Phenomenal Intentionality - Bibliography - PhilPapers

Phenomenal Intentionality - Bibliography - PhilPapers
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Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness
Consciousness and Content
Phenomenal Intentionality
Phenomenal Intentionality
Edited by
Angela Mendelovici
and
David Bourget
About this topic
Summary
Phenomenal intentionality is an alleged type of intentionality that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the "what it's like" aspect of mental states. According to proponents of the Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (PIT), all original intentionality is phenomenal intentionality. Debates regarding phenomenal intentionality are closely associated with debates regarding cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of thinking. Loosely speaking, PIT is the reverse of representationalism: while representationalism aims to explain consciousness in terms of intentionality, PIT aims to explain intentionality in terms of consciousness.
Key works
Key works include
Strawson 1994
Horgan & Tienson 2002
Loar 2003
Pitt 2004
Farkas 2008
Kriegel 2013
, and
Mendelovici 2018
Introductions
Introductions to phenomenal intentionality include
Bourget & Mendelovici 2016
and
Kriegel 2013
Show all references
Related
Siblings
Consciousness and Intentionality
251
Representationalism
524
Conscious Thought
197
Internalism and Externalism about Experience
137
Phenomenal Concepts
332
Consciousness and Content, Misc
111
See also
The Contents of Perception
2,121
| 198)
Phenomenology and Consciousness
439
Cognitive Phenomenology
167
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Transparency, Revelation and Sensory Knowledge. Gauging the Explananda to a Theory of Phenomenal Presence.
Carlos Muñoz-Suárez
manuscript
details
There are two arguments in contemporary philosophy of consciousness and perception with which every theory of sensory awareness and phenomenal presence must deal: the Argument from Transparency and the Argument from Revelation. The first one is about the intentionality of sensations or conscious sensory states and the second one is about their epistemic role. These both arguments depend, on the one hand, on specific interpretations of ‘transparency’ and ‘revelation’ and, on the other hand, on specifying the formal structures that they
...
have. My main aim is to specify the conceptual conditions of conceivability of the explananda of a theory of phenomenal presence by analyzing transparency and revelation and their corresponding arguments. I will argue that we can arrive to neutral versions of the both arguments which do not depend on endorsing metaphysical theses about sensory content. From these versions of the arguments, I will show that to understand the relationships between them will give rise to a basic characterization of what must be explained by any theory of sensory phenomenal presence. My plan is as follows. In the first part I will present what I think to be the standard interpretations of the two arguments, their logical structures and the interpretations that I take to be the more neutral ones. Hence, I will offer an analysis of each one which allows us to identify some metaphysical and epistemological commitments of their interpretative alternatives. In the second part I will relate these arguments and I will make explicit their strongest relationships. I will present the working concepts of ‘transparent’ and ‘revealed’ and what I call the Transparency-Revelation Argument characterizing the explananda of a non-reductive theory of phenomenal presence. Such argument gives rise to three claims which will be presented as describing the basic explananda of a theory of sensory phenomenal presence. Finally, in the third section, I will sketch the main conclusions. -/- . (
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Consciousness and Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Explaining Consciousness, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Perception, General
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Nature of Contents, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Presentational and representational character of perceptual experience.
Paweł Grad
forthcoming
In Istvan Danka & Zsuzsanna Kondor,
Representations in Science and Cognition
. Bloomsbury Academic.
details
This paper aims to investigate the prospects of representationalism in accounting for the presentational character of perceptual experience. “Presentational character” refers the unique directness and qualitative richness with which perceptual experience relates us to its objects. My claim is that reductive representationalism is ill-suited to account for presentational character and that phenomenal intentionalism fares much better. Moreover, presentational character is an anchor—an experiential anchor—of our concept of mental representation. §2 elaborates on the concept of “presentational character” to fix the ideas.
...
§3 examines accounts of presentational character available to reductive representationalism. §4 does the same for phenomenal intentionalism. §5 suggests how considerations related to presentational character might be used by phenomenal intentionalists to support their core claim. §6 concludes. (
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Consciousness and Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Representationalism
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Concept of Representation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Theories of Representation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Varieties of Representation
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Conscious Intentionality: What Vision and Mood Teach Us.
Uriah Kriegel
forthcoming
In Maik Niemeck,
The Philosophical Significance of Intentional Modes
. London: Routledge.
details
Mental life exhibits both consciousness and intentionality: both subjective experience and object-directedness. Vision and mood pull us in opposite directions on the question of the relationship between the two. By holding tight to both pulls, and forcing them into a single framework, I formulate a general account of conscious intentionality as such – an account of how inner experience and external directedness cohabit in the structure of consciousness.
