…s. A similar cause of such discards is unicast reverse path forwarding (uRPF) [ RFC3704 ]. In this document, the term "filter" is used for simplicity to cover all such cases. In any case, one cannot assume that the host is aware whether an ingress filter, a stateful firewall, or …

…ere rp_filter - INTEGER 0 - No source validation. 1 - Strict mode as defined in RFC3704 Strict Reverse Path. Each incoming packet is tested against the FIB and if the interface is not the best reverse path the packet check will fail. By default, failed packets are discarded. 2 - …

…LSE rp_filter - INTEGER 0 - No source validation. 1 - Strict mode as defined in RFC3704 Strict Reverse Path Each incoming packet is tested against the FIB and if the interface is not the best reverse path the packet check will fail. By default failed packets are discarded. 2 - Lo…

…wed through anti-spoofing filters (such as those described in [ RFC2827 ] and [ RFC3704 ]) or through Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) checks [ RFC5635 ]. The guidelines in Section 4 of [RFC6343] remain valid for those who choose to continue operating anycast 6to4 despite i…

…ic, although when combined with edge filtering using BCP38 [RFC2827] and BCP84 [RFC3704] guidelines (discussed in Section 2.5), then the risk of spoofing is mitigated, barring a compromised internal system. [...] It should say: o Data Origin Authentication - Management traffic is…

…ic, although when combined with edge filtering using BCP38 [RFC2827] and BCP84 [RFC3704] guidelines (discussed in Section 2.5), then the risk of spoofing is mitigated, barring a compromised internal system. [...] It should say: o Data Origin Authentication - Management traffic is…