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세계경제 포커스
베트남 사회경제개발계획 조정의 의미와 한국-베트남 경제협력에 주는 시사점
▶ 베트남은 2026년 1월 개최된 제14차 전국대표대회(이하 제14차 당대회)를 기점으로 국가 발전의 근본적인 패러다임을 재편하는 ‘민족도약의 시대(Kỷ nguyên vươn mình của dân tộc)’로의 진입을 공식 선포
- 제14차 당대회의 핵심 의제는 이러한 구조적 한계를 돌파하기 위해 과학기술, 혁신, 디지털 전환을 국가 성장의 새로운 핵심 동력으로 설정하고 고부가가치 산업 경제로의 이행을 공식화
。2026년 1월 당대회에서 조정되고 4월 또럼 총비서가 최종 승인한 「사회경제발전계획(SEDP) 2026-2030」은 양적 성장의 목표치(연평균 10% 성장)를 극대화함과 동시에 질적 고도화(총요소생산성 기여도 55% 이상)에 대한 로드맵을 제시
곽성일
2026-04-21
제14차 당대회,
사회경제개발계획(SEDP) 2026-2030,
총요소생산성(TFP)
오늘의 세계경제
2026년 양회를 통해 본 중국의 경제정책 방향과 시사점
▶ 2026년은 ‘15차 5개년 규획(2026~2030)’(이하 ‘15.5 규획’)의 출발 원년으로, 이번 양회에서는 2035년 사회주의 강국 건설 목표 달성을 위한 가교(bridging) 계획인 ‘제15차 5개년 규획’이 심의·확정됨.

▶ 15.5 규획을 기반으로 중국은 경제의 질적 성장을 본격화할 계획으로, 2026년 중국정부가 제시한 4.5~5%의 경제 목표성장률은 질적 성장을 위한 중저속 안정 성장 체제를 구축하기 위한 포석임.
문지영 , 정지현 , 오종혁 , 이한나 , 조고운
중국 경제정책,
15차 5개년 규획,
2026년 중국 정부업무보고,
양회
2026-04-17
KIEP 기초자료
미국 휴머노이드 로봇 산업 및 정책 동향과 시사점
▶ 인공지능(AI)과 로봇이 결합한 ‘휴머노이드 로봇’은 ‘피지컬(Physical)’ AI를 구현할 차세대 기술로 주목받고 있음.
- 글로벌 휴머노이드 로봇 시장은 2024년 20.2억 달러에서 2030년 152.6억 달러로 39.2%의 연평균 성장률(CAGR)을 기록할 것으로 전망됨.
- 휴머노이드 로봇 산업 생태계는 부품 공급망, 로봇 제조사, AI 소프트웨어 개발자, 시스템 통합자, 제조ㆍ물류 산업 등이 상호 유기적으로 연결된 구조로 형성되어 있음.
김종혁
미국,
휴머노이드 로봇,
피지컬 AI,
미중 경쟁,
제네시스 미션,
인공지능 국가정책 프레임워크
2026-04-15
오늘의 세계경제
경제 환경 불확실성에 대한 기업 인식 설문조사 및 시사점
▶ 경제 환경을 GDP, 매출액, 수출액 성장률의 전망과 불확실성 기준으로 측정한 결과, 조사 기업은 GDP 성장률 전망은 기댓값 기준 약 1.79%로, 불확실성은 표준편차 기준 약 0.53%p로 인식함.
- 수출기업은 내수기업보다 GDP 성장률을 더 높게 전망하는 동시에 불확실성도 더 크게 인식함.
- 기업이 인식하는 불확실성은 GDP보다 매출액, 매출액보다 수출액 성장률에서 더 크게 나타남.
이재필
불확실성,
경영전략,
한미 관세 협상,
CPTPP
2026-04-13
KIEP 포커스
트럼프2기
더보기
글로벌 관세장벽 확산의 경제적 영향과 시사점
▶ 미국발 관세장벽의 글로벌 확산 추세
- 국제 관세 질서가 WTO가 주도하는 기존의 ‘규범 중심’에서 일방주의와 ‘힘 중심’으로 재편되고, 관세는 단순 무역 보호 차원을 넘어 마약 관리, 국제수지 개선, 대외 투자 유치 및 자국 산업 육성 재원 마련을 위한 수단이 됨.
- 트럼프 2기는 규범 내 예외 조항을 쓰던 1기나 바이든과 달리, IEEPA(국제긴급경제권한법) 등을 통해 보편ㆍ상호관세로 압박 수위를 높임.
- 주요국들은 국제 공조와 보복 관세, 투자-면세 패키지 딜, FTA 네트워크 등으로 대응