Aspects of Consciousness, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Aspects of Intentionality, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Moods
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Perceptual Relation, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Transparency
in
Philosophy of Mind
Vision
in
Philosophy of Mind
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The Value of Cognitive Experience.
Preston Lennon
forthcoming
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
details
Recent debates about consciousness and welfare have focused on whether consciousness is required for welfare subjectivity. There have been fewer attempts to explain the significance that particular kinds of consciousness have for welfare value. In this paper, I explore the relevance of cognitive experience for theories of welfare. I introduce the cognitive zombie intuition, the idea that an absence of cognitive experience can drastically change one’s welfare. I then attempt to explain the cognitive zombie intuition. I first consider and reject
...
the idea that cognitive experience is itself a welfare good. I then argue that cognitive experience plays an object-expanding role: it drastically expands the range of objects welfare subjects can desire or be pleased by. This expanded range includes paradigmatic welfare goods such as intellectual achievement, friendship, humor, aesthetic experiences, and existential experiences. I close by showing how cognitive experience’s object expanding role is compatible with leading theories of welfare. (
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Cognitive Phenomenology
in
Philosophy of Mind
Conscious Thought
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Value of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Well-Being, Misc
in
Value Theory, Miscellaneous
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Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.
Angela Mendelovici
forthcoming
In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong,
What is Belief?
Oxford University Press.
details
Abstract In slogan form, the thesis of this paper is that beliefs are self-verifying fictions: We make them up, but in so doing, they come to exist, and so the fiction of belief is in fact true. This picture of belief emerges from a combination of three independently motivated views: (1) a phenomenal intentionalist picture of intentionality, on which phenomenal consciousness is the basis of intentionality; (2) what I will call a “self-ascriptivist” picture of derived representation, on which non-fundamental representational
...
features are a matter of our ascribing contents to ourselves or our mental states or contents; and (3) a representationalist picture of the attitudes, on which the attitude components of mental states (e.g., the “belief” bit of a belief that P) are represented contents. This paper outlines and motivates the view of beliefs as self-verifying fictions, compares the view to alternative views of belief, and contrasts beliefs on the resulting picture to other belief-like mental states. (
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Belief
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Propositional Attitudes
in
Philosophy of Mind
Representationalism
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Intentionality.
Pierre Pierre
forthcoming
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
details
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
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31 citations
Intentionality and Extension.
M. Potrč
forthcoming
Acta Analytica
details
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Sankarāchārya and Kantian notion of consciousness.
Manas Kumar Sahu
forthcoming
Advaitya Utsav Conference
details
In this paper, my objective is to show how Sankarāchārya's concept of reality is different from the Kantian notion of reality, despite many similarities between them. Cartesian skepticism of universal doubt is a challenge for the Kantian notion of reality; however, it can't be applied to Sankarāchārya's concept of reality because of the acceptance of different paradigm to explain the reality and Sankarāchārya's non-representationalistic approach towards the reality. The attack on representationalism can't be applicable to Sankarāchārya's philosophy.
Kant: Philosophy of Mind
in
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Representationalism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Theistic Indian Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
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Understanding Concepts: Why Experience Matters.
Declan Smithies
forthcoming
In Geoffrey Lee & Adam Pautz,
The Importance of Being Conscious
. Oxford University Press.
details
What is it to understand a concept? This paper has two main goals. The negative goal is to argue against inferentialism: the thesis that understanding a concept is having the capacity to make certain inferences. The positive goal is to argue for experientialism: the thesis that understanding a concept is the capacity to have certain cognitive experiences. On this view, the cognitive experience of thinking a thought is sufficient for understanding its content no matter how you’re disposed to use it
...
in inference. There is no further requirement that these cognitive experiences must be disposed to play a certain role in inference. (
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Concept Possession
in
Philosophy of Mind
Conscious Thought
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Inferential Theories of Concepts
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Thought and Thinking
in
Philosophy of Mind
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A structuralist theory of phenomenal intentionality.
Ben White
forthcoming
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
details
This paper argues for a theory of phenomenal intentionality (herein referred to as ‘Structuralism’), according to which perceptual experiences only possess intentional content when their phenomenal components are appropriately related to one another. This paper responds to the objections (i) that Structuralism cannot explain why some experiences have content while others do not, or (ii) why contentful experiences have the specific contents that they have. Against (i), I argue that to possess content, an experience must present itself as an experience
...
of something distinct from itself, and that only experiences whose components are suitably structured satisfy this requirement. Against (ii), I argue that Structuralists can provide a deeper explanation of perceptual content than other theories of phenomenal intentionality by showing how the content-determining relations among our experiences depend on the selection pressures under which our perceptual systems developed. (
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Consciousness and Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Contents of Perception, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
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On Taking Appearances Seriously: Phenomenology, New Confucianism, and the Yogācāra Theory of Consciousness.
