Summa Theologiae/Appendix/Question 1 - Wikisource, the free online library
Jump to content
From Wikisource
Summa Theologiae
Appendix
Summa Theologiae
by
Thomas Aquinas
Question 1 - OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY (TWO ARTICLES)
Appendix, Question 2
1154269
Summa Theologiae
— Question 1 - OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY (TWO ARTICLES)
Thomas Aquinas
Appendix 1
edit
Question. 1 - OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY (TWO ARTICLES)
edit
We must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped
of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we
shall treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only.
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted
with punishment by fire?
(2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within
themselves?
Art. 1 - Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire, and are punished by fire?
edit
Objection 1: It would seem that souls which depart with none but
original sin, suffer from a bodily fire and are punished by fire. For
Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, xxvii] says: "Hold firmly
and doubt not that children who depart this life without the sacrament
of Baptism will be punished everlastingly." Now punishment denotes
sensible pain. Therefore souls which depart this life with original sin
alone, suffer from a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of
fire.
Objection 2: Further, a greater fault deserves a greater punishment.
Now original sin is greater than venial, because it contains more
aversion, since it deprives its subject of grace, whereas venial sin is
compatible with grace; and again because original sin is punished
eternally, whereas venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that
venial sin is deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is
original sin.
Objection 3: Further, sins are more severely punished after this life
than during lifetime, for in this life there is room for mercy. Now,
sensible punishment corresponds to original sin in this life, for
children who have only original sin are justly subject to many sensible
punishments. Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this
life.
Objection 4: Further, even as in actual sin there is aversion and
conversion, so in original sin there is something corresponding to
aversion, namely the privation of original justice, and something
corresponding to conversion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment
of fire is due to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it
is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence.
Objection 5: Further, after the resurrection the bodies of children
will be either passible or impassible. If they be impassible---and no
human body can be impassible except either on account of the gift of
impassibility (as in the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as
in the state of innocence)---it follows that the bodies of children
will either have the gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious,
so that there will be no difference between baptized and non-baptized
children, which is heretical, or else they will have original justice,
and thus will be without original sin, and will not be punished for
original sin, which is likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they
be passible, since everything passible suffers of necessity in the
presence of the active, it follows that in the presence of active
sensible bodies they will suffer sensible punishment.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiii) that the mildest
punishment of all will be for those who are burdened with original sin
only. But this would not be so, if they were tormented with sensible
punishment, because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore
they will not suffer sensible punishment.
Further, the grief of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure
of sin (Apoc. 18:7): "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived
in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." But there is
no pleasure in original sin, as neither is there operation, for
pleasure follows operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Therefore
punishment by fire is not due to original sin.
Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which is entitled on
Holy Baptism, distinguishes three classes of unbaptized persons: those
namely who refuse to be baptized, those who through neglect have put
off being baptized until the end of life and have been surprised by
sudden death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive it
through no fault of theirs. Of the first he says that they will be
punished not only for their other sins, but also for their contempt of
Baptism; of the second, that they will be punished, though less
severely than the first, for having neglected it; and of the last he
says that "a just and eternal Judge will consign them neither to
heavenly glory nor to the eternal pains of hell, for although they have
not been signed with Baptism, they are without wickedness and malice,
and have suffered rather than caused their loss of Baptism." He also
gives the reason why, although they do not reach the glory of heaven,
they do not therefore suffer the eternal punishment suffered by the
damned: "Because there is a mean between the two, since he who deserves
not honor and glory is not for that reason worthy of punishment, and on
the other hand he who is not deserving of punishment is not for that
reason worthy of glory and honor."
I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to fault, according
to the saying of Isaias (27:8), "In measure against measure, when it
shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now the defect transmitted to
us through our origin, and having the character of a sin does not
result from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon
human nature by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal or
corruption of something that had been superadded to nature. Nor does
this sin belong to this particular man, except in so far as he has such
a nature, that is deprived of this good, which in the ordinary course
of things he would have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore
no further punishment is due to him, besides the privation of that end
to which the gift withdrawn destined him, which gift human nature is
unable of itself to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and
consequently the loss of this vision is the proper and only punishment
of original sin after death: because, if any other sensible punishment
were inflicted after death for original sin, a man would be punished
out of proportion to his guilt, for sensible punishment is inflicted
for that which is proper to the person, since a man undergoes sensible
punishment in so far as he suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt
did not result from an action of his own, even so neither should he be
punished by suffering himself, but only by losing that which his nature
was unable to obtain. On the other hand, those who are under sentence
for original sin will suffer no loss whatever in other kinds of
perfection and goodness which are consequent upon human nature by
virtue of its principles.
