(PDF) The Fallen Balance

ATATÜRK KÜLTÜR, DİL VE TARİH YÜKSEK KURUMU ATATÜRK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ YAYINLARI MİLLİ DİRENİŞTEN İSTİKLÂL HARBİ’NİN İLK ZAFERİNE MARAŞ’IN KURTULUŞUNUN 100. YILI EDİTÖRLER Nejla GÜNAY Hüseyin TOSUN ANKARA-2021 5846 sayılı Fikir ve Sanat Eserleri Kanunu’na göre bu eserin bütün yayın, tercüme ve iktibas hakları Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi’ne aittir. Milli Direnişten İstiklâl Harbi’nin İlk Zaferine Maraş’ın Kurtuluşunun 100. Yılı /ed.:Nejla Günay, Hüseyin Tosun.__Ankara: AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2021. XII,628s.:tbl.:res.;24cm.__(Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi yayını no:497) Eser, elektronik kitaptır. ISBN:978-975-17-4801-0 1.KAHRAMANMARAŞ (TÜRKİYE)__TARİHİ__20.YÜZYIL 2.TÜRKİYE__TARİHİ__DEVRİM,1918-1932 I.Günay, Nejla, ed. II.Tosun, Hüseyin, ed. III.E.a.: Milli Direnişten İstiklâl Harbi’nin İlk Zaferine Maraş’ın Kurtuluşunun 100. Yılı IV.Seri 956.6710102 İNCELEYENLER : Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sıtkı BİLGİN Prof. Dr. Hayati AKYOL Doç. Dr. Hatice GÜZEL MUMYAKMAZ KİTAP SATIŞ : ATATÜRK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ Mağaza : Bayındır 1 Sok. Nu: 24/6 Kızılay/ANKARA Kurum : Ziyabey Cad. Nu: 19 Balgat-Çankaya/ANKARA Tel: 009 (0312) 285 55 12 Belgegeçer: 009 (0312) 285 65 73 web : http://www.atam.gov.tr e-mağaza : emagaza-atam.ayk.gov.tr ISBN : 978-975-17-4801-0 YAYIN NO : 497 BASKI HAZIRLIK : Erdal Basım Yayın Dağıtım İÇİNDEKİLER ÖN SÖZ ............................................................................................ VII GİRİŞ Genel Hatlarıyla Tarihi Süreç İçinde Türk Milli Mücadelesinin Anlam ve Önemi Adnan SOFUOĞLU ............................................................................. 1 BİRİNCİ BÖLÜM MARAŞ MİLLİ MÜCADELESİ İÇİN YAPILAN HAZIRLIKLAR VE ÇATIŞMALAR Maraş’ın Millî Mücadelesi Nejla GÜNAY..................................................................................... 15 Bağımsızlık ve Kent Savunmasının Öncüsü Kahramanmaraş Yaşar AKBIYIK ................................................................................. 75 Sivas Kongresi ve Suriye İtilafnamesi Kararları Ekseninde Maraş’ın Kurtuluşu Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme F. Rezzan ÜNALP ............................................................................ 101 Heyet-i Temsiliye Başkanı Mustafa Kemal Paşa’nın Maraş Savunmasını Yönlendirmesi Ahmet EYİCİL ................................................................................. 125 İstiklale Giden Süreçte Maraş’ta Yaşananlar İbrahim SOLAK - Sebiha ÇOMRUK .............................................. 163 Maraş Savunmasında Temsil Heyeti’nin Yürüttüğü Faaliyetler Fahri KILIÇ...................................................................................... 197 Maraş Kurtuluş Savaşında Türkoğlu Cephesi İlyas GÖKHAN ................................................................................ 225 IV İÇİNDEKİLER Milli Mücadele Döneminde Antep-Maraş Dayanışması Nuri YAVUZ..................................................................................... 265 İKİNCİ BÖLÜM YABANCI KAYNAKLARDA MARAŞ MİLLİ MÜCADELESİ İngiliz İşgali Döneminde Maraş’ta Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Mustafa Sıtkı BİLGİN ...................................................................... 279 The Fallen Balance Maxime GAUIN ............................................................................... 293 Sovyet Tarih Yazımında Fransız İşgaline Karşı Maraş Ulusal Mücadelesi Sevinç ALİYEVA .............................................................................. 337 Maraş Olayları (1920, İngiliz Belgelerine Göre) Neşe ÖZDEN .................................................................................... 367 Amerikalı Misyonerlerin Günlüklerinde Maraş Savunması Mustafa Edip ÇELİK ....................................................................... 395 ÜÇÜNCÜ BÖLÜM TÜRK BASININDA MARAŞ MİLLİ MÜCADELESİ VE MARAŞ’IN İŞGALİNE TEPKİLER Milli Mücadelede Maraşlıların Hükümet Düşüren Direnişi: Ali Rıza Paşa Hükümetinin İstifasının Maraş Havalisindeki Tepkileri Mehmet ŞAHİNGÖZ ....................................................................... 423 Maraş’ın İşgaline Çeşitli Kuruluş ve Kamuoyundan Gelen Tepkiler İsmail ÖZÇELİK .............................................................................. 437 İzmir’in İşgalinin Maraş’taki Yankıları Haluk SELVİ .................................................................................... 453 İÇİNDEKİLER V Maraş Yerel Basını ve Ulusal Basına Göre Maraş Millî Mücadelesinin Değerlendirilmesi (1923-1960) Cengiz ŞAVKILI - Ali AKYILDIZ................................................... 467 DÖRDÜNCÜ BÖLÜM MARAŞ’IN KURTULUŞUNUN SONUÇLARI Maraş’ın Kurtuluşunun Yankıları Hale ŞIVGIN .................................................................................... 499 Maraş’ın İşgalden Kurtuluşu ve TBMM Tarafından İstiklal Madalyası ile Onurlandırılması Erhan ALPASLAN ........................................................................... 515 Maraş Milli Mücadelesinde Bir Motivasyon Aracı Olarak “Ümmet” ve “Millet” Kavramları Tülay AYDIN ................................................................................... 555 Savaş Konulu Maraş Ağıtlarının Söz Varlığı Üzerine Dilek ERGÖNENÇ........................................................................... 583 FOTOĞRAFLAR .............................................................................. 611 THE FALLEN BALANCE Maxime GAUIN * “He who applies and administer a decision is always more powerful than he who makes it.” Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 1921 1. As I already presented a paper on the insurrection of Maraş, in this same university in 2017, I will not repeat it here. Instead, I shall focus on the causes and relevance of the uprising and then of the evac- uation policy for the French and the military operations. No publica- tion provides such an analysis by systematically using the relevant ar- chives. The most important one remains the long part of Robert F. Zeidner’s published dissertation devoted to these events, but it has been submitted in 1991, when not all the French archives were avail- able 2. Kemal Çelik and Stanford Jay Shaw have provided interesting studies but not based on enough French sources 3 . Lastly, Vahé Tachjian’s published doctoral dissertation, in spite of a real work, is factually wrong on key aspects, as the author writes from an Armenian nationalist perspective 4. The first part of this study explains what the contradictions of the situation; between the intents of Paris and the command on one side, * Euroasia Research Center,

1 Bernar d Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Third Edition, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 362. 2 Robert Zeidner, The Tricolor over the Taurus, Ankara: TTK, 2005. 3 Kemal Çelik, Millî Mücadele’de Adana ve Havalisi, Ankara: TTK, 1999; Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to Republic. The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923, Ankara: TTK, 2000, 5 volumes. 4 Vahé Tachjian, La France en Cilicie et en Haute-Mésopotamie: aux confins de la Turquie, de la Syrie et de l’Irak, 1919-1933, Paris : Karthala, 2004. 294 MAXIME GAUIN and the realities on the field (in Maraş more acutely than anywhere else) on the other side. The second part analyzes the uprising itself, while the third one analyzes its consequences. I) A paradoxical situation A) “Integral Armenia,” violence against the Turks and French reactions The project of “Integral Armenia,” from the Karabakh to Mersin, is presented as early as April 1915 by the Armenian nationalists, 5 then reiterated for years 6. The French government opposes the claim from the beginning. Initially, she is not in favor of the partition of the Otto- man Empire, and if the partition happened, Çukurova must be a part of Syria, not Armenia 7. Even after the establishment of the Eastern Legion (made of Armenian and Arab volunteers) in 1916, 8 the posi- tion of Paris remains unchanged and, contrary to what Armenian na- tionalist leaders (Boghos Nubar in particular) claim, there is no prom- ise, at any moment, for an “Integral Armenia” or an Armenian state in Çukurova 9. The Eastern Legion can all the less modify the stance 5 Archag Tchobanian, Les aspirations arméniennes, 7 avril 1915, in Hasan Dilan (ed.), Les Événements arméniens dans les documents diplomatiques français, Ankara : TTK, 2005, volume II, pp. 152-167; Letter of Tchobanian to Sir Edward Grey, 13 April 1915, The National Archives, Kew Gardens-London, FO 371/2484/43561; Archag Tchobanian, L’Arménie sous le joug turc, Paris : Plon, 1915, pp. 29-30. 6 For example: Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, The Armenian Question Before the Paris Peace Conference, New York: The Armenian National Union of America, 1919, pp. 7- 11; Vahan Kurkdjian, The Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, New York: American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, 1919. 7 Vatche Ghazarian (ed.), Boghos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question. 1915-1918, Waltham: Mayreni Publishing, 1996, pp. 29-33; Lettre de François Georges-Picot à Albert De- france, 17 juin 1915, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères, La Courneuve (AMAE), 56 PA-AP 2. 8 Le ministre de la Guerre au contre-amiral Lacaze, ministre de la Marine, 20 novembre 1916; Le général Roques, ministre de la Guerre, à M. Aristide Briand, président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères, 25 novembre 1916, in Arthur Beylerian, Les Grandes Puissances, les Arméniens et l’Empire ottoman dans les archives françaises (1914-1918), Paris, 1983, pp. 272-277. 9 Le ministre des Affaires étrangères à M. de Selves, président de la commission des Affaires étrangères au Sénat, 28 décembre 1920; Id., 13 février 1921, AMAE, P 16670. THE FALLEN BALANCE 295 of Paris since the development is laborious, without mutual trust, par- ticularly because of the absence of discipline showed by the majority of the legionnaires 10. A mutiny even erupts in May 1918 11. A note written in February 1919 by order of Jean Gout, deputy director of Asia at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, proves that after the armistice and before the emergence of the Turkish national move- ment, the tension is strong. “The Armenians,” writes the author (Hu- gues de Montbas, one of Gout’s assistants) have “enslaved their win- ners” (Turks and Kurds), are vainglorious and represent about 25- 30% of the population of the six vilayets (Sivas, Elazığ, Diyarbakır, Van, Bitlis, Erzurum) as a whole; in none of them were the Armenians in majority. The Hunchak and the Armenian Revolutionary Federa- tion (ARF/the Dashnaktsutyun), continues the note, had organized “ri- ots and uprisings” during the 1890s, their behavior in 1908-1909 at the origin of the bloody events in Adana was particularly inexcusable, and their claims in 1912-1913 were “unacceptable.” The text briefly mentions a part of the massacres of Turks and other Muslims by Ar- menian nationalists. Now, argues the note, the solution faces three main obstacles: The ARF, the Hunchak, ready to instigate violence to achieve their “exag- gerated” aims, and the incapacity of many Armenians not affiliated to these parties to understand that there is no Armenian issue but an “Armeno-Islamic issue.” The note advocates the complete exclusion of Çukurova from an Armenian state, and this state should be “federal”, but also securing the complete equality of all its inhabitants, including 10 Le commandant Romieu, chef de la mission militaire française en Égypte, à M. le ministre de la Guerre, 11 décembre 1916; Id., 14 décembre 1916, Service historique de la défense, Vin- cennes (SHD), 7 N 2148; Extrait du rapp ort d’inspection du général Bailloud, chargé de mis- sion en Orient, 4 octobre 1917, SHD, 7 N 2150; Punitions, 1917-1918, SHD, 4 H 34, dossier 1. 11 État nominatif des légionnaires manquants aux appels des 14 mai, 21h, et du 15 mai, 5h 30; État nominatif des légionnaires évadés de prison, le 15 mai; Note du service de la place, 16 mai 1918; Bureau de la place, Rapport sur la mutinerie du camp des réfugiés du Djébel Moussa, 21 mai 1918; Lieutenant-colonel Louis Romieu, Incidents des 16 et 17 mai à Port-Said, 23 mai 1918, SHD, 4 H 34, dossier 2. 296 MAXIME GAUIN the Muslims 12. Similarly, in April 1919, Robert de Caix (1869-1970), éminence grise of the Quai d’Orsay (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs- MFA) for the Near East, affirms: “Cilicia is Turkish, not Armenian” 13. This strong stance nevertheless does not change anything in the desire of the Armenian nationalists to impose their designs. The French military governor of İskenderun urgently asks for Algerian ti- railleurs as early as 12 December 1918, because it is “impossible to se- cure order” with Armenian legionnaires and four days later, he is alarmed by “the acts of terrorism by Armenian soldiers” (“threats, plunder, rapes”) 14. The first note for the minister of Foreign Affairs alerting him on these crimes is written the same month. As a result, the Eastern Legion is divided in January 1919 between an Armenian Legion (in today’s Turkey) and a Syrian Legion (in Lebanon) 15. The officers know well that this violence is not spontaneous but the imple- mentation of the designs and orders of the Armenian nationalist com- mittees, in particular the Ramkavar and the Reformed Hunchak Party (which merges with the Ramkavar in 1921) 16 . Brigadier General Hamelin complains about the “derisory numbers” he has in December 1918, but, probably because the attention is concentrated on Ger- many, Paris begins to react one month later only, and then the British 12 Note sur l’Arménie, 9 février 1919, AMAE, 196 PA-AP 8. Similar views in Note pour le ministre, 25 décembre 1918, AMAE, P 16670. 