RFC 9582: A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)

RFC 9582: A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
RFC 9582
Route Origin Authorization
May 2024
Snijders, et al.
Standards Track
[Page]
Stream:
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
RFC:
9582
Obsoletes:
6482
Category:
Standards Track
Published:
May 2024
ISSN:
2070-1721
Authors:
J. Snijders
Fastly
B. Maddison
Workonline
M. Lepinski
Carleton College
D. Kong
Raytheon
S. Kent
Independent
RFC 9582
A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs).
A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block.
This document obsoletes RFC 6482.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by
the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further
information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of
RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
document must include Revised BSD License text as described in
Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1.
Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security.
(See
RFC6480
for more information.)
As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an Autonomous System (AS) has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block.
A Route Origin Authorization (ROA) provides this function.
The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
RFC6488
, which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper
RFC5652
for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects.
Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (see
Section 4
of [
RFC6488
), this document defines:
The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA.
(This OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object.)
The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent.
(This is the payload that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.)
The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
X.690
Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the validation steps specified in
RFC6488
).
1.1.
Requirements Language
The key words "
MUST
", "
MUST NOT
",
REQUIRED
", "
SHALL
",
SHALL NOT
", "
SHOULD
",
SHOULD NOT
",
RECOMMENDED
", "
NOT RECOMMENDED
",
MAY
", and "
OPTIONAL
" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
RFC2119
RFC8174
when, and only
when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
1.2.
Changes from RFC 6482
This section summarizes the significant changes between
RFC6482
and the profile described in this document.
Clarified the requirements for the IP address and AS identifier X.509 certificate extensions.
Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions.
Incorporated errata for RFC 6482.
Added an example ROA eContent payload, and a complete ROA (Appendix A).
Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of ipAddrBlocks.
2.
Related Work
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
RFC5280
and "
X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers
RFC3779
Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object profile
RFC6488
; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed.
Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates adhering to the RPKI resource certificate profile
RFC6487
; thus, familiarity with that profile is also assumed.
3.
The ROA Content Type
The content-type for a ROA is defined as id-ct-routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.
This OID
MUST
appear within both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object and the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see
RFC6488
).
4.
The ROA eContent
The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised.
If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number.
A ROA is formally defined as:
RPKI-ROA-2023
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }

id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }

RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
addresses ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses
({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }

ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS {
&afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
&Addresses
} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses }

AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }

addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }
addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }

afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H

ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4}
ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6}

ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32
ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128

ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE {
address BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)),
maxLength INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL }

END
4.1.
The version Element
The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation entry
MUST
be 0.
4.2.
The asID Element
The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.
4.3.
The ipAddrBlocks Element
The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes.
Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than that used in the IP address delegation extension defined in
RFC3779
That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP prefixes.
4.3.1.
Type ROAIPAddressFamily
Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family.
This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6; therefore, addressFamily
MUST
be either 0001 or 0002.
IPv4 prefixes
MUST NOT
appear as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (
Section 2.5.5.2
of [
RFC4291
).
There
MUST
be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI in the ROA.
Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure
MUST NOT
appear more than twice.
The addresses field contains IP prefixes as a sequence of type ROAIPAddress.
4.3.2.
Type ROAIPAddress
A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element of type BIT STRING and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER.
4.3.2.1.
The address Element
The address element is of type BIT STRING and represents a single IP address prefix. This field uses the same representation of an IP address prefix as a
BIT STRING as the IPAddress type defined in
Section 2.2.3.8
of [
RFC3779
4.3.2.2.
The maxLength Element
When present, the maxLength element specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise.
The maxLength element
SHOULD NOT
be encoded if the maximum length is equal to the prefix length.
Certification Authorities
SHOULD
anticipate that future Relying Parties will become increasingly stringent in considering the presence of superfluous maxLength elements an encoding error.
If present, the maxLength element
MUST
be:
an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix, and
less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP address in the applicable address family: 32 in the case of IPv4 and 128 in the case of IPv6.
For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix with a maximum length of 26.
In this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.192/26, but not 203.0.113.0/27.
See
RFC9319
for more information on the use of maxLength.
When the maxLength element is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress structure's address element.
4.3.2.3.
Note on Overlapping or Superfluous Information Encoding
Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element).
For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28.
This ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.
Additionally, a ROA
MAY
contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases.
However, this is
NOT RECOMMENDED
, because in such a case, the ROAIPAddress element with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.
4.3.3.
Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks
As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for many different ways to represent the same set of IP address information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP address information has a unique representation.
In order to produce and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section
SHOULD
be used to ensure that information elements are unique with respect to one another and sorted in ascending order.
Certification Authorities
SHOULD
anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this canonical form.
This canonicalization procedure builds upon the canonicalization procedure specified in
Section 2.2.3.6
of [
RFC3779
In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an abstract data element composed of four integer values:
afi
The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer.
addr
The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6) integer value.
plen
The length of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field as an integer value.
mlen
The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress element, if present; otherwise, the above prefix length value.
Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can be tested by comparing their abstract representations.
4.3.3.1.
Comparator
The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered.
The order of two ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the following list.
Data elements with a lower afi value precede data elements with a higher afi value.
Data elements with a lower addr value precede data elements with a higher addr value.
Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with a higher plen value.
Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with a higher mlen value.
Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates of one another.
4.3.3.2.
Example Implementations
A sorting implementation
roasort-c
in ISO/IEC 9899:1999 ("ANSI C99").
A sorting implementation
roasort-rs
in the Rust 2021 Edition.
5.
ROA Validation
Before a Relying Party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the Relying Party
MUST
first validate the ROA.
To validate a ROA, the Relying Party
MUST
perform all the validation checks specified in
RFC6488
as well as the following additional ROA-specific validation steps:
The IP address delegation extension
RFC3779
is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address delegation extension.
The EE certificate's IP address delegation extension
MUST NOT
contain "inherit" elements as described in
RFC3779
The Autonomous System identifier delegation extension described in
RFC3779
is not used in ROAs and
MUST NOT
be present in the EE certificate.
The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in
Sections
and
If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety
MUST
be considered invalid and an error
SHOULD
be logged.
6.
Security Considerations
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users.
There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.
The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix or prefixes in the ROA.
Thus, the integrity of a ROA
MUST
be established.
This ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations discussed in
RFC6488
also apply to ROAs.
Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure.
The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix or prefixes is established through the use of the address space and AS number PKI as described in
RFC6480
Specifically, one
MUST
verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI and check that the prefix or prefixes in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's IP address delegation extension.
7.
IANA Considerations
7.1.
SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
IANA has updated the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in the "SMI Security for S⁠/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:
Table 1
Decimal
Description
References
24
id-ct-routeOriginAuthz
RFC 9582
7.2.
RPKI Signed Objects Registry
IANA has updated the Route Origination Authorization entry in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by
RFC6488
as follows:
Table 2
Name
OID
Reference
Route Origination Authorization
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24
RFC 9582
7.3.
File Extension
IANA has updated the entry for the ROA file extension in the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by
RFC6481
as follows:
Table 3
Filename Extension
RPKI Object
Reference
.roa
Route Origination Authorization
RFC 9582
7.4.
SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
IANA has allocated the following entry in the "SMI Security for S⁠/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:
Table 4
Decimal
Description
References
75
id-mod-rpkiROA-2023
RFC 9582
7.5.
Media Type
IANA has updated the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media Types" registry as follows:
Type name:
application
Subtype name:
rpki-roa
Required parameters:
N/A
Optional parameters:
N/A
Encoding considerations:
binary
Security considerations:
Carries an RPKI ROA (RFC 9582).
This media type contains no active content. See
Section 6 of RFC 9582 for further information.
Interoperability considerations:
None
Published specification:
RFC 9582
Applications that use this media type:
RPKI operators
Additional information:
Content:
This media type is a signed object, as defined
in
RFC6488
, which contains a payload of a list of
prefixes and an AS identifier as defined in RFC 9582.
Magic number(s):
None
File extension(s):
.roa
Macintosh file type code(s):
None
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Job Snijders
Intended usage:
COMMON
Restrictions on usage:
None
Change controller:
IETF
8.
References
8.1.
Normative References
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S.
"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"
BCP 14
RFC 2119
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119
March 1997
[RFC3779]
Lynn, C.
Kent, S.
, and
K. Seo
"X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers"
RFC 3779
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779
June 2004
[RFC4291]
Hinden, R.
and
S. Deering
"IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture"
RFC 4291
DOI 10.17487/RFC4291
February 2006
[RFC5652]
Housley, R.
"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"
STD 70
RFC 5652
DOI 10.17487/RFC5652
September 2009
[RFC6268]
Schaad, J.
and
S. Turner
"Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)"
RFC 6268
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268
July 2011
[RFC6481]
Huston, G.
Loomans, R.
, and
G. Michaelson
"A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure"
RFC 6481
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481
February 2012
[RFC6482]
Lepinski, M.
Kent, S.
, and
D. Kong
"A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)"
RFC 6482
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482
February 2012
[RFC6487]
Huston, G.
Michaelson, G.
, and
R. Loomans
"A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates"
RFC 6487
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487
February 2012
[RFC6488]
Lepinski, M.
Chi, A.
, and
S. Kent
"Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)"
RFC 6488
DOI 10.17487/RFC6488
February 2012
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B.
"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"
BCP 14
RFC 8174
DOI 10.17487/RFC8174
May 2017
[X.690]
ITU-T
"Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)"
ITU-T Recommendation X.690
February 2021
8.2.
Informative References
[RFC4648]
Josefsson, S.
"The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings"
RFC 4648
DOI 10.17487/RFC4648
October 2006
[RFC5280]
Cooper, D.
Santesson, S.
Farrell, S.
Boeyen, S.
Housley, R.
, and
W. Polk
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"
RFC 5280
DOI 10.17487/RFC5280
May 2008
[RFC6480]
Lepinski, M.
and
S. Kent
"An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing"
RFC 6480
DOI 10.17487/RFC6480
February 2012
[RFC9319]
Gilad, Y.
Goldberg, S.
Sriram, K.
Snijders, J.
, and
B. Maddison
"The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)"
BCP 185
RFC 9319
DOI 10.17487/RFC9319
October 2022
[roasort-c]
Snijders, J.
"ROA sorter in C"
commit 68969ea
July 2023
[roasort-rs]
Maddison, B.
"ROA sorter in Rust"
commit 023e756
August 2023
Appendix A.
Example ROA eContent Payload
An example of a DER-encoded ROA eContent is provided below, with annotation following the "#" character.
$ echo 16i 301802030100003011300F040200023009300703050020010DB8 P \
| dc | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE # RouteOriginAttestation
2:d=1 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :010000 # asID 65536
7:d=1 hl=2 l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE # ipAddrBlocks
9:d=2 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddressFamily
11:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING # addressFamily
0000 - 00 02 # IPv6
15:d=3 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # addresses
17:d=4 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress
19:d=5 hl=2 l= 5 prim: BIT STRING # 2001:db8::/32
0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8
Below is a complete RPKI ROA signed object,
Base64 encoded per
RFC4648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The object in this appendix has the following properties:
Object size: 1668 octets
Object SHA256 message digest:
3a39e0b652e79ddf6efdd178ad5e3b29e0121b1e593b89f1e0ac18f3ba60d5e7