Christian Coseru
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 153-182.
details
This paper examines whether proto-phenomenological accounts in Chinese thought, introduced through Buddhism, provide a conceptual bridge to Husserlian phenomenology. It explores the renewed interest in Yogācāra among twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, in particular Xiong Shili, revealing inevitable tensions in his interpretation of Yogācāra concepts. Coseru argues that while something analogous to an appearance-reality distinction is present in classical Chinese philosophy, it differs in important ways from how that distinction is drawn in the Yogācāra and Husserlian traditions. He further argues that the
...
fundamental act-content distinction central to Husserlian phenomenology may be absent in Xiong’s monism, raising questions about the compatibility of his New Confucian thought with Yogācāra and the broader phenomenological project, and showcasing the challenges that cross-cultural philosophical inquiry sometimes faces. (
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Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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On Charles’s “Quasi-Fear”: A Perceptual–Phenomenological Defence of Thought Theory.
Hicham Jakha
2025
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
56 (3):213-234.
details
This article puts forth a perceptual–phenomenological defence of “thought theory” as a solid solution to the paradox of fiction. Arguing against Kendall Walton’s pretence solution to Charles’s fear and going along the lines of Peter Lamarque’s and Noël Carroll’s thought theory, my proposed defence makes use of the philosophy of a figure who is rarely discussed in the context of phenomenology and never discussed in the context of the paradox of fiction: Leopold Blaustein. To bring forth my proposed perceptual–phenomenological defence,
...
I devise Blaustein’s descriptive account of “perception” and its role in shaping aesthetic experience. Within this line of thought, I further develop a perceptualist reading of Blaustein, paralleling Christine Tappolet’s version, that may be of service to proponents of the “perceptual theory of emotions.”. (
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Aesthetic Perception
in
Aesthetics
Aesthetics and Emotions
in
Aesthetics
Imagination and Pretense
in
Philosophy of Mind
Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Objects and Contents of Emotions
in
Philosophy of Mind
Paradox of Fiction
in
Aesthetics
Perception and Phenomenology
in
Philosophy of Mind
Perceptual Theories of Emotion
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
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Le legs twardowskien d'une ontologie épistémique.
Gilles Kassel
2025
Philosophiques
52 (1):81-107.
details
In this article, we reassess Twardowski's scientific legacy on the basis of an ontological analysis of his theory of conceptual representation and judgement that breaks with commonly established analyses. In 1903, in his 'The Essence of Concepts', Twardowski posits the concept as part of acts of ‘non-intuitive’ representations. We attribute to the concept the role of bringing to consciousness an object endowed with properties, enabling the subject to think about an arbitrary object. The existence of this immanent thought object, coupled
...
with the fact that the concept is also an object of representation, leads us to bring to light a coherent set of notions concerning judgement, namely that of represented judgement and that of carried judgement. Among the objects thought about, we specify the nature of the affair, distinct from the thing, conferring on the subject a knowledge of evolutions in the world. Finally, to fully characterize Twardowski's ontological psychologism, we mention the nature of the social construct that he attributes to the thought object. (
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Cognitive Ontologies
in
Philosophy of Mind
Epistemological Theories, Misc
in
Epistemology
Existence
in
Metaphysics
History of Western Philosophy, Misc
Intentionality, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Concepts
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy, General Works
The Concept of Representation
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Cognitive phenomenology: in defense of recombination.
Preston Lennon
2025
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
68 (2):483-512.
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The cognitive experience view of thought holds that the content of thought is determined by its cognitive-phenomenal character. Adam Pautz argues that the cognitive experience view is extensionally inadequate: it entails the possibility of mix-and-match cases, where the cognitive-phenomenal properties that determine thought content are combined with different sensory-phenomenal and functional properties. Because mix-and-match cases are metaphysically impossible, Pautz argues, the cognitive experience view should be rejected. This paper defends the cognitive experience view from Pautz’s argument. I build on resources
...
