb. 13, 2004. http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/cau/cau_200402_218_2_eng.txt Shermatova 2004; http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article25945; Sabrina, Tavernise and Steven Lee, Myers. "Toll in Russia Climbs to 41 in Bombing at a Hospital", Sullivan-country.com. Aug. 3, 2003. http://www.sullivan-county.com/bush/41_russia.htm; http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnya/act_terrorism/d040732 ;; http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnya/act_terrorism/Nord-Ost/d024506; "Terrorist Attacks in Russia", Nationwide VCIOM survey, October 25-28, 2002. http://www.russiavotes.org/hostage.htm; http://www.bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnya/chechenian/of030402. 454 Kaz, de Jong, Maureen, Mulhern, Alison, Swan and Saskia, van der Kam. “Assessing Trauma in Sri Lanka: Psycho-social Questionnaire, Vavuniya Survey Outcomes”, Médecins Sans Frontières, The Netherlands. 31 May 2001: 18-20. http://www.msf.org/source/countries/asia/srilanka/2001/psyc- soc.doc. 455 Robert D., Putnam. 2002. “Bowling Together”. The American Prospect, 13 (3). Feb. 11, 2002. At http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/3/putnam-r.html. 456 Mark A., Schuster et al. 2002. After 9/11: Stress and Copying Across America. A paper presented before the United States Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labour and Pensions field hearing on “9/11 and NYC Children”, June 10, 2002. http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT198/CT198.pdf. 457 Example for prayer services, see: “Responses to 9/11”, The Text This Week. http://www.textweek.com/response.htm. 458 Ann B., Bettencourt, Kelly, Charlton, Nancy, Dorr and Deborah L., Hume. 2001. “Status Differences and In-group Bias: A Meta-analytic Examination of the Effects of Status Stability, Status Legitimacy, and Group Permeability”. Psychological Bulletin, 127 (4): 520-542; Jennifer S., Lerner and Dacher, Keltner. 2001. “Fear, Anger, and Risk”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8: 146-159; Daniel, Bar-Tal and Avner, Ben-Amos. In press. “Patriotism as a Social Psychological Phenomenon: Introduction to the Analysis of the Israeli Case”. In Avner, Ben-Amos and Daniel, Bar- Tal (eds.) Patriotism in Israel. Tel Aviv: Papirus (Hebrew); Karen, Jones. 2004. “Trust and Terror”, Presented at the Conference on Trust, University of California–Riverside. 14th Annual Philosophy Conference, February: 27-28. 459 Darren W., Davis and Brian D., Silver. 2004. “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America”. American Journal of Political Science, 48: 28-46; Leonie, Huddy. 2003. “Group Identity and Political Cohesion”. In David O., Sears, Leonie, Huddy and 241 Robert, Jervis (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Huddy, Leonie, Stanley, Feldman, Charles, Taber and Gallya, Lahav. 2002. “The Politics of Threat: Cognitive and Affective Reactions to 9/11”, Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Boston, August -September. 460 Darren W., Davis, and Brian D., Silver. 2004. “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America”. American Journal of Political Science, 48: 28-46. 461 The surveys can be located at: http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnya/act_terrorism/of040602; http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnya/act_terrorism/t906612. 462 National Security Studies Centre surveys, http://nssc.haifa.ac.il/. 463 Such as the law dealing with internal security–S. J. Res. 23, Public Law No. 107-40; Immigration Laws–Public Law No. 104-208, Section 641; S. 1424, Public Law 107-45; H.R. 3525, Public Law No. 107-173; and more then 134 acts of legislation regarding September 11th; "Legislation Related to the Attack of September 11, 2001", The Library of the Congress. Oct. 30, 2002. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm. 464 Vinay, Lal. 1994. “Anti-Terrorist Legislation: A Comparative Study of India”. The United Kingdom and Sri Lanka Lokayan Bulletin, 11 (1), July-August 1994: 5-24. 465 It should be noted that the arrest should be approved by a judge. For the full description of the law please refer to: http://civics.haifa.ac.il/civics_files/warriors.htm (Hebrew). 466 For full description of the law please refer to: http://www.panorama.ru/works/patr/govpol/project1- 3.html or http://www.duma.gov.ru/. 467 The data was taken from the National Security Studies Centre databases at Haifa University: http://nssc.haifa.ac.il/. 468 Ibid. 469 Ronald D., Crelinsten. 1998. “The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Liberal Democracies”. Australian Journal of politics and History, 44 (3): 389-413; Peter, Chalk. 1998. “The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy”. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44 (3): 373-388; Fernando, Reinares. 1998. “Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism”. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44 (3): 351-371. 470 For more information on this cycle of violence, please refer to: Ronald D., Crelinsten and Alex P., Schmid. 1992. “Western Response to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet”. Terrorism and Political Violence, 4 (4): 307-340; Peter, Chalk. 1998. “The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy”. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44 (3): 373-388; Christopher, Hewitt. 1984. The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies. Lanham, New York: University Press of America. 471 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (forthcoming); Scott, Atran. 2004. “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism”. The Washington Quarterly, 27 (3): 67-90. 472 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 356-357. 473 Arie, Perliger and Ami, Pedahzur. “The Merit of Defensive Coping with Suicide Terrorism: Lessons Based on the Israeli. Case Study”, The American Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL. August 2004; William L., Waugh. 1994. “Regionalising Emergency Management: Countries as State and Local Government. Public Administration Review, 54 (3): 253-259; Ashton B., Carter. 2001. “The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism”. International Security, 26 (3): 5-23. 474 Allan J., Behm and Michael J., Palmer. 1991. “Coordinating Counterterrorism: A Strategic Approach to a Changing Threat”. Terrorism, 14 (3): 171-193. 475 Leonie, Huddy, Stanley, Feldman, Theresa, Capelos and Colin, Provost. 2002. “The Consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling the Effects of Personal and National Threat”. Political Psychology, 23 (3): 485-509; Brian J., Gaines. 2002. “Where’s the Rally? Approval and Trust of the President, Cabinet, Congress, and Government since September 11”. Political Science and Politics, 35 (3): 531-536. 476 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 346-347; Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (forthcoming); Scott, Atran. 2003. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”, Science, 299 (5619): 1535; Assaf, Moghadam. 2003. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26 (2): 72; Bruce, Hoffman. 2003. “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The Atlantic Monthly, 291 (5): 40-47; 242 477 Marc, Sageman. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 478 Mia M., Bloom. 2004. Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. Ch. 4 (Forthcoming). 479 Robert A., Pape. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. American Political Science Review, 97 (3): 348-350. 243