Papers by Sandy C Boucher
Forthcoming in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2026
There has been considerable discussion in recent years of methodological naturalism in the scienc... more There has been considerable discussion in recent years of methodological naturalism in the sciences: the question of whether science does, or should, operate under the assumption that it may only investigate natural phenomena or offer natural explanations, and what form this assumption does or should take. Most of the discussion has centred around theories such as intelligent design creationism, but in this paper I argue that vitalism in biology-an immaterialist theory of living systems-provides an instructive and under-utilised test-case for methodological naturalism. I focus on three views: intrinsic methodological naturalism, provisional/pragmatic methodological naturalism, and, in particular, the 'unintelligibility' view I have previously defended: views which have not, for the most part, been applied to vitalism. The unintelligibility view comes in a metaphysical, and an epistemic form. I suggest that on the epistemic interpretation theories such as vitalism should be understood along the lines of 'mysterian' or 'ignorance' accounts of consciousness, and that this provides an illuminating account both of vitalism itself, and of its relationship to organicism in biology.
Synthese , 2025
Functionalism in biology is the view that with respect to organic form, structure is explained in... more Functionalism in biology is the view that with respect to organic form, structure is explained in terms of function, and structuralism is the view that structure is explained independently of function. Recent work on the topic has focused on 'meta-level' question such as, how should functionalism and structuralism be understood? What sort of positions are they? How if at all can they be justified? And what role to they play in biology? I have argued (Boucher 2015) that they should be understood as philosophical stances sensu van Fraassen (2002): clusters of attitudes, values, goals and commitments, rather than factual beliefs. In making this case I adapt van Fraassen's argument for treating materialism as a stance in this sense. In both cases, I suggest, only the stance interpretation can do justice to the manifest historical continuity of these views, and the fact that they have persisted through revolutionary changes in theory. In her recent book (2023), Rose Novick offers a critique of my view, and suggests that functionalism and structuralism should be construed rather as explanatory strategies. This can, she claims, capture the historical continuity of the views, while also having the virtue of showing how function-structure disputes can be empirically decided, something the stance account struggles with. In this paper I defend my view against Novick's critique, while extending and developing it. I argue that Novick's conception of explanatory strategies is too minimalist to capture the forms of functionalist and structuralist reasoning in question, and propose an expanded, richer and, I claim, more adequate explanatory schema for functionalism and structuralism that builds in value judgments characteristic of stances. And I respond to Novick's normative claim that even if functionalism and structuralism have in fact taken the form of stances, it would be better for biology if such stances did not exist.
People and Nature , 2025
Despite its relative infancy, ecological science plays a pre-eminent role in current environmenta... more Despite its relative infancy, ecological science plays a pre-eminent role in current environmental decision-making globally and has, over recent decades, permeated a broad range of academic disciplines. Developments in two areas of philosophical thought in particular, environmental aesthetics and the aesthetics of science, beg an exploration of their intersection with respect to the role of aesthetics in ecological science. Here, we provide a contemporary synthesis of both environmental aesthetics and aesthetics of science to explore aesthetic dimensions of contemporary ecological science, highlighting three main areas of convergence: 1.) the influence of aesthetic experiences and judgements of nature by ecologists on ecological science and our contemporary understanding of nature; 2.) the development and role of ecological 'taste' amongst ecologists; and 3.) moral, cultural and political implications of the ecological imagination as underpinned by current ecological science. We identify a risk for feedback mechanisms to perpetuate a relatively homogeneous ecological aesthetic as a result of reciprocal influences between ecological science and society which may further promote inadvertent policy advocacy and stifle scientific innovation. We suggest ecological science would benefit from increased aesthetic literacy and reflection by broadening the ecological imagination and intentionally facilitating more diverse and equitable science to inform policy outcomes. Our argument should be of interest to philosophers of science, ecologists and those that draw on their outputs.
