New Publication by Serhiy Kudelia
Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West, 2023
Book review of Anna Aratyunyan, Hybrid Warriors: Proxies, Freelancers and Moscow’s Struggle for U... more Book review of Anna Aratyunyan, Hybrid Warriors: Proxies, Freelancers and Moscow’s Struggle for Ukraine (Hurst, 2022) and Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll, Ukraine’s Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022 (Cambridge University Press, 2022).
Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West, 2023
Mit Blick auf den Ausbruch des Krieges im Donbass 2014 wird über den Einfluss lokaler Akteure und... more Mit Blick auf den Ausbruch des Krieges im Donbass 2014 wird über den Einfluss lokaler Akteure und dem Moskaus diskutiert. Zwei aktuelle Publikationen gewichten vor allem das Handeln lokaler Akteure im Donbass und Südosten der Ukraine stärker als externe Faktoren. Ihre Argumentationen sind zwar nachvollziehbar, doch unterschätzen sie den russischen Einfluss, der sich nicht nur im direkten Eingreifen zeigt, sondern auch in der Verbundenheit lokaler Akteure mit Russland. LEAD Die Region Donbass, bestehend aus den Provinzen Donezk und Luhansk, ist im Verlauf von acht Jahren zwei Mal das Ziel einer russischen Invasion in die Ukraine geworden. Die erste begann im Februar und März 2014 mit der Ankunft von verdeckten russischen Agenten in mehreren Großstädten im Südosten der Ukraine, die von der Lancierung großer Demonstrationen mit separatistischen und irredentistischen Slogans in Donezk, Luhansk, Charkiv und Odessa begleitet war. Der Begriff "russischer Frühling", den ein russischer nationalistischer Blogger prägte, bot eine übergreifende Rahmenerzählung für die unterschiedlichen Ausbrüche prorussischer Gefühle. Diese Bezeichnung beschwörte romantische Vorstellungen des "Frühlings der Nationen" von 1848 und der Aufstände des "Arabischen Frühlings" von 2011 herauf, die zahlreiche im Nahen Osten stürzten. Impliziert wurde mit der Bezeichnung, dass die Ukraine ihr Regierungssystem ändern müsse oder ihre Staatsgrenzen neu gezogen würden. Allerdings kam es nur im Donbass zu einer prorussischen Mobilisierung auch außerhalb der großen Städte in der ganzen Region. Damit waren die Bedingungen für Milizeinheiten unter dem Kommando bewaffneter russischer Söldner günstig, um die Kontrolle über ein größeres Gebiet zu gewinnen. Bereits vor Russlands zweiter Invasion im Februar 2022 war der Donbas nach acht Jahren intensiver Kämpfe stark in Mitleidenschaft gezogen. Der bewaffnete Konflikt spaltete die Region: Der größere Teil blieb unter der Kontrolle der ukrainischen Regierung, doch ein Drittel der Region mit den beiden Hauptorten Donezk und Luhansk war unter dem Deckmantel der zwei selbsternannten separatistischen "Republiken" de facto von Russland besetzt. Zehntausende Truppenangehörige auf beiden Seiten der 457 km langen Kontaktlinie beschossen sich regelmäßig mit Artillerie und nahmen kleinere Einfälle vor. Gemäß konservativen Schätzungen kamen zwischen dem 14. April 2014 und dem 31. Januar 2022 3107 Zivilisten ums Leben, während über 7000 Menschen verletzt wurden. 1 Trotz deutlich weniger Waffenstillstandsverletzungen und zivilen Opfern in den zwei Jahren zuvor rechtfertigte Russland seine umfassende Invasion am 24. Februar 2022 mit einer fehlenden Einigung über den Donbass. Statt
Current History, 2022
The success of the Ukrainian state in repelling the Russian military onslaught and sustaining its... more The success of the Ukrainian state in repelling the Russian military onslaught and sustaining its operations in the first months of the war grew out of the humiliating experience of 2014."