▶ 미국발 관세장벽 확산의 사후적 영향
- 미국 수입시장에서 중국 비중 감소, EU, 멕시코 등 주요국 비중 증가, 중국 수출시장에서 미국 비중 감소, 베트남, 인도 등의 비중 증가 / 한국 수출시장에서 중국 비중 감소, 미국 비중 증가, 한국 수입시장에서 미국, 중국 비중 증가
- 미국의 대중 관세는 중국 수출에 통계적으로 유의한 감소 효과, 제3국(40개국 전체)의 경우 국별 이질성 등으로 인해 대미 수출의 양(+)의 증가 효과는 뚜렷하지 않음.
- 한국의 경우 자본재와 소비재를 중심으로 일부 양(+)의 간접효과

▶ 글로벌 관세장벽 확산의 사전적 영향
- 동적 일반균형 무역 모형의 시나리오 분석에 의하면 관세로 인해 단기에 큰 가격 상승과 무역 위축을 유발하고, 장기에는 공급자 전환이 점진적으로 진행되어 그 충격이 완화되지만 무역과 실질임금의 손실은 상당 부분 잔존함을 확인
- 미국은 광범위한 IEEPA 및 232조 관세로 인해 산업별로 가격이 3~33% 이상 상승하고, 그 결과 실질임금이 장기적으로 하락 / 중국의 경우 대미 수출이 크게 감소하나 제3국으로의 수출 전환과 우회 효과로 총수출의 감소는 제한적으로 나타나며, 내수 물가 하락과 명목임금 감소가 겹치면서 후생은 감소 / 한국은 대미 수출 감소와 후생의 하락이 나타나나, 관세 협상 타결로 인해 영향이 일정 부분 완화

▶ 대응 방향
- 한국 수출의 ‘이중 리스크’ 관리
- 품목ㆍ조치별 표적 대응과 예외 조항의 전략적 활용
- 우회수출에 따른 추가 피해 최소화
- 국내 피해기업 지원 확대
- 산업정책–통상정책의 유기적 연계
2026-04-24
미국 휴머노이드 로봇 산업 및 정책 동향과 시사점
▶ 인공지능(AI)과 로봇이 결합한 ‘휴머노이드 로봇’은 ‘피지컬(Physical)’ AI를 구현할 차세대 기술로 주목받고 있음.
- 글로벌 휴머노이드 로봇 시장은 2024년 20.2억 달러에서 2030년 152.6억 달러로 39.2%의 연평균 성장률(CAGR)을 기록할 것으로 전망됨.
- 휴머노이드 로봇 산업 생태계는 부품 공급망, 로봇 제조사, AI 소프트웨어 개발자, 시스템 통합자, 제조ㆍ물류 산업 등이 상호 유기적으로 연결된 구조로 형성되어 있음.
- 미국에서는 연구, 우주 탐사, 돌봄, 엔터테인먼트 분야에서의 휴머노이드 로봇 수요 증가가 시장 성장을 견인할 것으로 전망됨.

▶ 미국은 AI 반도체·알고리즘·플랫폼에서, 중국은 하드웨어·제조 인프라에서 각각 강점을 보유하며 기술·표준·시장 주도권 확보를 위해 경쟁 중에 있음.
- 미국의 반도체 기술은 세계 최고 수준이며, AI 모델 개발도 중국에 비해 6개월 이상 앞선 것으로 평가됨.
- 중국은 휴머노이드 로봇 부품의 글로벌 핵심 기업 63%를 확보하고 있으며, 2025년 인도된 휴머노이드 로봇의 87%를 생산함.
- AI, 휴머노이드 로봇과 같은 새로운 기술에 대한 신뢰도는 기술 채택 속도, 범위를 결정하는 데 중요한 역할을 하는데, 중국(87%)은 미국(32%), 영국(36%), 독일(39%)에 비해 신뢰도가 높게 나타남.