Metascience, 2024
Review of Javier Suárez and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Units of Selection. Cambridge: Cambridge Universi... more Review of Javier Suárez and Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Units of Selection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023, 75 pp, £49.99 HB
Synthese, 2024
In recent years there has been a noticeable yet largely unacknowledged 'pragmatic turn' in the sc... more In recent years there has been a noticeable yet largely unacknowledged 'pragmatic turn' in the scientific realism debate, inspired in part by van Fraassen's work on 'epistemic stances'. Features of this new approach include: an ascent to the meta-level (the focus is not so much on whether scientific realism is true, but on the prior questions of the nature of the positions in this debate, how to decide whether to be a scientific realist, etc.); a reinterpretation of scientific realism and anti-realism as (or as closely associated with) stances, frameworks, rather than theories or beliefs; a move away from the previously dominant empirical-explanatory (i.e. quasiscientific or naturalistic) conception of scientific realism, anti-realism, and their justification; and a stress on the pragmatic and values-based elements in the debate. The traditional scientific realism debate is concerned with determining which position is true, or most epistemically justified. The new approach by contrast is concerned with determining which position best serves certain values, e.g. is most useful, fruitful, or otherwise prudentially preferable. In this paper we try to bring together the various strands in this new orientation, summarise its key features, contrast it with superficially similar but opposing views, and explore the similarities and differences among some of its adherents. Given we are advocates of the turn, we also offer a defence of the value and fruitfulness of this reconceptualization of the debate.
Inquiry, 2024
I argue that the Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering framework, in its pragmatist versio... more I argue that the Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering framework, in its pragmatist version as recently defended by Thomasson, provides a means of articulating and defending the conventionalist interpretation of projects of conceptual extension (e.g. the extended mind, the extended phenotype) in biology and psychology. This promises to be illuminating in both directions: it helps to make sense of, and provides an explicit methodology for, pragmatic conceptual extension in science, while offering further evidence for the value and fruitfulness of the Conceptual Ethics/Engineering framework itself, in particular with respect to conceptual change within science, which has thus-far received little attention in the literature on Conceptual Ethics/Engineering.
Biology and Philosophy, 2023
This paper defends global realism about the units of selection, the view that there is always (or... more This paper defends global realism about the units of selection, the view that there is always (or nearly always) an objective fact of the matter concerning the level at which natural selection acts. The argument proceeds in two stages. First, it is argued that global conventionalist-pluralism is false. This is established by identifying plausible sufficient conditions for irreducible selection at a particular level, and showing that these conditions are sometimes satisfied in nature. Second, it is argued that local pluralism-the view that while realism is true of some selection regimes, pluralist conventionalism holds for others-should also be rejected. I show that the main arguments for local pluralism are consistent with global realism. I also suggest that local pluralism offers an unacceptably disunified view of the metaphysics of selection. It follows that we should accept global realism. But this leaves open the question of how to classify so called
Research in Ethical Issues in Organisations, 2022
Editors' Introduction to the special issue of Research in Ethical Issues in Organisations, the pr... more Editors' Introduction to the special issue of Research in Ethical Issues in Organisations, the proceedings of the 27th Annual Conference of the Australian Association of Professional and Applied Ethics, hosted by the Discipline of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of New England in 2020.
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2022
Cladism, today the dominant school of systematics in biology, includes a classification component... more Cladism, today the dominant school of systematics in biology, includes a classification component – the view that classification ought to reflect phylogeny only, such that all and only taxa are monophyletic (i.e. consist of an ancestor and all its descendants) - and a metaphysical component – the view that all and only real groups or kinds of organisms are monophyletic. For the most part these are seen as amounting to much the same thing, but I argue they can and should be distinguished, in particular that cladists about classification need not accept the typically cladist view about real groups or kinds. Cladists about classification can and should adopt an explanatory criterion for the reality of groups or kinds, on which being monophyletic is neither necessary nor sufficient for being real or natural. Thus the line of reasoning that has rightly led to cladism becoming dominant within systematics, and the attractive line of reasoning in the philosophical literature that advocates a more liberal approach to natural kinds, are seen to be, contrary to appearances, compatible.
Foundations of Science, 2021
The extensive philosophical discussions and analyses in recent decades of function-talk in biolog... more The extensive philosophical discussions and analyses in recent decades of function-talk in biology have done much to clarify what biologists mean when they ascribe functions to traits, but the basic metaphysical question-is there genuine teleology and design in the natural world, or only the appearance of this?-has persisted, as recent work both defending, and attacking, teleology from a Darwinian perspective, attest. I argue that in the context of standard contemporary evolutionary theory, this is for the most part a verbal, rather than a substantive dispute: the disputants are talking past one another. To justify this claim I develop a general framework within which reductionist views, such as the standard 'etiological' account of biofunctions, occupy an intermediate position between what I call full-blooded realism and full-blooded anti-realism, and suggest that whether such views count as 'realist' views has no objective, theory-neutral answer.