Reply to Objection 1: In the authority quoted punishment denotes, not
pain of sense, but only pain of loss, which is the privation of the
divine vision, even as in Scripture the word "fire" is often wont to
signify any kind of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Of all sins original sin is the least, because it
is the least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will of the
person, but only by the will of the origin of our nature. But actual
sin, even venial, is voluntary by the will of the person in which it
is; wherefore a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial
sin. Nor does it matter that original sin is incompatible with grace;
because privation of grace has the character, not of sin, but of
punishment, except in so far as it is voluntary: for which reason that
which is less voluntary is less sinful. Again it matters not that
actual venial sin is deserving of temporal punishment, since this is
accidental, for as much as he who falls venially has sufficient grace
to attenuate the punishment. For if venial sin were in a person without
grace, it would be punished eternally.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between pain of sense before
and after death, since before death the pain of sense results from the
power of the natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior as
fever or the like, or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after
death nothing will act by natural power, but only according to the
order of divine justice, whether the object of such action be the
separate soul, on which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or
the body after resurrection, since then all natural action will cease,
through the cessation of the first movable which is the cause of all
bodily movement and alteration.
Reply to Objection 4: Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure,
which is in the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual
concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no pleasure. Hence,
sensible pain does not correspond thereto as punishment.
Reply to Objection 5: The bodies of children will be impassible, not
through their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the
lack of an external agent to act upon them: because, after the
resurrection, no body will act on another, least of all so as to induce
corruption by the action of nature, but there will only be action to
the effect of punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore
those bodies to which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will
not suffer punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will
be impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering;
hence impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.
Art. 2 - Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state in which they are?
edit
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in question suffer spiritual
affliction on account of the state wherein they are, because as
Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Matth.), the punishment of God in that
they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their
being burned in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing
God. Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.
Objection 2: Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one
wishes to have. But these souls would wish to have the divine vision,
else their will would be actually perverse. Therefore since they are
deprived of it, seemingly they also suffer.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that they do not suffer, because
they know that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on
the contrary: Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain
of punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is
disinherited or deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore
these souls likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through no
fault of theirs, suffer none the less.
Objection 4: Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit
of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But
baptized children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of
Christ's merit. Therefore the unbaptized suffer pain through being
deprived of eternal life on account of Adam's demerit.
Objection 5: Further, separation from what we love cannot be without
pain. But these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for
that very reason will love Him naturally. Therefore since they are
separated from Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this
separation without pain.
On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after
death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment.
If for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin,
their sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the
damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have
the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the
mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is [*See A[1], "On the
contrary"]. If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it
follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their
will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus would be actually
inordinate, which is not to be granted. Therefore they will feel no
sorrow.
Further, right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of
what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv, and De
ira ii, 6) that "a wise man is not disturbed." Now in these children
there is right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will
not be disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which they could
nowise avoid.
I answer that, on this question there are three opinions. Some say that
these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so
much in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have
lost. It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily
burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to
explore, and many more besides. Hence others say that they have perfect
knowledge of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that
they are deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow
on this account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as
it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are
condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow
cannot be little for the loss of so great a good, especially without
the hope of recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the
mildest. Moreover the very same reason that impugns their being
punished with pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues
against their feeling sorrow within, because the pain of punishment
corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original sin is
void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain. Consequently
others say that they will know perfectly things subject to natural
knowledge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal life
and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge
will not cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we must
explore.
Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason
one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one's
power to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one
is capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to
fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since
these things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked
that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man
who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because
he can prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life [*Cf.
[5183]FS, Q[109], AA[5],6]; so that if he fail in this, his grief will
be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess. But
children were never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was
this due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it
surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of
their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence they will nowise
grieve for being deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they
rejoice for that they will have a large share of God's goodness and
their own natural perfections. Nor can it be said that they were
adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by
the actions of others around them, since they could be baptized by
others, like other children of the same condition who have been
baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace
that one should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Wherefore the
lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die without
Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of
the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.
Reply to Objection 1: In those who, having the use of free-will, are
damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but
not in children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity
between the two.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the will may be directed both to the
possible and to the impossible as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, an ordinate
and complete will is only of things which in some way are proportionate
to our capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but
not if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should
be called "velleity" [*Cf. [5184]FS, Q[13], A[5], ad 1; [5185]TP,
Q[21], A[4]] rather than "will"; for one does not will such things
absolutely, but one would if they were possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or
bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at
their loss, whether this be through his own or another's fault: hence
it is clear that the argument is not based on a true comparison.
Reply to Objection 4: The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as
stated in Rom. 5:15, seqq. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized
children have as much of evil as the baptized have of good.
Reply to Objection 5: Although unbaptized children are separated from
God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from
Him: in fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods,
and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge
and love.
Retrieved from "
Hidden category:
Subpages
Summa Theologiae/Appendix/Question 1
Add topic