in the philosophy of mind literature to show that cognitive-phenomenal properties are modally independent from sensory-phenomenal and functional properties. The result is that mix-and-match cases, though modally remote, are metaphysically possible. The possibility of mix-and-match cases allows us to move from defensive posture to a critical one: it poses problems for any theory of content that imposes rationality constraints, including Pautz’s positive view, phenomenal functionalism. (
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Cognitive Phenomenology
in
Philosophy of Mind
Conscious Thought
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Interpretivist Accounts of Meaning and Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Introduction.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 7-18.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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The Bodily Self in Ancient Chinese Arts and in Twentieth-Century Euro- American Painting.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 237-268.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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Self-Knowledge, Perspective, and the Possibility of Understanding in Zhuangzi’s Happy Fish Dispute.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 41-70.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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The Sense Organs, Awareness and Luminosity in Classical Chinese and Indian Thought.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 95-120.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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Self, Mind, and Consciousness: Comparative Reflections.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 183-194.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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Ritual and Confucian Shame.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 195-216.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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Index of Subjects.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 271-272.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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Selfhood and Subjectivity in Neo- Confucianism.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 121-152.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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Kierkegaard, Confucius, and the Intersubjective Dance.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 217-236.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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Perspective, Dwelling, and Phenomenology in Early Chinese Philosophy.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 19-40.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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“Not Having a Heart” (wu xin 無心) or the Paradox Between Existence and Knowledge in the Philosophy of Guo Xiang 郭象.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 71-94.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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Kierkegaard, Confucius, and the Intersubjective Dance.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 217-236.
details
Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
The Consciousness-Only School of Chinese Buddhism
in
Asian Philosophy
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Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
details
Human beings have always been concerned with fundamental questions about their selves, including the deeply personal nature of human experience, the persistence of the self over time, the relation between mind and body, and the interdependence between self and community. The goal of this volume is to rethink these questions against the backdrop of Chinese philosophical traditions, covering the ideas of major thinkers from Classical to late imperial China, with a particular focus on the fact that human experience is necessarily
...
characterized by the first-person perspective. The contributors to this volume employ different methods (historical, comparative, phenomenological), but they all aim at bringing the rich resources of Chinese philosophy to life in our global present. (
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Chinese Neo-Confucianism
in
Asian Philosophy
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy
in
Asian Philosophy
Phenomenal Intentionality
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Index of Names.
Kai Marchal
Ellie Hua Wang
2025
In Kai Marchal & Ellie Hua Wang,
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Chinese Philosophy: Phenomenological, Comparative and Historical Perspectives
. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 269-270.
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Chinese Neo-Confucianism
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The Quality of Thought
by David Pitt.
[REVIEW]
Angela Mendelovici
2025
European Journal of Philosophy
33 (4).
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European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Content Internalism and Externalism
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Phenomenal Intentionality and Derived Intentionality: A Commentary on David Pitt's
The Quality of Thought
Angela Mendelovici
2025
Journal of Consciousness Studies
32 (3):175-192.
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David Pitt's The Quality of Thought defends a hardcore version of phenomenal intentionalism, the view that at least the most basic kind of intentionality is nothing over and above phenomenal consciousness. The book is focused on the case of thought, advancing the view, roughly, that thoughts' contents are identical to their phenomenal characters. But the view is meant to apply more broadly to all intentional states: for Pitt, the content of any intentional state is identical to its phenomenal character. One
...
of the most pressing challenges facing phenomenal intentionalism is that of accounting for allegedly intentional unconscious mental states. In response to this challenge, many phenomenal intentionalists develop a two-tiered picture of intentionality, maintaining that the most basic kind of intentionality, original intentionality, is nothing over and above phenomenal consciousness but that mental states can have another, less basic, kind of intentionality, derived intentionality, which is derived in some way from actual or possible originally intentional states. Pitt rejects this derivativist picture and maintains a hard-line position on which non-phenomenal states cannot have any kind of intentionality. In this symposium contribution, I consider Pitt's arguments against derivativist pictures of intentionality, arguing that the derivativist has a ready response. I suggest that even if derived intentionality belongs to a different natural kind than original intentionality, it plays an important role in the mind. (
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Naturalizing Phenomenal Intentionality.
Andrea Pace Giannotta
2025
In Alberto Voltolini,
Marking the Mark of the Mental
. Springer Cham. pp. 77-102.
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According to the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), intentionality is grounded in phenomenal consciousness: the qualitative and subjective character of experience, which makes possible the intentionality of mental states. PIT is in continuity with an approach in philosophy that originated with René Descartes and that is centered on the epistemological primacy of knowledge of one’s conscious mental states, i.e. primacy of experience. However, within this approach one first encounters the problem regarding the existence of the external world (Cartesian external world skepticism).