13 Lettre à Philippe Berthelot, 12 avril 1919, AMAE, P 11203. On the demographic issue: Justin McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities. The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire, New York-London: New York University Press, 1983; Meir Zamir, “Population statistics of the Ottoman empire in 1914 and 1919,” Middle Eastern Studies, XVII-1, January 1981, pp. 85-106. 14 SHD, 4 H 8, dossier 3. 15 Le président du Conseil, ministre de la Guerre, à M. le ministre des Affaires étrangères, 20 janvier 1919, AMAE, P 1426. 16 Le général Hamelin, commandant les Troupes françaises du Levant, à M. le général com- mandant le XXIe corps britannique, 20 mars 1919; Rapport du lieutenant Aulagne, président du contrôle militaire, sur la marche du service pendant la semaine écoulée, 30 mars 1919, SHD, 4 H 42, dossier 6; Colonel Édouard Brémond, Historique résumé de l’installation et du fonc- tionnement des services administratifs dans les T[erritoires] E[nnemis] O[ccupés] nord (Cilicie) [1920], AN, 594 AP 5 (confirmation in a letter from the same Brémond to the director of poli- tical affairs of the MFA, 1 March 1919 : AMAE, P 16671). THE FALLEN BALANCE 297 command blocks, until spring 1919, the arrival of three battalions of infantry and four squadrons of cavalry 17. On February 16, 1919, dozens of Armenian legionnaires clash with Algerian soldiers in İskenderun, and another group attacks the Turkish civilian population, killing, plundering and burning. The “canons and machineguns” of the French Navy have to be used to put an end to the mess, and, the next day, a group of prisoners tries an uprising. The French officer in charge has to open fire “to defend himself,” killing three and seriously wounding seven others. Algerian tirailleurs kill six other Armenian mutineers, to protect their officer. One Armenian sergeant is sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor for plunder, two legionnaires are sentenced to ten years, two to eight years and one to five years in jail. Twenty civilians are sentenced (be- tween two months and two years in jail, depending on the cases) for deal in stolen goods. The whole 4th Armenian battalion is suppressed: 400 men are sent to a disciplinary battalion in Egypt, and the 400 re- maining, considered “non-suspect,” are dispatched to other units 18. 17 Télégramme du général Hamelin au ministre de la Guerre, 5 décembre 1918; Le président du Conseil, ministre de la Guerre, à M. le maréchal commandant en chef les armées du nord et du nord-est, 7 janvier 1919; Note, 3 mars 1919, AMAE, P 1426; Jean Pichon, Sur la route…, p. 301. 18 Télégramme de l’amiral Cassard au ministre de la Marine, 18 février 1919; Id., 1er mars 1919; Télégramme de François Georges-Picot au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 19 février 1919, AMAE, P 1426; Rapport du gouverneur militaire d’Alexandrette, 18 février 1919; Rap- port du lieutenant-colonel Romieu, 28 février 1919; Télégramme du général Hamelin au minis- tère de la Guerre, 21 février 1919; Id., 27 février 1919, Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), 1SL/1V/126; Jugement rendu par le conseil de guerre de la Légion armé- nienne, n° 70, 26 février 1919; Id., 6 mars 1919; Id., 26 mars 1919, SHD, 11 J 3073; Le général Hamelin, commandant les Troupes françaises du Levant, à M. le ministre de la Guerre, 22 mars 1919, SHD, 4 H 42, dossier 6; Gustave Gautherot, La France en…, pp. 153-166. 298 MAXIME GAUIN Meanwhile, the campaign for an American mandate on an “Inte- gral Armenia” begins 19. If the U.S. renounce, the Armenian commit- tees “would prefer Great Britain” 20. Yet, even before the uprising at Maraş, the report of Major General James G. Harbord seriously un- dermines the probability of an acceptance of such a mandate by the U.S. Congress (the negative vote eventually takes place in May 1920) 21. Concerning the British alternative, the cabinet of His Majesty never considers a mandate on Armenia and even among the supporters of the Armenian cause in London, the idea is not popular 22. On the field of the French public opinion, Pierre Loti launches his campaign as early as autumn 1918 23. Berthe Georges-Gaulis (linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1914 and to the general resi- dency in Morocco) begins in May 1919 to defend a peace the Turks could accept. Her tone is initially more or less paternalist, 24 but her first meetings with officials of the Turkish national movement, in au- tumn of the same year, make her the most consistent supporter of the 19 Woodrow Wilson to Newton Diehl Baker (Secretary of War), 8 February 1919; Woodrow Wilson, Remarks to Members of the Democratic National Committee, 28 February 1919, in Arthur S. Link and alii (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 55, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 27-28 and 322-324; James B. Gidney, A Mandate for Armenia, Oberlin (Ohio): Kent State University Press, 1967, pp. 77-82; Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America. The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 271-273. 20 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Boston-New York: Houghton Mifflin C°, 1928, volume IV, p. 199. 21 Seçil Karal Akgün, “The General Harbord Commission and the American Mandate,” in Ge- orge S. Harris and Nur Bilge Criss (ed.), Studies in Atatürk’s Turkey. The American Di- mension, Leyden-Boston: E. J. Brill, 2009, pp. 55-82; James G. Harbord, Conditions in the Near East. Report of American Military Mission to Armenia, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920. 22 Akaby Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915-1923, London-Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984, pp. 116-119 and 142-143. 23 Pierre Loti, “Les Turcs”, L’Écho de Paris, 1er novembre 1918, p. 1; “Un appel de Pierre Loti”, Le Figaro, 23 janvier 1919, p. 1; “Une lettre de Pierre Loti”, Le Figaro, 23 février 1919, p. 1; Pierre Loti, “Plaidoyer suprême pour les condamnés à mort”, Le Figaro, 18 mars 1919, p. 1; “Turcs et Arméniens — Une lettre de Pierre Loti”, L’Illustration, 19 avril 1919, p. 415; Pierre Loti, “Le khalife de l’islam”, Le Figaro, 23 mai 1919, p. 1. 24 Berthe Georges-Gaulis, “Les Français d’Orient”, L’Opinion, 31 mai 1919, pp. 488-489; Berthe Georges-Gaulis, ”La question ottomane”, L’Opinion, 12 juillet 1919, pp. 33-34; Berthe Georges-Gaulis, “L’avenir turc”, L’Opinion, 20 septembre 1919, pp. 288-289. THE FALLEN BALANCE 299 Kemalists during the war of independence 25. Correspondingly, the high commission in İstanbul, 26 as well as the intelligence services of the land army and Navy 27 quickly understand the true nature of the Turkish national movement and advocate conciliation. B) The turn of September-October 1919 At the end of August, Pierre Loti publishes another op-ed, this time focusing on the interest of France to maintain a viable Turkey, 28 then his friend Louis Barthou (1862-1934), past President of the Min- isters’ Council, 29 gives a copy to Georges Clemenceau, President of the Ministers’ Council from November 1917 to January 1920. Barthou writes to Loti on 2 September: “I believe Clemenceau has returned to better feelings toward the Turks” 30. Concerning the other side, Cle- menceau states: “Nous en avons assez des Arméniens !” 31 and his choices for the high commission of Beirut are congruent with this statement. General Henri Gouraud (1867-1946) is appointed as high commis- sioner in Beirut. Yet, in his own words, General Gouraud has “known during the war only one chivalrous enemy,” namely the Turk 32. His mentor is Marshal Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934), general resident in 25 Berthe Georges-Gaulis, “En Anatolie”, Journal des débats, 11 novembre 1919, pp. 1-2; Berthe Georges-Gaulis, “L’éveil national turc”, L’Opinion, 15 novembre 1919, pp. 511-512; Berthe Georges-Gaulis, “Lettre de Turquie — Le mouvement nationaliste”, Journal des dé- bats, 6 décembre 1919, pp. 3-4; Berthe Georges-Gaulis, “La Turquie nationaliste”, L’Opinion, 13 décembre 1919, pp. 587-589. 26 [Albert Fouque-Duparc ?], Origine du mouvement national [1919]; La situation en Turquie et le rôle des puissances alliées [1919], AMAE, 74 PA-AP 12; Le lieutenant Lemaigre-Du- breuil, chargé de mission en Anatolie, à M. le haut-commissaire de la République française en Orient, 4 septembre 1919, CADN, 36 PO/1/10. 27 Le commandant Labonne à M. le général commandant en chef des Armées alliées, 31 août 1919, CADN, 36PO/1/10; S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 859, 2 juillet 1919; Id., n° 1033, 4 sep- tembre 1919; Id., n° 1048, 13 septembre 1919, p. 1, SHD, 1 BB7 233; Id., n° 1134, 1er octobre 1919, SHD, 1 BB7 234. 28 Pierre Loti, “Nos intérêts en Orient”, L’Information, 27 août 1919, p. 1. 29 On their friendship: Louis Barthou, “Pierre Loti”, Revue des deux mondes, 15 février 1930, pp. 952-972; Pierre Loti, Soldats bleus. Journal intime, 1914-1918, Paris : La Table ronde, 2014, pp. 228, 232, 316-317, 324 and 331-332. 30 Alain Quella-Villéger, La Politique méditerranéenne de la France. Un témoin, Pierre Loti (1870-1923), Paris : L’Harmattan, 1992, pp. 170-171. 31 Houri Berberian, “The Delegation of Integral Armenia: From Greater Armenia to Lesser Ar- menia,” Armenian Review, XLIV-3, Autumn 1991, p. 57. 32 Léon Rouillon, Pour la Turquie, Paris : Grasset, 1921, p. 55. 300 MAXIME GAUIN Morocco who advocates a conciliation with the Turks, by Islamophilia, by consciousness of his difficulties and als o because he has lost his trust in the UK and would like an alliance with the Muslim world 33. Robert de Caix (previously mentioned here about the Turkish major- ity in Çukurova) is appointed as general secretary of the high commis- sion. Yet, the Armenian nationalists cannot have forgotten that it was the same de Caix who spread, in spring 1914, 34 the report of Vice- Consul S. Zarzecki on the situation in Bitlis and Van, published as an article with the permission of the ministry of Foreign Affairs 35. Zar- zecki concluded that peace in these provinces had two enemies: The chiefs of the nomadic Kurdish tribes and the ARF. This publication provoked extremely violent reactions from the Dashnaks 36. Even more relevant is the editorial de Caix publishes just before leaving France. The newly appointed general secretary presents the Turkish national movement, led “by an energetic soldier,” as the log- ical consequence of the errors of the Entente. His knowledge of the movement is not perfect, as he suspects a hidden agenda of pan-Tu- ranism and pan-Islamism, but he considers the “dismembering” of Turkey (amputating this country from the Straits, İzmir and eastern Anatolia) impossible and in opposition to the French interests. The peace conference, concludes de Caix “must have a policy for Turkey, a policy which now must be made, for a large part, of compromises” 37. Such an editorial is obviously read both by the Kemalist leadership 33 Hubert Lyautey, Rapport d’ensemble sur la situation du corps d’occupation, 21 février 1920, AN, 475 AP 84; À M. Wladimir d’Ormesson, 6 janvier 1919; À M. Clemenceau, président du Conseil, 15 juin 1919 in Pierre Lyautey (ed.), Lyautey l’Africain. Textes et lettres du maré- chal Lyautey, Paris : Plon, volume IV, 1919-1925, 1957, pp. 3-18. 34 Robert de Caix, “La question kurdo-arménienne”, L’Asie française, avril 1914, pp. 151-157; “La question kurdo-arménienne”, Journal des débats, 17 avril 1914, pp. 1-2. The second ar- ticle is not signed, but de Caix is, at that time, foreign policy editor of the Journal des débats. 35 S. Zarzecki, La question kurdo-arménienne dans les vilayets de Van et Bitlis, 11 octobre 1913, AMAE, P 16745; Lettre de S. Zarzecki à Gaston Doumergue, 21 mars 1914; Lettre du chef de cabinet à S. Zarzecki, 31 mars 1914, AMAE, 394 QO 1566; S. Zarzecki, “La question kurdo-arménienne”, La Revue de Paris, 15 avril 1914, pp. 873-894. 36 A translation in French of all (but one) the hostile articles are in the dispatches of Zarzecki’s successor, dated 18 and 28 May 1914, AMAE, P 16745. 37 Robert de Caix, “La question turque”, Journal des débats, 1er octobre 1919, p. 1. THE FALLEN BALANCE 301 and by the Armenian nationalists. Similarly, Le Temps, the mouthpiece of French MFA publishes one week later an editorial entitled “The Victory of the Turkish Nationalists”: As nobody can even consider “a European crusade against the Turkish nationalists, from Ismid to Van, from Mersine to Erzéroum,” argues the daily, the peace “should keep Turkey from Andrinople to the Taurus and to the Persian boundary” 38. Major General Julien Dufieux (1873-1959) arrives in December 1919 to command the occupation troops in Çukurova (from Mersin to Dörtyol, including Maraş). He receives written and oral orders to ease the situation, to conciliate the Muslims, “particularly the Turks,” to diminish the direct administrative control, to “relax, on the contrary, the ties between the French authorities to the Armenian organizations, the development and the claims were deemed dangerous.” “In one word, holding an equal balance between the various races and reli- gions” 39. It is true that the chief administrator of Çukurova and eastern ter- ritories (Antep, Urfa) from February 1919 to September 1920, Colonel Édouard Brémond (1868-1948), has pro-Armenian biases, 40 but he is not, in autumn 1919, the caricature of himself he portrayed after his recall to Paris. On the contrary, at the end of October 1919, he for- wards a report to the military governors of Adana, Mersin, Tarsus, Kozan and Osmaniye. The report has been made by Commander Bruneau, who has been in eastern Anatolia for “more than five months.” Bruneau affirms: “My conviction is that the Turks will not move if they are not attacked. On the other hand, the presence of the Armenian Legion is very antipathetic to them.” Brémond continues: 38 “La victoire des nationalistes turcs”, Le Temps, 8 octobre 1919, p. 1. 