Just War Theory by Renaud-Philippe Garner
European Review of International Studies, 2020
This article argues that Fabre's cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psycholog... more This article argues that Fabre's cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psychological realities of war. Building on J.L. Mackie's notion of an 'ethics of fantasy'-a morality reduced to lip-service and incapable of action-guiding-I argue that a view based on a flawed view of either human agency or the environment in which it is exercised is doomed to practical irrelevance. In rejecting patriotism and advancing a highly individualistic view of war, Fabre relies upon a highly flawed view of human agency, ignoring the psychological mechanism of depersonalisation essential to large-scale cooperation and the practice of war. In Part i, I offer an initial account of what an 'ethics of fantasy' is and offer one major reason why certain moralities fail as practical guidance. In Part ii, I contrast Fabre's moral cosmopolitanism with ancient cosmopolitanism; I focus on her rejection of patriotism and other identity-based forms of partiality. In Part iii, I summarise key findings, mostly in social psychology, on how large-scale social cooperation is achieved. I highlight the central role of depersonalisation and its felicity conditions. In Part iv, I argue that Fabre's view faces a dilemma. Either her cosmopolitanism is compatible with identity-based partiality, or it is not. If not, then she does not even have a view of war given that large-scale cooperation requires it. If her view is compatible, then she needs a functional replacement for patriotism. I conclude by showing that the alternatives fail to satisfy the felicity conditions of depersonalisation which war requires. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 |
The Journal of Philosophy , 2016
In this paper, I seek to close a gap in Michael Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldi... more In this paper, I seek to close a gap in Michael Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers. Specifically, I seek to show that Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers depends upon an implicit analysis of the function of excuses. I provide this analysis of excuses: a triadic relationship between moral norms, a background of normality and excuses. I then use this analysis to show that Jeff McMahan’s argument for the moral inequality of soldiers rest upon an implausible view of excuses, namely that the conditions of war merely constitute excuses for failing to comply with ordinary, or peacetime, morality. I argue that the conditions of war are best understood as providing a new background of normality rather than a set of excuses. To show this, I identify five conditions that separate the normality of war from the normality of peace.
Papers by Renaud-Philippe Garner
A troubled inheritance: Overcoming the temporality problem in cases of historical injustice
Journal of social philosophy, Jul 7, 2024
Allons Enfants de la Patrie: An Analysis and Defence of Patriotism and the Social Self
Synthese, Oct 28, 2021
One might think that if the majority of virtue signallers judge that a proposition is true, then ... more One might think that if the majority of virtue signallers judge that a proposition is true, then there is significant evidence for the truth of that proposition. Given the Condorcet Jury Theorem, individual virtue signallers need not be very reliable for the majority judgment to be very likely to be correct. Thus, even people who are skeptical of the judgments of individual virtue signallers should think that if a majority of them judge that a proposition is true, then that provides significant evidence that the proposition is true. We argue that this is mistaken. Various empirical studies converge on the following point: humans are very conformist in the contexts in which virtue signalling occurs. And stereotypical virtue signallers are even more conformist in such contexts. So we should be skeptical of the claim that virtue signallers are sufficiently independent for the Condorcet Jury Theorem to apply. We do not seek to decisively rule out the relevant application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. But we do show that careful consideration of the available evidence should make us very skeptical of that application. Consequently, a defense of virtue signalling would need to engage with these findings and show that despite our strong tendencies for conformism, our judgements are sufficiently independent for the Condorcet Jury Theorem to apply. This suggests new directions for the debate about the epistemology of virtue signalling.
Thumos
Presses Universitaires de France eBooks, Apr 3, 2019
Conquête
Presses Universitaires de France eBooks, Apr 3, 2019
Why cosmopolitan war is an ethics of fantasy?