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Furthermore, one also encounters the problem of the relationship between mind and nature (problem of naturalism). I identify a parallelism between PIT and Husserlian phenomenology, which also developed the notion of phenomenal intentionality. Husserlian phenomenology faces the same problems as PIT: the problem of motivating Cartesian external world skepticism and the problem of naturalism. I propose a way out of these problems through a phenomenological investigation of the temporal nature of phenomenal intentionality. By complementing phenomenology with a version of neutral monism (panqualityism), I argue that it is possible to naturalize, in a specific sense, phenomenal intentionality. (
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The phenomenal intentionality of mental imagery and seeing-as.
Ben White
2025
Synthese
205 (2):1-24.
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Advocates of Structuralist theories of phenomenal intentionality maintain that the content of perceptual experiences depends on the relations among their phenomenal components. This paper extends this view beyond basic perceptual experiences to mental imagery and experiences of seeing-as without relying on cognitive phenomenology. I develop a Structuralist account of mental imagery that distinguishes between two types of imaginative content, one of which is determined by an image’s sensory phenomenal character, while the other derives from the representation that produced the image.
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This proposal is then combined with a treatment of certain representations I call perceptual concepts to provide a Structuralist account of experiences of seeing-as. On this account, the deployment of perceptual concepts in experiences of seeing-as alters the phenomenal character and content of such experiences by imbuing them with imagery, thereby making them perceptual/imaginative hybrids. (
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Is Intentionality a Relation? A Dialogue.
David Bourget
Angela Mendelovici
2024
Argumenta
9 (2):337--361.
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This dialogue explores the question of whether intentionality—the “ofness”, “aboutness”, or “directedness” of mental states—is a relation. We explore three views: the Naive View, on which intentionality is a relation to ordinary, everyday objects, facts, and other such items; the Abstract Contents View, on which intentionality is a relation to mind-independent abstract entities that are our contents; and the Aspect View, on which intentionality is a matter of having intentional states with particular (non-relational) aspects that are our contents. We consider
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the challenges facing these views, which include empirical challenges in accounting for all the contents our intentional states can represent, metaphysical challenges in making sense of how contents can be entertained or otherwise represented by us and how they can play a psychological role in the mental economy, and challenges in making sense of how intentionality connects us to the world—if at all. Along the way, we consider the question of how consciousness is related to intentionality and how this affects one’s choice of views. (
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Are Phenomenal Theories of Thought Chauvinistic?
Preston Lennon
2024
American Philosophical Quarterly
61 (3):199-213.
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The phenomenal view of thought holds that thinking is an experience with phenomenal character that determines what the thought is about. This paper develops and responds to the objection that the phenomenal view is chauvinistic: it withholds thoughts from creatures that in fact have them. I develop four chauvinism objections to the phenomenal view—one from introspection, one from interpersonal differences, one from thought experiments, and one from the unconscious thought paradigm in psychology—and show that the phenomenal view can resist all
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four. (
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Husserl, representationalism, and the theory of phenomenal intentionality.
Chang Liu
2024
European Journal of Philosophy
32 (1):67-84.
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Representationalism is a philosophical position which reduces all phenomenal conscious states to intentional states. However, starting from the phenomenal consciousness, the phenomenal intentionality theory provides an explanation of all sorts of intentionality. Against Michael Shim's interpretation, I argue that, although Hussserl's phenomenology is certainly considered as an antipode of strong representationalism, Husserl does not stand in opposition the weak representationalists, because Husserl maintains an essential connection between the senses of noemata and the hyletic data. In addition, Husserl's phenomenology is also
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consistent with the phenomenal theory of intentionality. According to him, statically and genetically, all non-phenomenal intentional states take a recourse to phenomenal intentional states and eventually to sensual perceptions. (
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Singular Contents (With and Without Objects).
Angela Mendelovici
2024
In Robert French & Berit Brogaard,
The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception
. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 133-156.
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Perceptual experiences seem to in some sense have singular contents. For example, a perceptual experience of a dog as fluffy seems to represent some particular dog as being fluffy. There are important phenomenological, intuitive, and semantic considerations for thinking that perceptual experiences represent singular contents, but there are also important phenomenological, epistemic, and metaphysical considerations for thinking that they do not. This paper proposes a two-tier picture of the content of singular perceptual experiences that is based on phenomenal intentionality theories
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of intentionality combined with self-ascriptivism about derived representation, a combination of views that allows mental states to have two types of contents: phenomenal contents and derived contents. On the proposed picture, singular perceptual experiences represent singular phenomenal contents, which do not involve worldly objects, as well as singular derived contents, which do involve worldly objects. This picture accommodates and reconciles the considerations for and against thinking that perceptual experiences have singular contents. (
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Three Perspectives on Perspective.