39 Le général Dufieux à M. le haut-commissaire de la République en Syrie-Cilicie, 9 mars 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 40 Le secrétaire général de l’Union générale arménienne de bienfaisance à M. le colonel Bré- mond, administrateur en chef en Cilicie, 14 août 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/129; Note de M. [Charles] Escande, mars 1921, AMAE, P 16675; Paul Bernard, Six mois en Cilicie, Aix-en- Provence, éditions du Feu, 1929, pp. 23 and 32; Édouard Brémond, Notes historiques et géo- graphiques sur l’Arménie, Le Caire: Imprimerie El-Maaref, 1918. 302 MAXIME GAUIN “According to Commander Bruneau, it is the only cause that could provoke a revolt. The behavior to have, considering these two pieces of in- formation: A policy of great prudence has to be followed, avoid any prov- ocation, and withdraw as soon as possible [underlined in the original] from Marache [Maraş], Aintab [Antep] and Ourfa [Urfa] the Armenian troops and to replace them by [Algerian and Senegalese] tirailleurs” 41. Correspondingly, François Georges-Picot, high commissioner on leave, meets in Konya Refet (Bele) Bey, the new Kemalist representa- tive, in September 1919. Interested and relieved by his interlocutor, Georges-Picot requests the permission to negotiate with Kemal (Ata- türk) himself. The Quai d’Orsay (MFA) agrees. For unknown reasons, the new meeting does not take place until December. The former high commissioner asks for mutual assurances of non-aggression in the oc- cupied territories of the south and proposes, as a “personal” idea, an evacuation of most of these territories (Çukurova, Maraş, Antep, Urfa) in exchange of economic advantages in Adana. The non-aggression is accepted by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) 42. However, all these changes take place in the context of the re- placement of the British troops by the French ones, yet the number of soldiers is insufficient, even more in considering the dangers of the Armenian Legion 43. Yet, it does not seem that the Armenian national- ists remain passive. The arbitration commissions, created at the begin- ning of 1919 for the recovery of their property by forcibly relocated Armenians, yet as far as evidence goes in the French archives, the ma- jority of abuses seems to be concentrated during the period November 1919-February 1920 (namely before and during the uprising at 41 Le colonel Brémond, adminisrateur en chef des T.E.O. nord, à MM. les gouverneurs d’Adana, Mersine, Tarsous, Kozan, Osmanié, 31 octobre 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/132 42 Sina Akşin, “French-Turkish Relations at the end of 1919,” in Hâmit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (ed.), L’Empire ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France, İstanbul-Paris : Les éditions Isis, 1986, pp. 441-444; Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to…, volume II, pp. 913-915. 43 Raoul Desjardins, Avec les Sénégalais par-delà l’Euphrate, Paris : Calmann-Lévy, 1925, pp. 23-25; Testis [Commandant Michel Canonge], “L’œuvre de la France en Syrie”, Revue des deux mondes, 1er mars 1921, pp. 810-811. THE FALLEN BALANCE 303 Maraş). Even more remarkably, this increase of abuses seems to be out of control, 44 unlike in summer, when the dishonest claims of Arme- nian plaintiffs were stopped and repressed 45. Correspondingly, the physical violence rises. For example, the murder of two prominent Turks by Armenians in November 1919 (one high-ranked civil servant in Adana and one professor in Erzin) provokes “a big emotion” and the majority of the Armenian legionnaires settled in Antep is displaced to the hinterland the same month 46. Even more seriously, Captain Fer- dinand Taillardat, governor of Kozan, also notices an increasing num- ber of “crimes, attacks” in his own district during the year 1919 and sees, too, the month of November as a turning point for the exasper- ation of the Turks 47. All these facts seem to be a general scheme of the Armenian nationalists to prevent the policy of Gouraud and de Caix, or even the prudence of Brémond, to be actually implemented. This tension between the intents and attempts on one side, the reality on the field on the other side, explodes in Maraş. C) A lack of men, errors of command and a strange interpreter Now regarding more particularly this city, General Gouraud is not informed of the use of an Armenian unit to occupy a predominantly Turkish city. He learns that only retrospectively and expresses his for- mal disapprobation. General Dufieux arrives in December only, namely after the occupation has begun. Colonel Brémond, as we saw, knows the problem with the Armenian Legion, but he does not receive sufficiently soldiers from France and Africa and the rivalry with the 44 Le capitaine Taillardat, gouverneur du sandjak de Kozan, à M. l’administrateur en chef [1919], CADN, 1SL/1V/138; Rapport du commandant Tommy Martin, 9 novembre 1920, pp. 1-2, AMAE, 399 PA-AP 191. 45 Lieutenant-colonel Normand, Rapport de l’enquête faite pendant le voya.g.e. du capitaine Ahmed, 16 juillet 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/129; L’Union nationale arménienne de Hadjine à M. le colonel Brémond, administrateur en chef des T.E.O. nord (Cilicie), 27 août 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/131; Tribunal militaire du sandjak d’Adana, 7 août 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/182. 46 Maurice Abadie, Opérations au Levant. Les Quatre sièges d’Aïntab (1920-1921), Paris : Charles-Lavauzelle & Cie, 1922, pp. 32-33; Lieutenant-colonel Flye Sainte-Marie, Rapport heb- domadaire sur la situation militaire et sur la situation politique du cercle d’Aïntab, 11 novembre 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 47 Ferdinand Taillardat, Protection des minorités chrétiennes en Cilicie, 11 décembre 1920, p. 2, CADN, 1SL/1V/144. 304 MAXIME GAUIN UK 48 incites to a replacement at any price. Worse for his understand- ing of the situation, the Armenians working under his orders in the administration of Adana act “like a screen” between him and the Turks 49 . His responsibility is directly involved, however, in the ab- sence of coordination with Beirut 50 and more particularly, in the case of Maraş, the absence discussion with General Gouraud (who is a friend of Brémond until their definitive rupture of summer 1920) re- garding the use of the Armenian Legion. All these causes have to be taken in consideration but still do not explain why Maraş is the first to experience an uprising. Two major errors at the local level have to be invoked in this regard: the choice of Pierre André and of his interpreter. André clearly does not like the Turks that much, even if it is not for religious reasons 51. Another of- ficer, Captain Fontaine, asks to leave Maraş in December 1919, argu- ing that with such an officer in charge, the French occupation forces will “receive gunshots,” 52 yet these troops are numerically and quali- tatively insufficient 53. Regardless, the most serious problem with An- dré is his lack of perspicacity. Captain André’s ignorance of the actual situation is confirmed by the intelligence notes he forwards to Adana on 3, 10 and 11 December 1919, affirming that the Turkish popula- tion of Maraş only wants to remain in peace and undisturbed 54. At the same time, General Dufieux, who stays in Adana, seems more con- cerned than his subordinate about the weapons (especially the ma- 48 Note sur les menées anglaises en Asie mineure, 31 janvier 1919, AMAE, 196 PA-AP 6; James Barr, A Line in the Sand. Britain, France the Struggle That Shaped the Middle East, London-New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011, pp. 72-99. 49 Rapport du commandant Tommy Martin, 9 novembre 1920, pp. 1-2, AMAE, 399 PA-AP 191. 50 Note de M. [Charles] Escande, mars 1921, AMAE, P 16675. 51 Pierre Redan (Pierre André), La Cilicie et le problème ottoman, Paris : Gauthier-Villars, 1921, pp. 54, 62-63 and passim. 52 Le sous-lieutenant Ernoult à M. le capitaine André, 11 décembre 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 53 Le capitaine Fontaine, commandant militaire de Marache, à M. le gouverneur André, 28 no- vembre 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 54 CADN, 1SL/1V/133. THE FALLEN BALANCE 305 chine-guns) accumulated on the Turkish side, and its level of organi- zation 55. Actually, Colonel Pierre Flye-Sainte-Marie (1869-1956), com- manding in the region, does not trust Captain André much, and that is why André prefers to leave in December 1919 and to remain in Os- maniye 56. That having been said, the personality of André’s interpreter, Va- han Kourbesserian (1894-1926), appears to be even more decisive in the outbreak of the conflict in Maraş than André himself. Indeed, by April 1920, the same André is in open conflict with the Ramkavar and even more the ARF, denouncing them as trouble-makers who want to kill Turks 57. In these conditions, it can be argued that with another interpreter, the results could have been different. A more direct evi- dence in this regard is the intelligence note of Commander Morbieu, chief of the administrative control in the district of Maraş during the brief French occupation. Morbieu argues that from the beginning, An- dré is misled by his Armenian dragoman, Vahan Koubesserian, who erases the French influence, replaces it with the Armenian one and multiplies the provocations, not only by aggressive statements and by the replacement of the Turkish flag by the French one in the city, but also by sending one hundred Armenian legionnaires to villages neigh- boring Maraş: The villages are burned by these Armenians. In addi- tion to the series of murders, plunders and other crimes of the Arme- nian Legion against Turks and Arabs since January 1919, this aggres- siveness provokes the rebellion of the Turkish population of Maraş in January 1920, according to Morbieu 58. In a later report, Morbieu re- iterates his accusations, and adds that the choice of André to settle in the house of Agop Kerlakian (Hırlakyan), former deputy of the city at the Ottoman Chamber of deputies, was terribly wrong, particularly as 55 Le général Dufieux à M. le général commandant en chef de l’armée du Levant, 4 décembre 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. Also see Renseignements, 4 décembre 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/133. 56 Le capitaine André, gouverneur du sandjak du Djébel Béréket, à M. le colonel administrateur en chef [Édouard Brémond], 12 décembre 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 57 Le capitaine André, gouverneur du sandjak de Djébel-Béreket, à M. le chef du contrôle ad- ministratif, 21 avril 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/148. 58 Renseignement, n° 10, 2 février 1920, AN, 594 AP 4. 306 MAXIME GAUIN the Kerlakian (Hırlakyan) clan “crowed too soon,” something that en- couraged the “impulsive” Koubesserian 59 . Even Colonel Brémond warns Captain André on 29 November 1919 (namely the day after the flag incident caused by Koubesserian): “Be patient: no useless zealous around you” 60. In such a context, “around you” can only mean the Armenian dragoman. The fact that André is misled is confirmed by his own words: In an intelligence note dated 6 October 1919, he writes (without contest- ing this daring claim) that “the Christians say that in removing about thirty agitators in Marach, we would have not to send a lot of troops” (a misleading affirmation that looks like an entrapment set for this na- ïve officer) 61. Remarkably, André does not try to defend his dragoman in his self-justification published in 1921 (he is completely silent about him) and Stanley Kerr (1894-1976), an American missionary settled in the city and globally favorable to the Armenian point of view, barely mentions Koubesserian in a couple of sentences. Kerr says nothing on the accusations against this interpreter, even to challenge them 62 . Vahé Tachjian mentions Koubesserian a few times, but, similarly, he never discusses the indictment against him (in spite of the fact that Mr. Tachjian worked in the boxes containing the reports of Morbieu cited here). Regardless, Mr. Tachjian provides us one interesting infor- mation: Koubesserian is a member of the Armenian delegation sent in Paris in autumn 1920, to ask for the maintain of the French occupa- tion 63. 59 Commandant Morbieu, Note sommaire sur la situation politique du sandjak de Marasch, de- puis l’occupation française jusqu’au soulèvement du 21 janvier 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/166 (quotation p. 4). 60 Le colonel Brémond, administrateur en chef des territoires occupés de la zone nord (Cilicie) à M. le gouverneur du sandjak de Marache et du Djébel-Béréket, 29 novembre 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 61 CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 62 Pierre Redan, La Cilicie et…; Stanley Kerr, The Lions of Marash, New York : SUNY, 1973, p. 71. 