ERIS – European Review of International Studies, Dec 17, 2020
This article argues that Fabre’s cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psycholog... more This article argues that Fabre’s cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psychological realities of war. Building on J.L. Mackie’s notion of an ‘ethics of fantasy’ – a morality reduced to lip-service and incapable of action-guiding – I argue that a view based on a flawed view of either human agency or the context in which it is exercised is doomed to practical irrelevance. In rejecting patriotism and advancing a highly individualistic view of war, Fabre relies upon a highly flawed view of human agency, ignoring the psychological mechanism of depersonalisation essential to large-scale cooperation and the practice of war. In Part i, I offer an initial account of what an ‘ethics of fantasy’ is and offer one major reason why certain moralities fail as practical guidance. In Part ii, I contrast Fabre’s moral cosmopolitanism with ancient cosmopolitanism; I focus on her rejection of patriotism and other identity-based forms of partiality. In Part iii, I summarise key findings, mostly in social psychology, on how large-scale social cooperation is achieved. I highlight the central role of depersonalisation and its felicity conditions. In Part iv, I argue that Fabre’s view faces a dilemma. Either her cosmopolitanism is compatible with identity-based partiality, or it is not. If not, then she does not even have a view of war given that large-scale cooperation requires it. If her view is compatible, then she needs a functional replacement for patriotism. I conclude by showing that the alternatives fail to satisfy the felicity conditions of depersonalisation which war requires.
Nationalism
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, May 18, 2022
Nationalism is a set of beliefs about the nation: its origins, nature, and value. For nationalist... more Nationalism is a set of beliefs about the nation: its origins, nature, and value. For nationalists, we are particular social animals. On the one hand, our lives are structured by a profound sense of togetherness and similarity: We share languages and memories. On the other hand, our lives are characterized by deep divisions and differences: We draw borders and contest historical narratives. For nationalism, humanity is neither a single species-wide community nor an aggregation of individuals but divided into distinct and unique nations. At the heart of nationalism are claims about our identity and needs as social animals that form the basis of a series of normative claims. To answer the question “what should I do” or “how should I live,” one must first answer the questions “who am I” and “where do I belong.” Nationalism says that our membership in a nation takes precedence and ultimately must guide our choices and actions. In terms of guiding choice and action, nationalist thought proposes a specific form of partiality. Rather than treat the interests or claims of persons and groups impartially, the nationalist demands that one favors one’s own, either as a group or as individual persons. While nationalism does not claim to be the only form of partiality, it does claim to outrank all others: Loyalty or obligations to other groups or identities are subordinated to national loyalty. Together, these claims function as a political ideology. Nationalism identifies the nation as the central form of community and elevates it to the object of supreme loyalty. This fundamental concern for the nation and its flourishing can be fragmented into narrower aims or objectives: national autonomy, national identity, and national unity. Debate on nationalism tends to divide into two clusters, one descriptive and one normative, that only make partial contact. For historians and sociologists, the questions are explanatory: What is nationalism, what is a nation, how are they related, and when and how did they emerge? Philosophers and political theorists focus on the justification of nationalism or nationalist claims: Is national loyalty defensible, what are the limits of this loyalty, how do we rank our loyalties, and does nationalism conflict with human rights?
Thumos
Presses Universitaires de France eBooks, Apr 3, 2019
Nationalism
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
Nationalism is a set of beliefs about the nation: its origins, nature, and value. For nationalist... more Nationalism is a set of beliefs about the nation: its origins, nature, and value. For nationalists, we are particular social animals. On the one hand, our lives are structured by a profound sense of togetherness and similarity: We share languages and memories. On the other hand, our lives are characterized by deep divisions and differences: We draw borders and contest historical narratives. For nationalism, humanity is neither a single species-wide community nor an aggregation of individuals but divided into distinct and unique nations. At the heart of nationalism are claims about our identity and needs as social animals that form the basis of a series of normative claims. To answer the question “what should I do” or “how should I live,” one must first answer the questions “who am I” and “where do I belong.” Nationalism says that our membership in a nation takes precedence and ultimately must guide our choices and actions. In terms of guiding choice and action, nationalist thought p...
Nationalism
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
Nationalism is a set of beliefs about the nation: its origins, nature, and value. For nationalist... more Nationalism is a set of beliefs about the nation: its origins, nature, and value. For nationalists, we are particular social animals. On the one hand, our lives are structured by a profound sense of togetherness and similarity: We share languages and memories. On the other hand, our lives are characterized by deep divisions and differences: We draw borders and contest historical narratives. For nationalism, humanity is neither a single species-wide community nor an aggregation of individuals but divided into distinct and unique nations. At the heart of nationalism are claims about our identity and needs as social animals that form the basis of a series of normative claims. To answer the question “what should I do” or “how should I live,” one must first answer the questions “who am I” and “where do I belong.” Nationalism says that our membership in a nation takes precedence and ultimately must guide our choices and actions. In terms of guiding choice and action, nationalist thought p...