Angela Mendelovici
2024
In Green Mitchell & Michel Jan G.,
William Lycan on Mind, Meaning, and Method
. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 67--100.
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William Lycan is a notable early proponent of representationalism, which is, roughly, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are nothing over and above its representational features (perhaps in addition to some further ingredients). Representationalism faces a challenge in accounting for perspectival experiences, which are, roughly, experiences that arise from our occupying a particular real or perceived perspective on the world. This paper presents representationalism, situating Lycan's version of representationalism within the representationalist landscape, and describes the challenge from perspectival
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experiences. It considers three different representationalist treatments of perspectival experiences: the Layered View, which is developed by Lycan; the Relational Properties View, which Lycan eventually comes to endorse; and the Naive View, which, I will argue, combines elements from both views to achieve the best overall view. (
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Phenomenal realism and subjective-objective dichotomy.
Manas Sahu
2024
Prometeica
29:164-176.
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The resolution of subjective-objective dichotomy is not lies in reduction rather grounded on the synthesis of phenomenal aspect and intentional-representational aspect of experience. We have to acknowledge the limits of both physical and mental objectivity and gradually transcend and expand the scope of physical as well as mental objectivity through neutral perspective. The Nagelian version of phenomenal realism has indicated for resolving the subjective-objective dichotomy by observing the interaction of subjective point of view and objective point of view about the
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reality from neutral perspective. (
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A plea for epistemic ontologies.
Gilles Kassel
2023
Applied ontology
18 (4):367-397.
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In this article, we advocate the use of “epistemic” ontologies, i.e., systems of categories representing our knowledge of the world, rather than the world directly. We first expose a metaphysical framework based on a dual mental and physical realism, which underpins the development of these epistemic ontologies. To this end, we refer to the theories of intentionality and representation established within the school of Franz Brentano at the turn of the 20th century and choose to rehabilitate the notion of a
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‘representation object’, as theorized by Kasimir Twardowski. We therefore propose that the categories of epistemic ontologies correspond to ‘general representation objects’. Secondly, we apply these proposals to the treatment of technical artefacts, material qualities of objects and events (notably as a continuation of our previous work on events). This leads us to sketch out a foundational epistemic ontology. (
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Aphantasia and Conscious Thought.
Preston Lennon
2023
In Uriah Kriegel,
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 3
. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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The sensory constraint on conscious thought says that if a thought is phenomenally conscious, its phenomenal properties must be reducible to some sensory phenomenal character. I argue that the burgeoning psychological literature on aphantasia, an impoverishment in the ability to generate mental imagery, provides a counterexample to the sensory constraint. The best explanation of aphantasics’ introspective reports, neuroimaging, and task performance is that some aphantasics have conscious thoughts without sensory mental imagery. This argument against the sensory constraint supports the existence
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of a non-sensory phenomenology of thought. Moreover, this argument can be extended to show that this non-sensory phenomenology determines a thought content. Finally, it can potentially diagnose the disagreement over cognitive phenomenology in the philosophy of mind, as such disagreement may turn on interpersonal variation in mental imagery. (
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Inner Speech
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Choice Paralysis: A Challenge from the Indeterminacy of Intentional Content.
Ryne Smith MacBride
2023
Dissertation, Georgia State University
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Christian List argues that three requirements are “jointly necessary and sufficient” for free will: intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control. In contrast, I argue that List’s accounts of intentional agency and alternative possibilities do not adequately explain how an agent has free will. Specifically, I argue that if an agent has free will, then it must also have phenomenality; because phenomenality determines the propositional contents of an agent’s intentional states. I demonstrate that List’s analysis of free will brackets phenomenality
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and, as such, an agent on his account may find itself in a permanent state of “choice paralysis,” a state in which it lacks the ability to choose due to the indeterminate content of its intentional states. I conclude by suggesting that philosophers must adopt methodologies derived from both the third- and first-person perspectives in order to adequately explain how an agent with free will interacts with the environment. (
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Truth and Content in Sensory Experience.
Angela Mendelovici
2023
In Uriah Kriegel,
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 3
. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 318–338.