CMS signing time: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000

X.509 end-entity certificate
Subject key id: DE145B193FB320B25A744355298C8BF7C2523D22
Authority key id: D67208EA470E9D6DD6654022F553ADC1389AB434
Issuer: CN=86525cd5-44d7-4df9-8079-4a9dcdf26944
Serial: 3
Not before: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
Not after: Thu 01 May 2025 00:34:13 +0000
IP address delegation: 2001:db8::/32

ROA eContent
asID: 65536
addresses: 2001:db8::/32
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank
Theo Buehler
Ties de Kock
Martin Hoffmann
Charles Gardiner
Russ Housley
Jeffrey Haas
Bob Beck
, and
Tom Harrison
for their help and contributions.
Additionally, the authors thank
Jim Fenton
Vijay Gurbani
Haoyu Song
Rob Austein
Roque Gagliano
Danny McPherson
Sam Weiler
Jasdip Singh
, and
Murray S. Kucherawy
for their careful reviews and helpful comments.
Authors' Addresses
Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Email:
job@fastly.com
Ben Maddison
Workonline
Cape Town
South Africa
Email:
benm@workonline.africa
Matthew Lepinski
Carleton College
Email:
mlepinski@carleton.edu
Derrick Kong
Raytheon
Email:
derrick.kong@raytheon.com
Stephen Kent
Independent
Email:
kent@alum.mit.edu