63 Vahé Tachjian, La France en…, p. 433. For a first-hand account of the visit by another Armenian nationalist: Kricor Tellalian, Histoire arméno-européenne, Paris: Imprimerie Araxes, 1943, pp. 110-114. By lack of sources on this point, Robert F. Zeidner, The Tricolor over… ignores Koubesserian. THE FALLEN BALANCE 307 Concerning the crimes of Armenian legionnaires described by Morbieu, a Turkish military report explains that “Armenians wel- comed them shouting ‘Long live Armenia’ while randomly shooting Muslims in the streets” and another one explains how “an Ottoman gendarme was killed” 64. An intelligence bulletin of the French Navy’s intelligence service confirms the existence of murders of Turks by these legionnaires in Maraş city—but without accusing André to have given any order in this regard 65. These three documents have been written in November 1919 and, as a result, cannot be considered, at any degree, attempts to justify the uprising of January-February 1920. A fourth source—an article written during the battle and left un- challenged by André and Brémond—must be cited. The correspond- ent in Turkey of the weekly L’Europe nouvelle, Édouard Bernier, af- firms that the creation of the Armenian Legion, as well as “the incor- poration of Armenians in the police and gendarmerie were more than a fault. It was a crime […].” Bernier continues by arguing that the “plunders, rapes, arsons, massacres, looting of villages” “very numer- ous” and could be checked by “an investigation commission” that would be in charge of deciding which sanctions are appropriate “against those of our agents who, by repeated abuses of power, have compromised the interests of France” in Çukurova. Bernier considers the crimes of the Armenian legionnaires, gendarmes, etc., to be re- sponsible for the clash in Maraş 66. Yet, not only his article is left with- out reaction, but the identity of the informant is extraordinary: This is Charles Escande, namely the general secretary of the administration in Adana, the main collaborator Brémond, who has lost his hope to 64 Reports dated 13 and 20 November 1919, translated in Stanford Jay Shaw, “The Armenian Legion and its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia,” in Türkkaya Ataöv (in.), The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period, Ankara: TTK/TBMM, pp. 159-160. Also see Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the…, p. 121 65 S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 1327, 20 novembre 1919, SHD, 1 BB7 234. 66 Édouard Bernier, “La question turque — Dans l’attente de la solution”, L’Europe nouvelle, 28 février 1920, p. 342. 308 MAXIME GAUIN convert his chief to a complete reversal of policy 67. In other words, this is by no means a random article, merely written from İstanbul. Yet, there is nothing in the reports of André at the end of 1919, or in his personal letters written to Brémond later, implying that he ordered the burning of villages, or even that he was aware of them. It corroborates the affirmation of Morbieu, leaving the main responsi- bility to Koubesserian and accusing André of blindness and incompe- tence more than anything else. II) The battle for Maraş A) The uprising erupts As it has been explained, Captain André leaves Maras in Decem- ber but it is too late to stop the rise of the conflict. Some days after his departure, a battalion and an artillery unit arrive: For the first time, the Armenian Legion is not the only force anymore. Regardless, it does not relieve the Turks, because the nationalist Armenians “see in the French military force the first sign of their hegemony,” so this re- inforcement is for them “the occasion of a noisy demonstration.” The local command is placed between them and the Turkish side, a side who is “hostile” To the occupation 68. Similarly, when another rein- forcement arrives on 10 January, “in spite of the given orders, the Armenian population” gives “an enthusiastic welcome,” hundreds of persons acclaiming the soldiers for “three kilometers.” Then, nine days later, when the Turkish side proposes reconciliation to the Ar- menian representatives, Raphael Kerlakian, on behalf of them, an- swers: “[The Armenians] do not recognize you and do not want to have anything with you. We refuse all your openings” 69. Ilhami Bey, 67 Note de M. [Charles] Escande, mars 1921, AMAE, P 16675. 68 Rapport du médecin de 2e classe Arlabosse sur les évènements militaires survenus à Marach du 4 janvier au 13 février 1920, p. 1, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 69 M. Demirkapoulian, chef de bureau, à M. le colonel Brémond, chef du contrôle administratif de Cilicie, 6 mars 1920, pp. 6 and 19, AN, 594 AP 4. THE FALLEN BALANCE 309 interpreter of the Normand unit (see below) also blames the threaten- ing behavior of the Armenian legionnaires of the reinforcements sent in December 1919 and January 1920 70. The revolt begins in the countryside, during the first days of Jan- uary—without order from Ankara. On 16 of that month, the com- mand of Adana sends 1,000 men, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Thibault, who arrive the next day. As a result, the garrison increases from 1,500 to 2,500 soldiers. Then, Maraş is encircled by a part of the occupation troops, the rest being put in defensive position. It does not prevent the eruption of the revolt, on 21 January, namely the day the main notabilities are convoked by Brigadier General Quérette, who decides (just before the first shots are fired) to force six of them (con- sidered the most hostile) to remain in the American College. The tel- ephonic line is cut at 5:00 pm by the insurgents. Initially, this is pre- dominantly a fight of snipers, the Turkish fighters being “very good” in shooting. The most problematic for the French are the Turks who have Russian rifles, because their bullets are shredded whatever they hit, causing terrible wounds. Regardless, no decisive result is obtained by any side for days. As a result, the “fire war” begins, arsons being used by Armenians against Turkish houses and vice versa. Fights by arsons between French and Turks also take place. However, according to the observations of Maxime Bergès, an officer of the rescue unit led by Colonel Normand, the fires started without any appearance of mil- itary necessity are the work of Armenians only 71. 70 Ilhami Bey, Rapport sur les événements de Marache et la marche de la colonne Normand, 26 février 1920, p. 5, AN, 594 AP 4. 71 Rapport du médecin de 2e classe Arlabosse sur les évènements militaires survenus à Marach du 4 janvier au 13 février 1920, p. 1, p. 2; Général Quérette, Rapport sommaire sur les opéra- tions dans la région de Marash, du 19 janvier au 14 février 1920, 16 février 1920, pp. 1-3 and 5; Journal de marche du gendarme Marcel Monge-Faur, commandant du poste de gendarmerie de Marash, 16 février 1920, pp. 3-4, CADN, 1SL/1V/166; Maxime Bergès, La Colonne de Marache et autres récits de l’armée du Levant, Paris : La Renaissance du livre, 1924, p. 81; C. Thibault, Historique du 412e régiment d’infanterie, Paris-Limoges-Nancy : Charles-La- vauzelle & Cie, 1923, pp. 231-242; Robert F. Zeidner, The Tricolor over…, pp. 183-199. Also see M. Demirkapoulian, chef de bureau, à M. le colonel Brémond, chef du contrôle administratif de Cilicie, 6 mars 1920, p. 35, AN, 594 AP 4 (in spite of his hostility to the Turks, V. Demir- kapoulian mentions here “a formidable arson, started by the Armenians”). 310 MAXIME GAUIN The intensity of the fight deserves some explanations. On the Turkish side, this is a matter of exasperation, after the series of exac- tions of the Armenian Legion in the city, in the countryside and in the rest of the French zone of occupation, as Morbieu has analyzed. Though the real intent of the French command can be analyzed today with the archives and published recollections, as it is done in this pa- per, it is hard to expect the ordinary Turks of Maraş in 1920 to guess them. And even if they guessed them, how different would be their reactions? Indeed, it can be argued that the Turkish side sees it as a fight for survival. The Turks of Maraş and the neighboring villages have the longest experience of attacks from the Armenian nationalists. Indeed, in 1862, the first Armenian rebellion motivated by nationalism erupts: 500 Ar- menians from Zeytun attack a Turkish village, kill seven inhabitants, including two children, then take refuge in Zeytun, where the popu- lation refuses to give them to the Ottoman authorities. The governor of Maraş defeats the vanguard sent to prevent him from entering Zey- tun, then stops to avoid any indiscriminate reprisals by his men and obtains the capitulation of the town. Meanwhile, Armenians of Maraş make no secret of their support for the insurgents but the Ottoman authorities manage to maintain order: On one side, 55 rifles are seized in the Christian (mostly Armenian) population, on the other side, any reprisal by the Muslims is prevented by the police forces 72. Then, an- other insurrection erupts in Zeytun in 1878, 73 in the context of the Ottoman-Russian war, then another one in 1895-1896 (Turkish sol- diers who were held as prisoners are massacred) 74. Troubles take place in 1913, 75 in 1914 and one more time, a major revolt happens in 72 Dépêche du vice-consul de France à Marache, 28 juin 1862; Id., 6 août 1862; Id., 20 août 1862; Id., 3 septembre 1862, CADN, 2 Mi 2566. 73 See the manifesto and the letters seized by the Ottoman gendarmerie at Zeytun and translated into French on 19 May 1879 to be forwarded to the Quai d’Orsay: AMAE, 75 ADP 41. 74 Aghassi (Garabet Toursarkisian), Zeïtoun. Depuis les origines jusqu’à l’insurrection de 1895, Paris : Mercure de France, 1897 (translated from Armenian by Archag Tchobanian). 75 Report of British Vice-Consul Fontana (Aleppo) to his chargé d’affaires, 21 October 1913, FO 371/1773/ 52128. THE FALLEN BALANCE 311 1915 76. All these past events have been necessarily told, generation af- ter generation, orally, among the Turks and other Muslims; and the recollections of the 1915 insurrection must be rather fresh. In these conditions, the tensions of 1919 and the clashes of 1920 must be un- derstood as the consequences of a cumulative effect for almost six dec- ades rather about an immemorial and purely religious hostility. An- other reason, technical this time, is the fact that superiority of the Turkish side lies in the quantity of ammunitions and their inferiority in the heavy weapons (machine-guns and cannons) 77. Regarding now the French perspective, the extremely acute issue the command tries—eventually in vain—to fix is: How to master the situation with not enough men and material? The officers depend to a large extent on the Armenian Legion and volunteers, precisely those who caused the Turkish uprising. The effectiveness of the Senegalese tirailleurs is diminished by the exceptional cold (between minus 16 and minus 18 virtually all the time) and the soldiers from France suffer, too, actually. On the contrary, as an officer observes retrospectively, “The rebels displayed remarkable vigilance and boldness” 78. In front of such a “remarkable vigilance and boldness,” the ammunitions and the food are in limited quantities, even after the arrival of the rescue unit led by Colonel Normand (see below about him). Indeed, the main quantity of supplying is transported by a unit who ignores the exist- ence of the rebellion in the city. The unit successfully defends itself against the insurgents of the countryside but is captured at the en- 76 Note de l’ambassadeur de Russie à Paris, 23 février 1915, Arthur Beylerian (ed.), Les Grandes Puissances…, p. 7; The Foreign Office to the Army Council, 1 March 1915, FO 371/2484/22083; M. Paul Cambon, ambassadeur de France à Londres, à M. Delcassé, ministre des Affaires étrangères, 3 mars 1915, in Jean-Claude Montant (ed.), Documents diplomatiques français. 1915, Berne: Peter Lang, 1999, volume I, p. 364; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts on the Relocation of Armenians (1914-1918), Ankara: TTK, 2002, pp. 47-48 and 58-59; Yusuf Sa- rınay (ed.), Osmanlı belgelerinde Ermeni İsyanları, Ankara, volume IV, 2008, pp. 105-108 and 113-115. Thanks to Dr. Sümeyye Hoşgör for the translation. 77 Journal de marche du gendarme Marcel Monge-Faur, commandant du poste de gendarmerie de Marash, 16 février 1920, p. 4, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 78 C. Thibault, Historique du 412e…, pp. 242-243 (quotation p. 243). 312 MAXIME GAUIN trance of Maraş. As early as the beginning of the insurrection, the ob- ligation to restrict the use of shells to the necessary and to reduce the consumption of food is taken into consideration. The scattering of the troops, by lack of space in the barracks, only makes the issue of sup- plies more acute 79. B) The attempt of Colonel Normand Colonel Robert Normand (1873-1929; later promoted as Major General Robert Normand, director of the Military engineering) is sent to command the rescue unit after the battle begins. Colonel Normand had served in Morocco before the First World War, where he imple- mented the policy of conciliation of General (later Marshal) Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934) 80. His previous mission is in Mardin and Diyar- bakır, where he visits the mutesarif and the vali, and Urfa, leading a small military mission made of Muslim soldiers only. The incidents are not numerous, but even in the most polite and quiet context, he ob- serves and notes, in spite of his systematic proclamation of friendship, the exasperation and the fears of the Muslim population (Turks and Kurds alike) toward the misdeeds of the Armenian legionnaires and gendarmes—misdeeds Colonel Normand knows to be true: they “caused an immense wrong to France” and they did not even punish actual perpetrators of illegal confiscations committed in 1915 81. He knows, for example, about the false denunciations of Armenians re- garding imaginary confiscations 82. 79 Ibid., pp. 243-244; Général Quérette, Rapport sommaire sur les opérations dans la région de Marash, du 19 janvier au 14 février 1920, 16 février 1920, pp. 3-4, CADN, 1SL/1V/166; M. Demirkapoulian, chef de bureau, à M. le colonel Brémond, chef du contrôle administratif de Cilicie, 6 mars 1920, pp. 25-27, AN, 594 AP 4. 80 Edmund Burke, “A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria, 1912- 1925,” Middle Eastern Studies, IX-2, May 1973, pp. 175-186 (reference to Normand pp. 179- 181). 81 Colonel Robert Normand, Colonnes dans le Levant, Paris-Limoges-Nancy : Charles-Lavau- zelle, 1924, pp. 2-29 (quotation p. 28). Also see: Suite au rapport sur la région d’Ourfa, [1920], CADN, 1SL/1V/138. 