▶ 트럼프 2기 행정부는 인공지능(AI)에 이어 휴머노이드 로봇을 차세대 성장 동력으로 설정하고, 제조업 온쇼어링 및 기술 패권 확보를 추진하고 있음.
- 트럼프 2기 행정부의 휴머노이드 로봇 관련 정책은 크게 인공지능(AI) 및 첨단 기술 지원, 연구개발ㆍ상업화ㆍ실용화를 위한 규제 완화, 대중국 기술 견제, 산업 주도권 강화에 초점을 맞추고 있음.
- 2025년 1월 23일 미국의 AI 주도권 확보 방안 마련을 위한 행정명령을 발표하였으며, 이후 Action Plan(7.23.), 3가지 후속 행정명령(7.23.), 제네시스 미션(일명 AI 맨해튼 프로젝트, 11.24.), 인공지능 국가정책 프레임워크(12.11.) 발표
- 로봇산업 발전 가속화를 위해 2026년 중 이와 관련된 행정명령 발표를 검토(2025년 12월)

▶ 미국 휴머노이드 로봇 산업의 현황, 정책, 주요 이슈 등을 종합적으로 분석하여, 기술 및 산업 생태계 변화에 선제적으로 대응하고 관련 분야의 경쟁력 제고를 위해 노력할 필요가 있음.
- 한국은 가전·자동차·배터리 제조 강점을 활용한 피지컬 AI 생태계 구축과 K-휴머노이드 연합 지원 강화를 통해 글로벌 공급망에서 위치를 확보하는 것이 중요함.
2026-04-15
경제안보
더보기
2026년 미-일 정상회담 결과와 시사점
▶ 트럼프 2기 행정부 출범 이후 미국과 일본의 세 번째 정상회담이 2026년 3월 19일 미국 백악관에서 개최됨.

▶ 2025년에 미국과 일본이 가진 기존 두 차례의 정상회담과 비교해 보면 △ 대미 투자, △ 핵심광물, △과학기술 관련된 의제가 더욱 구체화되고 있다고 평가할 수 있음.
- [대미 투자] 이번 미-일 정상회담에서 발표된 일본의 제2차 대미 투자 계획은 미국의 원자력 및 천연가스 발전시설 건설에 최대 730억 달러를 투입하는 것을 골자로 하며, 이는 에너지 공급 안정화를 우선시하는 미국과 에너지 공급선 다변화를 추구하는 일본의 상호 이해관계가 절충된 형태라고 볼 수 있음.
- [핵심광물] 미-일 양국은 △ 핵심광물 공급망 회복력을 위한 미-일 액션플랜, △ 미-일 핵심광물 프로젝트 협력에 관한 공동 팩트시트, △ 미국 상무부-일본 경제산업성 간 심해 광물자원 개발에 관한 협력각서(MoC) 등 세 건의 문서를 발표함.
- [과학기술] 2025년 10월 정상회담에서 체결된 미-일 기술 번영 양해각서 체결 이후 AI 기반 혁신, 고성능 컴퓨팅·양자기술, 우주, 바이오 분야에 대한 협력 추진이 확인됨.

▶ 반면, 경제안보 조치를 통한 대중국 견제에 대한 언급은 과거 정상회담에 비해 덜 명시적으로 드러나며, 방위·안보 관련 문제도 기존 정상회담 수준을 유지한다고 볼 수 있음.
- [경제안보 조치] 트럼프 2기 행정부에서 열린 첫 번째 미-일 정상회담(2025. 2. 7.)에서는 수출통제를 명시적으로 언급하면서 포괄적인 핵심 및 민감 기술에 대한 보호 조치 공조의 필요성을 강조했으나 이번 정상회담의 경우 투자 보안에 대한 협력을 지속하며 일본이 인바운드 투자규제를 강화하겠다는 언급만 있음.
- [방위·안보] 미-이란 전쟁 직후 열린 이번 미-일 정상회담에서는 인도·태평양 지역에 다소 초점이 맞춰진 일본의 방위 및 안보 관여 의지를 재확인할 수 있었음.

▶ 우리나라는 일본의 사례를 참고해 대미 투자 프로젝트를 선별하고, 한-미-일 공동 프로젝트를 고려하며, 정상회담에서 미-일 간 협력이 점차 진전되는 양상을 참고해 대미 협력 방향을 수립할 필요가 있음.
- 트럼프 2기 행정부에서 개최된 미-일 정상회담은 이전 바이든 행정부에서의 한-미-일 정상회담과 달리 경제적 차원의 한-미-일 협력을 논의하지 않지만, 한-일 협력이 가능한 분야에서 상호 전략적 대미 투자를 연계하여 공급망 결핍 부분을 보완하거나 규모의 경제 기회를 모색해 볼 수 있음.
2026-04-03
EU 산업가속화법(IAA)의 주요 내용과 시사점
▶ EU 집행위원회는 「산업가속화법(IAA: Industrial Accelerator Act)」 초안을 발표(2026년 3월), EU 역내 제조역량 강화를 위한 일련의 조치를 통해 EU 산업 경쟁력 제고를 추진함.
- 동 법 추진 배경에는 전략산업(에너지 집약산업, 자동차 및 기후중립 기술 산업)의 EU 역내 제조역량 약화, 특정국에 대한 높은 의존도, 장기적으로 경제안보에서 EU의 주권 확보 필요성 등이 있음.