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David Papineau’s _The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience_ is deep, insightful, refreshingly brisk, and very readable. In it, Papineau argues that sensory experiences are intrinsic and non-relational states of subjects; that they do not essentially involve relations to worldly facts, properties, or other items (though they do happen to correlate with worldly items); and that they do not have truth conditions simply in virtue of their conscious (i.e., phenomenal) features. I am in enthusiastic agreement with the picture as described so far.
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But Papineau also argues that sensory experiences are in no interesting sense essentially representational and that what is responsible for their truth conditions is their correlations with the environment. Here, I disagree. Indeed, I think Papineau does not follow his arguments to their proper conclusions. For if sensory experiences are intrinsic, non-relational, and only contingently correlated with worldly conditions (as Papineau and I agree they are), then the phenomenal features of sensory states are representational in an important sense: they constitute what we think, perceptually experience, or otherwise entertain, making up how things seem to us from a first-person perspective. Because of this, the truth conditions of perceptual experiences cannot be entirely independent of their phenomenal features. They cannot merely be a matter of environmental correlations. If we follow Papineau’s arguments to their proper conclusions, we end up with a view much closer to a version of representationalism that Papineau dismisses, a view he calls “pure phenomenal intentionalism”. (
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Attenuated Representationalism.
Angela Mendelovici
2023
Analysis
83 (2):373–393.
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In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau offers some metaphysical reasons for rejecting representationalism. This paper overviews these reasons, arguing that while some of his arguments against some versions of representationalism succeed, there are versions of phenomenal intentionalism that escape his criticisms. Still, once we consider some of the contents of perceptual experiences, such as their perspectival contents, it is clear that perceptual experience does not present us with the world as we take it to be. This leads to
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a rather attenuated form of representationalism, perhaps one that even Papineau could come close to agreeing with. (
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Facing Up to the Problem of Intentionality.
Angela Mendelovici
David Bourget
2023
Philosophical Perspectives
37 (1):228-247.
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We distinguish between different problems of “aboutness”: the “hard” problem of explaining the everyday phenomenon of intentionality and three less challenging “easy” sets of problems concerning the posits of folk psychology, the notions of representation invoked in the mind‐brain sciences, and the intensionality (with an “s”) of mental language. The problem of intentionality is especially hard in that, as is the case with the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness, there is no clear path to a solution using current methods. We
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argue that naturalistic theories of mental representation do not address the hard problem—either they are only intended to address the easy problems, or the claims they make help address the problem of intentionality only under undefended andprima facieimplausible assumptions to the effect that the hard problem reduces to some combination of the easy problems. We offer a positive account of what would be required to properly face up to the problem of intentionality. (
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Success Semantics, Reinforcing Satisfaction, and Sensory Inclinations.
Howard Nye
Meysam Shojaeenejad
2023
Dialogue
:1-12.
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Success semantics holds, roughly, that what it is for a state of an agent to be a belief that P is for it to be disposed to combine with her desires to cause behaviour that would fulfill those desires if P. J. T. Whyte supplements this with an account of the contents of an agent's “basic desires” to provide an attractive naturalistic theory of mental content. We argue that Whyte's strategy can avoid the objections raised against it by restricting “basic
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desires” to sensory inclinations that cause us to do things independently of our beliefs about their contents. -/- La sémantique du succès soutient, en gros, que ce qu'il faut pour qu'un état d'un agent soit une croyance en P, c'est que cet état soit disposé à se combiner avec ses désirs pour provoquer un comportement qui répondrait à ces désirs si P. J. T. Whyte complète cela par un compte-rendu du contenu des « désirs de base » d'un agent pour fournir une théorie naturaliste attrayante du contenu mental. Nous soutenons que la stratégie de Whyte peut éviter les objections qui lui sont faites en restreignant les « désirs de base » aux inclinations sensorielles qui nous font agir indépendamment de nos croyances sur leur contenu. (
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Analytic Phenomenology and the Inseparatism Thesis.
Christopher Stratman
2023
Argumenta
:1-26.
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A phenomenological turn has occurred in contemporary philosophy of mind. Some philosophers working on the nature of intentionality and consciousness have turned away from views that construe the basic ingredients of intentionality in terms of naturalistic tracking relations that hold between thinkers and external conditions in their environment in favor of what has been called the “Phenomenal Intentionality Theory” (PIT). According to PIT, all “original” intentionality is either identical to or partly grounded in phenomenal consciousness. A central claim for PIT
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is the inseparatism thesis, which asserts that the phenomenal and the intentional are inseparable. In this article, I will situate this thesis within a methodological context I call “analytic phenomenology” and then show why proponents of PIT should take seriously our phenomenology of temporal experience. But I am not aiming to disprove PIT or defend it against views of intentionality that reject inseparatism. Rather, I want to understand what PIT says and how to approach the view, assuming that our goal is to test the theory using the assumptions and methods endorsed by proponents of the theory. (
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Representation and Phenomenal Intentionality - The Problem with Mendelovici’s Theory and Its Solution on the Basis of Husserl’s Phenomenology -.