Nationalities Papes, 2019
This article examines the effect of shared group membership on civilian attitudes regarding insur... more This article examines the effect of shared group membership on civilian attitudes regarding insurgent forces during an armed conflict. We rely on the original survey conducted in eight towns of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in May–June 2015. Based on the bivariate and multivariate analysis of the survey results, this article finds that a sense of shared identity with rebel forces at the start of the armed conflict in Donbas had a strong independent effect on civilian views of insurgents. Those respondents who identified themselves as residents of the region were more likely to attribute ideational motives to insurgents, report no knowledge of civilian victimization caused by rebel forces, and feel secure in their presence. By contrast, respondents identifying themselves as Ukrainian citizens were more likely to attribute material motives to insurgents, indicate their responsibility for attacks against civilians, and feel intimidated during direct encounters with rebels. These findings point to broader significance of identity cleavages in explaining the Donbas conflict.
Single-Authored Peer-Reviewed Articles by Serhiy Kudelia
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2019
The effectiveness of recruitment strategies is crucial for sustainability of any insurgent campai... more The effectiveness of recruitment strategies is crucial for sustainability of any insurgent campaign. This paper identifies eight mechanisms used to encourage overt and covert participation in the armed conflict in Donbas and shows that they varied depending on the type of service expected from a recruit. It relies on the original dataset compiled from studying 798 court cases of insurgents and informers convicted in Ukrainian courts in the period from October 2014 to March 2017. The paper finds that militants were more responsive to contractual or hierarchical mechanisms of recruitment, while informers who provided cover support were more likely to join through ideological appeals or activation of prior social ties.
Comparative Politics, 2018
Recent studies show that protest campaigns have a greater chance of success if they adopt nonviol... more Recent studies show that protest campaigns have a greater chance of success if they adopt nonviolent tactics, while the use of violence is often self-defeating. This article argues that violence may prove effective when combined with high popular mobilization, embedded in a generally non-violent movement and practiced against an unresponsive regime with low cost-tolerance threshold. Based on the case study of Ukraine's 2014 revolution, the article shows that the presence of an ideologically motivated agency skilled in violent techniques lowers the initial costs of generating violence, while the moral outrage in the face of regime backlash decreases further participation costs. If armed resistance on the part of protesters can increase the costs of a crackdown for the regime beyond its tolerance level, it will yield to protest demands.
Post-Soviet Affairs, 2018
The limits on presidential authority in premier-presidential regimes permit legislatures to wield... more The limits on presidential authority in premier-presidential regimes permit legislatures to wield preeminent influence over government formation and termination. This article shows that even without formal powers to dismiss the prime minister, the president may play a decisive role in government replacement. The article compares three successful and one failed attempt by the president to unseat the prime minister in Ukraine under a premier-presidential system. Based on a review of the significance of 10 variables accounting for presidential activism, it finds that the president’s informal control over institutional veto players as well as the unity of his party faction and cooperation of opposition groups were necessary for the success of attempted cabinet turnover.
"This article examines the evolution of the state in Ukraine from an object of elite predation in... more "This article examines the evolution of the state in Ukraine from an object of elite predation in early 1990s into a dominant actor in relations with non-state actors under Kuchma, an instrument of elite struggles for power and rents under Yushchenko and a return to a centralized state authority under Yanukovych. Despite its different transformations the state in Ukraine has been continuously characterized by the prevalence of informal levers of power and the absence of strong formal institutional foundations. As a result, after twenty years it still lacks the prerequisites of effective governance in a modern state – an impersonal bureaucracy, rule of law and mechanisms of accountability. This institutional void produces Ukraine’s vicious cycling between hybrid types of authoritarianism and democracy leaving the state dysfunctional and incomplete.
Keywords
Post-Soviet; State building; State-society relations; Informal institutions; Ukraine"""
Eastern European Politics & Societies, Volume 27 Issue 1 February 2013 pp. 147 - 179.
"Do warring sides in asymmetric conflicts always know what type of violence they use against civi... more "Do warring sides in asymmetric conflicts always know what type of violence they use against civilians? This article relies on the case study of an anti-Soviet insurgency in Western Ukraine between 1944 and 1953 in order to demonstrate how selective violence used by insurgents can become indiscriminate under the influence of a counterinsurgency strategy rather than their conscious choice. It challenges two major theories of coercive violence that refer to exogenous factors to explain shifts in the character of
violence and shows how insurgents may recognize such a shift only once they see its counterproductive effects. Using recently declassified documents, this article demonstrates how the insurgents’ decision to engage in a violent campaign against Soviet-led collectivization gradually turned the rural base of insurgency against them. Apart from shedding a new light on the Soviet–Ukrainian conflict in the late 1940s, the article has broader implications for the studies of insurgency campaigns and the reasons for civilian defection to the incumbent side."