▶ [유럽산 개념 도입] 유럽 내 전략산업(에너지 집약 산업, 자동차 및 기후중립 기술의 경우)의 가치사슬 강화 차원에서 공공조달(public procurement) 및 공공지원(public intervention) 참여 시 EU 역내 원산지 요건(‘Made in Europe’)을 준수하도록 함.

▶ [신흥 전략산업 분야 외국인투자 사전심사 도입] 투자 금액 1억 유로 초과 및 외국인 투자자의 국적국이 해당 분야 글로벌 제조역량의 40% 이상을 보유한 경우 외국인 직접투자(FDI)에 대해 사전 승인 의무 부과
- 투자 심사기관은 6개 부가가치 창출 요건(고용, 지배구조, 협력형태, 기술이전, R&D 투자, 공급망) 중 필수 요건인 고용을 포함해 4개 이상 요건을 충족하는 외국인 직접투자에 한해 승인

▶ [인허가 간소화 및 특별지역 지정] 신규 투자 및 탈탄소화 촉진을 위해 회원국 내 하나 이상의 산업제조 가속화지역(Industrial Manufacturing Acceleration Area, 일명 ‘Accelerator zone’)을 지정
- 산업제조 가속화지역은 전략산업 부문 프로젝트 허가, 인프라 연결, 환경영향평가 등에서 혜택을 제공함.

▶ [전망] 「EU 산업가속화법」은 법안 제안 이전에 회원국 간 그리고 산업계 내부 이견으로 인해 당초 계획보다 지연되어 발표된 만큼 최종 법안 채택 논의 과정에서 주요 요건을 중심으로 변경될 가능성을 배제할 수 없음.