82 Lieutenant-colonel Normand, Rapport de l’enquête faite pendant le voya.g.e. du capitaine Ahmed, 16 juillet 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/129. THE FALLEN BALANCE 313 That having been said, Colonel Normand is far from being an en- emy of the Armenians: He has no sympathy for their nationalist par- ties and their “dangerous spirit of reprisals,” but considers that if the domination of these parties end, a positive spirit will dominate and the necessary reconciliation will permit the reconstruction of “this splen- did land” where “less than fifty years ago,” Turks and Armenians “lived perfectly side by side.” His general overview is not immune of prejudices (toward the Muslims and Jews in particular) but, except the Catholics (quite logically his favorite population), the Turks and the Armenian are the two ethnic groups of the region to which he recog- nizes the most qualities 83 . In other words, he fits the policy of the “equal balance” and actually, his mission to Diyarbakır, Mardin and Urfa had been ordered by General Gouraud. Normand is designated as the chief of the rescue unit on 31 Jan- uary and arrives on 7 February. His cannons and machine-guns rein- force the French superiority in terms of heavy weapons but as early as 8 February, it is clear that the supplies will not suffice and that no new convoy could arrive on time. A decision must be taken on 9 February. It is eventually decided to evacuate. The withdrawal takes place in the night from 10 to 11 February, dissimulated by massive gunshots 84. In- deed, the rebellion of Maraş has inspired the Muslims in the rest of the region and the Normand unit is all what can be mobilized. Briga- dier General Quérette approves the conclusion, gives the order to leave and retrospectively, justifies this painful decision in arguing that if the insurgency in Maraş city could have likely been defeated (he mentions the offer of peace made by insurgents just before the depar- ture) the stocks of food and ammunition would have been terminated before obtaining any victory against the fighters of the whole region 83 Robert Normand, “La Cilicie”, Annales de géographie, XXIX/162, 1920, pp. 447-451. 84 Colonel Robert Normand, Historique de la colonne de secours de Marach, 15 février 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/166; Maxime Bergès, La Colonne de…, pp. 61-82. 314 MAXIME GAUIN and the occupation troops would have “succumbed” 85. Correspond- ingly, the instruction of Major General Dufieux to Colonel Normand orders to reach Maraş “at any price” but leaves to the officer in charge the choice to remain or to evacuate, as the general situation makes impossible a “total sacrifice for Maraş alone” 86. After having heard and read the reports on the evacuation, Dufieux approves this decisions, for the reasons already described 87. As a result, there is no mystery in the reasons why Colonel Nor- mand convinces Brigadier General Quérette to evacuate, contrary to what has been claimed by Vahé Tachjian, who has regardless worked in the most relevant box at the Center of Diplomatic Archives in Nantes (and could not have missed all the documents used here) 88 and before him by two officers who were not in Maraş 89. That having been said, there is still another issue to discuss: The reasons why Colonel Normand fails to obtain a negotiated peace. In- deed, on 2 February 1920, namely five days before reaching Maraş, he writes a letter for the Turkish population of this city: “To the Muslims who fight against the Frenchmen I always protected the Muslims and I am coming to Maraş with the hope to restore a Turkish mutesarif. I will burn no village but I want to pass and walk in agreement with you. I am a soldier and I have only one word. France must become your friend.” 85 Général Quérette, Rapport sommaire sur les opérations dans la région de Marash, du 19 jan- vier au 14 février 1920, 16 février 1920, pp. 6-9, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 86 Général Dufieux, Instructions pour le colonel Normand, 30 janvier 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 87 Le général Dufieux à M. le haut-commissaire de la République en Syrie-Cilicie, 9 mars 1920, pp. 23-26, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 88 Vahé Tachjian, La France en…, pp. 129-130. 89 Édouard Brémond, La Cilicie en 1919-1920, Paris : Imprimerie nationale, 1921, p. 40; Paul du Véou (Paul de Rémusat), La Passion de la Cilicie, Paris : Paul Geuthner, 1954, pp. 133- 136. THE FALLEN BALANCE 315 The letter, translated into Turkish by Ilhami Bey, is given to a messenger, but Vahan Kourbesserian, the already described inter- preter of Captain André, illegally gives the order to arrest this agent. Colonel Normand learns the arrest on 3 February, namely when it is “too late” to repair this misdeed. He concludes that this is “a new at- tempt, by Armenians, to fully engage France militarily in this country, when I was trying to ease the future” 90. Yet, it has to be emphasized that Normand blames Kourbesserian before reaching Maraş and, as a result, before taking any decision regarding the evacuation. As a re- sult, it cannot be considered, at any degree, as a self-justification for a rather humiliating departure. Another aspect of this “attempt,” not mentioned this time by Colonel Normand, is the arson started in a Turkish village, some hours before reaching Maraş, by Armenian le- gionnaires of his unit in the countryside, against the orders of the French officers and without even caring if these officers are sufficiently far away from the fire or not 91. This behavior actually has all the as- pects of an attempt to prevent Colonel Normand from reaching his aims. Ilhami Bey, the Turkish interpreter of the Normand unit, con- firms this. He explicitly accuses Kourbesserian to have sabotaged the efforts of Colonel Normand to make peace with the insurgents and affirms that at least two other villages (in addition to the one mention in the previous paragraph) have been burned, without military neces- sity and in spite of the interdiction decided by Colonel Normand, by the Armenian legionnaires of the rescue unit 92. Yet, Ilhami is a Turk, but also fiercely anti-CUP and anti-Kemalist. His testimony cannot be called, at any degree, supportive of the insurgents 93. In this regard, it is remarkable that if Major General Dufieux affirms to find the tone 90 Le colonel Normand à M. le général commandant la 156e division, 3 février 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 91 Maxime Bergès, La Colonne de…, pp. 55-57. 92 Ilhami Bey, Rapport sur les événements de Marache et la marche de la colonne Normand, 26 février 1920, pp. 9-12, AN, 594 AP 4. 93 Ibid., pp. 4 and 16; Ilhami Bey, Rapport sur le voya.g.e. avec la mission Normand, 20 janvier 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/138. 316 MAXIME GAUIN of Colonel Normand excessively conciliatory toward the Turks, in practice, his following orders are in conformity with Normand’s choices, in particular this: “Burn no village” (underlined twice in the manuscript) 94. It is perhaps equally remarkable that, as early as Janu- ary 1920, so before the evacuation of Maraş, Armenian nationalists of the region ask (initially in vain) Greece for weapons 95. What could the purpose of such smuggled weapons, except creating troubles? C) The massacre that never was The allegation of “massacre” during the insurrection dates back 1920 96 and is repeated until today, including by authors who do not see the necessity to provide any source 97. Admiral Ferdinand de Bon (1861-1923), chief of the French Navy in the Mediterranean Sea, who is present, at that time, in Istanbul, exposes in a report that he system- atically checked the accusations, speaking with French, British and Ar- menians: “As a result, so far, it is impossible to say that there was somewhere massacres of Armenians. It is widely discussed, but no one could provide me with a safe and accurate indication. [...] Armenians have participated in [this] action and suffered losses as all fighters. A serious study of the figures suggests that the Armenian losses did not exceed a thousand. […] 94 Télégramme chiffré du général Dufieux au colonel Normand, 3 février 1920; Télégramme chiffré du général Dufieux à l’Armée du Levant, 5 février 1920; Général Dufieux, Addition à l’instruction personnelle et secrète n° 1602/31, du 12 avril 1920, 13 avril 1920 (quotation p. 4), CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 95 Ioannis Hassiotis, “Shared Illusions: Greek-Armenian Cooperation in Asia Minor and the Caucasus,” in Greece and Great Britain During World War I, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1985, p. 173. If Jean Naslian, Les Mémoires de Mgr Jean Naslian, évêque de Trébizonde, sur les événements politico-religieux en Proche-Orient, de 1914 à 1928, Vienna: Imprimerie Méchithariste, 1955, volume II, p. 342 is not wrong, weapons are delivered later during the year 1920. 96 «Les événements de Cilicie», Bulletin arménien, 29 février 1920; Aram Turabian, «La France que nous aimons», Aiguillon, 15 mars 1920, p. 1; Édouard Brémond, La Cilicie en…, p. 40 (it must be emphasized one more time that Brémond never comes to Maraş and writes his recollections after his humiliating recalling in Paris). 97 Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006, pp. 300 and 309; Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris, New York: Perennial, 2004, p. 180. THE FALLEN BALANCE 317 I cannot sufficiently warn the Minister [of Navy] against the tenden- tious rumors spread by [those] interested [namely the Armenian nationalists and their Anglo-Saxo supporters] in disregard of any accuracy” 98. Similarly, Le Petit Parisien estimates the number of Armenians killed by “violence” (not “massacre”) to be less than 1,600 99 and Henri Rollin, the chief of the French Navy’s intelligence service for Turkey and southern Russia concludes that the “so-called massacres” claimed at the beginning of March 1920 in Anatolia were “at the very least grossly exaggerated” 100. Vahé Tachjian pretends to use reports of officers serving in Çuku- rova, particularly Major General Dufieux, to support the “massacre” charge, but he does so in an unscholarly manner. Indeed, Dufieux speaks about a “massacre” only before having heard the officers in charge in Maraş, when the communications with the city are cut. His final report, which is 34-pages long, blames the indiscipline and “plun- der” by a part of the Armenians, but never alleges that Turks killed unarmed civilians. 101 Correspondingly, neither in his report nor in his recollections does Colonel Normand mentions any “massacre” of Ar- menians during the Maraş uprising 102. More explicitly, the general staff in Paris concludes that “there were no massacres strictly speak- ing,” but 3,000 Armenians killed during clashes and later by adverse cold weather 103. It is true that in the recollections (curiously never cited by Mr. Tashjian) of Georges Boudière, a second lieutenant of infantry at that time, there is half of a sentence alleging a massacre of Armenians in Maraş, on 21 January 1920. Yet, in his own notes written in 1919-1920 98 Télégramme du président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères, à l’ambassadeur fran- çais à Londres, 7 mars 1920, AMAE, P 16673. 99 “Le faux bruit de la prise d’Alexandrette”, Le Petit Parisien, 1er mars 1920, p. 3. 100 S.R. Marine, Turquie, 19 octobre 1920, AMAE, P 16674. 101 Le général Dufieux à M. le haut-commissaire de la République en Syrie-Cilicie, 9 mars 1920 (quotation p. 28), CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 102 Colonel Robert Normand, Historique de la colonne de secours de Marach, 15 février 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/166; Colonnes dans le…, pp. 30-48. 103 Note de l’État-major des armées, 3e bureau, 17 avril 1920, SHD, 6 N 197. 318 MAXIME GAUIN and published by himself together with his recollections, it appears that he was in Beirut on that day, and there is absolutely nothing on any “massacre” of Armenians in his contemporary diary. However, there are, in these notes, clear descriptions of rapes and arsons perpe- trated by Armenian legionnaires in the presence of Boudière 104. An apparently stronger case is present in the book of Lieutenant-Colonel C. Thibault. Here, he claims he heard “hearsay” of massacre (about 2,000 victims) during the afternoon of 21 January, “rumors” which later were “confirmed” 105. Yet, Thibault does not explain who con- firmed this “hearsay” and still less why Dufieux, embittered by the hu- miliation of Maraş, and who initially believed in the allegation of kill- ings, eventually does not take this accusation seriously in his last re- port. Even more importantly, I found no contemporary report from Thibault containing such an accusation, and even Mr. Tachjian does not claim to have found such a document. Equally problematic for the credibility of the claim of Thibault is the fact that the report of V. Der- mirkapoulian, an Armenian of the French administration serving as interpreter in Maraş, in spite of his explicit hostility toward the Turks, does not accuse them of any “massacre” of civilians on 21 January 1920 106. Actually, as early as March 1920, Zenope Bezdjian, head of the Protestant Armenian community of the Ottoman Empire, admits, in front of U.S. High Commissioner Admiral Mark Bristol, that the claims of massacres in Maraş in 1920 are “greatly exaggerated” 107. The same month, Admiral Bristol successfully asks his compatriot William Nesbitt Chambers (a leading missionary) to remove the allegation of “massacre” of Armenian civilians by Turks in Maraş and neighboring towns from a letter Chambers was drafting to be sent to the United 104 Georges Boudière, “Notes sur la campagne de Syrie-Cilicie : l’affaire de Maraş (janvier- février 1920)”, Turcica, IX/2, pp. 158, 165-166 and 168-169. Also see Georges Boudière, Iti- néraires en Orient et au Levant, 1918-1920, Paris: La pensée universelle, 1978, p. 131. 105 C. Thibault, Historique du 412e…, p. 242. 106 M. Demirkapoulian, chef de bureau, à M. le colonel Brémond, chef du contrôle administratif de Cilicie, 6 mars 1920, pp. 23-27, AN, 594 AP 4. 