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Volume 21, Number 2 / Spring 2013
This article analyzes two decades of
contestation over Ukraine’s constitutional provisions
regu... more This article analyzes two decades of
contestation over Ukraine’s constitutional provisions
regulating executive-legislative relations using insights
from the theories of interstate bargaining. It demonstrates
how changes in the power balance between elite actors
and the variation in the length of their time horizons
affect the probability of them reaching an agreement.
The article explains the reasons for elite acquiescence to
the building of a powerful presidency in Ukraine in the
1990s, a successful shift to a semi-presidential system in
2004, repeated failures to amend the semi-presidential
system, and an abrupt return to a super-presidential
model in 2010.
Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 60, No. 1, January-February, 2013, Feb 2013
The failure of Western leverage to prevent the jailing of Ukraine’s former prime minister, Yulia ... more The failure of Western leverage to prevent the jailing of Ukraine’s former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, shows that the political costs of compliance make EU’s democratic bargaining ineffective in dealing with authoritarian states.
Journal of Democracy, vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 19 - 34., Jul 2014
Former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych’s misrule, the popular reaction against it, and the ... more Former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych’s misrule, the popular reaction against it, and the manner of his downfall disrupted the very foundations of Ukraine’s still nascent and defective state. While in office, Yanukovych’s greed for power and wealth proved devastating to both him and his country. In order to grasp the reasons for the destructive effect of Yanukovych’s presidency, one needs to look at the way in which he reconfigured Ukraine’s political regime and the strategies that he adopted to maintain power. - See more at: http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/maidan-and-beyond-house-yanukovych-built#sthash.1Ys4LqaA.dpuf
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.23, No.1, March 2007, pp.77–100
"‘Electoral revolutions’, of which the Orange Revolution is an example, are a byproduct of a prot... more "‘Electoral revolutions’, of which the Orange Revolution is an example, are a byproduct of a protracted and inconclusive struggle among political elites, and they promote democratization only inasmuch as they push elites to a consensus on the
new institutional rules. This is illustrated by the dynamics of elite conflict in Ukraine, starting from the founding political crisis of 2000 and tracing the changing institutional preferences of the incumbents and challengers, as well as their conflicting political strategies. Ukraine’s protests in 2004 helped ruling and opposition elites to reconcile their differences and agree on the new power-sharing arrangement embodied in the parliamentary–presidential system."
Invited Journal Articles by Serhiy Kudelia
Current History, 2018
This article reviews President Poroshenko’s first term in office and argues that he failed in his... more This article reviews President Poroshenko’s first term in office and argues that he failed in his attempt to balance the imperatives of power consolidation with demands for institutional development. Key reforms have been implemented only partially due to the resistance of the vested interests linked to the ruling elite. The most significant setback occurred in the areas of political rights and freedoms and respect for civil society where pro-government actors interfered to neutralize potential threats to their power from below. Furthermore, the authorities nation-building policies have been based on the ethnocentric ideology meant to encourage greater cultural homogeneity of the Ukrainian society. Although the Ukrainian public might have ultimately emerged as a more cohesive national unit, the failures to improve the quality of governance made it even more resentful of the political establishment and skeptical about the prospects for reform if the current president retains power.
Breaking the Russia-Ukraine Stalemate
Russia in Global Affairs, 2018
This paper examines Russian-Ukrainian relations of the past four years in the context of the pres... more This paper examines Russian-Ukrainian relations of the past four years in the context of the present political regime in Ukraine and the interests of its ruling elite. It focuses on the fundamental changes in the Ukrainian leadership’s foreign policy strategy and points to long-term risks associated with Kiev’s hopes that Western patronage will help strengthen its security. In conclusion, the author considers three scenarios for the development of the Ukrainian state in the coming decade and analyzes their possible consequences for Russian-Ukrainian relations.