▶ [시사점] 유럽산 요건 강화 및 외국인투자 사전심사 제도 도입에도 불구하고 「EU 산업가속화법」에서 규정하고 있는 전략산업에 속한 한국 기업에는 위기이자 기회로 작용할 가능성이 높은 만큼 정부 간, 기업 간 대EU 아웃리치를 강화할 필요가 있음.
2026-04-03
KIEP Opinion
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From Aid to Trade: Rethinking Korea’s Development Cooperation through Energy Infrastructure
Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) policy appears to be entering a period of strategic reassessment. With the recent reductions to the total budget allocated toward ODA, policy directions are increasingly emphasizing the efficiency of outcomes serving Korea’s national interest as well as global development agendas. This shift in policy agenda comes at a time of growing uncertainty in global value chains and increasing fragmentation of the trade system. In such an environment, renewed attention on the role of development cooperation in supporting trade competitiveness and economic resilience has been emerging.Among the various strategies for assisting development in partner countries, energy infrastructure ODA seems to offer a coherent and strategic way to align Korea’s development cooperation with its policy objectives, particularly when explicitly framed as Aid for Trade (AfT). Energy infrastructure is not merely a development input but a foundational determinant of productivity growth in developing economies. Supporting such infrastructure could therefore help strengthen partner countries’ production and export capacity while also creating conditions that may foster deeper trade relationships with Korea over time.For decades, trade policy and development assistance have been treated as separate domains. Trade negotiators focus on tariffs, market access, and regulatory barriers while development agencies build roads, schools, and power plants. However, in practice, the ability to trade depends less on formal market access than on whether firms can reliably produce, transport, and deliver goods and services. Among the many constraints facing developing countries, unreliable energy supply stands out as one of the most binding. This is an area where Korea possesses both experience and technological capabilities.Going back to the fundamental objective of Aid for Trade (AfT), which seeks to align to the goals of both donors and partner countries through trade, energy infrastructure emerges as a particularly relevant area of cooperation. Assistance in this sector may strengthen partner countries’ export capacity while potentially advancing Korea’s longer-term trade interests by diversifying the risks of associated with its energy sources. In addition, deeper engagement in energy-related development projects could contribute to broader economic partnerships that extend beyond aid itself. Energy as a binding constraint on tradeOne of the key aspects to consider when designing an effective development cooperation is identifying the bottlenecks of economic growth and building a consensus between partners that addressing those constraints is mutually beneficial. In many developing economies, inadequate and unreliable energy supply represents precisely such a bottleneck. A growing body of empirical research suggests that unreliable and expensive electricity supply significantly suppresses firm productivity, export participation, and integration into global value chains. Firm-level studies consistently show that power outages reduce output, increase unit costs, and discourage firms from entering export markets.World Bank enterprise surveys show that firms experiencing frequent power outages exhibit significantly lower productivity and export intensity than otherwise similar firms with reliable electricity. In low-income countries, electricity disruptions are often ranked above inadequate access to finance as a constraint to doing business. These micro-level distortions accumulate into macro-level trade underperformance. Cross-country evidence suggests that countries with weak electricity infrastructure tend to export fewer manufactured goods, remain concentrated in low-value primary products, and struggle to attract foreign direct investment. Even when tariffs are low and trade agreements are in place, firms cannot exploit market access if they cannot power factories, logistics networks, or digital services.In this sense, energy infrastructure is not peripheral to trade for the partnering countries, it is a prerequisite for it.Strategic economic benefits for KoreaFrom Korea’s perspective, energy infrastructure ODA as Aid for Trade is not solely an altruistic endeavor. It may also generate a range of indirect economic benefits for Korea.First, energy infrastructure stimulates demand for Korean capital goods and engineering services. Power plants, grids, and energy management systems rely on imported equipment and technical expertise. When projects are well-designed, they create long-term commercial linkages rather than one-off construction contracts. Otsubo (2014) finds that, in the case of Japan, the most direct response was seen in the rise of imports in machinery and parts required to meet Japanese technical specifications for intrastructure development in recipient countries.Second, Aid for Trade type projects may reduce entry risks for Korean firms in partnering markets. Empirical studies show that firms from donor countries are more likely to export to and invest in aid-recipient countries when aid targets productive infrastructure rather than consumption-oriented spending. Hühne, Meyer, and Nunnenkamp (2014) found, using a gravity model, that imports from the donor country increase as a result of infrastructure building assistance.Third, cooperation in energy infrastructure development could support broader economic partnerships with resource-rich partnering countries. As one of the top energy consumers in the world, Korea relies on imports to meet almost all of its energy needs due to limited domestic sources. While development cooperation does not directly guarantee access to energy supplies, stronger economic engagement with resource-rich partner countries may, over time, contribute to more diversified and resilient energy relationships.These dynamics suggest that early and