107 Mark Bristol, War diary, 13 March 1920, p. 1, LC, Bristol papers, container 1. THE FALLEN BALANCE 319 States. During the discussion, William Peet, treasurer of the Near East Relief, supports Bristol’s point of view on the unreliability of the alle- gations of “massacre.” After this discussion, Bristol reads in front of three American journalists the account of Dr. Lambert, remaining in Maraş after the insurrection, and praises it as the best available ac- count. Lambert denies the existence of a “one-sided massacre” and describes the event as a fierce inter-ethnic clash 108. Even more clearly, U.S. Colonel Charles Furlong, sent in Anatolia by President Woodrow Wilson: “The so-called Marach massacres have not been substantiated, in fact, in the minds of many who were familiar with the situation, there was a grave question whether it was not the Turk who suffered at the hands of the Armenian and French armed contingents which were occupying that city and vicinity” 109. Such sources help to understand why the accusation, far from be- ing supported in the Parisian press, is denied by very various newspa- pers 110. This is not to deny the violence of the fights (already discussed) or the ravages of the cold weather, after the evacuation, 111 but it has to be emphasized that the cold kills even more Armenians as there is no kind of solidarity between them. “They do not help each other, by no means” 112. At least one mother abandons her baby, still alive (a French officers takes him but the baby dies the same day) and others 108 Mark Bristol, War diary, 4 and 22 March 1920, p. 1, LC, Bristol papers, container 1. Also see Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, Baltimore, John Hop- kins University Press, 1965, pp. 258-259. 109 Letter to President Wilson, April 4, 1920, quoted in Mesut Uyar, “An American Military Observer of the Turkish Independence War: Colonel Charles Wellington Furlong,” in Sinan Kuneralp (dir.), A Bridge between Cultures: Studies on Ottoman and Republican Turkey in Memory of Ali İhsan Bağış, İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2006, p. 189. 110 Hyacinthe Philouze, “Luther contre Mahomet”, L’Europe nouvelle, 28 février 1920, p. 338; Fanny Clar, “L’escroquerie à la pitié”, Le Populaire, 3 mars 1920, p. 2; Jacques Bainville, “Notre rôle en Orient”, L’Action française, 9 mars 1920, p. 1; Pierre Loti, “Une cynique im- posture”, Échos de l’islam, 20 avril 1920, p. 2. 111 Graphic descriptions are in Maxime Bergès, La Colonne de…, pp. 82-118. 112 Colonel Robert Normand, Historique de la colonne de secours de Marach, 15 février 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 320 MAXIME GAUIN decease because they refuse to leave their bags of gold behind them 113. The allegation of “massacre” may be, one more time, an attempt to distract the attention from the real responsibilities. It is, anyway, a part of the political offensive against France. III) From “the equal balance” to the rapprochement with Ankara A) Battles on all fronts (January-September 1920) The development of insurrections in the north and the east 114 leads to a reduction of the zone of occupation to what can be de- fended. As early as March 1920, General Dufieux writes: “This game is exhausting and cannot be prolonged” 115 . The same month, and more abruptly, second lieutenant Boudière records in his notebook that “it would be madness to think about overcoming the Kemalists, the country is too vast” 116. Indeed, in Urfa, the Turkish gendarmes, not paid because there is simply no money for that, are the first to rebel, in February 117. Unlike in Maraş, the occupation troops have no artillery, which is one of the main reasons for their eventual defeat, but they continue to fight until the supplies are exhausted, namely until April, when they have no choice but to surrender (a defeat that may be considered a counter-factual argument for the wise nature of decision taken by Colonel Normand to evacuate Maraş). The surren- der takes place in honor and the garrison leaves Urfa but a convoy of 475 soldiers is attacked by about 4,000 Kurds on the way and most of them are killed; the survivors and the other soldiers are made prison- ers. The person most responsible for the ambush is Ali Saib, a Kurd of very varying stance during the Turkish war of liberation. Another in- 113 Maxime Bergès, La Colonne de…, pp. 102 and 107. 114 Le général Gouraud, haut-commissaire de la République française en Syrie, commandant en chef de l’Armée du Levant, à M. le ministre de la Guerre, 27 avril 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/138. 115 Télégramme chiffré du général Dufieux à l’armée du Levant, 10 mars 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/166. 116 Georges Boudière, Itinéraires en Orient…, p. 156. Also see Lettre de Paul Cambon à Al- bert Defrance, 16 mars 1920, AMAE, 56 PA-PA 4. 117 Raoul Desjardins, Avec les Sénégalais par-delà l’Euphrate, Paris : Calmann-Lévy, 1925, pp. 34-35. THE FALLEN BALANCE 321 dication for his personal responsibility is the fact that, after this inci- dent, the fate of the prisoners—the officers more than the simple sol- diers—improves quickly: The guardians are not brutal and the Amer- ican mission is allowed to provide a serious relief 118. Beside the specificities of Urfa, the worsening of the peace condi- tions during the conference of San Remo, in April (see below about their causes) only increases the difficulties of the French occupation troops and administration. An undated note of the High Commission in Beirut (March or April 1920) lucidly observes that the draft of the treaty is unrealistic and that imposing them by force is simply impos- sible. Meanwhile, the main occupied cities are attacked, in addition the railroad, the only way to transport a significant amount of sup- plies. In Syria, the conflict with Emir Fayçal, the man of the British, and his supporters exacerbates and the perspective to at least suspend the fight on one front is ardently desired in Beirut 119. In May, General Secretary of the High Commission Robert de Caix comes to Ankara to negotiate an armistice. He arrives without apprehension, but the ne- gotiations are more painful than he expected. In spite of these diffi- culties, the first de facto recognition of the Ankara government by a Western power is signed, and the hostilities are suspended for twenty days, by 30 May 1920 120. The armistice is not renewed on 18 June, for a series of reasons, including the absence of revision of the draft of peace treaty and the fact that the decision to dissolve the Armenian Legion, already taken, is not yet implemented (the details shall be given in a moment). The plan of the Turkish forces is to push the French to the sea—to generalize what has been done in Maraş. The 118 Rapport du sous-lieutenant Deloire, 22 juin 1920; Extrait d’une lettre du sergent Joyeux, du 412e régiment d’infanterie, 11 septembre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/166; Mary Caroline Holmes, Between the Lines in Asia Minor, New York-Chicago-London-Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1923, pp. 78-124. 119 Note d’information — L’effort militaire français au Levant, [du] 1er novembre 1919 au 1er octobre 1920, pp. 9-16, CADN, 1SL/1V/138. 120 Lettre de Robert de Caix à sa femme, 16 mai 1920, AMAE, P 11202; Capitaine Mazen, Les négociations d’Angora (21-23 mai 1920), SHD, 4 H 58, dossier 2a. 322 MAXIME GAUIN attacks of June, July and August concentrate on Mersin, Adana, Tar- sus and, to a lesser extent, Cihan. Not unlike the attacks of April, the railroad is, aside the cities, the main target. They are repulsed one by one, the weapons and ammunitions being concentrated instead of be- ing scattered, but at the price of considerable difficulties 121. The fire- power of the Turkish forces clearly is reinforced by the delivery of weapons by Italians—even if the Italian support is above all directed against the Greek expansionism—, and the French army knows that well 122. As early as July, Emir Faysal is defeated for good in Syria, 123 then In August, the military situation is stabilized in Çukurova itself, but Antep is lost the same month and is not retaken until February 1921 124. This easing of the situation in the plain and in Syria makes possible the final steps of the repression of the Armenian nationalist violence, a repression having started months before, and not de- scribed here until now for reasons of clarity. In April, most of the Ar- menians volunteers of Bahçe (a unit distinct of the Armenian Legion) are disarmed and recalled because of their chronicle “indiscipline.” The murderers and the worst plunderers are sent to the military tri- bunal of Adana, and Colonel Brémond warns Mirhan Damadian, rep- resentative in Adana of the Armenian delegations of Paris, that such crimes “completely attenuate the trust of the French authorities to- ward” the Armenian parties. The same month, the Armenian gen- darmes of Tarsus are fired because they are “brutal with the popula- tion when there is nothing to fear” but are “cowards” in case of a 121 Rapport hebdomadaire, 29 juin 1920; Id., 27 juillet 1920; Id., 4 août 1920; Id., 11 août 1920; Id., 24 août 1920; Général Gouraud, Ordre général n° 26, 2 août 1920, SHD, 4 H 58, dossier 2; Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère de la Guerre, 19 juillet 1920, AMAE, P 17784. 122 S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 1079, 16 septembre 1919, SHD, 1 BB7 233; Rapport hebdoma- daire, 31 août 1920, p. 4; Id., 9 septembre, p. 10, SHD, 4 H 58, dossier 2; Lettre du général Gouraud à Robert de Caix, 2 juin 1920, AMAE, P 11203; Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to…, volume III-1, pp. 1437-1439. 123 Dan Eldar, “France in Syria: The Abolition of the Sharifian Government, April-July 1920,” Middle Eastern Studies, XXIII-3, July 1993, pp. 487-504 124 Maurice Abadie, Opérations au Levant…, pp. 79-118; Édouard Andréa, Siège d’Aïntab, 1920-1921, SHD, 1 K 208. THE FALLEN BALANCE 323 fight 125. In April, too, middle-rank officers of the Armenian Legion, and the officer in charge of the Legion himself, C. Beaujard, advocates (with the support of Brigadier General Quérette) the pure and simple suppression 126 of “this troop of deserters and thieves that dirties the French uniform” 127. Already numerous (more than 160) in 1919, 128 the desertions indeed take hemorrhagic proportions after the Maraş affair and the following clashes. As a result, in May, the General Staff advocates the suppression of the Armenian Legion. The same month, the minister of War asks to the minister of Foreign Affairs (who is also the President of the Ministers’ Council) if he agrees and in June the reply is positive. The decision is confirmed in July. However, because of the continuous clashes, the disbanding is completed in September only 129. Targeting the basis, the repression also reachs the head. On 13 March 1920, an accidental explosion reveals the terrorist activities of ex-Archbishop Mouchegh Séropian, general administrator of the Ar- menian National Union (political parties and churches), previously sentenced to death in absentia by the Ottoman justice, in 1909. His brother is killed while manipulating a bomb 130 . The former Arch- bishop is in Egypt at that time, and never comes back to Adana. He is sentenced in absentia on 23 April of the same year, to ten year years 125 Le gouveneur de Tarsous à M. le colonel Brémond, 2 avril 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/148. 126 Rapport du capitaine Josse, 20 avril 1920; Le chef de bataillon Beaujard, commandant la Légion arménienne, à M. le général commandant la 1re brigade au Levan, 12 avril 1920; Id., 17 avril 1920; Id., 22 avril 1920, 4 H 42, dossier 6. 127 Le lieutenant Arrighi à M. le général Quérette, commandant la 1re brigade à Djihan, 25 avril 1920, 1SL/1V/173. 128 Le lieutenant Adge, commandant la première compagnie, à M. le commandant du 1er batail- lon, 24 avril 1919, SHD, 4 H 42, dossier 6; Jugement n° 79, 29 mai 1919, SHD, 11 J 3074; Renseignements, 1er septembre 1919, CADN 1SL/1V/131; [Vahan Portoukalian], Rapport sur la Légion arménienne [1919], pp. 13-22, SHD, 4 H 42, dossier 1. 129 Troupes du Levant, État major, 1er bureau, 11 mai 1920; Télégramme du général Dufieux au général Gouraud, 17 juillet 1920; Général Dufieux, Note de service, 7 septembre 1920, SHD, 4 H 42, dossier 6; Le ministre de la Guerre à M. le ministre des Affaires étrangères, 20 mai 1920; Le ministre des Affaires étrangères à M. le ministre de la Guerre, 18 juin 1920; Le mi- nistre de la Guerre à M. le ministre des Affaires étrangères, 12 juillet 1920, AMAE, P 1426. 130 Rapport du gouverneur militaire de la ville et du sandjak d’Adana [Tommy Martin], 14 mars 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/182. 324 MAXIME GAUIN of hard labor and twenty years of ban of residence (interdiction de séjour), for conspiracy (association de malfaiteurs), fabrication of bombs, storing of war weapons and war ammunitions and complicity in man- slaughter (the death of the Armenian baker accidentally killed by the explosion) 131. This sentence and the flow of refugees from Maraş leads to the replacement of the Ramkavar by the Hunchak as the dominant Armenian nationalist party in Adana. Wanting, as early as spring 1920, to impose a fait accompli, the Hunchak organizes the anti-Muslim riots of July 1920, which are curbed by summary executions 132. Failing to understand the situation, the ARF proclaims an Armenian Repub- lic, an initiative immediately stopped by Colonel Brémond, 133 then the same officer has to suppress another attempt, by all the Armenian na- tionalist parties this time 134. The roads becoming usable again, all the sentenced Armenian plunderers are expelled from Adana to Leba- non 135. Right after the replacement of Colonel Brémond by Lieuten- ant-Colonel Pierre Capitrel (see below about him), Capitrel and Du- fieux prevent a third attempt 136. All these events take place when the Lloyd George cabinet uses the Maraş and the false allegations of “massacre” to impose the return of Damat Feri Paşa as Grand Vizir. By the threat to act alone, London 131 Conseil de guerre permanent de la 1re division A.F.L., séant à Adana, Jugement par contu- mace, 23 avril 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/182. 