이종우
2023
Cheolhak-Korean Journal of Philosophy
157:185-213.
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현상적 지향성 이론(phenomenal intentionality theory)은 주체(subject)의 현상적 상태를 통해 주체의 지향적 상태를 설명하는 이론이다. 현상적 지향성 이론의 한 가지 문제는 모든 지향적 상태가 고유한 현상적 상태를 동반하는 것은 아니라는 점이다. 멘델로비치(A. Mendelovici)는 이러한 문제를 해결하기 위해 이른바 ‘자기귀속주의(self-ascriptivism)’를 제안한다. 자기귀속주의에 따르면, 주체는 그가 가지는 현상적 상태가 무엇을 의미하는지 생각하는 성향을 가지고, 이러한 성향을 통해 다양한 지향적 상태들이 일어난다. 하지만 자기귀속주의는 주체의 지향적 상태를 그것에 관한 주체의 반성적인 생각을 통해 설명한다는 점에서 근본적으로 잘못되었다. 다른 한편 후설(E. Husserl)의 현상학에 근거하여 이러한 문제를
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일으키지 않는 현상적 지향성 이론을 전개할 수 있다. 이러한 이론에 따르면, 주체가 가지는 현상적 상태는 주체가 아직 가지지 않는 이러저러한 현상적 상태들에 대한 기대를 일으키고, 이러한 기대를 통해 다양한 지향적 상태들이 일어난다. 그리고 이러한 기대는 이러저러한 현상적 상태들이 일어나면 만족하고 그렇지 않으면 실망하는 성향이다. 이러한 현상적 지향성 이론은 자기귀속주의에 있는 문제를 일으키지 않는다. 나아가 그것은 감각적이거나 감정적인 현상들로부터 구별되는 새로운 종류의 인식적 현상(cognitive phenomenology)을 필요로 하지 않는다. (
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The ins and outs of conscious belief.
Sam Coleman
2022
Philosophical Studies
179 (2):517-548.
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What should advocates of phenomenal intentionality say about unconscious intentional states? I approach this question by focusing on a recent debate between Tim Crane and David Pitt, about the nature of belief. Crane argues that beliefs are never conscious. Pitt, concerned that the phenomenal intentionality thesis coupled with a commitment to beliefs as essentially unconscious embroils Crane in positing unconscious phenomenology, counter-argues that beliefs are essentially conscious. I examine and rebut Crane’s arguments for the essential unconsciousness of beliefs, some of
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which are widely endorsed. On the way I sketch a model of how belief states could participate in the stream of consciousness. I then consider Pitt’s position, arguing in reply, along Freudian lines, that we should posit not just dispositional but occurrent unconscious beliefs. This result, I argue, indeed requires advocates of phenomenal intentionality to posit unconscious qualia to fix these unconscious occurrent thoughts, and I defend the coherence of the notion of unconscious qualia against some common attacks. Ultimately, I claim, the combination of taking seriously the occurrent unconscious, and a commitment to phenomenal intentionality, should lead us to expand William James’s conception of the stream of consciousness to encompass, additionally, a stream of unconscious mental life—or, perhaps better, to posit a single partly conscious partly unconscious qualia-stream of mental goings-on. (
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Content-Determinacy Skepticism and Phenomenal Intentionality.
Terry Horgan
George Graham
2022
In Stephen Hetherington & David Macarthur,
Living Skepticism. Essays in Epistemology and Beyond
. Boston: BRILL.
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Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists.
Giulia Martina
2022
Phenomenology and Mind
22 (22):138.
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In this paper, I outline a disjunctivist proposal for understanding the intentionality of perceptions and hallucinations within a naïve realist framework. For the case of genuine perceptual experience, naïve realists can endorse a version of the view that their intentionality is phenomenally-grounded: perceptual experiences have intentionality in virtue of being relations of conscious acquaintance to aspects of the mind-independent environment. By contrast, hallucinations have intentionality dependently or derivatively, in virtue of their indiscriminability from, or similarity with respect to, perceptual experiences.
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Within this proposal, naïve realists can allow that perceptions and hallucinations have a property in common – that of being intentionally directed at apparently mind-independent entities – whilst having wholly different metaphysical natures. (
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