well-targeted investments in energy infrastructure ODA could increase the likelihood of mutually beneficial outcomes for both recipient countries and donors.Korea’s comparative advantage in energy infrastructureKorea’s own development experience lends credibility to engagement in energy infrastructure development. The country’s rapid industrialization during the 1970s and 1980s was supported by large-scale investments in electricity generation, transmission networks, and industrial energy management. Today, Korean firms are globally competitive in power plant construction, grid systems, energy efficiency technologies, and increasingly in renewables, hydrogen, and smart energy solutions.This background suggests that energy infrastructure may represent a domain in which Korea’s development cooperation aligns well with the objectives of Aid for Trade. Compared with donors that primarily emphasize budget support or institutional reform, Korea may be particularly well positioned to deliver technology-intensive infrastructure projects that directly lower production costs and improve trade competitiveness in partner countries.However, as illustrated in Figure 1 below, Korea currently ranks 8th among DAC donors in energy-sector ODA, contributing roughly USD 1.44 billion (2.2 percent) between 2015 and 2024. This places Korea well behind major donors such as Germany and Japan, suggesting significant room to expand its role. Given its comparative advantage in energy infrastructure, even a moderate increase in Korea’s engagement could have meaningful strategic and economic impact.Figure 1. Top 15 DAC Donors in Energy-Sector ODAIn contrast, for the periods in which data is available, Korea ranks 2nd in Other Official Flows (OOF), with roughly USD 1.53 billion, accounting for nearly 20 percent of total OOF in the sector. Building on the observed imbalance between ODA and OOF, a more fundamental issue emerges regarding Korea’s overall approach to development financing in the energy sector. The contrast between the two methods of assistance suggests not merely a difference in scale, but a lack of a fully integrated strategic framework that aligns concessional and non-concessional instruments toward common objectives. While Korea’s strong position in OOF indicates a high level of engagement in commercially viable infrastructure projects, its relatively limited use of ODA in the same sector raises questions about whether financing tools are being deployed in a manner that maximizes both development impact and long-term national interest.Figure 2. DAC Donors with OOF – AfT to Energy SectorA more integrated framework would therefore require systematic evaluation of which instruments are most effective under specific conditions, as well as stronger coordination across government agencies involved in development cooperation, export finance, and energy policy. Such an approach would allow Korea to move beyond a fragmented financing structure toward a strategically aligned model in which ODA and OOF jointly support both partner countries’ development needs and Korea’s broader economic and trade objectives.Why Aid for Trade matters as a framing deviceThe WTO’s Aid for Trade initiative aims to address supply-side constraints that prevent developing countries from benefiting from trade liberalization. Energy infrastructure fits well within this mandate. The Aid for Trade at a Glance report for 2024, published by the OECD and WTO, finds that aid targeted at economic infrastructure, including energy and transport, is more strongly associated with export growth than aid focused on social sectors alone. The study estimates that increases in infrastructure-related Aid for Trade are linked to higher exports, particularly in manufacturing and tradable services, when combined with complementary policies.By framing energy infrastructure projects within the Aid for Trade framework, Korea may be able to strengthen the economic rationale behind its development cooperation while linking projects more closely to measurable trade-related outcomes.Minyoung Song ✉️Ph.D., Associate Research Fellow Development Cooperation Policy Team
2026-04-15
World Economy Brief
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Japan’s Semiconductor Supply Chain Structure and Its Implications for South Korea
I. IntroductionAs the competition for technological supremacy between the United States and China has intensified since the 2020s, the Japanese government is also staking its future on the “revival” of its semiconductor industry by strengthening its supply chain. Japan’s global market share in semiconductor products peaked at around 50% in the 1980s but has since fallen to around 10% in the 2020s. It is now maintaining its presence in the so-called legacy semiconductor sector, which includes power semiconductors, microcontrollers (MCUs), and CMOS image sensors. In the semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials sector, which maintains a relatively high global market share, certain semiconductor materials—such as yellow phosphorus, helium, rare gases, and fluorite—are exposed to the risk of supply chain disruptions due to high import dependence on specific countries.This WEB paper analyzes the supply chain structure of Japan’s semiconductor industry and examines the government’s semiconductor industry policy from the perspective of strengthening supply chain resilience, with the aim of exploring future directions for cooperation between Japan and South Korea in the semiconductor industry. In the second section we analyze the input structure of Japan’s semiconductor industry using input-output analysis, while also assessing the import dependency of Japanese semiconductor products and materials to examine the supply chain structure of the industry. The third section provides an overview of the industrial policies the Japanese government has been pursuing since 2020 to revitalize the semiconductor industry, with a particular focus on the next-generation semiconductor project—the Rapidus 2-nanometer foundry. Section IV proposes a cooperation agenda between South Korea and Japan which involves: first, the sharing of supply chain information regarding export control, and joint procurement of semiconductor raw materials; and second, the joint development of semiconductor back-end packaging technologies and cooperation in the field of AI semiconductors.