132 Tommy Martin, Renseignements n° 178, 7 juin 1920; Id., n° 398, 13 octobre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/222; Ordre du colonel Brémond, 10 juillet 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/139; Jugement n° 365/280, 6 août 1920, SHD, 11 J 3202.; Paul Bernard, Six mois en Cilicie, Aix-en-Provence : éditions du Feu, 1929, pp. 59-85; Kourken Tahmazian, “Homma.g.e. à la République armé- nienne”, L’Orient illustré, mars-avril 1920, p. 5. 133 Le colonel Brémond à M. Damadian, représentant de la Délégation de l’Arménie intégrale, 3 août 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/135. 134 Proclamation de l’indépendance de la Cilicie, 4 août 1920; Le colonel Brémond à M. le général commandant la 1re div ision du Levant, 4 août 1920; Le colonel Brémond à M. Damadian, 5 août 1920; Note, 6 août 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/174; Paul Bernard, Six mois en…, pp. 87-89. 135 The list (undated but written in August or September 1920) is in CADN, 1SL/1V/182. 136 Le général Dufieux, commandant la 1re division, à M. le lieutenant-colonel Capitrel, délégué administratif du haut-commissariat en Cilicie, 21 septembre 1920; Général Dufieux, Instruction personnelle et secrète pour le commandant des Ordons, 21 septembre 1920; Général Dufieux, Confirmation de messa.g.e. téléphonique, 22 septembre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/160; Paul Ber- nard, Six mois en…, pp. 107-108. THE FALLEN BALANCE 325 reinforces the occupation of İstanbul, then, by a blackmail on the de- livery of coal, imposes a harshening of the conditions of peace for Tur- key between the London and San Remo conference. Regardless, the conclusions of the San Remo conference then the Sèvres treaty are signed by the French government without intent to implement them, even less as before the signature of the treaty, it is clear that there is no majority in the Parliament to ratify it, 137 and as most of the public opinion, is against Sèvres 138. The liberal and Marxist left asks for the evacuation of Çukurova, denouncing the occupation as misguided im- perialism 139. The “integral nationalist” far right argues that “We do not have the soldiers and the available credits to guard the boundaries of two or three Armenias” (reference to Adana), that dismembering Turkey is detrimental to both the French interests and to the balance of power 140. B) A policy of appeasement Remarkably, Colonel Brémond himself tries to ease the tension with the Turks, but his attempts are too few, too late. The competences 137 “La journée”, La Croix, 27 juin 1920, p. 1. 138 Among many others: Saint-Brice, “Les clauses essentielles du traité turc”, Le Journal, 10 mai 1920, p. 1; Édouard Daladier, “La guerre prochaine”, Le Rappel, 10 mai 1920, p. 1; An- toine Peretti, “Le traité turc est-il acceptable ? Non !”, La Lanterne, 15 mai 1920, pp. 1-2; Georges Scelle, “Le traité turc et l’opinion française”, L’Information, 19 mai 1920, p. 1; “La France en Orient”, Le Figaro, 24 mai 1920, p. 1; “Les dessous du traité turc”, L’Humanité, 26 mai 1920, p. 3; “Il y a un traité turc… Mais il y a aussi des Turcs”, L’Intransigeant, 26 mai 1920, p. 1; Jean Longuet, “L’Islam et le Socialisme”, Le Populaire, 29 mai 1920, p. 1; René d’Aral, “Notre politique en Orient”, Le Gaulois, 27 juin 1920, p. 1; René Johannet, “Il faut réviser le traité turc — Constantinople”, La Croix, 1er juillet 1920, p. 1; “La Turquie signera- t-elle ? — Le grand vizir et les sultanes inclinent à la soumission”, L’Œuvre, 23 juillet 1920, p. 1; Démètre Pournaras, “Le traité avec la Turquie”, Le Populaire, 7 août 1920, p. 2; Pierre Loti, “Un traité qui dignement couronne la série d’âneries de notre politique orientale”, L’Œuvre, 20 août 1920, pp. 1-2; Camille Vergniol, “La France en Orient et les affaires de Turquie”, Le Monde illustré, 21 août 1920, pp. 120-121; Berthe Georges-Gaulis, “La paix orientale I”, L’Opinion, 25 septembre 1920, pp. 345-347; “La paix orientale II”, L’Opinion, 9 octobre 1920, pp. 399-401. 139 Gustave Roanet, “Au Sénat — Que font nos armées en Cilicie ?”, L’Humanité, 26 mai 1920, p. 2; Gaston Doumergue, “Les élections allemandes — Les leçons à en tirer”, Le Petit Méridional, 13 juin 1920, p. 1; Paul d’Estournelles de Constant, “Contre les expéditions en Syrie et en Cilicie. Séance du Sénat du 28 juillet 1920”, Conciliation internationale. Bulletin semestriel, n° 1, 1920, pp. 131-148. 140 Jacques Bainville, “La Turquie à San Remo”, L’Action française, 20 avril 1920, p. 1. 326 MAXIME GAUIN of the arbitration commission are reduced to the litigations equal or inferior to 50 liras right after the Maraş revolt, then they are com- pletely suppressed in June or July 141. The unjust confiscations of Mus- lim properties taking place in June and during the first days of July (the perpetrators hoping that the military situation would distract the attention) are canceled by Brémond on 11 July 142. Correspondingly, the return of Muslims in Adana after the riots of July begins on 19 August, 143 so before Brémond is replaced. Regardless, his name is too associated to the errors toward the Armenian nationalists and he per- sistently fails to understand the seriousness of the Kemalist movement as well as the demographic balance in Çukurova. As a result, General Gouraud seizes at the end of August an occa- sion given by Charles Escande (general secretary of the Adana’s ad- ministration and fierce opponent to Armenian nationalism) to remove Colonel Brémond, something wished by the high commission of Bei- rut since spring 1920. He is replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Capitrel, 144 who fought at the Verdun battle in 1916 then served in the military mission in Romania before joining the Army of the Le- vant. The instructions given by General Gouraud are the following: If the Kemalists remain the enemies for now, it could change soon, and in any case, the supporters of Kemal in Adana should not be “perse- cuted;” the “trust” of the Turks in general has to be gained; the Ar- menians have to understand that no other “blackmail” nor other at- tempts to impose a “fait accompli” can be tolerated. Capitrel is not, unlike his predecessor, the chief administrator, but the administrative 141 Rapport du commandant Tommy Martin, 9 novembre 1920, pp. 1-2, AMAE, 399 PA-AP 191. 142 Le colonel Brémond, chef du contrôle administratif de Cilicie, à M. le gouverneur de la ville et du sandjak d’Adana, 17 juillet 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/174. 143 Paul Bernard, Six mois en…, pp. 99-100. 144 M. Charles Escande, secrétaire général du contrôle administratif de Cilicie, à M. le général, haut-commissaire, 27 août 1920; Télégramme du général Gouraud au général Dufieux, 29 août 1920; Charles Escande, Comment essayer de ramener le calme en Cilicie, 31 août 1920; Le général Gouraud, haut-commissaire de la République en Syrie et en Cilicie, à M. le général Dufieux, commandant la 1re division, 20 septembre 1920; Le général Gouraud, haut-commis- saire de la République en Syrie et en Cilicie, à M. le ministre de la Guerre, 8 novembre 1920, AMAE, 399 PA-AP 191. THE FALLEN BALANCE 327 delegate, the change of the title meaning the change of policy toward the administration 145. His nomination is considered on the Turkish side as “a sign of appeasement” and on the Armenian side as “the prel- ude to an excessively early abandonment” 146. Conscientiously, Lieutenant-Colonel Capitrel replaces the admin- istrative services by a simple administrative control, from September to December 1920. Concretely, it means restituting the tax administra- tion and the civil justice to the Turks, and more generally a diminu- tion of the absolute number of French officers in the region 147. Beside this quick implementation of the orders he received, Capitrel advo- cates the establishment of a “French Relief” in Çukurova, to facilitate the “peaceful penetration” of the region, to consolidate the situation of the French schools and investments, in front of the Anglo-Saxon relief institutions, particularly the U.S. ones. Capitrel is perfectly aware that it means the end of the “too particularistic character of our [relief] work” (namely the relief for the repatriated Armenians only) and the “necessity to have a Muslim clientele,” in other words “a fair balance in our moral and material help to the various races of the country.” The fair balance seems to him easy to obtain: Even the French Catholic missions commonly have Muslim and Christian stu- dents; a secular relief would be even more neutral in this regard. It is also significant that the educational program proposed by Capitrel is the same for the Armenian, Assyrian and Muslim orphanages and that the director for the Muslim orphanage’s school must be, according to him, a Muslim, to show that the Islamic traditions will be “entirely re- spected” 148. Consciously or not, the combination of schools, relief, hos- pitals and orphanages presented in this plan is similar to the system 145 Général Gouraud, Directives politiques n° 4, données le 8 septembre 1920 au lieutenant- colonel Capitrel, délégué administratif du haut-commissaire en Cilicie, CADN, 1SL/1V/144. 146 “La situation en Cilicie”, L’Europe nouvelle, 31 octobre 1920, p. 1599. 147 Le général Dufieux, commandant la 1re division du Levant, à M. le haut-commissaire en Syrie-Cilicie, 16 décembre 1920; Le conseiller financier du haut-commissariat à Adana, à M. le haut-commissaire, 13 décembre 1920; Lieutenant-colonel Pierre Capitrel, Liquidation admi- nistrative, 14 décembre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/153. 148 Lieutenant-colonel Pierre Capitrel, Organisation d’une assistance française en Cilicie, 23 novembre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/144. Also see Lieutenant-colonel Pierre Capitrel, Proposition 328 MAXIME GAUIN elaborated in Mount Lebanon from 1860s to 1914 149—with one major difference: In Mount Lebanon, it was mostly for the Catholic (Maro- nite and Melkite) majority; in Çukurova, for “all races” but in consid- ering that the Muslim majority is essential. This is not a mere update of the “equal balance,” because a policy of “rapprochement” with the Turks is carried out. As early as Novem- ber 1920, and even more in January 1921, the French authorities no- tice a significant amelioration 150 . Past Grand Vizir Sait Halim Paşa (1865-1921) reports in his Memoirs that, after the departure of Bré- mond, the situation improves significantly and quickly 151 . Another proof is the systematic refusal of the proposals made by the Armenian nationalists to reconstitute military units. In October, General Gouraud repeats that it is out of question to accept any landing of Antranik Ozanian (1865-1927) in Mersin, as such a revolutionary leader would necessarily cause the renewal of the “provocations” against the Turks 152. Using a diplomatic language, Gouraud does not elaborate on the “provocations” he fears, but he knows the crimes of the now disbanded Armenian Legion and other Armenian units (“looting and burning villages and massacring unarmed Muslims”) 153 and the French MFA is aware that Antranik is a war criminal 154. d’organisation en Cilicie d’une assistance française, 15 octobre 1920; Organisation des œuvres de scolarité en Cilicie, 23 novembre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/153. 149 Dominique Chevallier, “Lyon et la Syrie en 1919. Les bases d’une intervention”, Revue historique, CCXXIV-2, avril-juin 1960, pp. 281, 284-291 and 298. 150 Commandant Hassler, Rapport hebdomadaire du 6 novembre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/153; Télégramme de Robert de Caix au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 6 janvier 1921; Réponse de Georges Leygues à Robert de Caix, 12 janvier 1921, AMAE, P 17785; Testis [Commandant Michel Canonge], “L’œuvre de la France en Syrie”, Revue des deux mondes, 1er mars 1921, pp. 837-838. 151 Sait Halim Paşa, L’Empire ottoman et la guerre mondiale, Istanbul : Les éditions Isis, 2000 (1921), pp. 68-69. 152 Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 23 octobre 1920, AMAE, P 17784. 153 Général Gouraud, Réponse à la note 9153/A du général de La Panouse, au sujet des Armé- niens, 25 novembre 1920, AMAE, P 17784. 154 Le district de Zanguezour, region contestée entre Arméniens et musulmans tatars, juin 1919, AMAE, P 16672. THE FALLEN BALANCE 329 Then, in November 1920, Ramkavar leader Archag Tchobanian (1872-1954) is allowed to come to Lebanon and Adana, “at the condi- tion to advocate the policy of appeasement preparing the implemen- tation of the Sèvres treaty,” namely the evacuation of most of Çuku- rova 155. Yet, contrary to what he had promised to General Gouraud, Tchobanian discusses with General Dufieux about about the claims for an Armenian autonomy in “Cilicia” and of new Armenian units, under the leadership of Antranik Ozanian, supposed to land in Mersin. Upon Tchobanian’s words, de Caix explodes: “You [Dufieux] would make our situation impossible if you left the slightest hope to the Armenians for any solution of this kind. They seem to me bypassing the other Orientals in the art to distort, conveniently for them, the sense of the words told to them. So far, I never had, for my part, a conversation with an Armenian, including men living in Europe such as TCHOBANIAN or NUBAR Pasha, without having seen them distort, with a bad faith so perfect that I wonder if it is not ingenuous, the meaning of my words” 156. The responsibility for his wording must be left to de Caix, but it also should be emphasized that he had to deal with Armenian nation- alist leaders only since 1913, never with elements of the ordinary pop- ulation. Major General Dufieux, who has had the same kind of con- tacts, and who is targeted by press campaigns of Armenian nationalists in Egypt and the U.S., 157 does not think otherwise: The time of the Armenian units is over 158. The lessons of the events caused by the Ar- menian Legion, including Maraş, are completely assimilated. 