The “Russian Spring,” which was taken up in Donetsk and Luhansk as
the struggle for the Donbas, l... more The “Russian Spring,” which was taken up in Donetsk and Luhansk as
the struggle for the Donbas, led to the loss of the territory for both
Ukraine and Russia. Although many blame Moscow for starting the war
in the region, the key role was played by processes that took place within
Ukraine. Violent revolution led to the government’s loss of its monopoly
on the use of force, polarized public opinion and produced countermobilization among its opponents. Oligarchs in Donbas hedged their bets trying to deal both with the new authorities and their local
challengers.Members of security forces from the Donbas considered the
new government illegal and supported separatism. Miscalculations by
the government allowed the separatist movement room to consolidate,
while the indiscriminate use of force by government troops increased
support for the movement among the population. Russia exploited these
developments, but did not play a determining role in them.
SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 32, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2012, pp. 151 - 162
This article explores the strength of authoritarian trends and the likelihood of democratic chang... more This article explores the strength of authoritarian trends and the likelihood of democratic change in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It argues that the regimes in all three states share some of the structural characteristics that made Arab autocracies vulnerable to a challenge from below. However, marked variation in the intensity of opposition movements in each of these countries lowers probability of a wave of successful regime change in the near term. In addition, the article explains how strategy of coercive demobilization allows authorities to raise immediate costs of further opposition activities, but also increases risks of a societal backlash in the future. The article concludes by suggesting that the main dilemma of the opposition leaders in three states is how to offer a comprehensive reform agenda to the society without alienating moderates and potential defectors inside the ruling regime.
Russia in Global Affairs/Россия в Глобальной Политике, 2018
Данное исследование рассматривает российско-украинские отношения последних четырех лет в контекст... more Данное исследование рассматривает российско-украинские отношения последних четырех лет в контексте особенностей политического режима в Украине и интересов правящей элиты. Оно выделяет ряд принципиальных изменений во внешнеполитической стратегии украинского руководства и указывает на долгосрочные риски связанные с расчетом Киева на западный патронаж для усиления безопасности Украины. В заключении, автор рассматривает три сценария развития украинского государства в ближайшее десятилетие и анализирует их возможные последствия для двусторонних отношений.
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New Publication by Serhiy Kudelia
Single-Authored Peer-Reviewed Articles by Serhiy Kudelia
Keywords
Post-Soviet; State building; State-society relations; Informal institutions; Ukraine"""
violence and shows how insurgents may recognize such a shift only once they see its counterproductive effects. Using recently declassified documents, this article demonstrates how the insurgents’ decision to engage in a violent campaign against Soviet-led collectivization gradually turned the rural base of insurgency against them. Apart from shedding a new light on the Soviet–Ukrainian conflict in the late 1940s, the article has broader implications for the studies of insurgency campaigns and the reasons for civilian defection to the incumbent side."
contestation over Ukraine’s constitutional provisions
regulating executive-legislative relations using insights
from the theories of interstate bargaining. It demonstrates
how changes in the power balance between elite actors
and the variation in the length of their time horizons
affect the probability of them reaching an agreement.
The article explains the reasons for elite acquiescence to
the building of a powerful presidency in Ukraine in the
1990s, a successful shift to a semi-presidential system in
2004, repeated failures to amend the semi-presidential
system, and an abrupt return to a super-presidential
model in 2010.
new institutional rules. This is illustrated by the dynamics of elite conflict in Ukraine, starting from the founding political crisis of 2000 and tracing the changing institutional preferences of the incumbents and challengers, as well as their conflicting political strategies. Ukraine’s protests in 2004 helped ruling and opposition elites to reconcile their differences and agree on the new power-sharing arrangement embodied in the parliamentary–presidential system."
Invited Journal Articles by Serhiy Kudelia
the struggle for the Donbas, led to the loss of the territory for both
Ukraine and Russia. Although many blame Moscow for starting the war
in the region, the key role was played by processes that took place within
Ukraine. Violent revolution led to the government’s loss of its monopoly
on the use of force, polarized public opinion and produced countermobilization among its opponents. Oligarchs in Donbas hedged their bets trying to deal both with the new authorities and their local
challengers.Members of security forces from the Donbas considered the
new government illegal and supported separatism. Miscalculations by
the government allowed the separatist movement room to consolidate,
while the indiscriminate use of force by government troops increased
support for the movement among the population. Russia exploited these
developments, but did not play a determining role in them.