Ⅱ. The Structure of Japan's Semiconductor Supply Chain1. Analysis of the Input Structure of Japan's Semiconductor IndustryAccording to our analysis of Japan’s 2020 input-output (I-O) tables, among Japan’s semiconductor industries, the sector with the highest external dependency ratio is integrated circuits, and the intermediate goods for integrated circuits were found to have a very high external dependency ratio. Japan’s external dependency ratio for manufactured goods used in integrated circuit production reached 48.3%, while its ratios for intermediate goods used in integrated circuit and wafer production were calculated at 100.0% and 51.0%, respectively (see Table 1). Among the inputs for integrated circuit production, other non-ferrous metal ingots (29.5%) showed a relatively high level of external dependence; for semiconductor device production, other inorganic chemical products (28.6%) showed a relatively high level of external dependence; and for wafer production, other non-ferrous metal products (100%), other non-ferrous metal ingots (80.5%), and inorganic chemical products (26.9%) showed relatively high levels of external dependence. However, Japan shows low external dependency for certain materials used as intermediate inputs in semiconductor production, such as polishing agents, industrial plastic products, and glass processing products. In other words, the domestic production rate for other plastic products used as inputs in the production of integrated circuits and semiconductor devices is over 78%; moreover, the domestic production rate for abrasives, plastic films and sheets, and industrial plastic products reaches 99%. In 2020, South Korea’s dependence on Japan for primary plastic products—one of the top 10 intermediate inputs in the country’s integrated circuit production—reached 63%, while dependence on Japan for abrasives, another key intermediate input, stood at 58%. Table 1. Results of Input Structure Analysis of Japan's Semiconductor Industry (2020)2. Analysis of Japan's Import Dependency of Semiconductor Products and MaterialsAs of 2024, Japan remains highly dependent on Taiwan in terms of its country-specific import reliance for semiconductor products, evident in, for example, its import reliance on Taiwan for items such as “unimplemented processors and controllers (90%),” “other unimplemented integrated circuits (90%),” and “unpackaged DRM (93%)” (see Table 2). This shows that Japan relies on Taiwanese foundries such as TSMC and UMC for IC manufacturing. Japan’s reliance on imports from specific countries is particularly high for certain semiconductor materials, such as silicon carbide (89% from China), phosphoric acid and polyphosphoric acid (90% from China), fluorite (73% from China), hydrogen fluoride (97% from China), and yellow phosphorus (99% from Vietnam). According to Fuji Keizai (2025), Japanese imports of gallium (a raw material for GaN wafers) and tungsten oxide (a raw material for tungsten hexafluoride) are also highly dependent on specific countries, and cerium (a rare earth element, CE), which is one of the raw materials for CMP slurry, also faces a high risk of supply chain disruption.Table 2. Semiconductor Products and Raw Materials with ≥70% Import Dependency on Specific Countries (2024)Ⅲ. The Japanese Government's Semiconductor Strategy1. The Japanese Government's Semiconductor Industry PolicySince the enactment of the Economic Security Promotion Act in May 2022, the Japanese government has been implementing industry policies to strengthen the semiconductor supply chain and enhance industrial competitiveness. Based on this Act, the Japanese government’s industrial policy is characterized by designating semiconductors as “critical materials (national strategic materials)” and providing government subsidies to relevant companies. In December 2022, 11 items—including semiconductors, batteries, cloud services, permanent magnets, machine tools and industrial robots, aircraft parts and materials, critical minerals, liquefied natural gas, and ship parts—were designated as “critical materials,” and in March 2024, advanced electronic components (capacitors, high-frequency filters) and certain minerals (gallium, germanium, uranium) were added. In June 2023, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) revised the Semiconductor and Digital Industry Strategy launched in June 2021, and presented a three-phase semiconductor strategy aimed at expanding the size of Japan's domestic semiconductor market to approximately 15 trillion yen by 2030—a threefold increase from the 2020 level (approximately 5 trillion yen). The first phase involves strengthening existing legacy semiconductor production facilities, including TSMC’s Kumamoto plant; the second phase aims to begin mass production of advanced logic semiconductors at the Rapidus foundry by the late 2020s; and the third phase aims to commercialize future semiconductor technologies, such as optoelectronic convergence technology. In November 2024, METI announced a policy titled “Framework for Strengthening the AI and Semiconductor Industrial Base,” which can be regarded as the “Semiconductor Strategy 2025.” Under the goal of increasing total public and private investment in the semiconductor industry to 50 trillion yen by 2030, this plan calls for the government to allocate a total budget of 10 trillion yen to R&D, design and development, and manufacturing in the AI semiconductor sector. As shown in Table 3, the Japanese government’s semiconductor support programs implemented to date have focused on three areas: government subsidies, tax credits, and infrastructure development. However, these semiconductor industry policies appear to have failed to prioritize and focus effectively, as their scope of support is too broad—encompassing not only advanced logic and memory semiconductors but also legacy semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and materials and raw materials suppliers. Table 3. Japanese