Synthese, 2021
Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) seek to infer from the evolutionary origin of human belie... more Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) seek to infer from the evolutionary origin of human beliefs about a particular domain to the conclusion that those beliefs are unjustified. In this paper I discuss EDAs with respect to our everyday, commonsense beliefs. Those who seriously entertain EDAs for commonsense argue that natural selection does not care about truth, it only cares about fitness, and thus it will equip us with beliefs that are useful (fitness-enhancing) rather than true. In recent work Griffiths and Wilkins argue that this is a mistake. Fitness-tracking and truth-tracking are not rival, but rather potentially complementary, hypotheses about the function of our cognitive belief-forming systems. It may be that those systems maximise fitness by tracking the truth. I argue that while they are right about the standard EDAs for commonsense, the threat of evolutionary scepticism remains, because cognitive systems whose function is to track the truth may still be highly unreliable. I propose an alternative, Moorean approach to vindicating our commonsense picture of the world and dispelling the threat of scepticism. Once this has been established, however, we may appeal to evolution to explain the good fit between our cognition and the world. I thus propose that an evolutionary explanatory project ought to replace the troubled evolutionary justificatory project. This ought to be appealing to those such as Griffiths and Wilkins who seek a naturalistic non-sceptical account of our commonsense beliefs and their origins.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2020
Creationists have long argued that evolutionary science is committed to a dogmatic metaphysics of... more Creationists have long argued that evolutionary science is committed to a dogmatic metaphysics of naturalism and materialism, which is based on faith or ideology rather than evidence. The standard response to this has been to insist that science is not committed to any such metaphysical doctrine, but only to a methodological version of naturalism, according to which science may only appeal to natural entities and processes. But this whole debate presupposes that there is a clear distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and thus that naturalism is a meaningful doctrine. I argue that this assumption is false. The concepts of the natural and the supernatural are in fact hopelessly obscure, such that the claim that science is committed to methodological naturalism cannot be made good. This is no victory for anti-naturalists however; explicitly supernaturalist theories, such as Creationism, can be ruled out of scientific consideration as a priori incoherent, given that they presuppose for their intelligibility that there is a meaningful natural-supernatural distinction. This is not the case for standard scientific theories however, as they are not explicitly naturalistic theories; they do not postulate natural or physical entities or processes as such.
South African Journal of Philosophy, 2020
I consider two attempts to combine realism with pluralism about the units of selection: Sober and... more I consider two attempts to combine realism with pluralism about the units of selection: Sober and Wilson’s combination of ‘model’ and ‘unit’ pluralism, and Sterelny and Griffiths’ ‘local pluralism’. I argue that both of these attempts fail to show that realism and pluralism are compatible. Sober and Wilson’s pluralism turns out, on closer inspection, to be a kind of monism in disguise, while Sterelny and Griffith’s local pluralism involves a combination of realism and anti-realism about interactors, and the units of selection, that is ultimately unstable. My conclusion is that one must choose whether to be a realist or a pluralist in this area: one cannot be both. The question of which we should choose is a further question that I do not take a stand on.
Philosophia, 2019
I outline a conception of the relation of metaphysics to science, motivated by van Fraassen’s wor... more I outline a conception of the relation of metaphysics to science, motivated by van Fraassen’s work on philosophical stances, that does justice to the role played by metaphysical assumptions and presuppositions in scientific inquiry, while honouring the anti-metaphysical attitude that has always characterised the empiricist tradition.
dialectica , 2018
Van Fraassen’s view that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than... more Van Fraassen’s view that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs with propositional content, has become increasingly popular. But the precise relation between a philosophical stance, and the factual beliefs that typically accompany it, is an unresolved issue. It is widely accepted that no factual belief is sufficient for holding a particular stance, but some have argued that holding certain factual beliefs is nonetheless necessary for adopting a given stance. I argue against this claim, along with the weaker claim that while there are no beliefs that are necessary for adopting a particular stance, those who share a stance must share some characteristic belief(s) in common. I outline and defend an alternative ‘cluster’ account, according to which, in order to accept a stance, one must hold some minimal subset of the set of theoretical beliefs characteristic of the stance in question. This view can accommodate the intuitions motivating those who defend the stronger necessity claims, while crucially allowing for the flexibility of a stance vis-à-vis the relevant factual beliefs, and its relative independence from those beliefs, which is central to van Fraassen’s main examples of stances and their nature.