Nationalism
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2022
Conquête
Passions sociales, 2019
Why cosmopolitan war is an ethics of fantasy?
European Review of International Studies, 2020
This article argues that Fabre’s cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psycholog... more This article argues that Fabre’s cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psychological realities of war. Building on J.L. Mackie’s notion of an ‘ethics of fantasy’ – a morality reduced to lip-service and incapable of action-guiding – I argue that a view based on a flawed view of either human agency or the context in which it is exercised is doomed to practical irrelevance. In rejecting patriotism and advancing a highly individualistic view of war, Fabre relies upon a highly flawed view of human agency, ignoring the psychological mechanism of depersonalisation essential to large-scale cooperation and the practice of war. In Part i, I offer an initial account of what an ‘ethics of fantasy’ is and offer one major reason why certain moralities fail as practical guidance. In Part ii, I contrast Fabre’s moral cosmopolitanism with ancient cosmopolitanism; I focus on her rejection of patriotism and other identity-based forms of partiality. In Part iii, I summarise key finding...
Allons Enfants de la Patrie: An Analysis and Defence of Patriotism and the Social Self
Synthese
One might think that if the majority of virtue signallers judge that a proposition is true, then ... more One might think that if the majority of virtue signallers judge that a proposition is true, then there is significant evidence for the truth of that proposition. Given the Condorcet Jury Theorem, individual virtue signallers need not be very reliable for the majority judgment to be very likely to be correct. Thus, even people who are skeptical of the judgments of individual virtue signallers should think that if a majority of them judge that a proposition is true, then that provides significant evidence that the proposition is true. We argue that this is mistaken. Various empirical studies converge on the following point: humans are very conformist in the contexts in which virtue signalling occurs. And stereotypical virtue signallers are even more conformist in such contexts. So we should be skeptical of the claim that virtue signallers are sufficiently independent for the Condorcet Jury Theorem to apply. We do not seek to decisively rule out the relevant application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. But we do show that careful consideration of the available evidence should make us very skeptical of that application. Consequently, a defense of virtue signalling would need to engage with these findings and show that despite our strong tendencies for conformism, our judgements are sufficiently independent for the Condorcet Jury Theorem to apply. This suggests new directions for the debate about the epistemology of virtue signalling.
A Tale of Two Moralities
Journal of Philosophy
In this paper, I seek to close a gap in Michael Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldi... more In this paper, I seek to close a gap in Michael Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers. Specifically, I seek to show that Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers depends upon an implicit analysis of the function of excuses. I provide this analysis of excuses: a triadic relationship between moral norms, a background of normality and excuses. I then use this analysis to show that Jeff McMahan’s argument for the moral inequality of soldiers rest upon an implausible view of excuses, namely that the conditions of war merely constitute excuses for failing to comply with ordinary, or peacetime, morality. I argue that the conditions of war are best understood as providing a new background of normality rather than a set of excuses. To show this, I identify five conditions that separate the normality of war from the normality of peace.
Drafts by Renaud-Philippe Garner
This paper is both a case study and a broader argument about how the proper exercise of the inte... more This paper is both a case study and a broader argument about how the proper exercise of the intellectual virtues is undermined by the lack of moral virtues and institutional incentives. Our topic is the rise and spread of trigger warnings as a pedagogical practice. Part I of the paper explains what these are and how they spread. Part II of the paper reviews the justifications on offer for this practice. Part III of the paper reviews the empirical evidence, namely a meta-analysis, to show how the arguments put forward by the defenders of trigger warnings fail. In Part IV, the paper moves from a case study to drawing a broader moral. Given that the empirical evidence never supported the claims made by advocates of trigger warnings and given that the growing consensus is that they are not only unable to help students but actively harming, how can we explain their ubiquity? The final section of the paper argues that the failure of prudence is explained by two other failures. On the one hand, the unwillingness to denounce an ineffective practice even as evidence compiles is due to a failure of character. Pedagogues are not unable to read the evidence, they are unwilling to speak out when doing is costly and requires courage. On the other hand, institutions of learning do not favour independence of mind or nonconformism. There is a tension between professional success defined in terms of pay and promotion and the excellence of a teacher defined in terms of intellectual and moral virtues.