Government's Support Programs for Semiconductor Industry2. Challenges for RapidusThe Japanese government is currently placing its industrial policy’s top priority on the next-generation semiconductor project—the Rapidus 2-nanometer foundry—and the development of AI semiconductors. Just as the Japanese government refers to Rapidus as a “government-backed company,” it recognizes that operating a cutting-edge semiconductor foundry is difficult to achieve with private capital alone. Furthermore, based on past experience, it believes that Rapidus cannot produce advanced logic semiconductors on its own, and is therefore actively pursuing technical cooperation with U.S. and European semiconductor companies such as IBM and imec. In December 2022, Rapidus signed a strategic partnership agreement with IBM to acquire a license for 2-nanometer-generation GAA test chips. In April 2023, the company dispatched approximately 150 engineers to IBM’s R&D center in Albany, New York, to advance technical collaboration. In December 2022, it signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) with imec in Belgium, agreeing to dispatch engineers, establish an imec hub in Japan, and form a partnership with LSTC. A representative R&D support program among the Japanese government’s next-generation semiconductor projects is the project to develop front-end and back-end semiconductor manufacturing technologies, which utilizes NEDO’s “Post-5G Fund.” In the development of back-end semiconductor manufacturing technologies, Rapidus is focusing on 2.xD and 3D packaging technologies and is currently conducting collaborative projects with TSMC and Samsung Electronics in parallel with its own program. Rapidus is dedicating its full efforts to the development of ultra-low-power AI accelerators, AI server systems and control technologies, and ultra-low-power, high-density AI computing platforms and optimal operation technologies. Notable AI semiconductor technology development projects currently underway in Japan include the joint development of edge AI semiconductor technology by LSTC and the U.S.-based company Tensorrent; the development of cutting-edge automotive SoC technology by ASRA, a technology research consortium led by Toyota, Honda, and Nissan; the development of AI semiconductors for telecommunications by EdgeCortix; and the development of AI semiconductors for computing resources (MN-core) by Preferred Networks.Whether the Japanese government will achieve its goal of revitalizing the semiconductor industry depends on the success of Rapidus. The challenges Rapidus currently faces include securing sufficient private funding, mass-producing 2-nanometer-class semiconductors, acquiring customers, and recruiting talent. Notably, Japanese semiconductor companies have been reluctant to invest in Rapidus, citing the fact that Rapidus has yet to achieve tangible results in terms of technological development and customer acquisition, as well as the uncertain outlook for supply and demand of the advanced semiconductors Rapidus plans to mass-produce. The technical issues surrounding Rapidus’s mass production of 2-nanometer-class semiconductors can be summarized as a debate over the “short turnaround time (TAT)” that Rapidus is promoting as a key component of its advanced semiconductor foundry strategy. Rapidus emphasizes a strategy of providing end-to-end contract manufacturing services—from design through front-end and back-end processes to packaging—leveraging its short TAT technology. However, some observers point out that securing customers as a foundry is crucial for Rapidus’s “short TAT technology” strategy and small-volume production strategy to establish a viable and sustainable business model. In addition, Rapidus faces the following technical challenges: establishing manufacturing technology for the 2-nanometer process (introduction of GAA FETs), the introduction and stable operation of EUV lithography technology, smooth technical cooperation and technology transfer with overseas partners (IBM, imec), vulnerabilities in the domestic supply chain, improving semiconductor manufacturing yield, and developing advanced packaging and chiplet design.Ⅳ. Policy Implications for South KoreaFirst, as part of a joint response to the resurgence of “resource nationalism,” the governments of South Korea and Japan should explore ways to cooperate in the areas of sharing supply chain information regarding export control, and joint procurement of semiconductor raw materials. Semiconductor raw materials for which Japan has a high degree of supply dependence on specific countries include silicon carbide (China), phosphoric acid and polyphosphoric acid (China), fluorite (China), hydrogen fluoride (China), sulfuric acid (Vietnam), gallium (China) and cerium (China). Similarly, South Korea also exhibits very high dependence on specific countries for certain semiconductor raw materials, such as sulfuric acid, fluorite, rare gases, and tungsten.Second, with regard to next-generation semiconductor industry cooperation between South Korea and Japan, it is necessary to closely monitor policy trends of the Japanese government while focusing, for now, on joint development of back-end packaging technologies and cooperation in the field of AI semiconductors. While joint R&D investment between South Korean and Japanese companies in semiconductor back-end packaging technology is generating expectations—particularly Samsung Electronics’ collaboration with a Japanese semiconductor materials company—there is a need to expand this partnership to include a long-term collaboration with Rapidus. In November 2024, METI announced a policy titled “Framework for Strengthening the AI and Semiconductor Industrial Base,” pledging to enhance support for R&D, design & development, and manufacturing of AI semiconductors; the South Korean government needs to consider measures to promote industrial cooperation in Japan with Japanese companies in the AI semiconductor sector.
2026-04-13
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지식포탈(EMERiCs)
중국전문가포럼(CSF)
한미경제연구소(KEI)
EAER 영문학술지
APEC 연구센터 컨소시엄 사무국
KIEP 뉴스레터
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