…cipated that existing security layers, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) [ RFC5246 ], continue to be used. Minimal changes are required to non-web applications, as most of the transaction occurs through a normal web browser. Hence, this specification is only appropriate for …

…m is not solved by security protocols, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) [ RFC5246 ], that do not take local character sets into account. 4.4 . Visually Similar Characters To help prevent confusion between characters that are visually similar (sometimes called "confusables")…

…retrieved from https://example.com, bypassing the protections afforded by TLS [ RFC5246 ]. Q: Why use the fully qualified host name instead of just the "top- level" domain? A: Although the DNS has hierarchical delegation, the trust relationships between host names vary by deploym…

…It has recently been shown that the security of the SSL/TLS handshake protocol [RFC5246], which uses RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 and certain countermeasures, can be related to a variant of the RSA problem; see [RSATLS] for discussion. Note: The following passages describe some security reco…

…ction with some external secure system such as TLS (Transport Layer Security, [ RFC5246 ]), as the user-id and password are passed over the network as cleartext. The "Basic" scheme previously was defined in Section 2 of [RFC2617] . This document updates the definition, and also a…

…ication of [ RFC5802 ], it was discovered that Transport Layer Security (TLS) [ RFC5246 ] does not have the expected properties for the "tls-unique" channel binding to be secure [ RFC7627 ]. Therefore, this document contains normative text that applies to both the original SCRAM-…

…chanism assumes that a security layer, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) [ RFC5246 ], will continue to be used. This specification is appropriate for use when a browser instance is available. In the absence of a browser instance, SAML profiles that don't require a browser, s…

…ppendix B ). When used in combination with Transport Layer Security (TLS; see [ RFC5246 ]) or an equivalent security layer, a mechanism from this family could improve the status quo for application protocol authentication and provide a suitable choice for a mandatory-to-implement…

… retrieved from https://example.com, bypassing the protections afforded by TLS [RFC5246] . Q: Why use the fully qualified host name instead of just the "top-level" domain? A: Although the DNS has hierarchical delegation, the trust relationships between host names vary by deployme…

…mum TLS Version Support MTAs supporting MTA-STS MUST have support for TLS 1.2 [ RFC5246 ] or TLS 1.3 [ RFC8446 ] or higher. The general TLS usage guidance in [ RFC7525 ] SHOULD be followed. Margolis, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 8461 MTA-STS September 2018 8 . Operational…

… Session Initiation Protocol Secure (SIPS) URI resulting in TLS establishment ([RFC5246]). TLS also prevents offline dictionary attacks when digest authentication is used. Thus, in the absence of TLS, the device MUST NOT respond to any authentication challenges. It is to be noted…

…e HTTPS URLs. The authorization server MUST use Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] in a version compliant with [RFC6749], Section 1.6. Implementations MAY also support additional transport-layer security mechanisms that meet their security requirements. If the host of the t…

…retrieved from https://example.com, bypassing the protections afforded by TLS [ RFC5246 ]. Q: Why use the fully qualified host name instead of just the "top- level" domain? A: Although the DNS has hierarchical delegation, the trust relationships between host names vary by deploym…

… HTTPS URLs. The authorization server MUST use Transport Layer Security (TLS) [ RFC5246 ] in a version compliant with [RFC6749], Section 1.6 . Implementations MAY also support additional transport-layer security mechanisms that meet their security requirements. If the host of the…

…ernet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) [ RFC5750 ] and Transport Layer Security (TLS) [ RFC5246 ] can be used to protect session description exchanges in an end-to-end and a hop-by- hop fashion, respectively. Camarillo & Schulzrinne Standards Track [Page 18] RFC 5888 SDP Grouping Framewo…