Metaphilosophy, 2018
Van Fraassen has argued that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather ... more Van Fraassen has argued that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs. In this paper I discuss the vexed question of whether and how such stances can be rationally justified. Until this question has been satisfactorily answered, the otherwise promising stance approach cannot be considered a viable metaphilosophical option. One can find hints, and the beginnings of an answer to this question, in van Fraassen’s (and others’) writings, but no general, fully clear and convincing account has been offered. I aim to provide such an account. In the first section I introduce the concept of a stance. In the second section I argue that stances may be justified pragmatically, in terms of both their epistemic fruits, and their coherence with values. In the third section I further consider the relationship between stances and values, arguing that the value-ladenness of a stance does not render it immune to rational scrutiny. In the final section I look at van Fraassen’s version of epistemological voluntarism, which plays a central role in his conception of the basis on which a stance may be rationally adopted. I show that voluntarism provides a theoretical framework, and approach to epistemology, within which the forms of justification appropriate to stance choice I outline in sections 2 and 3 find a natural home.
A. Walsh, U. Maki, and M. F. Pinto (eds.), Scientific Imperialism, 2017
Current debates over so-called ‘scientific imperialism’, on one plausible reading, explore signif... more Current debates over so-called ‘scientific imperialism’, on one plausible reading, explore significant general issues about the proper boundaries between distinct disciplines. They raise questions about whether some forms of territorial expansion by scientific disciplines into other domains of inquiry are undesirable. Clearly there is a strong normative undercurrent here, as the use of the pejorative term ‘imperialism’ would indicate. However, we face a genuine puzzle here: why should we regard some forms of expansion as illegitimate? Why should any particular boundaries between various disciplines be regarded as sacrosanct? In response we note that one striking feature of the examples upon which opponents of scientific imperialism focus (such as the use of economics for sociological explanations) is that that they involve cases where folk conceptions of morality and philosophical anthropology appear to be threatened. We suggest that rather than seeking a more general pluralist account of the proper boundaries between disciplines, we should consider the epistemic and normative implications of particular expansions.
Studies Hist Phil Biol Biomed Sciences, 2017
Stephen Jay Gould’s views on the ontology of species were an important plank of his revisionist p... more Stephen Jay Gould’s views on the ontology of species were an important plank of his revisionist program in evolutionary theory. In this paper I cast a critical philosopher’s eye over those views. I focus on three central aspects of Gould’s views on species: the relation between the Darwinian and the metaphysical notions of individuality, the relation between the ontology of species and macroevolution, and the issue of contextualism and conventionalism about the metaphysics of species.
Biology and Philosophy, 2015
I consider the broad perspectives in biology known as functionalism and structuralism, as well as... more I consider the broad perspectives in biology known as functionalism and structuralism, as well as a modern version of functionalism, adaptationism. Adapting van Fraassen’s argument for treating materialism as a stance, rather than a factual belief with propositional content, in the first part of the paper I offer an argument for construing functionalism and structuralism as stances also. In the second part of the paper I consider Godfrey-Smith’s distinction between empirical and explanatory adaptationism, and suggest that while the former is an empirical scientific hypothesis, the latter is closely related to the functionalist stance.
Synthese, 2014
Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should... more Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In section 1 I consider van Fraassen’s argument for construing empiricism as a stance, and look at some responses to it. In section 2 I outline my conception of stances as perspectives or ways of seeing, and explain how stances so understood may be justified. I illustrate this conception by way of a discussion of the model pluralist position with respect to the units of selection debate in biology, and suggest that on the model pluralist view different perspectives on the units of selection, such as the gene’s eye view, are in fact van Fraassian stances. In section 3 I discuss the view put forward by Teller and Chakravartty among others that stances should be understood as epistemic policies, and argue that it is consistent with the conception of stances as perspectives. In the final section I criticise Rowbottom’s attempt to assimilate stances to Kuhnian paradigms. I argue that he has overlooked some important disanalogies between stances and paradigms, so that the comparison obscures more than it reveals.