155 Télégramme de Robert de Caix au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 24 novembre 1920, AMAE, P 17784. 156 Lettre de Robert de Caix au général Dufieux, 25 novembre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/137. 157 Lettre du général Dufieux au colonel Brémond, 29 décembre 1920, pp. 6-7, AN, 594 AP 2; Général Dufieux, L’ingratitude d’un peuple, 28 janvier 1921, CADN, 1SL/1V/159. 158 Télégramme chiffré du général Gouraud à Robert de Caix, 2 décembre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/159. 330 MAXIME GAUIN C) The porcelain in pieces Writing at the end of August 1920 a comment on the Sèvres treaty where he does not express any kind of satisfaction, past President of the Republic (1913-1920) Raymond Poincaré (1860-1934) notices, re- ferring to the fact that the treaty has been signed in porcelain factory: “This is a fragile object, perhaps a broken vase” 159 . The following months confirm this analysis. Answering the attacks of the Republic of Armenia, which refuses to give up any territorial claim guaranteed by the Sèvres treaty and underestimates the strength of the Turkish army, Ankara carries out massive attacks 160. The French Navy’s Intel- ligence Service confirms the reactive nature of the Turkish offensive concluding that it is a riposte to the Greeko-Armenian policy, namely to the attempt to strangulate Turkey, to sabotage the policy of General Gouraud in Çukurova and the action of the French and Italian gov- ernments at the conferences taking place in Western Europe 161. The service adds that the charge of massacre against the Azeris of Armenia, presented as the main justification by Ankara, is true, as they have been “seen by reliable Europeans” 162. The “triple movement of stran- gulation” (eastern Anatolia, Çukurova, Western Anatolia) was re- ported since July 163. Regardless, the Turkish victory is quick and easy, in spite of the numerical inferiority and of the fact that the weapons and ammunitions are not lacking on the Armenian side 164. Actually, the Intelligence Service of the Navy and the Consul in Tbilisi had 159 Raymond Poincaré, “Chronique de la quinzaine”, Revue des deux mondes, 1er septembre 1920, pp. 213-216 (quotation p. 213). 160 Kemal Atatürk, Discours du Ghazi…, pp. 429-430; Hovannes Katchaznouni, The Arme- nian Revolutionary Federation…, pp. 9-10; Alexandre Khatissian, Éclosion et développe- ment de la République arménienne, Athènes : Publications de la F.R.A. Dachnaktsoutioun, 1989, pp. 229-241; Moustafa Tchokay Oghly, “Entre Arméniens et musulmans”, Orient et Occident, 15 janvier 1923, pp. 62-71 : Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to…, volume III-2, pp. 1487-1488. 161 S.R. Marine, Turquie, 10 octobre 1920, AMAE, P 16674. 162 Henri Rollin, La situation en Orient au 1er décembre 1920, SHD, 1 BB7 236. 163 S.R. Marine, Turquie, 4 juillet 1920, SHD, 7 N 3211. 164 Antoine Poidebard, Défaite de l’armée arménienne [1921 ?], AMAE, P 16675 (also in CADN, 36PO/1/111); Georges Labourel, “Impressions de Turquie — Le vrai péril”, Le Gau- lois, 20 décembre 1920, pp. 1-2. THE FALLEN BALANCE 331 warned Paris that the Armenian government is not serious and even utterly incompetent 165. Meanwhile, the Soviets fail in their attempt to crush Poland and to reach Germany to spread revolution in Western Europe, are re- pulsed by the Polish army equipped and advised by France and sign an armistice in October 1920. Then, Soviet Russia turns to fight the decisive battle against the army of General Piotr Wrangel. More liberal than his predecessor Anton Denikin, including as far as the non-Rus- sian nationalities are concerned, he and his government are officially recognized—and materially helped—by France in summer 1920. However, his attacks and the Polish ones do not provoke the collapse of the Communist regime. Alone, Wrangel is defeated decisively in November 1920. He and his men take refuge in İstanbul 166. It causes a stabilization in the east: Soviet Russia is stabilized internally and at the same time blocked by Poland in the north. But there has be a lock in the south, yet Azerbaijan, helped too late, has been invaded in April, and Georgia shall be soon as well. In this context, as early as 1 October 1920, the Navy’s Intelligence Service recommends to refuse any help to Armenia and to consider that the only credible barrier against an expansion of Communism in the Near and Middle East is Kemalist Turkey 167. By November, Henry Franklin-Bouillon, future negotiator of the Ankara agreement, advocates anti-Bolshevik alliance with An- kara 168. Months before, a part of the French press had advocated an alliance with Ankara against Moscow, and argued that such an alliance 165 Henri Rollin, La situation en Transcaucasie, 10 septembre 1919, AMAE, P 16673; Louis Nettement, L’Arménie. Notes de voya.g.e., 6 septembre 1920, AMAE, P 16674. 166 Thomas Fiddick, Russia’s Retreat from Poland, 1920. From Permanent Revolution to Peaceful Coexistence, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1990; Jonathan E. Smele, The ‘Russian’ Civil Wars, 1916-1926, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 155-171. 167 Henri Rollin, La situation en Orient au 1er décembre 1920, SHD, 1 BB7 236, citing S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 2352, 1er octobre 1920 (not found). 168 Henry Franklin-Bouillon, “L’intérêt commun des alliés exige une politique nouvelle en Orient”, Le Matin, 28 novembre 1920, p. 1. 332 MAXIME GAUIN necessarily means the acceptance of the territorial program of the Ke- malist movement 169. Particularly important, too, is the fall of Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos. While Venizelos enjoys a certain (albeit ques- tionable) reputation of friend of the Entente, Greek King Constantine, whose supporters win the legislative elections in Greece, is deeply dis- trusted and disliked in France, from the Marxists to the far right, 170 including by one of few friends of Greece remaining, in Autumn 1920, among the Parisian editorialists, 171 because of his proximity and sup- port for former German Emperor Wilhelm II. Yet, as early as Novem- ber 1920, documents and testimonies begin to be published, proving Constantine’s personal responsibility in the murderous ambush against French sailors near Athens in December 1916 172. As the leaked documents are published by three different platforms (the Revue uni- verselle, the pro-government daily Le Matin, and the Revue des deux mondes), in less than two months (the first article in Le Matin being even printed 48 hours after the first one of the Revue universelle), it looks like a campaign inspired and nurtured by the Ministry of Navy. Any- way, it bears noting that one of the two authors of the very first article is Henri Massis (1886-1970), who is later on a warm supporter of the 169 Jacques Bainville, “Conférence de la paix — Le casse-cou oriental”, Excelsior, 23 février 1920, p. 2; Camille Vergniol, “La France en Orient et les affaires de Turquie”, Le Monde il- lustré, 21 août 1920, pp. 120-121. 170 Léon Bailby, “Le choix est encore possible”, L’Intransigeant, 22 novembre 1920, p. 1; Paul Louis, “La crise grecque et l’Orient”, Floréal, 4 décembre 1920; “Diadoque des morts”, Le Gaulois, 5 décembre 1920, p. 1; Jacques Bainville, “Constantin et la Turquie”, L’Action française, 14 décembre 1920, p. 1; Jacques Roujon, “Les Alliés et Athènes”, Le Figaro, 23 décembre 1920, p. 1; Jean Longnon, “Constantin de Grèce et sa légende”, La Revue hebdo- madaire, 25 décembre 1920, pp. 405-416. 171 Auguste Gauvain, “La défaite de M. Venizelos”, Journal des débats, 17 novembre 1920, p. 1. 172 Édouard Helsey and Henri Massis, “La trahison de Constantin”, La Revue universelle, 15 novembre 1920, pp. 399-423; 1er décembre 1920, pp. 562-592; “Constantin et la Grèce”, Le Matin, 19 novembre 1920, p. 1; “Le gouvernement grec invite Constantin à revenir à Athènes”, Le Matin, 10 décembre 1920, pp. 1-2; Ernest Daudet, “Quelques scènes du drame hellénique (juin-décembre 1916). III —Autour des journées de décembre 1916”, Revue des deux mondes, 1er janvier 1921, pp. 148-175. THE FALLEN BALANCE 333 Ankara agreement of October 1921, 173 and that the dominant ten- dency in the press, including the unofficial daily Le Temps, sees in the defeat of Venizelos the occasion to revise the Sèvres treaty 174. At the same time (November 1920-January 1921), another wave of demands for the evacuation of Çukurova (sometimes of Syria itself) takes place in the press and the Parliament 175. Robert de Caix knows the situation well: “If the war with the [Turkish] nationalists continues indefinitely” the Parliament could cut the credits, not only for the occupation of Adana but also of Syria, “under least flattering and the least advanta- geous conditions for us [the French]” 176. In this context, General Gouraud comes to Paris, speaking with deputies and senators, to defend his work, including the end of any “Armenian policy,” and to argue that the peace treaty has to be mod- ified to diminish the expenses in the Near East. He faces a “unani- mous” support for these views—at least as far as the treaty is con- cerned—, in Chamber of the deputies then in the Senate. Georges Leygues, President of the Ministers’ Councils, also states that Sèvres has to be modified 177 . The French policy is not immediately com- 173 Henri Massis, “L’accord franco-turc du 20 octobre et la paix en Orient”, La Revue hebdo- madaire, 29 octobre 1921, pp. 617-623. 174 “L’aventure grecque”, La Croix, 18 novembre 1920, p. 1; Charles Saglio, “Si Constantin revient en Grèce — Il va falloir réviser le traité de Sèvres”, L’Œuvre, 19 novembre 1920, p. 1; Rober-Raynaud, “L’échec de M. Vénizélos”, L’Information, 19 novembre 1920, p. 1; René d’Aral, “L’Entente et la Grèce — Trop d’hésitations”, Le Gaulois, 22 novembre 1920, p. 1; Gaston Doumergue, “Une occasion à saisir”, Le Rappel, 23 novembre 1920, p. 1; R. Le Chol- leux, “La question d’Orient”, La Croix, 11 décembre 1920, p. 1; “À quand la paix de l’Orient ?”, Le Temps, 13 décembre 1920, p. 1. 175 “La politique française en Syrie et en Cilicie — Le gouvernement demande des crédits pour notre intervention en Orient”, La Lanterne, 21 novembre 1920, p. 1; Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés, 7 décembre 1920, p. 3495; 24 décembre 1920, pp. 3934-3937; 25 décembre 1920, pp. 3990-3993; Édouard Herriot, “Syrie et Cilicie”, Le Rappel, 22 novembre 1920, p. 1; Édouard Daladier, “Questions d’Orient”, Le Rappel, 14 décembre 1920, p. 1; Paul Louis, “Évacuez la Syrie”, L’Humanité, 20 décembre 1920, p. 1; Victor Bérard, “Le gaspilla.g.e. des forces françaises en Syrie et en Cilicie”, Les Cahiers des droits de l’homme, 25 janvier 1921, pp. 27-30; 25 février, pp. 84- 88 176 Lettre de Robert de Caix au général Dufieux, 25 novembre 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/137. 177 Commission des Finances et des Affaires étrangères réunies, 8 décembre 1920, pp. 21, 33, 36 and 45, Archives du Sénat, 69 S 268; “Notre situation dans le Levant — L’impressionnant 334 MAXIME GAUIN pletely reversed, but in December 1920, for the first time, ammuni- tions are sent by the occupation corps of İstanbul to the Turkish na- tional movement. In January 1921, for reasons of domestic policies, Leygues is forced to resign by the Chamber of Deputies and Aristide Briand replaces him. He is determined to make peace with Ankara as soon as possible, and the Turkish side is aware of this 178. The recap- ture of Antep, in February, 179 gives to Briand more serenity to nego- tiate. Conclusion The events of Maraş are one of the main reasons why the policy of equal balance is replaced, in a relatively short time, by a reversal of alliance. It is one case among others of the practice of physical violence by Armenian nationalists that eventually causes their defeat instead of bringing them success. Far from obtaining the reinforcement of the French presence and/or an Anglo-Saxon military intervention, Maraş is the beginning of a chain of events (quite logical, albeit not inevitable) leading to the evacuation of Çukurova and the mass deliveries of weapons and ammunitions (for sale by September 1921, 180 for free in January-April 1922 181) by France to Ankara. There is certainly a delay of almost two years but this is due precisely to the series of battles in 1920 in the context of Franco-British rivalry (toward the post-Otto- man space, Iran and Germany). This is one of the determining cause of the return to the traditional alliance of Francis I (François Ier) and exposé du général Gouraud”, Le Petit Parisien, 21 novembre 1920, p. 1; “Une bonne paix avec les Turcs”, L’Intransigeant, 22 novembre 1920, p. 1. 178 See for example the letter of Ahmet Rıza to Aristide Briand on 19 January 1921: AMAE, P 1441. 179 Édouard Andréa, Compte-rendu, 8-9 février 1921, SHD, 1 K 208; Maurice Abadie, Opéra- tions au Levant…, pp. 85-114. 180 Stanford Jay Shaw, The Turkish War…, volume III-1, pp. 1434-1435. 181 M. Briand, président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères, à M. Barthou, ministre de la Guerre, 11 janvier 1922, in Christian Blaecher (ed.), Documents diplomatiques français. 1922, volume I, Berne : Peter Lang, 2007, pp. 70-72; Commission de l’armée, Séance du mer- credi 1er février 1922, pp. 2-6, Archives du Sénat, Paris, 69 S 9; Note au sujet des cessions de matériel militaire faites aux autorités turques, 5 mars 1922, SHD, 4 H 175, dossier 5. THE FALLEN BALANCE 335 Süleyman Kanuni, as none of the two participants can decisively de- feat the other on the battlefield and both need an agreement—the Turks to defeat the Greek forces, the French to administer Syria and Lebanon quietly.